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John Willem Smith
The Challenge of Sustainable Local Development at the 
site of the Tampakan Copper Project in the Philippines.
“Some may feel that by saying a blanket “No” to the issue of mining 
we have solved the problem. Others may feel that by saying a 
blanket "Yes” to mining, we have significantly addressed the 
economic concerns of the country. Both answers have the appeal of 
simplicity, but in fact they only reinforce our natural tendency to avoid 
dealing with the real problem.”- Pedro Walpole
"to be surprised by the prerequisites of capitalist development is not 
to have done one’s home work”- Herb Thompson.
"economic change is never just a matter of technological diffusion, 
market rationalisation or ‘capitalist penetration’. Deep down, it is also 
a matter of community, morality and power" - Robert Hefner.
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Abstract
This thesis concerns the welfare of communities hosting major 
mining projects in remote regions of the world, it is based upon 
analysis of ten recommendations made to mining companies by 
the World Bank in 1998. This was achieved through evaluation 
of five factors, each of which influences local mineral-driven 
development These factors are; the impact of violence upon 
local development, the implications of antecedent social 
practices for formal structures, political power in the creation of 
local institutions, understanding of the physical realities of 
mining, and equity within the local mineral-driven development 
apparatus. These factors were tested in the context of the 
Tampakan Copper Project operated by Western Mining 
Corporation, on the island of Mindanao, in the Philippines. 
Because violence and political power on one hand, and tradition 
and understanding on the other, are rooted in respectively 
national and local institutions, a dichotomous national-local 
methodology was devised. Research of ‘national’ factors such 
as the cause of conflicts in the region, and the legal rights of host 
communities for examples, were conducted through archival 
research and interviewing of key figures. Research of ‘local’ 
factors was achieved through the collation of various local data. 
Moreover, because there were five 'Tribal Councils’ within the 
vicinity of the proposed minesite, a comparative assessment of 
local factors was possible. A methodology for measurement of 
Council performance was designed, which provided a means for 
reinforcing findings, and thereby extending evaluation of the 
requirements of local mineral-driven development.
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Chapter One.
The challenge of local mineral-driven development
The popular view of the relationship between mining and development is that mining 
companies contribute to economies by availing governments of large quantities of cash 
that can benefit the country as a whole. This route to development is challenged by the 
economic context of third world countries - that is the leakage of resources from the 
process of economic multiplication due to bad laws, weak property rights, and the 
unenforceabiiity of contracts. At the national level growth may be limited by the 
vulnerability of state institutions to political patronage, and the return of capital investment 
overseas. For areas affected by mining, there is no automatic linkage between local 
economies and mining projects. Moreover, the recent history of mineral development 
indicates that there will be opposition to mining if host communities are left outside of 
project planning. Companies have therefore found it necessary to consider the welfare of 
local communities and have begun to seek means of providing local development This 
search for new ways to operate in the interests of both companies and local communities 
is the essence of this thesis.
1.1. Recent approaches to local mineral-driven development.
Familiarity with mining projects reveals that mining companies do not cany appropriate 
expertise to compensate host communities other than in financial terms. Writing on behalf 
of the industry, Allan Gelb suggests that responsibility for education, jobs, housing, eta, 
lies with the state [Gelb 1988]. Unfortunately, developing nation states are typically weak 
in remote regions and cannot be relied upon to provide such services. In the absence of 
appropriate development strategies, local environments and societies have been 
sacrificed in the interest of national economies. Persistent poverty among host 
communities at Ok Tedi in Papua New Guinea's Western province, despite decades of 
large scale mining, testify to this - see for example Howard [1991 ] or Wanek [1993].
Conversely, many companies have suffered prolonged stoppages due to local opposition. 
The mines operated by Freeport-McMoRan in Irian Jaya have been the scene of repeated 
protest by local Amungme communities. Indeed, at least until the deposition of President 
Suharto in 1998, the company had to rely upon the military to keep the mine open. 
Minesites in Papua New Guinea have also experienced problems. They include the 
Panguna copper mine on Bougainville island in North Solomons province, which shut in 
1990 [May and Spriggs 1990]. The Porgera and Lihir gold mines in Enga and New Ireland 
provinces respectively, have also been the scene of damaging conflicts.
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In the course of time, disputes at minesites and the painful losses to the minerals 
industry exacted by local opposition, have worked to shift attitudes toward host 
communities, promulgating debate of mining practices. The proceedings of the Berlin 
‘Round Table’ in 1991, the *Mining and Mineral Resource Policy Issues' conference at 
the Australian National University in 1995, and the 'Mining and the Community 
conference\ held at Madang in Papau New Guinea in 1998, exemplify this process. 
These proceedings reached a broad consensus over four key changes needed to 
produce locally compatible mineral-driven development
1. Broadening the scope of compensation.
Mining companies had tended to direct compensation at community leaders or 
landowners. Such people typically represent a small and very specific section of host 
communities. Compensation packages should for example, be aimed at women and 
landless families too.
2. Deepening participation bv communities.
The idea of participation by host communities in developmental initiatives also received 
support Managerial and executive responsibilities were to inculcate skills necessary for 
prosperity in a formal setting, particularly market institutions.
3. Creating partnerships between companies and communities.
Partnerships between companies, communities, and people’s organisations were 
considered to be important for sustainable development. They would facilitate the 
sharing of information, enabling mineral-driven development institutions and initiatives to 
be flexible and respond to changing situations more effectively. Indeed, solving 
problems without recourse to outside agencies would enhance trust and understanding 
between companies and communities.
4. Integrating responses to developmental dilemmas.
Companies were found to have focused upon environmental issues at the expense of 
social concerns. Realisation that many social and environmental issues at minesites 
were intimately connected, demanded a more comprehensive response.
These generally agreed principles were incorporated into the latest and perhaps most 
respected recommendations for better practices at minesites, within Wortd Bank 
Discussion Paper No 384, ‘Integrating Social Concerns into Private Sector 
Decisionmaking1 [McPhail and Davy 1998].
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World Bank Recommendations.
1. Adopt a policy on sodaI issues and develop capacity.
2. Identify stakeholders and acknowledge the legitimacy of their perspectives.
3. Identify social risks and opportunities.
4. Assess soda! and environmental impacts thoroughly: Integrate where 
appropriate.
5. Recognise public involvement as integral to project sustainability.
6. Delineate responsibilities for sodal provisions.
7. Aim for sodal equity in revenue distribution, compensation and other sodal 
investments.
8. Develop partnerships in support of sustainable development.
9. Develop mechanisms for long term representation of stakeholders.
10. Calculate the effectiveness of sodal investments.
[McPhail and Davy 1998:11-35],
Laid down in detail in section 2 . 1 these points represent a great deal of progress 
from the advent of large-scale mines in the 1960s, when host communities in 
developing countries commonly received tinned food, clothes, and tobacco, in 
exchange for mining rights. Nevertheless, one of the central themes of this thesis is 
that although they may be necessary, the recommendations are not enough. The 
concerns of the Berlin Roundtable and the World Bank, etal., will not prevent disputes 
occuring at minesites, nor ensure the sustainability of local development initiatives.
Moreover, the fact that the World Bank Discussion Paper bases itself upon 
contributions from a host of prominent mining companies is a cause for concern. As 
papers submitted to recent mining conferences indicate, ‘better' practices have been 
promulgated by threats to investments in remote regions, as much, if not more than by 
the needs of local people. This raises questions as to whether companies genuinely 
appreciate the position of host communities. Whether the harmonisation of relations 
between companies and communities means the same thing to the mining industry as 
sustainable local development, is unclear.
Drawing upon previous empirical experience in Southeast Asia, and subsequent study 
of the literatures discussed in Chapter Two, this thesis raises five limiting factors, vital 
to successful company - community relations, which are necessary for sustainable 
local development, but that are neglected by the World Bank recommendations.
These are the lack of respect for traditional structures in the design of new institutions, 
the impact of violence unrelated to mining, the fact that communities have insufficient 
power to consolidate development gains, ignorance of the realities of mining among 
host communities, and the lack of procedural equity for host communities within 
organisations tasked with promoting development in the vicinity of minesites.
11
1.2. An outline of the limiting factors.
Remote regions of developing countries are home to many traditional societies - from 
Arctic Aleut to African KhoiKhoi - whose lifeways and value systems differ from those 
upon which modem institutions are based. Experience of mineral development in 
Southeast Asia confirmed that many host regions are home to comparable societies. 
Thus it seemed logical to suppose that opposing values might undermine agreements 
between companies and communities. Indeed, institutional theorists such as Robert 
Bates [198111989), Jean Ensminger [1992}, and Elinor Ostrom [1990 /1993) suggest 
that any gap between the value systems of parties will have negative consequences for 
contractual outcomes. It is therefore hypothesised that traditional structures have 
important implications for local mineral-driven development strategies. While the World 
Bank recommendations state that communities should have a role within modem 
structures, they fail to acknowledge the possibility that developmental structures might 
need to be designed according to traditional concepts and value systems [McPhail and 
Davy 1998:13-4). Ignorance of the relationship between antecedent traditions among 
host communities, and the process of local mineral-driven development therefore 
constitutes the first limiting factor.
Perhaps the most obvious characteristic of remote regions in developing countries is 
that they are often violent Previous visits to the Philippines confirmed that Mindanao is 
no exception, and sporadic violence there has various causes. Furthermore, 
experience of minesites suggested that violence has a negative impact on development 
initiatives. One potential drawback of the World Bank recommendations therefore, is 
that they only take account of violence caused by actions of mining companies. The 
potential effect of violence from other sources is ignored. In regions like Mindanao, this 
may be a significant oversight
Following discussions with colleagues at the London School of Economics, this thesis 
turned to the Social Capital literature in order to analyse the relationship between 
violence and mineral-driven development Fundamental to this field are studies by 
James Coleman [1990) and Robert Putnam [1993 /  1995a /  1995b /  2000), who argue 
that social networks have value for societies. Deepa N a ray an and Lant Pritchet [1996] 
extend this, by demonstrating that networks within societies are important for economic 
development Furthermore, Jeremy Holland and Caroline Moser [1997) show that 
violence destroys social capital and capacity for development It is therefore 
hypothesised that external violence hinders the development efforts of even those 
mining companies that adhere to the new recommendations.
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Prior experience also indicated that a lack of power on the part of host communities vis- 
d-vis political and economic institutions, can undermine developmental initiatives. The 
World Bank Discussion Paper does not address the question of what power is held by 
host communities. Nevertheless, scholars such as James Putzel [1997] and John 
Harriss [1997] have demonstrated that there is an important connection between power 
and development Their work suggests that political and legal contexts must be 
considered in the implementation of mining projects. That is to say sustainable local 
development will depend upon the ability of communities to articulate themselves in a 
wider context - through dealings with markets and political institutions for example - 
which lie beyond the scope of the mine site.
The fourth factor is the low level of understanding of mining on the part of host 
communities, observed during earlier visits to the region. Whether it is possible for 
small, isolated, and traditional communities, with no prior experience of mining, to 
appreciate its implications was doubtful. Emile Durkheim [1915], Alfred Getl [1992], and 
Esteban Magannon [1972 /1984] stress the significance of traditional concepts of time, 
scale, and space, to local lifeways. It is therefore hypothesised that traditional 
communities will interpret mining contracts in different ways from those intended by 
companies. The subsequent potential for conflicts between companies and 
communities is supported by scholars such as Tim Flannery [1999] and Alexander 
Wanek [1996], who have found that despite considerable exposure to ‘forma? or 
‘modem’ institutions, host communities failed to analyse issues in such terms.
The final limiting factor is the degree of equity held by host communities in relation to the 
respective mining company, within the context of developmental structures - 'councils’, 
‘committees’, ‘associations’, etc. Case studies of disputes at ‘celebrated’ mines such as 
the Panguna mine on Bougainville island in Papua New Guinea, indicate that procedural 
equity on the part of host communities, within organisations established to administer 
development, is vital to avoiding a real [or imagined] local sense of disenfranchisement 
This extends beyond compensation, or indeed partnerships between companies and 
people’s organisations, and towards a position of power within institutions responsible 
for local development [Thompson 1990/Filer 1989/Quodling 1991]. Therefore, as well 
as the second hypothetical point about power vis-&-vis external relations, power is also 
considered to be important internally - within the bounds of a mining project.
1.3. The study area.
In order to test whether the limiting factors operate as hypothesised, it was necessary to 
select a mining project in which a company has attempted broadly to implement toe
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recommendations for better practices noted in section 1.1. Examples of appropriate 
conduct cited by the World Bank induded the management of oil revenues in the 
Casanare department of Colombia by British Petroleum, Chevron Niugini's Kutubu 
petroleum project in Papua New Giunea, the organisation of social and community 
concerns in the Torres Straits by Rio Tinto, Placer Dome’s gold mine at Las Cristinas in 
Venezuela, nickel mining and the San Isidro Foundation at Montelibano in Colombia by 
Cerro Matoso, Royal Dutch Shell’s gas project in the Inca region of Peru, and Western 
Mining Corporation's Tampakan Copper Project in the Philippines [McPhail and Davy 
1998:11-36].
Of these projects, Western Mining Corporation’s Tampakan Copper Project was selected - 
for which there were three reasons. Considering fieldwork, the first was pragmatism. 
Having already completed a Master’s dissertation on the subject of mineral-driven 
development across the border between Indonesia and Papua New Guinea, this 
researcher had experience of mining projects in Southeast Asia.
Secondly, Western Mining stood out because Chief Executive Officer Hugh Morgan had 
participated in the 1991 Berlin Round Table Conference, where mining companies 
addressed developmental dilemmas [Berlin Guidelines 1992]. Stephen Davis, Western 
Mining’s Group Geographer, had also been a member of the Steering Committee for tee 
1998 World Bank Discussion Paper [McPhail and Davy 1998:60], These facts underlined 
tee willingness of Western Mining to fulfil tee recommendations of the World Bank.
Third, in 1995, the administration of President Fidel Ramos [1992-98] passed the 
Philippine Mining Act [Republic Act 7942], offering a series of incentives to foreign 
investment These induded 100% equity in mining projects. According to tee terms of 
Financial or Technical Assistance Agreements [FTAAs], foreign companies were allowed 
to mine within an area of up to 81 000 hectares for a period of 25 to 50 years in exchange 
for a minimum investment of 50 million $US. This led to an immediate boom in the 
minerals sector of the Philippine economy, and 5, 874,238 hectares, or twenty percent of 
tee Philippines’ land area, being covered by FTAAs within a year [Leonen and Begonia 
1995]. Thus this research forms part of, and draws support from, commensurate concern 
for the realities of mineral development
Indeed, tee Philippines provide a comprehensive opportunity for study of problems at 
minesites. There is a dear social and economic disparity between regions such as 
Mindanao, and the site of mineral policy formulation in Manila. This gap can be expressed 
by tee following aspects of the area in which tee Tampakan Copper Project is located [see 
Map 2]. The Quezon mountains comprise steep terrain, and access is limited to narrow
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logging roads. The inhabitants sustain themselves by farming the mountainsides, which 
provides limited income. The area is also dose to a region of strong Islamic influence and 
adjacent to one of the last areas of Mao inspired New People’s Army activity, and is the 
scene of frequent dashes between insurgents and government forces. Challenges to 
development at the Tampakan site are therefore comparable with those of minesites 
where mineral drivervdevelopment dilemmas have emerged.
In accordance with the terms of its FTAA, Western Mining sought agreements with the 
three provinces - South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, and Davao del Sur- and their 
respective municipalities - Tampakan, Columbio, and Kiblawan, as well as the five 
Visayan Barangay Councils - the smallest sodo-politica! unit in the Philippines - that were 
affected. These were Pula Bato, Danlag and Tablu in Tampakan, Datal Blao in Columbio, 
and Kimlawis in Kiblawan. In return, all of these bodies were to receive payments from 
Western Mining.
As well as Visayans, the five barangays are also home to traditional B’laan communities 
who occupy the more remote areas in which actual mining was to take place. Western 
Mining obtained ‘Heads of Agreement with their leaders. These confer exdusive rights to 
explore in exchange for monthly payments. Because tribal leaders represented only 
informal leadership, Western Mining also sought stronger and more representative 
organisations for Tribal Prindpal Agreements. Commensurate with the arrival of the 
company, the Philippine government agency responsible for fulfilling the responsibilities of 
the state to traditional communities, the Office for Southern Cultural Communities, 
established Tribal Coundls in each barangay. These are Bong Mai, Folu Bato, Danlag, 
Salna’ong and S’banken. Each Coundl comprises a Chairman or Chieftain and ten to 
fifteen Coundl members, all of whom are elected by each community to represent their 
interests. Western Mining extended its monthly payments to provide salaries for, and 
cover the Operation and Administration costs of, each Coundl. The Tribal Coundls form 
the basis of the relationship between host communities, government and mining company 
[Western Mining Corporation 1997: 27-40].
PrindpalAgreementsweresignedbysuccessiveTribalCoundls. They committed the 
communities to mining for the duration of the Project - from exploration to rehabilitation. In 
exchange, the company made finandal commitments to compensation and local 
development On completion of the Prindpal Agreements, Foundation Boards were also 
established. These comprised representatives of B’laan communities, Western Mining, the 
Office of Southern Cultural Communities /  National Commission for indigenous Peoples, and
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the Mines and Geosciences Bureau. The purpose of the Foundations was to facilitate 
control of local development by the host communities through training and managerial 
assistance [Western Mining Corporation 1997:40].
The Western Mining approach was therefore significant for two major reasons. First it 
was comprehensive, potentially encompassing all aspects of community development 
and welfare. Second, it ostensibly involved the host communities in their own 
development and made their contribution central to decision-making. In light of such 
an institutional approach, the project appeared to represent a new generation of 
community development strategies at minesites in remote regions of developing 
countries.
1.4. The research process and thesis structure.
As has been noted, the ideas from which the factors hypothesised to obstruct mineral- 
driven development were derived, came from empirical experience at minesites in 
Southeast Asia during the four years preceding fieldwork in the Philippines. 
Relationships between supposed causes of disputes at minesites and local mineral- 
driven development, were variously assessed through consultation with colleagues 
within academia and experts at mining companies and beyond. Upon this basis, 
relevant literatures were consulted, from which it was established that five of the 
challenges facing local-mineral driven development - that is the influence of traditional 
structures, violence, powertessness, lack of understanding of mining, and the need for 
procedural equity - were worthy of analysis. In conjunction with this process, the 
causes of conflicts were observed, and the subsequently established limiting factors 
were compared with the recommendations of the World Bank, et. al. This attempt to 
match problems with supposed solutions revealed a shortfall, raising questions as to 
the capacity of the World Bank to address issues at minesites.
Fieldwork was conducted in the Philippines in 1999. A considerable portion of that 
year was spent in archival research in Manila - particularly at the Ateneo de Manila 
library in Quezon City. Regional libraries, in General Santos and Koronadal cities in 
Mindanao were also important lor analysis of social, political, cultural and indeed 
historical interpretations of events in Tampakan. Research of hypothetical factors 
depended on interviewing of players in the development arena - that is to say 
government officials, company executives, academics, or representatives of local 
organisations associated in one way or another with mineral development either in 
Manila or regional cities. Research also depended upon the gathering of data 
pertaining to the performance of individual Tribal Coundls. This was carried out within
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the affected communities themselves, and involved the recruitment of research 
assistants, the hire of a vehicle, and in some cases horses, in order to access the 
remotest parts of the area affected by the Tampakan Copper Project
Successive sections of Chapter Two discuss social capital, institutional, 
anthropological, developmental, and associated literatures, on the basis of which, the 
mechanics of the five factors hypothesised to obstruct local mineral-driven 
development are explained. In terms of data and the actors involved, these limiting 
factors fall into two groups - ‘national’ and ‘local’. Causes of violence in remote 
regions of developing countries that influence development via social capital, are 
frequently rooted in broad - indeed universally recognised - ideological differences, i.e. 
Marxist or sectarian struggles. Furthermore, institutions that determine the position of 
host communities within the prevalent political economy - and hence power, are rooted 
in legal structures and constitutional laws. These factors were therefore determined at 
the state or national level. Conversely, other factors, such as traditional structures and 
understanding of the implications of mining, lay within the domain of host communities, 
and were regarded as local.
This national - local dichotomy was reinforced by the fact that the community 
development program was being conducted in a quintuplicate manner - there being 
five different communities and five different Tribal Coundls. This made it possible to 
examine whether local limiting factors show up in a comparative analysis of relative 
Tribal Coundl performance, which was the focus of Chapter Six.
Chapter Three comprises a contextual evaluation of Tampakan and its environs for the 
purposes of the research project Assessment of circumstances at the site of the 
Tampakan Copper Project had to be undertaken before any spedfic methodological 
techniques could be implemented. That is because prevailing conditions in which the 
researcher would have to operate, and the nature of data available, had to be 
assessed. Such a contextual analysis also permitted assumptions about local-mineral 
development in the Philippines, as well as the Tampakan area and its inhabitants, to 
be tested.
Chapter Four comprises the methodology used to test how far the limiting factors 
would influence mineral-driven development at the site of the Tampakan Copper 
Project. The National - Local dichotomy necessitated a two-part design. One to
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assess the influence of hypothetical factors sourcing from outside of the Project 
boundaries, and another to function at the local level.
The national - local approach to research.
' Local N 
mineral-driven 
development 
v outcomes /
National Factors
• Violence
• Power
Development 
strategy of a 
mining company
Local Factors
• Understanding
• Traditional Structures
• Procedural Equity
Performance of 
individual development 
structures such as Tribal 
Councils I Foundations.
Hypothetical Factors
The diagram above maps out the research strategy. On the left side are the factors on which 
sustainable, locally based mineral-driven development was hypothesised to depend. Their 
influence over the developmental strategies adopted by mining companies in accordance 
with the recommendations of the World Bank et. al. had to be assessed. Where local factors 
were concerned, variations between communities offered a means of deepening the analysis 
through comparison with the performance of developmental structures. In order to do this, 
adherence to traditional lifeways for example, was to be assessed in each community. The 
performance of each Tribal Council - Foundation was also to be measured. The two patterns 
could then be compared for correlations that would explain the relationship between the local 
factors and development
Chapter Five focuses on those national factors, for which interviews with actors in the mineral 
development arena provided the basis for analysis. These figures included officials at 
agencies such as the Department of Environment and Natural Resources and the National 
Commission for Indigenous Peoples, tasked with representing the state in various aspects of 
its commitment to mineral development, following the disbandment of the Office for Southern 
Cultural Communities in 1996. Once again, this was important in order to assess the power 
of the host communities in terms of their ability to influence decisions affecting them. The 
Philippine National Police provided some of the data pertaining to criminal activity upon which 
the relationship between violence and development could be articulated. Development 
agencies, both domestic and foreign, assisted analysis of the potential impacts of road 
building, which was frequently debated as a means of improving opportunities for remote 
communities. Organisations opposed to mining development such as the Roman Catholic
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Diocese of Marbel, offered a means of cross-examining company statements and the actions 
of state agencies.
Chapter Six concerns the second part of the methodology, beginning with the performance 
of each Tribal Council. In orderto measure Coundl performance, appropriate indicators had 
to be found, at which point a choice presented itself. Measurement could have been directed 
at the Tribal Coundl - Foundation structure as a whole. However, this would have meant 
switching the focus of the research away from host communities and diluting measurement of 
the local contribution to institutional capacity. That is because, given their role within the 
Foundations, the dedsion-making of company executives would be induded in the subject. 
Indeed, representatives of B’laan communities constituted a minority on Foundation Boards. 
Foundations did not therefore provide for measurement of the performance, success, or 
otherwise, of host communities. Moreover, the comparative objective would have been 
weakened because Western Mining Foundation Board members - and indeed members from 
the Bureau of Mines and Geosdences, and the National Commission for Indigenous People, 
were the same individuals, pursuing the same polides. Incorporating their input would have 
masked variations and any pattern therein. Indeed, it would also have threatened the 
integrity of the research through the implidt indusion of company parameters for success. In 
addition to this, only four Tribal Coundls had signed the Prindpal Agreement with Western 
Mining, and one of those had done so very recently. Consequently, while three communities 
had partidpated in a Foundation Board, one had not and the other had minimal experience. 
Measurement of performance therefore focused on Tribal Coundls and the developmental 
capacity of host communities. A set of indicators was subsequently devised comprising data 
gathered from members of each Coundl, and an Index of Tribal Coundl Performance 
constructed. This was corroborated by a variety of sources external to the Tampakan 
Copper Project
Chapter Seven comprises a comparative exercise, examining those local factors 
hypothesised to obstruct mineral-driven development - traditional structures, understanding, 
and procedural equity - with patterns of Tribal Coundl performance identified by the Index of 
Tribal Coundl Performance. Both positive and negative correlations between the success of 
developmental institutions and variations in hypothetical factors, were apparent These 
patterns provided important lessons for local mineral-driven development, which are 
elaborated in the conduding chapter.
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Chapter Two.
Literature review.
Having encountered numerous disputes in the vicinity of minesites, and a range of 
problems within host communities apparently associated with mining projects, both 
through personal experience and case studies from the limited mineral-development 
literature, the process of PhD research began. Political, economic, developmental, and 
indeed geographic causes were discussed with people familiar with mining, experts 
within companies, governmental bodies and non-govemmental organisations, and 
elsewhere. Generic sources of conflicts, broadly relevant to mining projects anywhere in 
the developing world, were identified, and scrutinised with tutors and colleagues at the 
London School of Economics.
From this scrutiny, concepts that would serve to explain the mechanics of each of the 
limiting factors - that is to say the way in which they hindered mineral-driven 
development - were selected. Understanding of how [as well as establishing that] 
factors such as external violence for example, affect the developmental initiatives 
available to mining, would it was intended, pave the way to enlightening conclusions. 
Thus, findings of fieldwork on each of the limiting factors would potentially offer new 
recommendations to mining projects - in order that they might be able to react 
appropriately to factors apparently overlooked by the World Bank.
Review of relevant literature begins with the relationship between mining and local 
development The first section outlines the challenge of reconciling mining with 
developmental needs, and indeed of disputes at minesites, which have given rise to 
progressive recommendations for better practices. Various conceptual fields are 
subsequently examined for insights into the local mineral-driven development dilemma. 
Institutional analysts such as Douglass North [1981], Robert Bates [1989] and Jean 
Ensminger [1992] provide a means of assessing the consequences of traditional 
organisational structures tor formal institutions and vice-versa. Interpretations of social 
capital by James Coleman [1990] and Robert Putnam [1993], and criticisms thereof from 
John Harriss [1997] and James Putzel [1997], offer a basis tor evaluation of the impact 
of violence and the implications of power within the development process. 
Anthropological works by Alfred Gell [1992], and Esteban Magannon [1984], were 
reviewed in order to ascertain the significance of local perceptions of mining. Moreover, 
empirical work by Herb Thompson [1991], relating to developmental experience at 
minesites, provide a means to evaluate and qualify conceptual insights. Upon the basis
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of each of these literatures, factors limiting local mineral-driven development are 
articulated.
2.1. Problems posed by mining as a means of driving local development
Mining is generally assumed to contribute to local development like other forms of 
investment - through rents, compensation, infrastructure, and employment. Harvey 
PeriofF s model for the regional impact of investment in the United States explains how 
this should work. Pertoffs Multiplier Effect decrees that every sizable injection of new 
investment brings in its train a series of related economic effects. Their impact is 
encompassed within regional multipliers, such as increasing employment, household 
purchasing power, and induced investment in the host region. A sequence of ‘multiplier 
stages’, varying according to ties with markets, source of employees, and whether scale 
of multiplication affects diversification, dictate the character of economic growth sparked 
by a key industry [Perloff 1960:93]. Pertoffs Activity Interaction Potential expresses the 
prospects for broad economic take-off finom a specific industry within the region in 
question [Ibid: 94].
This process of multiplication is not likely to be true for most regions of developing 
countries that play host to large-scale mining projects, and for a number of reasons.
First, the location of a mine depends entirely upon the orebody. Proximity to other 
industries, transport nodes, markets, population centres, etc., are coincidental. Mining 
therefore defies the need for spatial integration, which Baldwin [1956] and Hirschman 
[1977] have each demonstrated to be crucial to economic take-off. Electronic assembly, 
garment manufacture, and service industries can be located in urban business parks 
and specialist centres, in order to best address the combined demands of corporate 
profit margins and for local employment Mines on the other hand, are generally remote 
from the metropole, in areas where political and economic institutions are weakest.
Second, open-cut mining projects are capital rather than labour intensive. Developing 
economies are on the other hand characterised by a surplus of labour and a shortage of 
capital, a point which is particularly true of remote regions. When compared with other 
industries, the costs incurred by large-scale mining are vast in relation to the level of 
employment provided. Machinery required for operating a mine must be bought and 
maintained from outside the area rather than sourced locally. Complex tasks such as 
feasibility studies, exploration, drilling and engineering, are managed by imported 
expertise. The local labour required for construction of roads and facilities is needed 
only on a short term contractual basis. One feasibility study, cited by Richard Auty, on
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bauxite deposits conducted in Latin America in 1980, estimated that a $300 million mine 
would spawn a settlement totalling no more than 4000 people [Alusuisse 1990].
Third, mine life is cyclical, comprising three stages - exploration, construction and 
operation [Godoy 1985]. Roif Gerritsen and Martha Macintyre explain how these stages 
affect the capacity of companies and shape mineral economies [Gerritsen and Mcintyre 
1991]. They argue that the source of the capital used in a mining project, plus the 
temporal imperatives associated with the project’s cash flows, vitally shape the 
implementation and public policy management of mining projects;
The 'capital logic’ of a mining project is moulded by financial flows. The 
source of the money, the timing of repayment of loans, the need to make a 
profit, all force a characteristically legalistic’ regime
[Gerritsen and Mcintyre 1991, quoted in Gerritsen 1995]
During exploration, costs are therefore moderate, taxation minimal, and revenues nil. in 
the event of construction, costs rise dramatically, and taxes pick up. At the operational 
stage, costs drop with the repayment of loans, revenues flow in - assuming that metal 
prices meet anticipated targets, but taxation remains high. It should also be noted that 
taxation revenue normally goes to national coffers, representing a major leakage from 
the affected area.
The cyclical nature of mine life affects host communities through subsequent 
inconsistencies in economic opportunities. Contractual agreements are established 
during exploration when communities are attempting to acclimatise to the prospect of 
mining. Most opportunities for host communities present themselves during the 
construction phase, when local labour and services are in greatest demand. Once 
construction ends, employment drops and businesses depending upon incomes from 
the mine may struggle to survive.
A final point is that minerals are finite. Presuming that a mining project reaches the 
operational stage, as reserves are exhausted, extraction slows and with it the flow of 
royalties. If sustainable enterprises have not been effected by such time, then the 
contribution of mining to local development is likely to be negligible [Gerritsen 1995}.
These factors combine to isolate mining projects from host communities and local 
economies. This in turn denies communities investment in health, education and other 
important services. Mining 'enclaves’ express the contrast between the wealth, 
modernity, and scale of mining facilities, and the poverty of host communities. Enclaves
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exist in varying strengths - sometimes barely apparent, sometimes acute. Means for 
measuring enclaves have yet to be established, but their existence is widely 
acknowledged - see for example Richard Auty [1990:12-14] and Micheal Howard 
[1991]. Jonathan Rigg notes the spatial coincidence of immense wealth set against 
stubborn poverty at the site of the Freeport-McMoRan mine nearTembagapura in Irian 
Jaya [Rigg 1997:94]. Tim Flannery elaborates, describing Tembagapura as luxurious 
by Melanesian standards, with a bank, specialist shops, bars, and restaurants. Local 
Amungme people were excluded from the town by a vigorous security force [Flannery 
1998:266]. At Timika airport, built to service Freeport, there was a Sheraton hotel. The 
village of Kwamki Lama, created for displaced Amungme, lay one kilometre away. In 
1995 nearly a hundred people living there died of cholera [Ibid: 274-5].
Divisions resulting from mining investment such as those at Tembagapura represent a 
danger to companies where communities respond by attacking mines. Three days of 
rioting by Amungme people in March 1996 testify to this. Freeport facilities were 
ransacked and both the Tembagapura mine and Timika airport were forced to dose. 
Protesters subsequently presented Chief Executive Officer James Moffet with a list of 
demands, including jobs for local people, rights of control over what happens on their 
land, and the dismantling of the Freeport security force [Ballard 1995 /  Press 1996 /  
WAHU 1996a]. In analysing the causes of problems at minesites in neighbouring 
Papua New Guinea, Colin Filer goes as far as to suggest that serious local-level 
disruption of mining projects is probable within 15 years of commencement [Filer 1990: 
111].
Disputes at minesites may also have political repercussions. Because of the multi­
ethnic and youthful character of many developing countries, political aspirations in 
remote regions are frequently divergent from those in the capital. Operasi Papua 
Merdeka in Irian Jaya draws support from opposition to the Feeport mine at 
Tembagapura, and there are similar mineral-driven secessionary sentiments in several 
Indonesian provinces [The Economist July 29th, 2000b]. In North Solomons province of 
Papua New Guinea, the Bougainville mine played a focal role in a short but brutal civil 
war [Connell 1991 /Filer 1990,1992/Griffin 1990/M ay 1990/Standish 1990].
While revenues make mining attractive to governments, mining cannot therefore be 
regarded as naturally conducive to local development Comparison of the conditions for 
multiplication laid out by PeriofF with the nature of the minerals industry, provide terms of 
reference for a case against multiplication and towards an eventual resource curse
24
scenario - in the event that mineral reserves have a negative effect upon the early and 
middle stages of economic development [Auty 1998:1-11 /  Auty and Mikesell 1998:11- 
30]. The word ‘toward’ is used rather than ‘for’ because the absence of multiplication 
does not itself determine the Resource Curse Thesis, which depends upon strong non­
multiplication and other variables in addition. Moreover, the tendency toward enclaves 
indicates that as well as having failed to provide local development, mines may foster 
local resentment, social problems, and violence.
A number of experts and organisations have attempted to address the mineral 
development dilemma. In conjunction with the United Nations Department of Technical 
Co-operation for Development, the German Foundation for International Development 
hosted the 'Mining and Environment Conference in 1991. Discussion concentrated on 
the long-term sustainability of mining in developing countries. The purpose was to 
formulate international protocols governing mining, in order that a consultative process 
between various actors involved might be initiated. Although consensus between 
corporate, governmental and societal sectors was problematic, twenty-four Guidelines 
were produced [see Appendix 1]. These stress the importance of balancing economic, 
social, and environmental concerns, that environmental and economic considerations 
be integrated within decision-making processes, and the importance of greater co­
operation between governments, communities and companies [Berlin Guidelines 1992: 
128-9].
Recommendations for relations with, and responsibilities toward indigenous 
communities were also promulgated by the 1992 UNCED Earth Summit The resulting 
Agenda 21 was a'comprehensive program of action addressed to governments, 
agencies of the United Nations, other inter-governmental organisations, non­
governmental organisations, and the public at large. A subsequent meeting of the 
National Councils for Sustainable Development in Asia, in 1995, gave forth a series of 
"Options" for successful implementation of Agenda 21 with respect to indigenous 
peoples [see Appendix 2]. While these were not related to communities specifically 
affected by mining projects, they set the tone for approaches to dealings with them.
These measures were followed by a World Bank Discussion Paper on the subject of 
effecting mineral-driven development in 1998. In response to problems experienced at 
minesites, ten recommendations were directed at the minerals industry. Their order 
reflects stages in a process that corporations might adopt to better integrate social 
concerns.
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Figure 2.1. Explanation of the World Bank recommendations.
1. Adopt a policy on social issues and develop capacity.
While environmental policies are standard practice for major corporations, those addressing 
social concerns are not so well established. The World Bank recommended that the 
implementation of such policies be a priority and die value of social and human capital, both to 
companies and communities be exploded.
2. Identify stakeholders and acknowledge their legitimacy.
Provisions for public involvement are either weak or non-existent in many developing countries. 
However, the legitimacy of all stakeholders is regarded as important, and the World Bank stress 
acknowledgement of local perspectives.
3. Identify social risks and responsibilities.
Opportunities for companies emerge where social responsibility is viewed as conferring business 
advantages such as reducing costs arising from local conflicts. Accidental spillage or release of 
process chemicals however, can significantly change public perception of corporate 
responsibility. The World Bank recommended the management of social risks and prevention of 
impacts.
4. Assess social and environmental impacts thoroughly: Integrate where appropriate.
Social impacts are not always adequately dealt with by the private sector, and project approval 
processes in many developing countries focus on environmental, rather than social issues. 
Where changes in environmental quality may affect
local communities, or environmental resources are threatened by social impacts such as in- 
migration, social and environmental assessments should be integrated.
5. Recognise public involvement as integral to project sustainability.
ft was no ted that indigenous people, women, and minorities, may be disproportionately impacted 
by projects. Moreover, local people can identify social and environmental concerns and assist in 
developing mitigation measures. For consultation to be fully effective, a common language was 
considered crucial.
6. Delineate resoonsibirrties for social provisions.
Mining companies provide certain social infrastructure, which commonly exceeds government 
services to local people. This raises the issue of who should benefit. The most obvious are 
employees and their families, but this becomes complex when workers arrive from outside the 
area. The World Bank notes that investment in social and community provisions should be an 
integral part of doing business. They recommend that ‘social costs' and business benefits be 
more dearly defined, and that corporations complement government systems, rather than 
replace them.
7. Aim for social equity in revenue distribution, compensation, and other social investments. 
Social equity was a primary concern in compensation. Groups such as women, the poor, or 
indigenous peoples often shoulder disproportionate burdens. It was recommended that these be 
factored into compensation arrangements. Any assumption that money itself can secure 
agreement was to be avoided, community based compensation being preferred.
8. Partnerships should be developed in support of sustainable development.
Partnerships were recommended because of the interdependence between development issues 
and the environment, and the complexity of development issues. Corporations were to pursue 
partnership approaches for delivery of social programs, the advantages being in the pooling of 
resources, building of respect and understanding between potential adversaries, and the transfer 
of knowledge.
9. Develop mechanisms for the long-term representation of stakeholders and conflict resolution. 
Development initiatives, by which communities may generate new livelihoods, require long-term 
commitment. Wfth time and planning local business start-ups for example, that may be more 
important than cash compensation.
10 Evaluate the effectiveness of social investments.
While the simplest measure of development is the sum of corporate contributions, the totaf 
amount given is less relevant than the value of outcomes. The World Bank argued that if the 
true social development impact is to be captured, new indicators are needed to measure the 
success of community investment activities.
McPhail and Davy 1998:11-35
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These recommendations reflect broad consideration of problems and the expanding 
scope of responsibility attributed to the private sector [see Appendix 3 for detailed 
explanation]. They represent 'global standards’ to which multi-national mining 
companies aspire. The fact that such measures are necessary is not in any doubt. 
The key issue is whether they are sufficient to ensure mineral-driven development 
They do not propose specific solutions to problems at minesites, relying upon 
conceptual ‘mechanisms’ and ‘partnerships'. Nor are they recognised by many 
domestic mining companies in developing countries, who it might easily be argued, 
oblivious to international scrutiny, continue to do the greatest damage to local 
communities. Most importantly, there is a considerable quantity of material in the 
fields of New Institutional Economics, Political Science, and Anthropology, indicating 
that such measures are insufficient to ensure local mineral-driven development. The 
following sections successively draw upon these sources in order to evaluate 
conditions facing host communities in developing regions of the world, and the 
capacity of the World Bank recommendations to address them.
2.2. The Implications of antecedent social structures for local development.
Travels in remote regions of Southeast Asia prior to embarkation on PhD research 
had exposed this researcher to traditional institutions among a number of societies. 
Local ‘ways of doing things’ have inevitable implications for the adoption of formal 
institutions - primarily those of trade, justice and property, upon which participation in 
the global economy depends. Indeed, Asia is home to myriad local interpretations of 
the narratives of modernity - such as capitalism, democracy, gender equality, etc. 
These observations suggested that consideration of antecedent social structures is 
essential for the success of new developmental institutions, and hence local mineral- 
driven development too.
Indeed, research in the field of New Institutional Economics suggests that antecedent 
institutions have a bearing upon development - see for example Harriss, Hunter, and 
Lewis [1995]. Existing institutional arrangements within traditional societies would 
therefore impact upon the processes of formal structures implemented by mining 
companies and state agencies. That is to say that tools adopted in accordance with 
the social, democratic, and market norms which determine development strategy, may 
dash with local ways of doing things. This would disrupt local development.
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Conventional institutional analysts such as Oliver Williamson are concerned with 
explaining different forms of organisation and consequently consider ideology to be 
exogenous when examining economic performance. Furthermore, because the 
driving force behind institutional change is assumed to be greater efficiency, they 
neglect the role played by individuals [Williamson 1981 ].
However, the idea that exclusively exogenous factors provide the basis for analysis 
begs an awkward question. How can it be determined what is exogenous in a 
developing country situation? It may be possible to identify external structures as 
those demanding cash exchange or perhaps even formal contracts, but these are 
likely to include endogenous aspects. Indeed, the market economy is not an 
overnight sensation. While it is dear that everywhere it has begun, the word 
‘developing’ suggests that it is incomplete. Stuart Schlegel demonstrates how cash 
and barter trade are often interdependent, with communities deriving sustenance from 
both means [Schlegel 1999: 78-100]. Such realities work to discount distinctions. 
Thus it is dear that while in modem capitalist contexts Williamson's rules may hold, in 
the developing world and less competitive markets, they do not
Douglass North provides a better starting point by avoiding the notion that institutions 
are created only to reduce transaction costs and increase economic efficiency. While 
those in the Northian camp are also interested in explaining organisations and 
economic performance, they are more concerned with explaining why different 
institutions arise, and in examining the role of ideology in the process [North 1981, 
1990 /  Siegenthaler 1989]. Such studies have a greater appredation of both history 
and relative bargaining power and there are many examples of how individuals and 
groups attempt to alter institutions to serve their interests - by means which defy neo- 
dassical assumptions [Bates 1981,1989 /  Hechter 1987 /  North 1981,1990],
Moreover, much anthropological research takes place in developing regions and 
among traditional sodeties. By its nature, anthropology treats institutions and 
ideology as endogenous. Anthropological insights gleaned from examination of 
determinants of institutions across hundreds of sodeties are relevant to institutional 
analysis [Ensminger 1992]. Developments can be traced within anthropology that 
parallel what has occurred in Institutional Economics - such as Barth’s introduction of 
the transactional approach [Barth 1966].
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Northian and anthropological analyses of institutions demonstrate that because 
information is incomplete and individuals have different ideas of how the world works, 
transactions have costs that are missed by the neo-classical model. Regard for land 
in commercial terms, that is according to the value of a specific resource therein, does 
not account for the ‘priceless’ cultural or spiritual value that may be attributed to 
environmental features by local communities. The market-place should therefore be 
regarded as only one social device for setting transactions and can be judged against 
others. Such institutional analysis extends neo-dassic economic principles to include 
the role of transaction costs in exchange and so take account of institutions as critical 
to economic performance. It suggests that ideology and traditional systems are 
important to the workings of developmental institutions established at minesites to 
accommodate host communities.
Regarding the process of change from traditional to formal responsibilities, many 
adherents of Douglass North are economic historians and appreciate the fact that 
existing institutional and ideological structures place constraints on future behaviour. 
Because institutions serve multiple purposes or are 'lumpy', institutional change may 
be difficult to achieve, a point echoed by Elinor Ostrom [1990]. Jean Ensminger 
explains that this precludes particular courses of action that those using a neo­
classical economic model might recommend. What is more, because existing and 
antecedent institutional features have a bearing upon the institutional scope available, 
deviance is likely to incur transaction costs [Ensminger 1992].
Scarlett Epstein illustrates this point. She explains how two Indian villages shared a 
common cultural heritage, one of which [Wangaia] had received irrigation twenty 
years before, while the other [Dalena] had not Irrigation in Wangaia was built upon 
traditional patterns of labour organisation. Change was subsequently gradual and 
societal structures remained intact Following the prolonged absence of 
improvements, Dalena attempted to change far more drastically, relying upon labour 
migration and contracts. This caused considerable social turmoil [Epstein 1962].
Institutional theory thereby suggests that changes introduced by mining projects 
should be evolutionary rather than revolutionary. Regard for evolutionary process, as 
well as the empowerment of participants, accounts for its emphasis on legal systems, 
property rights and organisations. Evolutionary change is of particular importance in 
developing regions because of the distance that has to be covered. This is
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exemplified by the gap between multinational companies and the anecdotal “Stone 
Age” societies they often enter [quoted from Raeburn 2000].
Intrinsic to institutional evolution is the degree of ‘smoothness' with which it takes 
place. In modem contexts, formal precedents are relatively well established.
However, in situations where new institutional models are promoted by outside 
agencies, such precedents are unlikely to exist. This may pose a significant threat in 
terms of legitimacy, which underpins all successful institutions. Indeed, there is a 
logical correlation between legitimacy and effectiveness. Studies in developing 
regions by scholars such as Robert Bates, indicate that existing institutions are 
containers of a valuable commodity - legitimacy - in environments where legitimacy is 
otherwise difficult to come by [Bates 1989].
What is more, legitimacy is an elusive quality which may require a great deal of time, 
perhaps generations, to foster from scratch, even in favourable circumstances. The 
process of institutional change is therefore best maintained as seamless as possible 
because any stall or hiccup may have damaging consequences via its effect on 
legitimacy among participants. The implication is that new institutions should best 
evolve from those existing, rather than be devised to ‘replace1 traditional institutions. 
Indeed illegitimacy imposes transaction costs of exactly the type identified by Northian 
scholars. The evolution of existing institutional forms is therefore cost effective, and 
its maintenance a tool capable of overcoming a considerable degree of irrationality.
Finally, antecedent institutional features may explain the performance of new models. 
Elinor Ostrom pays particular attention to the design of institutions that motivate all 
actors in infrastructure development to keep transformation, co-ordination and 
information costs down. As well as nurturing existing institutions and placing value 
upon them, she observes that they contain dues as to why problems exist and that 
remedies may be identified within them [Ostrom 1993]. Concepts upon which 
traditional institutions are based might therefore provide mining companies and state 
agendes with a ’manual’ for relations with new organisations.
Comparing these points with the efforts of mining projeds to engage with traditional 
aspects of host communities and the cultural systems which orient them, a number of 
points are apparent. The maintenance of communication with indigenous 
communities, identification of indigenous interests, provision of opportunities to
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indigenous people, and promotion of business relations with indigenous partners, are 
prominent themes within Indigenous People’s Policies. Mining companies have also 
increasingly come to employ anthropologists, as is evident from participant lists at 
mining conferences. These personnel typically produce a range of studies of 
indigenous rituals, territories, and genealogies etc. for the social environs of each 
project. However, it should be noted that Indigenous People's Policies are premised 
upon the assumption that mining is a given, and that mechanisms for monitoring them, 
external or otherwise, are usually absent Indeed, contractual agreements between 
companies and communities in developing countries rarely reflect the findings of 
anthropological studies and few meaningful links are made between the apparent 
importance of Tradition and project progress.
The apparent significance of antecedent institutions observed in Southeast Asia, 
confirmed by the institutional literature, suggests a considerable oversight on the part 
of the World Bank. Their recommendations fail to address the gap between traditional 
structures and the westem-style development paradigm they promote. 
Recommendation No. 2., Identify stakeholders and acknowledge the legitimacy of their 
perspectives, makes some concession to traditional perspectives, but focuses upon 
the resource - for example, stewardship rather than ownership of land [McPhail and 
Davy 1998:13-4]. it does not relate to the value systems or kinship structures that 
orient the mode of production within traditional communities. Nor does it stress that 
these must be any more than ‘acknowledged’. That is to say there is no attempt to 
persuade the mining industry to incorporate such values into any institutions invested 
with responsibility for affecting development, despite recommendations No. 5., 
Recognize public involvement as integral to project sustainability, No. 6., Delineate 
responsibilities for sodaI provisions, No. 8., Develop partnerships in support of 
sustainable development, and No. 9., Develop mechanisms for the long-term 
representation of stakeholders and conflict resolution, all urging the involvement of 
local communities [Ibid: 21-34].
In light of institutional analyses related here, this thesis hypothesises that any 
developmental model implemented among traditional communities hosting mining 
projects should tessellate with antecedent structures in order to be successful. That is 
to say whatever means are established to manage the process, developmental 
initiatives should be seen as legitimate from the host community perspective.
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2.3. Violence and the Importance of social capital for local mineral-driven 
development
As has already been noted, even a casual observer of Southeast Asia cannot help but 
be aware of the prevalence of violence in remote regions, be it sectarian, ethnic, or 
ideological in nature. Moreover, the relationship between violence and development is 
clearly a negative one. On the other hand, the relationship between peace and 
development is by no means straightforward either. In his study of the Filipino peace 
process, Darwin Rasul uses a quote from President Fidel Ramos [1992-8] as his 
foreword; “It is a primary objective of the Government to attain a just, comprehensive 
and lasting peace which we believe is the basic foundation for economic development 
and national prosperity.” [Rasul 1993]. No development without peace. Conversely, in 
their analysis of the prospects for environmental protection and economic development 
in the Philippines, Broad and Cavanagh quote a Filipino priest as saying “For peace to 
be sustainable in the Philippines, there must be equitable development” [Broad and 
Cavanagh 1992:140]. No peace without development These oppositional 
perspectives each have important implications for local mineral-driven development 
strategies and comprise the basis for sections 2.3. and 2.4.
The concept of Social Capital underlies much recent development thinking - see for 
example, the World Development Report of 1996. It has since been adopted by 
governments and non-govemmental organisations alike [World Bank 1997]. The idea 
is that the success of developmental initiatives depends not only on their cost or design, 
but upon social conditions - principally related to trust as a basis for co-operative effort, 
within communities.
Pierre Bourdieu referred to social capital as ‘connections’ between people and a way to 
analyse the logic whereby this kind of capital may be accumulated, transmitted and 
reproduced. Also a means of understanding how it turns into economic capital, and 
vice-versa. And as a way to grasp the function of institutions such as the family and 
dubs, which serve as sites for the transmission of sodal capital [Bourdieu 1993:32-3].
James Coleman describes social capital as sodal-structural resources that constitute ‘a 
capital asset for the individual*. He explains that sodal capital is defined by its function. 
It is not a single entity, but a variety of different entities with two characteristics in 
common - they all consist of some aspect of sodal structure, and they fadlitate certain 
actions of those individuals who are within the structure. Like other forms of capital,
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social capital is productive, making possible particular ends that would not otherwise be 
attainable [Coleman 1990:302].
According to Coleman, three aspects of social relations constitute useful capital for 
individuals. First, the significance of insurance, related to obligations and expectations 
which arise in sodal relationships - so that rational individuals create obligations 
amongst others, which function as credit slips. Secondly, information communicated 
through sodal relations. Third, the ways that the existence of norms and effective 
sanctions fadlitate action - which reduces transaction costs [Ibid: 307].
Robert Putnam has assembled a broad range of evidence indicating that the nature and 
intensity of human interaction in dvil sodety - what he refers to as ‘networks of dvil 
engagement*, are the prindpal determinants of institutional performance. Civic 
engagement in the shape of networks, norms and trust, gives rise to sodal capital that 
fadlitates co-ordination and co-operation. Moreover, an important aspect of Putnam’s 
contribution to understanding of sodal capital, is his distinction between horizontal and 
hierarchical linkages within sodety. He states that organisational structures based 
upon horizontal linkages such as communal utility bills, shared childcare arrangements 
and informal credit schemes, are more likely to increase trust and co-operation 
necessary for the development of stocks of sodal capital, than are those organisations 
based on vertical, hierarchical linkages, such as sodal welfare systems [Putnam 1993]. 
It is the implications of dvic engagement and horizontal linkages that have exerdsed 
the minds of development planners at the World Bank and elsewhere.
Putnam subsequently deploys indicators of dvic engagement to show that sodal capital 
has been dedining in western nations since the late 1960s. These indicators indude 
partidpation in voluntary organisations, the amount of time spent sodaiising, 
attendance of meetings, and membership of sodeties, dubs, and assodations, all of 
which have steadily fallen [Putnam 1995a, 1995b]. Putnam goes on to posit four 
destroyers of sodal capital. These are television viewing, mothers returning to work 
after having children, increasing commuting time, and the disappearance of distinct 
generational characteristics such as the experience of world war [Putnam 2000:183- 
284]. Putnam finds a strong correlation between decreasing sodal capital and poor 
standards of education, crime, dinical depression, tax evasion, radal intolerance, and 
income inequality. He therefore condudes that the dedine in sodal capital is pladng 
an increasing burden upon western states [Ibid: 287-414].
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One of the most thorough attempts at measuring the impact of social capital in the 
developing country context is that of Narayan and Pritchett, They use data from 
household surveys in Tanzania to construct a ‘Putnam Index1 that combines information 
on the number of groups in different villages, their kin heterogeneity, income 
heterogeneity and functioning. They found a positive correlation between village social 
capital and levels of individuals’ incomes, even after controlling for household 
education, physical assets and village characteristics. They therefore conclude that 
social capital is also important for developing regions [Narayan and Pritchett 1996].
Putnam's destroyers of social capital, such as television viewing and commuter 
distances, are clearly not as relevant in developing countries as they are in Europe or 
the United States. Nevertheless, other factors limit levels of social capital. Caroline 
Moser has conducted research of responses to poverty and vulnerability in poor 
communities. She took social capital as being a characteristic of societies and 
described reciprocal arrangements and community based organisations. She found 
that crime severely eroded trust between neighbours [Moser 1996].
The relationship between poverty, violence, and institutions became the subject of a 
subsequent study by Caroline Moser, in collaboration with Jeremy Holland. This 
demonstrated that violence contributes to fear and distrust, that erodes social capital. 
To summarise their findings, violence damaged social relationships by restricting 
physical mobility and increasing levels of tension. Restricted mobility, i.e., limits on the 
times of day when people could leave their homes, eta, affected social interaction and 
thereby community association that was important for building trust and co-operation. 
Violence also prevented the installation of infrastructure, which ate into community 
cohesion by reducing associations! space. As community cohesion was undermined by 
the decline of strong hierarchical leaders, an institutional vacuum ensued. Police 
attempted to fill this vacuum, but their presence often fuelled tension [Moser and 
Holland 1997: 23-35].
Moser and Holland concluded that under conditions of fear and mistrust, communities 
often lack basic forms of co-operation or communication. Despite the efforts of 
individuals and local organisations, violence in all its forms, left communities bereft of 
the most basic stocks of social capital [Ibid 1997]. These findings have implications for 
ail development projects - including those instigated by mining companies.
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The World Bank recommendations do acknowledge the potential for conflicts arising 
from poor relations between companies and communities at minesites. They do not 
address the fact that many mining companies operate within contexts of violence and 
unrest not related to mining. In light of the frequency of violence in remote regions of 
developing countries, and the importance of peace for development, this represents a 
major oversight
Moreover, studies of social capital may contain significant lessons for local mineral- 
driven development It is recognised that much social capital is a public good and not 
necessarily in any individuals’ interest to bring it into being. Nevertheless, there are 
some forms of social capital which are the result of deliberate investment by actors. 
Coleman dtes business organisations and voluntary associations, where those 
concerned have the aim of receiving a return on their investment [Coleman 1990: 317]. 
It is therefore supposed that the networks, norms and trust, which give rise to social 
capital and facilitate co-operation, can be fostered to improve the prospects of 
developmental initiatives.
In light of the apparent gap in the World Bank recommendations with respect to 
violence in developing regions, and the potential for economic development expressed 
by analyses of sodal capital, another factor in the search for local mineral-driven 
development success can be identified. That is scope for the promotion [if not the 
presence] of sodal capital, expressed by reduction [or absence] of violence.
2.3 .1 . Criticisms of Robert Putnam’s interpretation of Social Capital.
Explaining the logical-seeming relationship between violence and development is not a 
straightforward task. This thesis draws upon Putnam’s work, in a limited application, in 
order to gain a handle on the importance of interconnections between people and an 
understanding of how violence might damage local development initiatives. As has 
been detailed, Putnam’s networks, redprodty, and trust are crutial to the hypothesis 
that violence damages prospects for sustainable development at minesites. Remote 
regions of developing countries are frequently violent, and in exploring failures of local 
mineral-driven development at minesites, this thesis could not ignore the possibility that 
violence, or the perception of violence, is a cause. Before continuing with literature 
pertaining to further hypothetical obstades to local mineral-driven development, it is 
important to also acknowledge some of the critidsms that have been levelled at
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Putnam’s interpretation of Social Capital - see for example Ben Fine [2001]. Moreover, 
it is also important to explain why Social Capital is nevertheless relevant in the context 
ofTampakan.
Possibly the most obvious point of contention is that if Social Capital is important in 
sustaining economic prosperity, where is the economic impact of the decline in Social 
Capital in the last thirty-five years that Putnam describes [Putnam 1995a, 1995b, 2000]. 
This can be explained in various ways, for example, the disappearance of Social Capital 
may have contributed to poverty in particular sections of US society where the variables 
cited by Putnam are in place, but not in others such as his own Massachusetts, 
resulting in an uneven pattern of economic growth across the nation as a whole.
Indeed, there is a wide gap between rich and poor sections of societies within the 
United States and other countries cited, and it is in the poorer parts where the greater 
part of the decline in Social Capital has taken place. Nevertheless, this point does 
indicate that Social Capital has limitations as an explanator of economic growth, and 
needs to be considered in the context of regional and other factors.
Another source of concern is that power relations are not addressed in Putnam's 
explanation of Social Capital. Indeed, racism and class structures for examples, are 
ignored. This is potentially a problem in Tampakan, where Visayans and B’laans could 
be regarded as representing opposing political and economic classes. In the early 
stages of the Tampakan Copper Project, Visayans in the pobladon of Tampakan did 
object to financial support being offered to fledgling Tribal Councils, for fear that they 
were losing out. This protest, and subsequent ill-feeling between Visayans and B’laans, 
might have obstructed the accumulation of Social Capital. However, in remoter regions 
of Mindanao, it was generally found that divisions between Visayan or immigrant 
communities and traditional or indigenous communities, diminished with distance from 
the pobladon. This appeared to be because poor Visayan farmers and ‘tribal’ farmers 
such as the B’laans share similar levels of poverty and physical hardship. Moreover, 
Visayans and B’laans in Tampakan were also united by particular issues, as was found 
to be the case in the demand for new roads linking the most remote communities, in 
which case Visayans and B’laan leaders were unanimous in their desire to see roads 
built
A third aspect of Robert Putnam's work which should be questioned, is his tendency to 
conflate economic and political issues. Putnam presents Sodal Capital as good for
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economic growth and good for democracy [Putnam 1993]. Putnam hypothesizes that 
with civic association comes not only economic growth, but also greater participation in 
political life and the deepening of democracy. Whether this is the case and by what 
mechanisms it might come about, has been questioned by Francis Fukuyama, who 
notes that while guilds contributed to economic prosperity in Germany, they had the 
opposite effect on political developments, which were dominated by the rise of Nazism 
[Fukuyama 1995]. Similarly, James Putzel stresses a need to distinguish between ‘what 
might be seen as the mechanics of trust [the operation of networks, norms etc] and the 
political content and ideas transmitted through such networks and embodied in such 
norms * [Putzel 1997: 941]. Indeed, while political awareness was growing among the 
local communities affected by the proposed mine in Tampakan for various reasons, 
among which was the creation of Tribal Councils that were effectively proto-Barangays, 
whether democracy would be engendered was in no way dear. Barangays are the 
lowest tier of government in the Philippines, and as pointed out by Nestor Castro, there 
are a number of negative factors, such as the undue influence of particular families who 
previously held power through antecedent institutions and electoral aspects of the 
barangay system that expose them to manipulation, impinging upon prospects for 
democratic process [Castro 1997]. Hence although it was uncertain whether Sodal 
Capital could deepen democracy, this does not detrad from the hypothesis that 
violence hinders assodational life within communities by imposing curfews, 
necessitating roadblocks, redudng communication, and so forth, and thereby affects 
development at minesites.
With resped to political power in a development setting, Anthony Bebbington notes that 
Sodal Capital demands a level of ethnographic analysis of relationships to establish 
whether they can alter forms of market and state embeddedness and thus change 
governance processes [Bebbington 2002]. This relates to differences between groups 
within sodety and the resultant political power they have, which is absent from 
Putnam’s work. Indeed, prior to conduding research, an extensive period was spent in 
Mindanao in order to develop an understanding of the sodal context within which the 
Tampakan Copper Projed was located. The historical and subsequent political context 
of the region are examined with the aim of evaluating the extent to which the 
strengthening of Sodal Capital might bring sustainable development gains. That is to 
say it was important to examine causes of violence at length in order to establish 
whether apparent violence was conneded with the mine or rooted in antecedent local 
issues. In each of these cases there might have been an obligation upon the company
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to address them or potential for specific local development efforts respectively. In fact, 
as section 5 .1 . elaborates, violence was symptomatic of wider sectarian or ideological 
conflicts, and it was moreover this analysis of violence that raised questions about 
some of the criticisms that have been made of Putnam's Social Capital.
Perhaps most significantly, Robert Putnam's interpretation of Social Capital differs from 
those of Pierre Bourdieu [1993] and James Coleman [1990], in that he regards Social 
Capital as a collective as well as an individual good [Putnam 1995b, 2000]. This 
transformation has been the source of a substantial portion of the condemnation 
directed at Putnam. James De Filippis has rightly pointed out that people network to 
get ahead of other people, and that the benefits of networking are only realised by 
individuals if they do it and others do not [De Filippis 2002]. While this point has dear 
merit, and sodal networks should not be regarded as nonmatively good things, it does 
not necessarily apply in the context of this thesis, centred as it is upon Tampakan. That 
is because if conflict in Tampakan is caused by external fadors, which is to say that 
ideological violence afflicting Mindanao or the Philippines at large, involving forces such 
as the Armed Forces of the Philippines, or the New People’s Army, then no group within 
the affeded community is likely to have anything to gain, and conversely everybody has 
something to lose.
James Putzel has elaborated on the point that there is unlikely to be a win-win scenario 
for users of Sodal Capital. Putzel described a ‘dark side’ according to which Sodal 
Capital is mobilised by particular groups within given sodeties in order to achieve 
violent ends which meet their own needs [Putzel 1997]. However, this thesis articulates 
an opposite scenario, in which the sources, motives, and indeed partidpants in violence 
are located outside of the sodety or community in question. In remote regions of the 
Philippines, a number of confiids, primarily sedarian [Islamic independence] and 
ideological [Maoist /  Marxist] are being fought without reference to local communities 
such as the B’laan tribe, simply because their areas offer cover to combatants. The 
point is that if this violence imposes a curfew or discourages partidpation in dinics, or 
travel between settlements, then the same limitations are being imposed upon all 
members of the community as a whole, and without reference or favour to any group or 
individual therein. Hence while there may not be a win-win situation, there can be one 
in which everybody is losing.
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The fact that conflicts in Mindanao are external to the communities affected by the 
proposed mine is not to say that local people are unaware of divisions within the 
country at large, or that they will never share them. Indeed, the construction of a large 
mine and the success or otherwise of local development initiatives may lead elements 
among the affected communities to oppose or support the mine or the state. It may 
also, for example, lead to the emergence of a ‘landed class' who own individual title to 
lands, to the exclusion of others, thereby engendering conflicts within the community. 
For the time being however, the host community remains unaffected by sectarian 
divisions in Mindanao and share almost identical experiences of economic hardship and 
isolation from wider political life.
2.4. Political power and local mineral-driven development.
Another apparent contrast between ‘developed’ and ‘developing’ societies was in 
terms of participation in formal institutions such as local government units, the 
holding of land titles, business transactions, and so on. These institutions are 
important because they convey power to their participants. In developed societies, 
by and large, representative government, laws, property rights, etc., enable people 
to act upon problems and improve their situation. In developing societies on the 
other hand, many traditional communities do not participate in formal structures.
This raises an important question with regard to mineral-driven development efforts. 
Whatever initiatives or organisations are established at the local level, will they 
provide host communities with real powers? Tribal Coundis and Foundations may 
be appropriate for company-community dialogue, but if development is to be long­
term and sustainable, communities will surely need to have dealings beyond the 
mining project, that will require legal-political powers. Communities who have no 
title to their land, nor political representation, nor in some cases ever having been 
induded in any census of population, are unlikely to sustain local mineral-driven 
development gains.
In critiquing the research of Robert Putnam, and sodal capital as a panacea for 
sodetal ills, John Harriss, Paulo di Renzio and James Putzel have pointed out that 
features of sodal organisation that fadiitate co-ordination, are influenced by 
political institutions [Harriss and di Renzio 1997 /  Putzel 1997]. Initiatives aimed at 
creating sodal capital, such as support for assodations in dvil sodety, might 
therefore miss the mark, attacking symptoms rather than the cause. That is
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because structural factors may be more important in explaining 
underdevelopment than any lack of social capital. The significance of political 
and economic structures for development is exemplified by studies of land 
reform. Hernando de Soto suggests that enfranchisement of individuals is 
crucial to economic progress because without secure access to land, tenants,
. farmworkers, and sharecroppers cannot be certain of meeting basic needs for 
survival. In countries where the majority of people earn their living from 
agriculture, and the majority of these own little or no land, this has serious 
economic consequences - particularly where combined with income inequality 
[de Soto 2001].
In many developing countries, economic and political ties of dependence 
between the rural poor and their patrons defy efforts to make land redistribution 
central to the logic of reform. Providing rights and power to ‘new* individuals and 
communities is a constitutional matter requiring changes in national laws and 
conventions. Local measures aimed at increasing social capital would be 
unlikely to improve economic well-being within such a context. As Robert Bates 
explains, typically weak and corrupted market stimuli in developing countries 
promote the strength of social and political mechanisms for controlling land and 
surplus, while at the same time reinforcing the absence of public institutions 
which might otherwise fill the vacuum. Moreover, once a developing economy is 
on an inefficient path that produces stagnation, it is more likely to persist. That is 
because the individuals and bargaining power that result from the institutional 
framework have a crucial stake in perpetuating the system [Bates 1989:147-54]. 
This situation represents what institutional analysts refer to as path dependence 
- the fact that conditions within societies have specific bearing upon institutional 
development.
This is not however, to discount the role of individuals completely. It should also 
be noted that while path dependence implies that individuals have no role in the 
development of institutions, there is considerable evidence to suggest that 
individuals also play an important part - the relationship between the two 
depending upon the strength of precedents and other prevailing circumstances.
In their studies of developing economies, Haber [1989] and Khan [1989] each 
indicate that while institutional arrangements do indeed influence individual 
behaviour, individuals’ responses also impact upon institutions. They show that
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individuals and local organisations can act as agents for institutional change. 
What is more, where utilisation of a resource lies outside the means of a 
community, institutional change does not necessarily take place in an exclusively 
top down manner. Rather, it can be initiated at a local level and spread 
throughout a region, nation or economy. Similarly, novel, productivity enhancing 
institutions can be triggered by individual initiatives and are not invariably rooted 
in collective behavioural change.
The potential of individuals to influence institutions, is borne out by mineral- 
driven development experience. Colin Filer explains how conflicts between 
landowners, provincial governments, mining companies, and states, can 
contribute to development. In 1989 Placer Pacific and its partners in the Porgera 
gold mine in Papua New Guinea became the first mining consortium to negotiate 
formally with provincial governments and local landowners as well as national 
government. The Development Forum is a policy instrument devised by the 
national government in the course of negotiations for the establishment of the 
Porgera mine. It consists of a series of tri-partite discussions between national 
government, provincial government, and local communities. These have two 
purposes. First, to secure joint endorsement of the terms under which the 
national government allows a mining company to operate. Secondly, to produce 
a separate set of agreements between these three ‘stakeholder1 groups, that 
spell out the distribution of costs, benefits, rights and obligations arising from the 
project [Filer 1995: 67-8].
Two of Filer’s findings stand out. First the fact that the local people concerned 
were landowners afforded them greater influence over negotiations and a 
subsequently larger portion of royalties [Filer 1995]. Second, the PNG 
constitution [designed to pre-empt secessionary tendencies], provided provincial 
governments considerable independence [Wanek 1996:70-7]. Circumstances in 
neighbouring Irian Jaya were very different There the Indonesian state 
assumed all rights to land and minerals therein [Moniaga 1993:140 /  Robinson 
1991:110]. Moreover, they had the political will and means to ensure those 
rights militarily [Walsh 1995 /  Munninghof 1995]. This severely curtailed 
opportunities for individuals and local organisations to secure mineral-driven 
development gains.
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While the notion of path dependence appears to dash with that of the individual, 
they in fact co-exist. Path dependence reflects the constraints posed by 
antecedent features and thus the scope available for change. The empowerment 
of individuals and organisations represents the extent to which that scope is 
explored. The comparison presented here indicates that whether ‘local 
initiatives' or ‘path dependency' prevails will depend upon the level of power 
vested in concerned parties. There is no reason to assume that suffident rights 
and powers for managing the consequences of mineral-driven development will 
be available to host communities or developmental institutions. Indeed, where 
communities occupy a marginal position, the opposite is likely to be the case.
The World Bank recommendations emphasise ‘partnerships’, ‘partidpation’ and 
the ‘long term’ context They imply empowerment via terms such as 
‘stakeholders’. They do not provide any definition of what rights or powers these 
will confer, referring only to relations with the company. Furthermore, little 
recommendation for the empowerment of host communities or their 
representative organisations is made to the governmental sector. McPhaii and 
Davy state that;
7/7 some situations governments might identify overriding social and 
environmental obstacles to development to help guide the allocation 
of concessions. This would prevent exploration companies from 
investing in areas of overriding social constraints and protect both 
companies and communities from conflicts.”
[McPhaii and Davy 1998: xi]
Such measures would serve to deflect mineral investment from certain regions, 
rather than encourage the empowerment of communities to cope with a mining 
projed. In any case, the extent to which developing states can be expeded to 
discourage investment in remote regions is undear.
It is therefore hypothesised that communities must have suffident power in order 
to articulate themselves within the regional politico-economic context, and 
thereby consolidate mineral-driven development gains such as rents and 
royalties - that is to convert them into sustainable livelihoods. The extent to 
which they do by comparison with antecedent structures and contemporary 
requirements is important and such a comparison can provide a basis for 
identifying improvement, if not definitive success.
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2. 5. Understanding of the implications of large scale mining.
Another common question arising from the experience of communities hosting 
mining projects, throughout Southeast Asia, is whether or not they comprehend 
what is mining. Mining may sound like an obvious and self-explanatory term to 
members of ‘modem’ societies. Indeed, members of traditional societies often 
state that they do know what mining means. However, the response of 
communities in many cases of subsequent mineral development led this 
researcher to doubt this.
Some communities have no doubt been deceived by the contractual terminology 
presented to them, and the mines that were built were genuinely not what had 
been stated. Other projects, such as Ok Tedi in Papua New Guinea and 
Marcopper on the island of Marinduque in the Philippines, experienced accidents 
which meant that their impact was greater than expected. Nevertheless, and in 
light of apparent differences in value systems noted in section 2. 2., there 
remained instances to suggest that no matter how many times the realities of 
mining might be explained to a prospective host community, they would not be 
able to grasp it. It was therefore supposed that lack of understanding, even where 
a project is clearly defined and goes according to plan, could obstruct local 
mineral-driven development
Of all the factors hypothesised to obstruct mineral-driven development, 
understanding was the most difficult to root in any theoretical literature. Following 
numerous discussions with others familiar with challenges to mineral-driven 
development, an anthropological approach was adopted. A large section of 
Anthropology is based upon the fact that societies have different concepts of time, 
scale, and space. This has implications for relationships between companies and 
communities. If interpretations of agreements and developmental planning are not 
mutual, then local mineral-driven development will be problematic.
Concern for indigenous notions of temporal reality can be traced to the work of 
Emile Durkheim. In contrast to realist-empiridsts such as John Stuart Mill, who 
regarded temporal structures as determined by natural processes, Durkheim 
argued that societies are in fact the source of such structures, obliging people to 
think in common because they live their lives in common.
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Durkheim described time as;
'like an endless chart, where all duration is spread out before the mind, 
and upon which all possible events can be located in relation to fixed and 
determined guidelines.. .  taken from sodal life.”
[Durkheim 1915:11]
Alfred Gell notes that this is the point at which time becomes interesting to 
anthropologists -  when the possibility is raised that collective representations of time 
do not passively reflect time, but actually create time as a phenomenon apprehended 
by sentient human beings. The idea of the social origin of human temporal 
experience offered the prospect of a limitless variety of experiences of unfamiliar 
temporal worlds, to be gained through the study of sodeties that have evolved in 
different places [Gell 1992: 3-15],
Perhaps the most simple deavage between perceptions of time is that of the cydical 
and linear. This is a specific concern of Esteban Magannon who notes that natural 
phenomena are largely cydical in character, that is to say dimatic variations, the 
waxing and waning of the moon and the passing of night and day. Human affairs on 
the other hand, take a more linear form. They are ever-changing in content duration 
and impact, and having passed, may leave permanent changes on sodeties 
[Magannon 1972 /1984]. Because of the reduced dependence of developed 
sodeties upon natural cydes of production and the growth of written records and 
information technologies, cydical determinants of time have dedined in significance, 
while those linear have grown.
Perceptions of time are therefore determined by experience. While one sodety 
is dominated by a technology-driven economy that owes no allegiance to the 
changing of the seasons, and is generally able to overcome subsequent 
environmental obstades, another is dependent upon aspects of the natural 
environment Moreover, while the former is able to record events predsely and 
fix them within a numerically measured and agreed-upon framework, the latter 
does not and takes action as and when conditions permit.
The consequences of such divisions are that host communities and mining 
corporations have different perceptions of agreements, particularly the terms 
according to which they will be carried out. Whether either can fully appredate
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the view of the other is uncertain. The two parties may be amicable at the 
outset, when no major challenge has been encountered and both are enjoying 
a ‘honeymoon’ period. Indeed, in the long term, at such time as host 
communities acquire experience and knowledge necessary to grasp mineral 
project processes, and or mining companies customise their strategy to 
incorporate local determinants, a mutually understood pattern of development 
may emerge. However, in the medium term there is likely to be a period of 
acculturation and potential conflict when ‘deadlines’ must be met and ‘quotas’ 
satisfied, that are ultimately determined by markets and have no connection 
with local ideas. It is during this period that any gap between socially 
determined categories is most likely to obstruct relations between companies 
and communities and the process of mineral-driven development.
Aside from time, consultation with anthropologists such as John Harriss and 
Terry Roopnaraine indicated that conceptual differences between parties 
extend to aspects of scale and space. Albert Alejo, a Mindanaon 
anthropologist, recalled how managers from the Rio Tinto mining conglomerate 
had explained the means by which they proceeded with mineral exploration. 
“Their portrayal of maps, the ease with which they talked about one hundred 
thousand hectares, and the casualness of their namedropping of continents. . .  
made me feel very u n e a s y Alejo related another encounter which made the 
issue of scale more real. A professional cartographer was introducing a three 
dimensional map to the people of Mount Kitanglad in Bukidnon, in the central 
highlands of Mindanao. A topographic map of tribal lands had been 
constructed. This type of map and its influence upon relations with tribal 
peoples raises a question of what are the politics of producing such knowledge.
On this point, Denis Wood explains that maps are never value-free images. 
Both in the selectivity of their content and in their signs and styles of 
representation, maps are a way of conceiving, articulating and structuring the 
human world, which is biased towards, promoted by, and exerts influence upon 
particular sets of social relations [Wood 1992:95-142]. Indeed, Peter Gow 
makes the point that land title is the concrete embodiment of certain social 
processes [Gow 1995: 62].
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Mapping is a way of making the environment shareable, but contained within the 
process are less explicit functions. Robert Rundstrom demonstrates this point;
T he intentional meaning behind the application of the distinctive federal 
public-land-survey grid to the official topographic series published by the US 
Geological Survey is straightforward: to assist in locating areas and to 
assign exclusive coordinates to them. The implicational meaning lies 
elsewhere in the related concepts of resource inventory, identificatbn, 
allocatbn, and purchase of private property; property protection and access 
through thousands of miles of barbed-wire fencing and pavement; manifest 
destiny; and the geometry of American society. The act of designing and 
producing such a map is an act of subjugation and appropriation of nature, a 
basic value of American society, not merely the reification of an idle curiosity 
in recording dimensions
[Rundstrom 1991:162]
Indeed, cartographic deconstruction can be used to reveal who is doing what to 
who. Thongchai Winichakul demonstrates how the inscription of a boundary around 
the geographical body of Thai territory was instrumental in the construction of Thai 
nationality. By reifying a “geobody" for Thailand, the boundary transformed 
indigenous ideas about space and Thai identity. Indeed the boundary did far more 
-  facilitating an anachronistic projection of “Thailand" back into Thai history.
Winichakul shows the assumption that pre-modem Thailand had a bounded 
geobody to be false, instead, structures of over-lapping authorities and tributary 
local leaders came to be replaced by the European notion of a political boundary.
Losses were to local authorities who were entirely erased, and to their populations, 
caught in a seismic political and geographical shift. By getting ‘under* the 
cartographic boundary, Winichakul reveals how maps may function as a political 
tool, and how acceptance of the map as a natural depiction of territory can distort 
understanding and influence identity [Winichakul 1994].
In examining Filipino histories, reading of Glenn Anthony May indicates that at the time of 
the declaration of independence in 1898, those that participated in the Malolos Congress 
and the war against Spain were dominantly Tagalog, and that the Filipino ‘geobody’ 
extended no further than the island of Luzon [May 1997:163-6]. Palawan and Mindanao 
were incorporated more gradually during the American interregnum [1898-1941] and in the 
course of successive settlement by migrants from Luzon and the Visayas. This raises an 
significant point. That is to say, whether the process of capture identified by Winichakul is 
as yet complete, and whether ail of the indigenous tribes of Mindanao are aware of their 
Filipino identity is not certain. This serves to underline the potential isolation of
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communities hosting mining projects, and the scale of change that they may have to 
undergo in order to participate in modem development.
Wood presents a range of means by which formal cartographical techniques may 
impose ideas upon traditional communities [Wood 1992]. Indeed, those mapping 
techniques developed by agencies such as Environmental Science for Social 
Change at the Ateneo de Manila, drawn by, and in conjunction with host 
communities, appear very different from those produced by mining companies 
and state agencies. Host communities may be vulnerable to mis-representation, 
particularly where contractual negotiations are based upon maps framed by the 
requirements of mining, and which do not incorporate indigenous perspectives.
Furthermore, studies of traditional societies indicate that such people have a 
multilayered mode of occupation - see Lebar e t al for an example [Lebar 1975].
A community typically builds its homes on a relatively small piece of land - which 
in the case of shifting-cultivators, moves. Beyond this, certain areas are required 
for various domesticated crops. A wider territory is necessary for collecting, 
hunting and fishing. Pathways and particular physical features are important for 
facilitating communication and social networks. And the landscape may also 
contain the dwellings and manifestations of spiritual aspects of traditional life.
Thus the intensity of land use varies with each layer, but none is regarded as 
exclusive.
This signals a broad contradiction between patterns of tenure, stemming from 
different relationships between peopie and land. On one hand there is the 
perception of communities, of land as a means to obtaining a livelihood directly, 
according to which its alteration will affect their well-being. On the other is the 
perception of mining companies, of land as a means of generating wealth that 
may be accumulated and sustained through financial channels, and who are not 
therefore dependent upon land and the environment it supports.
Interestingly, experience from certain minesites indicates that outcomes may be 
more complex than anthropological insights suggest Following its establishment 
at Porgera and subsequent developments at Misima and Kutubu, proceedings of 
the Development Forum implemented at Lihir in Papua New Guinea’s New
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Ireland Province in 1993, present a further challenge stemming from the 
discrepancy between the positions of mining interests and host communities.
Colin Filer states that;
'a significant section of the Lihir community, and the most obstinate 
section of its leadership, has always regarded the advent of the mine as 
a millenial event - a chance for salvation or damnation, not as an 
economic phenomenon whose social impact can be dealt with by 
calculating costs and benefits and striking lasting bargains on this basis.
It is this disparity of attitude and sentiment, already evident throughout 
the exploration phase, which is now likely to be exaggerated by the 
imposition of ‘serious business’ on the seriously unbusinesslike quality 
of Lihirian aspirations”
[Filer 1995: 74]
The contractual concerns of the host community repeatedly returned to issues of 
compensation. What is interesting is that these demands arose from local regard for 
the mine as ‘a millenial event’ on the part of an ‘obstinate section of the community'. 
That is to say, rather than on the basis of differing concepts of time, scale, and space 
etc.
Regarding this point, Rolf Gerritsen describes the Construction phase of the mine life­
cycle in the following manner,
"During construction the mining company spends money like a nation at 
war. Material pours into the mine locality in what appears to the villagers 
to be boundless quantities. Airstrips, townships and physical plant are 
constructed seemingly overnight. This creates the local perception of the 
mining company’s boundless wealth and capacity, a perception that is 
stored for future reference."
[Gerritsen 1996: 83]
The scale of mine operations may therefore lead communities to the assumption that 
mining companies are capable of any material or financial feat The causes of 
contractual problems may therefore leapfrog differences of time, scale, and space, 
and head directly to millenial aspirations and dependency. Attempts to engage with 
local concepts and perceptions may therefore be redundant by default. That is to say 
that in light of what a company shows itself to be capable of, the traditional systems of 
marginal communities may be overwhelmed by the apparent superiority of the ‘new1 
system.
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Tim Flannery’s account of research in Papua New Guinea contains a revealing passage;
“Often on the Sol, I would be approached by a Telefol elder in the 
dead of night. He would whisper to me: This evening I told you 
everything of the secrets of Afek. Now tell me, friend, where does money 
come from?’
At first I did not understand the nature of these questions, and would 
respond by saying that money represents accumulated wealth and that 
my ancestors had worked and saved hard. They had invested their 
money in banks or companies, creating even more wealth.
On hearing this my listener would typically become irritable and say,
'Money does not come from work. You come here and pay us to work 
for you. We carry your equipment and feed you. You do not work, yet it 
is you who have the money. Now tell me really, as a friend who will keep 
your secret, where does money come from?
What the Telefol wanted to hear was the magic formula, whereby 
money could be literally made
[Flannery 1999:136]
Inability to grasp technological processes and means of capital accumulation is by 
definition, characteristic of areas where levels of modernity are low. This has important 
implications for relations between traditional communities and mining. First of all, as in the 
case of temporal and spatial considerations, contracts may have different meanings for 
each party. As has been explained, these differences may be compounded by 
comparisons of scale.
Second, although neither side may grasp the position of the other, and misunderstanding 
is often mutual, mining contracts are framed primarily by companies in accordance with 
markets, technologies, and the dictates of state agencies. A written contract and the maps 
therein, is itself alien to traditional societies. Nevertheless, once such a document has 
been signed, the burden of understanding rests upon the host community, and the 
question becomes one of whether the community understands the position of the 
company, rather than the other way around.
Third, studies such as those of Gerritsen and Madntyre [1991], Omundsen and van Dusen 
[1991], and West [1992], concerning relations between companies and communities, 
indicate that understanding of the realities of mining may remain weak over long periods of 
time. Even after several decades, communities remained oblivious to the formal structures 
that determine the actions of mining companies and upon which local development 
initiatives depended. This would inevitably intensify the challenge of effecting sustainable 
local mineral-driven development
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Finally, understanding has implications for procedural equity on the part of affected 
communities within mineral-driven developmental structures. That is to say, in contrast to 
outside organisations and across economic and political institutions in the region as a 
whole. Regardless of the proportion of votes, financial clout, or veto power, held by 
communities or community members, in company-community associations, councils, and 
other bodies, lack of understanding, by its very nature, defies equity. If local participants 
do not understand, then the most generous terms should be questioned.
The World Bank recommends that companies acknowledge the legitimacy of host 
perspectives, implying that communities will do likewise, and that this will be the basis of a 
mutually enriching relationship. They do not take into account the fact that host 
communities are unlikely to be able to share the formal-developmental perspective even if 
they want to. Poor grasp of the implications of mining has a direct bearing upon capacity 
to fulfil recommendations No. 5., Recognize public involvement as integral to project 
sustainability, No. 6., Delineate responsibilities for social provisions, and No. 8., Develop 
partnerships in support of sustainable development [McPhail and Davy 1998:21-30]. 
Indeed, without a grasp of the realities of mining, communities cannot participate as 
partners - 'participation’ and 'partnership' being prominent terms of reference throughout 
[Ibid 1998].
Although understanding varies between host areas, it is an inevitable factor in remote 
regions and a defining aspect of situations in which standards of modernity are low. 
Understanding of the implications of mining on the part of host communities prior to 
contractual agreements, therefore constitutes the fourth hypothetical pre-condition for 
successful local mineral-driven development
2.6. Procedural equity within the local mineral-driven development apparatus.
The final limiting factor concerns the ways in which companies and communities work 
together to create local development. A significant feature of mining projects is that 
host communities are unlikely to be owners of mineral reserves, those rights being 
assumed by the state. Moreover, host communities are rarely able to participate, nor 
qualified to, in negotiations thereof with companies, that are conducted with central 
governments. Indeed, equity on the part of host communities cannot usefully be 
interpreted in terms of the equal sharing of mineral wealth. That is perhaps most 
obviously because major mineral agreements, i.e. involving multi-national companies, 
are predicated upon the constitutional sovereignty of the state. Instead, 'development
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trust funds’, ’associations’ and other organisations are established using a portion of 
royalties or revenues as dictated by the terms of agreement between the company and 
government concerned. These bodies have a remit of disbursing compensation, 
establishing commercial ventures to provide new sources of livelihood and sustainable 
incomes, and abetting corporate-community relations. It is in terms of the structure of 
these organisations, and the roles allocated to company and community 
representatives, that procedural equity is meant, and by which this thesis refers to the 
balance of power between communities and mining interests.
Due to the novelty of the enterprises they undertake among host communities, 
developmental organisations inevitably involve the imposition of alien management 
structures and outside ’experts’ such as accountants, agriculturists and educators. As a 
result, there are a multitude of scenarios by which host communities may not have an 
equitable position within them and thus vis-a-vis mining itself. The experience of 
Bougainville illustrates the dangers of mining companies, and possibly an elite within 
the host community also, having a disproportionate degree of control over management 
and decision-making.
The Panguna mine on Bougainville island in Papua New Guinea’s North Solomons 
province is among the best documented examples of the mineral development dilemma, 
see for example May and Spriggs [1990]. Commercial reserves of copper were 
discovered at Panguna in 1964 and production by Bougainville Copper Ltd., owned by 
CRA, part of the Rio Tinto Zinc conglomerate, began in 1972. However, the mine was 
plagued by political tensions. These came to a head in 1987 with local demands for 
environmental protection, backpayments from profits, and 10 billion US dollars in 
compensation. When these were not met, the Bougainville Revolutionary Army began 
harassing the mine which closed the following year. A state of emergency was 
declared by the government but after two years of martial law, the army were withdrawn 
in favour of a blockade which remains in effect today. Two studies, by Colin Filer 
[1990], and Herb Thompson [1991] have evaluated exploitation, colonialism, corporate 
neo-colonialism, ethnicism and racism, all of which have been popularly regarded as 
causes of the rebellion. Their work provides clarity in the identification of sources of 
conflict specific to mineral development projects.
Because of tribal fragmentation and isolation, there has always been a strong sense of 
parochialism and balkanism in Papua New Guinea [Wanek 1996]. Desire for autonomy
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in regions such as North Solomons has been portrayed in two dimensions. First, in 
relation to the colonial presence symbolised by the mine [Howard 1991 /  Suter 1997]. 
Second, in relation to other indigenous groups, evidenced by the historical enmity 
between ‘Highlanders’ and ‘Islanders’ [Ogan 1991 /  Spriggs 1992]. Filer and Thompson 
explain that these were phenomenal rather than essential to the crisis. Neither 
colonialism, nor its antithesis, nationalism, although embellishing political rhetoric, were 
the cause of the rebellion [Filer 1990 /  Thompson 1991]. Indeed, as has already been 
noted here, examples of communal, racial and ethnic antagonism persist in many parts 
of the developing world. Hence it is difficult to establish correlation between such 
antagonisms and the presence of a particular mine.
Environmental degradation was a manifestly more serious issue for host communities. 
At Bougainville, river systems and tributaries were damaged and forests swamped by 
the elevated water table. Fishing was reduced by pollution and sedimentation, and 
hunter-gathering activities curtailed by ecological changes. Reduced availability of land 
led to the development of squatter camps on the outskirts of established settlements. 
According to one report, too little compensation was offered too late [Applied Geology 
Associates 1989]. Thompson finds environmental damage to have been a crucial 
reason for rebellion because it had been bome largely as a detrimental externality by 
the people of Bougainville, with insufficient compensation [Thompson 1991: 81].
However, that is not to say that if the people of Bougainville had been given sufficient 
financial compensation for environmental destruction and loss of land, and even skills 
and opportunities to use it productively, the rebellion would have been averted. At best 
it would have been delayed. Thompson indicates that while destruction of the 
environment and inadequate financial compensation were more important reasons for 
rebellion than colonialism or racism /  ethnicism, there were other more powerful 
explanations [Ibid: 81].
Thompson explains this by analysing the developmental apparatus implemented at 
Bougainville. Comprising customary landowners in the mining lease area, the Panguna 
Landowners Association [PLA] was established in 1979. A trust fund that included 
members of the PLA was formed two years later. This body provided a business arm as 
well as education, health, and other basic services. According to Thompson, over a 
period of time, the trust fund became a source of antagonism between the executive 
and other members of the community. This was instigated by an emergent younger
52
generation that suspected the directors were embezzling the money and felt themselves 
disenfranchised. Disproportionate distribution of income, concern that actual 
expenditure of the trust fund on social amenities was trivial, irregular meetings and lack 
of information, and the belief that outsiders were manipulating the board, all motivated 
opposition. Overall, there was a widespread view within the community, that the trust 
funds’ management was corrupt and self-serving. Indeed, 300 000 Kina had to be 
written off as bad debt during the first few years of the funds’ operation. Thompson 
argues that it was because of these factors, beliefs, and perceptions that there was a 
coup in 1988, with the younger group replacing the old PLA [Ibid: 82],
Thompson finds that class antagonisms were amplified by declining availability of land 
for both cash crop and subsistence production. A small indigenous capitalist class had 
not been able to amplify the accumulation of capital in the plantation sector. Peasantry 
had seen a decline in the availability of useful land and had inadequate opportunity to 
sell their labour. Younger Bougainvilleans had been shut out from smaller 
entrepreneurial activities such as retail shops, which had been under the control of 
Bougainville Copper Ltd., indigenous and expatriate capitalists, or the old PLA 
members. These problems were compounded by a booming population [Ibid: 83].
Symbols of colonialism such as the white consultants hired by the company, or 
elements of racism /  ethnicism portrayed by epithet Redskins, directed against other 
Papua New Guineans by Bougainvilleans, were convenient metaphors for underlying 
economic problems emerging in the province as a whole. It was not that the foreign 
owned mine or racial differences were unimportant to a complete analysis, but that they 
had to be seen in articulation with the developing class structure and antagonism 
connected with land and economic development [Ibid: 83],
To summarise, Filer and Thompson indicate that of the numerous popular causes of 
conflict, only two are exclusively associated with minesites without having existed prior 
to mining. They are environmental damage and the disenfranchisement of host 
communities. In the case of Tampakan, the former is not yet relevant because the 
physical impact of mining is as yet minimal. The latter relates to the circumstances 
incurred by enclaves at minesites noted in section 2.1. The Bougainville mine project 
failed to accommodate the aspirations of the local community in a responsive manner. 
Moreover, inevitabilities such as time, growing population, and shortage of land, 
compounded the problem. Bougainville Copper Ltd. and the Panguna Landowners
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Association, were unprepared for the complexity of mineral-driven development, which 
they never successfully addressed [Filer 1990 /  Thompson 1991],
At Bougainville, both state and company relied upon Kaldor and Hicks’ assertion that 
while most resource reallocations make someone worse off, this is not a barrier to 
efficiency. If the gains made by some people are great enough to allow them to 
compensate the losers, then the new distribution of factors of production, goods and 
services is regarded as more allocatively efficient [Kaldor 1939 /  Hicks 1939]. However, 
as Judith Rees points out, this has implications for distributive equity. In all definitions 
of allocative efficiency, the resulting distribution of income, goods and services in the 
economy is irrelevant
‘a situation can be efficient if 1 per cent of the population owns 90 per
cent of the wealth, and .a project or policy could be efficient if all the
gains go to this 1 per cent There is therefore, nothing necessarily
equitable about economic efficiency
[Rees 1990:127]
Finally, the hypothetical significance of Procedural Equity is supported by a strong 
parallel with the rights-based approach to local mineral-driven development adopted by 
Oxfam and its partner agencies. Bob Muntz argues that the principal right of affected 
communities is the right to negotiate, on the basis that other economic, social and 
cultural rights, such as the right to food, shelter, education and maintenance of culture 
and tradition, can only be effectively exercised when the right to negotiate is fully 
available to communities. According to Muntz, the right to negotiate comprises four 
elements - the right to be fully informed, the right to adequate resources to enable a 
community to effectively negotiate, the right to say “no", and the right of communities to 
negotiate collectively [Muntz 2001: VIII].
To conclude this section, World Bank recommendations No. 7., Aim for social equity in 
revenue distribution, compensation, and other social investments, and No. 9., Develop 
mechanisms for long-term representation of stakeholders and conflict resolution, refer to 
equity. However, this social equity is between sections of affected communities in order 
that those most directly affected by mining receive proportional benefits. Social equity 
relates to sensitivity toward gender, age and economic and social status [Aidan and 
Davy 1998: 26-30]. The issue of equity as parity with the company, state, or other 
outside agencies, in local development structures, is not addressed.
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Moreover, the preponderance of terms such as improved ‘social provisions’, ‘better 
compensation’ and ‘effective social investments’ are a matter of concern. They suggest 
that the World Bank are recommending better placatory methods rather than equity for 
host communities. This may be due to problems in sharing control over mineral 
resources with local communities. Nevertheless, the measures recommended by the 
World Bank function as a substitute for procedural equity, and do not address this key 
issue. If procedural equity has not been provided for from the outset, then events at 
Bougainville suggest that local investments will be equivalent to Danegeld, with 
communities regressing into dependency, repeatedly returning for more, and potentially 
threatening mining projects.
Furthermore, and perhaps most significantly, the World Bank spares few words for 
situations in which mining should not take place, defining them only as where 
communities lack the capacity to adapt to the proposed development without losing 
their social and cultural identity”, and *where communities are unwilling to accept the 
development” [Aidan and Davy 1998:20-21]. These brief statements are not supported 
by specific explanations, that is to say what constitutes ‘social and cultural identity’ or 
what counts as loss. Nor are any means provided for measuring how willing any given 
community is, considering that there are many local dissenters to any mining project. 
Moreover, the authors fail to acknowledge important precedents, of which they should 
be aware - legislation in Australia’s Northern Territory for example, preserves the right 
of aboriginal communities to reject mining proposals. Indeed, this is respected in a long 
term manner, the laws of that state specifying that five years must pass before any 
company may attempt to reopen discussions. Fiona Solomon explained that research 
she conducted for the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation 
[CSIRO] showed that one proposed mining project in the Australian state of Victoria 
was turned down by the state government, while another company withdrew its proposal 
because of negative local perceptions.
In light of the points raised in this section, it is hypothesised that the broadest portion of 
communities should hold an equitable position with respect to management of the 
developmental apparatus, and that this must be maintained throughout the life of a 
mining project. It is also apparent that the attentions of the community may shift from 
their ‘organisational responsibilities and benefits therefrom', back towards a 
fundamentally inequitable viewpoint of themselves as traditional custodians of great 
wealth that is being stolen from them, along with their land and livelihoods, by
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foreigners. In this respect, the very impression of procedural equity in a local 
organisation may have value as a means of displacing what many opponents of mining 
view as robbery, thereby providing social and political stability.
2.7. Test Factors.
The five factors presented here, that is traditional structures, crime, powerlessness, 
misunderstanding, and procedural inequity on the part of host communities, are ail 
hypothesised to obstruct local mineral-driven development as recommended by the 
World Bank et. al. In order to test this, a methodology was needed to assess their 
impact on the Tampakan Copper Project. This demanded that suitable aspects of the 
Project be identified.
The following table outlines the limiting factors and hypothetical points raised thereby, 
and test factors that form the basis of Chapters Five and Seven. It should however be 
noted that the test factors pursued in the field were not the only aspects of the 
communities that might have been selected. Police statistics cannot provide a 
comprehensive picture of violence. Nor can the strength of the rights or powers held by 
a community be expressed by their tenurial rights alone. Such aspects are only proxies 
for the limiting factors, and were chosen for practical reasons associated with the 
availability of data, available means of data collection, and the circumstances under 
which the research was conducted.
Limiting Factors Literatures Test Factors / Proxies
Influence of 
traditional structures.
Institutional
Analysis
Traditional versus formal 
Leadership /  Legitimacy
Prevalence of 
Violence
Social Capital Incidence and 
nature of Crime
Lack of Rights 
and Power
Criticisms of 
Social Capital
Tenurial Rights /  
Road Construction
Lack of understanding 
of formal institutions
Anthropology Grasp of the physical 
realities of mining
Procedural Equity 
within local 
development apparatus
Case study 
materials
Division of responsibility 
between Tribal Councils 
and Foundation Boards
Beginning with Tradition, analysis of the relationship between antecedent or traditional 
structures and those of the Tribal Council system at the site of the Tampakan Copper 
Project was necessary to identify traditional structures. Comparison between the two 
would indicate the extent to which Tribal Councils fitted with traditional structures, or the
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level of familiarity with formal institutions already achieved by the Tribal Councils. That 
is to say that considering the experiences of other tribal communities in the Philippines, 
see for example Eder [1993] and Schlege! [1999], it was not anticipated that indigenous 
communities would be in a ‘pristine* state. Rather that some adaptation toward modem 
institutions would be underway.
In order to establish the impact of violence in the region hosting the Tampakan Copper 
Project, levels of criminal activity and proximity to host communities was to be 
assessed. Moreover, analysis of the causes of crime also had to be conducted. That is 
to identify not only the threat to Social Capital but the prospects for strengthening it too. 
Local crime of an economic nature, such as cattle rustling and theft of property, would 
suggest that the strengthening of social capital and other local economic initiatives 
could play a role in development. Ethnic, religious or political issues on the other hand, 
might imply more serious obstacles to progress.
With respect to Power, in order to estimate the ability of communities hosting the 
Tampakan Copper Project, to articulate themselves in the prevailing political and 
economic sphere, means of assessing their rights and powers had to be found. 
Moreover, these had to be connected with development in order that communities could 
be said to have benefited from them, or conversely, that development could be seen to 
have been denied should the communities fail to secure them. They also had to be 
specific, preferably delimited by laws. That is because other factors, such as whether 
communities had sufficient resources, or the will to assert themselves, might otherwise 
cloud the issue and render findings ambiguous or impossible to prove.
Two familiar aspects pertaining to the welfare of indigenous communities in developing 
countries are their right to the land on which they live in the face of encroachment by 
outsiders, and access to state services - see Leonen and Begonia [1995] and Hughes 
[2000]. For the former, analysis of tenurial legislation and challenges encountered in its 
application could provide indication of tenurial security. Regarding the latter, different 
regions have different developmental priorities and some aspect of development for 
which there was a need, had to be isolated. Considering the remote location of the 
Tampakan Copper Project and distances from the host communities to market places, 
schools, etc., road construction provided a potential example.
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Testing of capacity for Understanding among the communities hosting the Tampakan 
Copper Project demanded assessment of their grasp of the physical and temporal 
implications of a large scale open-cut mine. This was to be achieved by means of 
structured interviews. Key issues relating to the size of a mine, the time it would take to 
build, and what the communities intended to do with rents and royalties accruing 
therefrom, was to provide an indication.
The Tribal Councils and Foundation Boards, and relations between the two were the 
obvious basis upon which to assess Procedural Equity on the part of the host 
communities in their relationship with mining. The role of the company and state 
agencies who participated in Foundation Boards had to be compared with that of 
Councils and their representatives to the Boards. On account of the distinct structure of 
the Councils and Foundations, this appeared a straightforward task. However, it 
depended upon access to the company and its willingness to discuss Council affairs, 
and also on triangulation of data wherever information gathered from Councils clashed 
with, or was confounded by, that provided by the company. This demanded the 
collection of data relating to developmental initiatives at the site of the Tampakan 
Copper Project from alternative sources.
Finally, as has been noted, test factors such as tenurial rights, and the allocative 
structure that determined the creation of new roads, were located in the surrounding 
institutional, social and political environment. Others, such as grasp of the realities of 
mining among.host communities, and the relationship between traditional structures and 
the Tribal Councils, were located within the boundaries of the Tampakan Copper 
Project. This distinction raised questions relating to the roles of government and 
company. Factors found to influence the Project from within, relating to for example, the 
Tribal Council or Foundations, would indicate that attention needs to be directed toward 
the actions of the company. Factors sourcing from outside the Project would point to 
the responsibility of the state and the extent to which it was able to support the 
company - and participate in Financial and Technical Assistance Agreements. This 
reinforced the need for a two part methodology, one assessing the environment within 
which the Tampakan Copper Project was located in conjunction with hypothetical 
preconditions associated with the region. The other addressing the performance of 
Tribal Councils and any relationship among those hypothetical preconditions applying 
to the proposed mining area itself. Chapter Four presents the methodological approach
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to these tasks. First however, a case study of the region and the host communities 
concerned, forms the basis of Chapter Three.
2.8. Research questions.
Having explained the apparent obstacles according to which the recommendations of 
the World Bank are to be tested, this section of the literature chapter serves to outline 
the research questions and a series of subsidiary questions. The purpose of this 
exercise is to indicate in practical terms how this thesis is to be operationalised. 
Following each subheading the obstacles presented in the previous sections will be 
successively addressed in terms of what this thesis is asking and how these questions 
will bejnvestigated and analysed. The final section will explain how the comparative 
methodology will function.
Antecedent Factors
The literature presented in section 2. 2., identifies the antecedent social context of 
specific communities as having important implications for local mineral-driven 
development. It is therefore necessary to ask what kind of social /  organisational 
structures exist among the communities hosting the Tampakan Copper Project This is 
to be achieved by interviews with Tribal Councillors and figures familiar with local life- 
ways, such as representatives of the Roman Catholic Diocese of Marbel, or existing aid 
organisations like Oxfam - Community Aid Abroad, who are active in the region. 
Comparison between these traditional systems among B'laan people, and processes of 
the Tribal Council - Foundation structure, local government, and other institutions, will 
indicate differences between traditional and modem systems of social organisation in 
Tampakan. Where local communities have shed traditional systems and adopted new 
ways of doing things such as participation in the Barangay system of local government, 
and familiarity with formal systems such as land title, and use of bank accounts, etc., or 
vice versa, that communities maintaining traditional systems and not engaging with 
formal institutions, findings can be compared with the performance of respective Tribal 
Council - Foundations. That is to ask whether communities who adhere to traditional 
systems perform well in terms of the objectives of the Tribal Council -  Foundation 
system. Correlations between adherence to traditional systems and mastery of modem 
institutions, positive or otherwise, are intended to throw light upon the role of 
antecedent structures, and suggest whether new local institutions such as Tribal 
Councils and Foundations should be modelled upon them.
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To summarize the questions raised;
•  What kind of social /  organisational structures exist among communities hosting the 
Tampakan Copper project?
•  What differences are there between traditional and modem systems of social 
organisation in Tampakan?
•  How do communities who adhere to traditional systems perform in terms of the 
Tribal Council System?
•  What is the role of traditional systems and antecedent social structures?
•  Should tribal Councils and Foundations be more closely modelled on traditional 
systems?
Violence.
While the World Bank has acknowledged the possibility that the activities of mining 
companies may engender violent responses that obstruct company activities, they do 
not countenance the possibility that other conflicts might have a similar effect. In order 
to address violence as an obstacle to local mineral-driven development, it is therefore 
necessary to identify the causes of any violence in proximity to the Tampakan mine-site. 
This will involve gathering empirical data from the Philippine National Police, as well as 
security agencies charged with managing security at the mine-site. It will also involve 
gathering qualitative information from community members, and organisations such as 
the Diocese of Marbel, relating to the causes of violence. All of this data can then be 
triangulated, patterns identified, and generic causes of violence described.
Following that, the impact of violence upon the local mineral-driven development 
process has to be assessed. That is to ask what changes violence is effecting upon 
local development This may be demonstrated directly through stoppages in 
development projects, or indirectly through curfews and breaks in communication 
between parties to local development Considering the causes of violence in terms of 
their social origins, it should be possible to make concluding comments about whether 
local development is feasible and indeed, about the circumstances in which mining 
should proceed. Moreover, it might also be possible to identify where mining 
companies may be able to cope with, and in the longer term reduce conflicts, through 
particular local development strategies or initiatives.
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To summarize the questions to be asked;
•  What are the causes of violence in the proximity of the Tampakan minesite?
•  What patterns and generic causes of violence can be identified?
• What influence is violence exerting over local development?
•  To what extent is local mineral-driven development feasible in the context of 
violence in the area?
• What might be circumstances under which mining should or should not proceed?
• How might mining companies cope with or address violence through their local 
development strategy?
Political power.
The third obstacle to local development is the lack of political power available to local 
communities hosting mining projects in developing countries. Remote or traditional 
communities generally occupy a marginal position in terms of economic and statutory 
structures. This situation prevents them from sustaining development gains beyond the 
terms of support provided by mining companies. It is therefore important to evaluate 
the political context in which host communities live, in order to assess whether local 
development will be sustainable. That means asking whether the communities affected 
by the Tampakan Copper Project are able to participate in economic and legislative 
institutions, if they are registered citizens, whether they are voting in elections, whether 
they own businesses, whether they hold title to land, and whether they are able to 
influence political decisions in the region. Political influence may be demonstrated by 
tracking the progress of requests made to statutory bodies or government agencies, 
and establishing to what extent specific needs are being addressed by local 
government units or other government agencies.
Where communities have greater participation in social, legal, and economic 
institutions, then agricultural and marketing initiatives aimed at providing for local 
development, such as carrot production or improvements to farm to market linkages, 
that are enacted on the ground, have a greater likelihood of being sustained in the 
longer term and beyond the life of the mine. If no progress has been made in terms of 
political power on the part of host communities, then sustainable development gains 
may be precarious.
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Questions to be asked;
•  What is the political context within which the communities hosting the Tampakan 
Copper Project live?
• Are community members able to participate in various economic institutions such as 
elections, business ownership, and title to land?
• Are local development gains sustainable?
Understanding.
The fourth factor is the level of understanding of the realities of mining held by local 
communities. According to the anthropological literature reviewed in section 2. 5., a low 
level of understanding on the part of communities hosting mining projects, may be 
ignored by outsiders and subsequently undermine agreements between companies and 
local communities, and hence mineral-driven development itself. In order to assess the 
implications of understanding for local development, it is necessary to ask how much of 
the proposed mining project the host communities in Tampakan understand. That 
means meeting with them and discussing the realities of mining by means of open- 
ended questions focussed on specific themes, such as the timescale involved and 
dimensions of a large mine. These questions are to be targeted at Tribal Councillors 
because it was these members of the communities who are responsible for decision­
making. Once an assessment of the level of understanding on the part of each 
community has been made, comparison between their grasp of certain aspects of 
mining and specific project proposals will provide a direct indication of preparedness for 
mining. Moreover, comparison between the level of understanding of the implications 
of mining and the performance of each of the new Tribal Councils may also provide a 
correlation between understanding and performance. Furthermore, if communities are 
found to have a minimal level of understanding of mining, then this will have 
implications not only for their ability to manage development in accordance with the 
mine and to sustain development in the eventual absence of the mine, but for the 
validity of agreements between Western Mining and the B’laan communities, and the 
very 'partnership' between company and community.
Questions to be addressed;
•  How much of the proposed mining project do host communities grasp?
• Are communities prepared for the implications of mining?
• Is there any correlation between preparedness for mining and the performance of 
Tribal Councils?
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• Is the notion of partnership between company and community realistic?
•  Are agreements between the company and host communities valid?
Procedural Equity.
The fifth area according to which local mineral-driven development efforts are to be 
scrutinised, is Procedural Equity. That is to say, by finding out whether the host 
communities are able to express themselves in terms of their developmental 
institutions, or whether perhaps these are being used by the company or the 
government as vehicles for implementing their own strategies for development or 
otherwise. In order to establish this, it is important to examine the workings of the Tribal 
Council -  Foundation system. That means assessing how the Tribal Council - 
Foundations works, what are the roles of the communities and company therein, how 
well each party is equipped to participate, and what are the rules governing their 
participation, e.g., can Western Mining overrule the host communities, or can the 
communities opt out of agreements. It also means assessing the actual proceedings of 
the Tribal Council -  Foundation system in terms of for example, attendance of 
meetings, recording of inputs, project proposals, and management of budgets. If it is 
the case that the company are dominating the Tribal Council -  Foundation system, it 
will be less likely that the affected communities are making decisions for, and hence 
managing, their own development, and the horizon for sustainable local development is 
further away than it might appear.
Summary of questions;
•  How do the Tribal Councils and Foundations operate?
• What was being achieved by the Tribal Councils and Foundations?
• Are the communities able to articulate themselves through the Tribal Council -  
Foundation system?
• Is the Tribal Council - Foundation system being used by mining interests to impose 
their development strategy upon the communities and their traditional territories?
• What are the rules governing the functioning of Tribal Councils and Foundations?
Comparative Analysis.
As a means of deepening the preceding bases for analysis, this research also sought to 
compare the performances of each Tribal Council as a vehicle for facilitating 
developmental efforts. This meant measuring the activities of each of the Tribal 
Councils, which was done on the basis of a series of indicators of performance, fulfilled
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by various data pertaining to the Tribal Councils. Some of this data was collected from 
Tribal Council members themselves. Other information came from publications 
concerned with the progress of local development efforts, as well as Western Mining, 
aid agencies, and the Diocese of Marbel, among others. The purpose of the index is to 
identify any consistencies between each of the Tribal Council performances. If one 
Council can be demonstrated to have performed better than any other, then this pattern 
would pave the way for comparison with those obstacles which sourced from within the 
local area -  that is the influence of antecedent social structures, understanding, and 
procedural equity. Positive or negative correlation between these local factors and 
Tribal Council performance would afFirm or deny the influence of antecedence, 
understanding, and procedural equity upon local development
Questions;
•  What are the activities undertaken by each of the Tribal Councils?
•  Are there any consistencies between the performances of Tribal Councils?
•  How do patterns of Tribal Council performance compare with local obstacles to 
mineral-driven development?
•  Does the comparative performance of the Tribal Councils support any apparent 
influence of antecedent social systems, understanding and procedural equity upon 
local development?
2.9. Definitions of key concepts.
Having set up the research questions, it is important to define a number of key concepts 
in relation to the literature before embarking upon the presentation of research itself.
These concepts, used throughout this thesis, include Community, Tradition, Modernity, 
Sustainable Economic Development Participatory Development, Rationality, and 
Power. They are used widely in social sciences literature for a variety of different 
purposes, hence it is essential to define them in the context of this work.
The term Community is used to describe six groups of people directly affected by the 
proposed mining project. They are the immigrant Visayan farmers and their families, and 
the indigenous B'laans who inhabit the area, who in turn comprised five tribal groups, 
sometimes referred to as clans, who had been adopted by Western Minings’ community 
development program, the Office for Southern Cultural Communities /  National Commission 
for Indigenous Peoples, and by church and other aid organisations, for support. This usage 
is in accordance with studies of indigenous peoples in the Philippines, such as Eder [1993]
64
and Schlegel [1999]. It must however be acknowledged that scholars such as Gujit and 
Shah [1998] have questioned the term Community in development discourse. They argue 
that simplistic understandings of communities treat them as homogeneous, static, and 
harmonious units, within which people share common interests and needs. This articulation 
of community, they argue, conceals power relations within communities and masks biases in 
interests and needs based on age, class, ethnicity, gender and religion. Indeed, Eder 
raises such concerns when deconstructing the stereotype of tribal societies as enjoying “a 
harmonious state of equilibrium with their environment. .  primitive affluence. .  contentment.
. and as being antimaterialisticf. Eder cites studies by Epstein [1968], Salisbury [1970], and 
Sutlive [1978] which present individualism and achievement orientation, which influenced 
the responses of tribal peoples to new opportunities for participation in wider socio­
economic systems [Eder 1993 p. 3]. Because of the life span of mining contracts - the 
Financial andTechncal Assistance Agreement between Western Mining and the Philippine 
government was for twenty-five years with the option of another twenty-five - and the 
timescale of processes such as land reforms in the Philippines, it was always expected that 
social changes would emerge within the five ‘traditional’ B’laan communities in particular. 
Indeed, the communal concept of land, embodied by the Certificates of Ancestral Land 
Claim in 1993, and susequently, Certificates of Ancestral Land Title in 1997, was 
particularly suspect, and as research established, was already being superseded by 
individuals among the five communities.
Two more concepts used throughout this thesis, and which demand definition are 
Tradition and Modernity. These work in opposing terms, which is to say that they are two 
broad poles that describe the lives of the B’laan communities affected by the proposed 
mine. The following table summarises key opposing features of tradition and modernity as 
they apply in this thesis.
Tradition Modernity
Internal tp the community
Informal
Local
Spoken word 
Customary law
Conducted in B’laan language 
Barter trade
Tribal - Kasfala justice system
External
Formal
National /  ‘western’
Written word
Constitutional / Filipino law 
Conducted in Filipino /  English language 
Cash economy /  banking / finance. 
Police /  Regional Trial Courts
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James Eder provides an excellent definition of traditional lifeways and the interface with 
modernity among Batak tribal groups in the Philippines [Eder 1993].
Regarding Sustainable Economic Development, perhaps the most familiar interpretation 
of sustainable development is that espoused by the World Commission on Environment 
and Development, which states that ‘Sustainable development is development that 
meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to 
meet their needs’ [World Commission on Environment and Development 1987:43].
This refers to the relationship between economic change and the natural resource base 
In which it is grounded. Performance is typically measured in terms of Gross National 
Product, energy consumption, and population growth rates. Recommendations focus 
on environmental resources and restraints on economic activities where they damage 
environments at a rate that exceeds capacity to reodver [de Haari, Kasimls, and 
Reddift, eds., 1997], However, this ‘strong sustainability’ definition, which implies that 
the same or an equivalent resource base will be available in the future, is not an 
appropriate Basis fo f this thesis. That is Because IB the case of major miffing projects, 
environmental impact and the appropriation of resources is already a given -  by its very 
nature, mining defies the World Commission’s definition of sustainable development.
Moreover, because of the capital and technological intensity of large scale mining 
projects, copper cannot be regarded as a common pool resource in the extraction of 
which local communities can participate. Hence, sustainability is here judged from a 
social father than enviforim e® in terms of the success of community
development projects rather than mining itself. As the experience of Tembagapura in 
Irian Jaya, presented in section 2.1., and also in Papua New Guinea in section 2.6., 
indicate, initiatives aimed at compensating communities and passing on some of the 
benefits of mining to local people, failed, leaving many people worse off than before. In 
critiquing interpretations of sustainable development, Robert Chambers contrasts 
environment thinking with development thinking and livelihood thinking, which offers a 
more useful starting point for local mineral-driven developers. He observes that the 
poor do not share the same concerns as economists or biologists, and that they are 
iriterested in reducing immediate risks arid obtaining short term gains [Chambers 1993]! 
This is borne out by experience at mining projects and feeds into the hands of 
companies who have obtained agreements with host communities in exchange for cash 
and even basic foodstuffs. Experience at e3dsiing minesites in developing countries
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indicates that achieving suslalriabie economic development would be a complex task 
and probably comprise the following points. Host communities often only participate in 
cash economies to a limited extent. They need money in order to obtain a growing 
number of esienfialsj from food, to seed, and books for those cHildreri fhat attend 
school. However, they may only be able to obtain money through the sale of a handful 
of surplus crops. In order to sell more of these crops they need various agricultural 
inputs, services such as roads and means of transportation. In order to consolidate 
their economic base, they also need to develop new skills, for which they require 
training in the short term and education in the long term. Wherever possible, they need 
jobs with mining companies andthe support services they attract In short, sustainable 
economic development means host communities first securing meaningful gains from 
their agreements with mining companies, and then maintaining those gains beyond the 
time at which compensation androyalties from mining"finish, a! a level equal to, or 
better than they had experienced prior to mining.
Another important idea is Participatory Development, which is conventionally presented 
as a response to the shortcomings of top-down development The ineffectiveness of 
externally imposed and export oriented planning became increasingly evident in the 
1980s, when development programmes began adbptirig participatory methods'- see for 
example, Robert Chambers [1983]. The aim of participatory strategies was to make 
people central to development. Indeed, the World Bank saw participation as a process 
through which stakeholders could share control over development initiatives [Worfd 
Bank 1994]. This recognition of greater involvement of local perspectives and priorities 
presented an alternative to outsider led development, and was widely adopted by 
organisations." Participatory approacBes't6"development justifiecf in terms'
of sustainability, relevance, and empowerment
However, Bill Cooke' and Uma Kothari have raised a number of caveats that must be 
acknowledged if this definition of participation by B’laans in the Tampakan Copper 
Projects’ Community Development Program is to be upheld. Their criticisms of 
participatory approaches comprises of two argurherits. The first focuses on the 
practical and technical limitations of participatory methods, the second on theoretical, 
political, and conceptual limitations of the participatory discourse itself [Cooke and 
Kothari 2001}. David Mosse demonstrates that local knowledge is often structured by 
participatory strategies, rather than the other way around. Indeed, local need was 
actually shaped by local perceptions of what local people anticipated that the
6?
development agency could deliver. Mosse also shows how participatory ideals are 
often operationally constrained by institutional contexts that require bureaucratic goals 
to be met [Mosse pp. 16-36 in Cooke and Kothari 2001]. Frances Cleaver points out 
the inadequacy of participatory approaches’ models of individual agency and the links 
between these and social structures. Cleaver argues that understandings of the 
motivations of individuals to participate, or not, are vague, and simplictic assumptions 
are often made about the rationality inherent in participating, and the irresponsibility of 
not doing so [Cleaver pp. 36-56, in Cooke and Kothari 2001]. Hildyard, Hegde, 
Wolvekamp, and Reddy show that while participatory forest management arose from 
political pressures arising from popular unrest over the commercial exploitation of 
forests and local peoples exclusion from forest resources, it nevertheless served to 
maintain that exploitation and exclusion. They conclude that unless participatory 
processes take into account the relative bargaining power of stakeholders, they are in 
danger of merely providing opportunities for the more powerful [Hildyard, Hegde, 
Wolvekamp, and Reddy 2001]. Furthermore, Henkel and Stirrat address the idea of 
empowerment They ask: for what purpose do development planners seek to empower. 
Their answer to this question is that participants are empowered to take part in the 
modem sector of developing societies, and that empowerment is therefore tantamount 
to Foucaula'ian subjection [Henkel and Stirrat 2001].
These issues do not mean that participation is a bad thing, but that acts and processes 
of participation - sharing knowledge, negotiating power relationships, political activism 
and so on - can conceal and reinforce oppression and injustice. As Cooke and Kothari 
point out, participatory development is constructed by development professionals. This 
must be accompanied by acknowledgement of questions such as ‘Whose reality 
counts?' [Chambers 1997], which suggests that there are contrasting versions of reality.
Concerning Rationality, Wendy Espeland refers to Karl Marx, George Simmel, and Max 
Weber, among other thinkers, who all argue that processes of rationalisation change 
what is meaningful and how we apprehend meaning [Espeland 1998:1-42]. Weber 
defines rationality in a series of distinctions, the most fundamental being rational and 
irrational action, with affective [or expressive] and traditional [or habitual] motivations 
exemplifying the latter. Rational action entails some logical relation between the action 
arid the goals of the actiori, whether these are a desired erid or belief. Weber further 
distinguishes between subjective rationality that may guide an individual’s behaviour, 
and objectified rationality, that has become institutionalised by values, rules or
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fecHniqlies [Weber TS75': 355}. Two forms of suBjecfive rationality theft dominate 
Weber's analysis are instrumental rationality and substantive, or value rationality. 
Instrumental rationality is oriented toward evaluating the means for accomplishing some 
defined end, arid value rationality is cdhdefh'ed with the intrinsic value of sdrfie action, 
without regard for its success or consequences [Weber 1978:24-25], In describing 
various forms of objectified rationality, Weber distinguishes between substantive 
rationality which is oriented toward some criteria of ultimate ends or values, and formal 
rationality which is oriented toward the calculation of means or procedures [Brubaker 
1984: 36]. Thus the former is a matter of value and the latter is a matter of fact. So, to 
qoute Espelarid, "eddtidtiiic Sctioti is fofmatty rStidnH fdf'W ebefwtien itiS  bSSeddti 
quantitative calculation, accounting, and deliberate planning; it is substantively rational 
to the extent that some ultimate value, whether it be hedonistic, utilitarian, egalitarian, or 
any one o f the infinite vanetydf pessihte values, provides the ctftetidn for evaluating the 
results of economic action" [Espeland 1998:35].
In explaining the process by which the Central Arizona Project's plan to dam the River 
Orme was overturned in favour of the Yavapai Indian community residing in the area 
immediately down stream, Espeland analyses the rationalities that motivated the Project 
itself,' and the community whose lifeways were at stake [Espeland 1998], Espeland 
refers to Theodore Porter, who argues that quantitative technologies like cost-benefit 
analyses are often responses to conflict, distrust, and scrutiny. However, the authority 
of numbers can threaten or limit other forms of authority such as personal discretion, 
informal knowledge, and expert judgement [Porter 1995:148-89]. Espeland's ‘Old 
Guard’ within the Central Arizona Project, represented a monolithic approach to dam 
building that ignored the sentiments of the community. The ‘New Guard’ attempted to 
use rational choice analyses to incorporate the needs of the Community, whose 
qualitative and value-based rationality defied such attempts at commensuration. 
RelaWns'between these groups reveal that tensions and contradictions are likely to 
arise when rationalities collide.
Parties to the Tampakan Copper Project come under three' broad headings. They are 
the State, the Company and the Community. Each operated according to specific 
rationalities. For the Filipino state, rationality was framed by national development 
goals, that were brokered by central government within the metropolis. The rationality 
of the state was formal, but subject to so many influences emanating from beyond the 
Project area, that it might be argued that at a local level the state acted in an irrational
manner For the company, rationality was formal arid framed 6y corporate ideals, that 
is profit and the cost-effectiveness of mining operations. For the community, rationality 
was more elusive to an outsider, but it was clearly substantive, being based upon more 
qualitative values, which Ware apparahtry ihc^ lrhmehsUfate With quantitative methods of 
state and company in particular. Research indicated that each of these rationalities 
were in fact changing as the project progressed. Broadly speaking, the state was 
changing slowly andthe motivation to do so was evolving political priorities and broad 
public opinion across the country. The company were also subject to public pressure to 
incorporate local perspectives, especially within its home country, Australia, but also 
because doing so made reear partnerships more effective. Finariy, within the B'taan 
community, the desire to obtain financial gain and secure rights such as land title, were 
eroding qualitative values such as the unique value of land.
Finally, it is arso important to say something about the term power and what it means in 
the context of this thesis. Power applies to relations between B’iaan individuals and 
communities, and external institutions such as mining companies, local government and 
the national raws of the Philippine Republic. Power is used in the manner of ‘outcome 
power*, described by Keith Dowding as the ability of an actor to bring about or help to 
bring about outcomes [Dowding 1996: 5], and is defined by the degree of influence 
BTaaris had OVer these rrisOfufTdris, encompassing legislative, economic, arid cultural 
aspects. For example, in terms of legislation, section 5.3 of this thesis charts the 
progress of traditional or tribal communities in securing legal tenure to their ancestral 
domains. Section 5.2. assesses relations between focal government arid the degree to 
which B’laans participated in the local economy. Sections 7.3.2. and 7.4. consider the 
workings of the Foundation Boards and the role B’laans had therein, which expresses 
their influence over decision-making in the local mirieral-dfiveri development project.
All of these express a low degree of influence or power on the part of B’laans, which 
was an outstanding feature of their development dilemma.
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Chapter Three.
A Casestudy of Tampakan.
Chapter Three comprises three sections relating to the area within which research 
focused. The first introduces the B’laan people, and outlines their systems of social 
organisation, upon which basis the impact of modem structures could be assessed.
The second presents the history of the region, which influenced the rights and power of 
B’laans within the prevalent political economy. Specific challenges included in- 
migration by settlers from the Visayas and Luzon, and the formal legislative framework 
for land tenure. The third section turns to the Tampakan Copper Project itself, 
introducing the five communities hosting the mining project and their relationship with 
Western Mining Corporation.
This exercise is important for a number of reasons. First, - as section 3 .1 . explains - 
traditional societies throughout the Philippines are ignored by many prominent works of 
Filipino history - see for example Agondllo [1967] and Constantino [1975 and 1978]. 
Traditional societies are also absent from those pragmatic textbook histories produced 
by foreign historians such as Wurfel [1991] and Steinberg [1994], In recent years 
however, a new wave of scholarship has come to the fore, providing a more inclusive 
interpretation of events. They have been led by historians such as Glenn Anthony May, 
who have berated their predecessors for creating a Tagalog myth of nationhood which 
has been imposed across the archipelago [May 1997]. Scholars of indigenous affairs 
such as Rodil [1993 /1994] and Gaspar [2000] have lamented the erosion of tribal 
cultures. Indeed, many B’laans with whom this research had contact, requested that 
their history be heard.
From a methodological point of view, as an alien to the region, with no native 
knowledge, it was also necessary to develop acquaintance with the area in question. 
This was in order to identify issues of concern for host communities and impacts to their 
lifeways that might otherwise go unnoticed, if for example, modem or formal 
institutions, that is to say the Tribal Councils established by the Office of Southern 
Cultural Communities /  National Commission for Indigenous Peoples, and Foundation 
Boards sponsored by Western Mining, were to be evaluated in accordance with their 
compatibility with traditional structures, as demanded by the hypothesis, those 
structures had to be assessed.
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This need was emphasised by the fact that unlike other traditional societies in the 
Philippines, such as the Bataks on Palawan island and the Teduray in western 
Cotabato, whose histories, economies and social structures have been the subject of 
rigorous contemporary studies, see Eder [1993] and Schlegel [1972 /1975  /1979] 
respectively, no comprehensive account of B’laan lifeways was available. A number of 
unpublished theses and other small studies did exist - see Lalo [1997], Lasen [1998], 
Lutero [1986], Ogoy [1985], and Sevilla [1999], but these were narrow in their focus and 
afforded no broad assessment of the B’laan predicament.
Section 3. 2. comprises a description of Visayan settlement of the region and 
explanation of the subsequent process of land titling with respect to indigenous 
communities. This demonstrates the considerable degree of institutionalisation of the 
tenurial system and marginalisation of B’laan communities. That is to say political 
structures were found to be historically entrenched and running along ethnic, cultural 
and linguistic lines. This had implications for both violence and political leverage, as 
factors limiting local mineral-driven development within the regional context.
Section 3. 3. duly addresses the positionality of mining and research relating thereto, in 
southern Mindanao. The rights of indigenous communities in the Philippines is a highly 
contentious arena, see for example, Broad and Cavanagh [1992], Rodil [1993], Tadem 
[1990], and Vitug [1993], Both the Mining Act of 1995 and the Indigenous Peoples 
Rights Act of 1997 were subject to legal challenge in the Philippine Supreme Court on 
constitutional grounds - see Cruz [1999] and Guzman and Tujman [1998] respectively.
In light of the claims and counterclaims of those 'for* and ‘against’ mining projects 
across the Philippine archipelago, it was important to establish the circumstances as 
they applied to host communities at this specific minesite - B’laans in the vicinity of 
Tampakan.
Moreover, accounts of B’laan history were frequently found to contain conflicting 
statements. Existing studies also reflected the ethnicity, political position, or 
occasionally the views of those who had contracted them. This gave rise to false 
impressions of the circumstances facing B’laan society, and mistaken assumptions of 
B'laan lifeways were commonplace. It was clearly important to avoid perpetuating 
inconsistencies, and to construct an accurate impression of how the B’laan situation 
had come about, in order to establish a reliable basis for research.
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This point also had ethical implications, there being an obligation to give B’laans a 
voice. An illustration of B'laan lifeways and challenges thereto, constitutes part of the 
contract between researcher and researched. That is in the sense that a PhD. thesis is 
a means of fulfilment, career advancement, and perhaps financial gain for the 
researcher, it is likewise a means for those who contributed to, and were subject of that 
thesis, to further their interests. Indeed, in a climate of ‘exploitation’ engendered in the 
most direct sense, by the arrival of a multi-national mining company, perceptions of 
something being taken away extended to all contacts between local people and 
outsiders.
3.1. The B’laan people and their social organisation.
Using the end of the Spanish colonial era in 1898 as a point of reference, the people of 
the Philippine archipelago may be categorised as those who were colonised and those 
who were not Those colonised generally belong to barrio and barangay communities, 
which respectively encompass the modem urban and rural populations. Those who 
were not colonised can be further sub-divided into those who resisted subjugation, and 
those who evaded contact with the Spaniards.
The first sub-group includes the thirteen Islamicised ethnolinguistic groups in Mindanao 
and Sulu, who are often referred to as ‘Moras’. The second sub-group comprises 
eighteen ethnolinguistic groups collectively known as ‘Lumads’, a Cebuano word 
meaning indigenous [Rodil 1992:242]. B’laans are one of these Lumad groups, 
occupying the southern and eastern regions of the province of south Cotabato, 
Southeast Davao Del Sur, around Lake Buluan in North Cotabato, and on Sarangani 
Island - see Map 3.
According to the national census of 1980, the population of Mindanao comprised 8 
million Christians, 2 million Moslems, and 700 000 Lumads [Casino 2000:105]. 
However, estimates of the B’laan population vary widely, going as high as 450 000 
[Avancena-Arcenas 1993:4]. 250 000 is the figure quoted by the Cultural Center of the 
Philippines’ Encyclopaedia of Philippine Art in 1994 [CCP 1994:130] and the now 
defunct Presidential Assistance for National Minorities in Mindanao, or PANAMIN 
[Lutero 1986:20]. Lutero also refers to an account by James and Gladys Dean, who 
approximated the B’laan population to be 20 000 in 1955 [Dean 1955: 313]. In 1978 
Passionist Father George Nolan who lived among the B’laan for more than a decade, 
estimated their number to be 60 000, while Father Carl Schmitz, whose pastoral area
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covered the hinterland of South Cotabato, judged it to be 75 000 in 1983 [Lutero 1986:
20]. The discrepancy between these figures expresses the paucity of rigorous studies 
concerning B’laan lifeways. The figure of 450 000 suggests that many included were 
actually mestizoes. What are essential B’laan characteristics also varies from one 
observer to another. Whether B’laans are nomadic, whether they live within traditional 
B’laan communities or speak B’laan dialects, and perhaps on the part of those with a 
more intimate relationship with them, whether or not they consider themselves to be 
B’laan, are all very different measures of identity.
The B’laan language comprises several local dialects. They also have a strong oral 
tradition, exemplified by the transcriptions of Cesar Lutero [1986]. Approximately half speak 
a Visayan language too, usually llonggo or Cebuano, of which all knew at least a few 
words.
Traditional B’laan subsistence depends upon Alnigo or Kaingin agriculture. This involves 
‘swidden’, ‘shifting’ or ‘slash-and-bum’ activities, similar to those described by Harold Conklin 
[Conklin 1961]. Commonly cultivated crops include rice, maize, banana, cassava and 
camote, and vegetables. An increasing portion of produce is taken to municipal marketplaces 
as cash crops, through the sale of which processed food, utensils, clothing and tools are 
obtained. Domestic animals include chickens and occasionally pigs, cows, and carabao - a 
large bovine species used for ploughing and hauling loads. B’laans in remote areas fish in 
rivers and hunt or trap wild pigs, deer, and monkeys, as are available. They also gather 
rattan to supplement their income, and fruits, nuts, and other products as part of their diet.
Mutual assistance is characteristic of B’laan culture, as manifested in the building of a house, 
clearing of land for planting, and the formation of an avenging party in order to seek retribution 
for wrongs done by another group or ‘clan’.
Blair and Robertson cite many of the earliest references to B’laans, from which it is clear that 
they shared the region with ‘Moras’, in particular the coast and certain settlements such as 
Lutayan and Buluan [Blair and Robertson 1903-9:190-197]. Through this influence, while not 
converted to Islam, B’laans did acquire many sodo-cultural, trade, and agricultural innovations.
The anthropologist, Fay Cooper-Cole, who visited the area in 1911, noted that because of 
mountainous tecrain, social organisation among B’laans was local. Communities were 
dispersed into small clusters and individual households for proximity to agricultural land and 
water sources. This obstructed the evolution of a central system of authority, the distance 
between valley settlements not permitting easy communication [Cooper-Cole 1913:131].
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Referring to B'laan society, Joseph Lalo explains how iocal settlement-based leaders are 
referred to as Bong Fulong, which translates as Big Leader, or where they are younger or of 
lesser social stature, simply as Fulong [Lalo 1997]. Where Moro influence has intervened, 
they may be known as Datu, although among B'laans this implies Moro suzerainty and not 
conversion to Islam. The position of Fulong is generally hereditary, leaders being 
succeeded by sons unless the son proves incapable, in which case another prominent male 
assumes the role. Several accounts of the qualifications associated with Fulongs were 
noted. Many of these related to the life of one Datu Baro Imba.
Data Baro Imba.
When Visayans arrived in Tampakan in 1940, ‘Data Baro’ was the most important B’laan 
in die eastern half of Marbel municipality, as well as parts of Columbio, Kiblawan and 
Tupi. Elderly settlers recalled Baro as a warrior, hunter, and fisherman. He was said to 
have had thirty-four wives and to have died in 1974 from an ulcer.
In Sitio Siok, part of Barangay Esperanza in the Municipality of Koronadal, an elderly 
B’laan related that his father had been Datu Tokayan, a brother-in-law of Baro. He 
explained that part of Baro’s importance derived from his ability to manufacture 
traditional metal objects like Agong [gongs] and Bo-os [a box for carrying tobacco]. 
B’laans had no source of metal of their own and bartered for it with Muslim and T’boli 
people. Only a few had knowledge of working metal, which along with the brass itself 
was a craft introduced by Maguindanaons.
Two men of the Bong Mai community, Warug and Mandari Duon, and Malayon Malid, 
Chieftain of the Salna’ong Tribal Council, were nephews of Datu Baro. They explained 
that Baro did not ‘rule’ as a king over a certain territory or people. He was undoubtedly a 
man of physical prowess, but his leadership was based upon knowledge and judgement 
He was assisted in this by charisma and ability to persuade. Moreover, Baro was 
considered to have magical powers, belief in which extended his reputation and influence 
over a wide area.
When asked if any B’laan retained such powers, the three informants identified two 
apprentices of Baro within the community. However, much traditional power had been 
lost because of “development”. Manifestations of modernity, and consciousness of the 
world at large, had distracted B’laans. Moreover, in pre-modem times, B’laans believed 
in beings which occupied environmental features such as trees, mountains, or stones. The 
demise of traditional beliefs was related to the physical environment and the fact that the 
environment was nowadays different from the environment before. The removal of trees, 
construction of roads and conversion of valleys and mountains into farmland, had served 
to physically evict the B’laan belief system. While the landscape was becoming more 
familiar and reassuring to Visayans, it had become increasingly the opposite for 
traditional B’laans. This process was supported by die work of Gregorio Ogoy, which 
relates to changes among the B’laan community at Assumption, ten kilometres from 
Tampakan [Ogoy 1985: 42-66]._______________________________________________
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Fulongs had a role similar to that of a judge, administering Kasfaia, that was equivalent 
to a judicial court Advocates of opposing parties presented cases and offered their 
opinions. Only when a resolution agreeable to all sides was reached, was the case 
considered settled. Typically the transgressor had to pay a fine in terms of confiscated 
property or indentured labour, which reflected the scale of the crime, as decided upon 
at the Kasfaia. Thus the Kasfaia provided the basis for B'laan law.
Much of the Kasfaia caseload stemmed from marital relations. Disputes relating thereto 
represented the majority of aggressive acts between B’laans. Similarly, Schlegel states that 
some aspect of making or remaking family units, or settling disputes that dealt with who was 
married to whom, accounted for 95% of “legal cases” among the Teduray [Schlegel 1999:
115]. However, there was no evidence to indicate that the Kasfaia or any similar institution 
was ever a means of negotiating terms of trade equivalent to a market institution. Moreover, 
money and formal property rights were foreign concepts to traditional B’laans.
An elderly B'laan in barangay Saravia, part of Koronadal, explained that he had been a 
Bong Fulong and that nowadays his son was a Barangay Councillor. Being a Bong 
Fulong had meant talking with many people to resolve problems. With the arrival of 
settlers, this responsibility began to diminish. If a B'laan was arrested for a crime he 
would be charged and his case determined according to the Trial Court system.
To summarise, Fulong leadership and the Kasfaia system of justice was the basis for 
organisation within B’laan society. Analysis of traditional structures hypothesised to be 
of consequence for the success of institutional initiatives subsequently focused on the 
relationship between these systems and the Tribal Council - Foundation structure.
Furthermore, although no broad or rigorous study of B’laan law, kinship or family structure, 
comparable with Stuart Schlegel’s work among the Teduray in western Cotabato [Schlegel 
1975], was available, close parallels between B’laan social organisation and that of other 
tribes in southern Mindanao were observed. Eric Casino for example, uses social and 
cultural continuities across a swathe of indigenous groups, including B’laans, Manobos, 
T’bolis, and Tedurays, to explain political and economic relations in southern Mindanao 
[Casino 2000:288-90]. Such accounts provided additional material in support of findings.
3.2. The history of B’laan homelands and the process of their marginalisation.
While the preceding section has provided an introduction to the B’laan people and their 
social structures, such matters are internal to B'laan society and say nothing of the 
processes of change that have occurred in the twentieth century. These have
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permeated every aspect of B’laan life and have consequences for the hypothetical 
preconditions for mineral-driven development.
The colonisation of land by sedentary Visayan farmers, and the introduction of new 
farming techniques, seed types, etc., for cash production, forced B’laans into ever more 
remote and barren spaces - as had happened to indigenous communities throughout the 
Philippines [Peralta 1979]. Visayan and state institutions, sodai, legal and economic, 
dominate B’laan life, which has come to revolve around exchange and other relationships 
with outsiders. Elements of traditional life irrelevant to such relationships have fallen 
away, and an individual B’laan’s well-being now depends as much upon securing the co­
operation of a Visayan patron, as upon that of another B’laan.
This process began under the United States' administration. Between 1913 and 1917, 
six colonies were founded in the former sultanate of Cotabato. In 1918, the Bureau of 
Labor established the Interisland Migration Division, which recruited homeseekers in 
Manila and Visayan towns such as Cebu and llo-llo [Pelzer 1948:130].
The Commonwealth Government of Manuel Quezon [1935-1941] continued to strategise 
for the opening of the Mindanao ‘frontier’ [Ibid: 132]. The Koronadal National Land 
Settlement Project, comprising Marbel, Tupi, Polomolok and Lagao, was established in 
1941 [Ibid: 141]. Following Philippine Independence in 1946, the NLSA and the Rice 
and Com Production Administration, which supervised settlement of Buluan, were 
replaced by the Land Settlement and Development Corporation which administered 
settlement of the Allah valley; Tacurong and Bagumbayan. This was subsequently 
subsumed by the National Land Settlement and Rehabilitation Administration in 1954 
[Wemstedt and Simkins 1965: 92]. In 1963, the Land Authority, a product of the new 
Land Reform Code, made settlement part of the land reform program.
The establishment of municipal authorities in the 1950s and 60s marked the completion 
of state sponsored settlement Nevertheless, landlessness in the Visayas, and ongoing 
state promotion of Mindanao as a ‘land of opportunity’, contributed to immigration which 
exceeded that of the pre-war period. Following the survey of the plains on the west 
coast of the Davao Gulf, settlers moved onto the foothills of the Quezon mountains which 
were part of B'laan country. Cotabato and Davao absorbed over sixty percent of 
immigrants to Mindanao between 1948 and 1960, an estimated 790 000 people. Indeed, 
there was a shift in the focus of migration in the post-war period, from older areas of 
settlement on the northern coast of Mindanao, to these regions [Wemstedt and Simkins 
1965: 90-103].
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The scale of migration is reflected in municipal statistics. Of forty-two dialects recorded 
in Koronadal in 1995, by far the most common were llonggo [69%], Cebuano [10%], and 
llocano [10%] all originating in the Visayan islands. Indeed, these languages dominated 
every municipality in South Cotabato [Philippines’ National Statistics Office 1997: 56-65].
Some scholars observe that early relations between the settlers and local Moros and 
Lumads were peaceful and harmonious [Casino 2000:114]. Indeed, General Manager 
Paulino Santos assured NLSA Administrators in Manila that;
*all overseers of settlements have frequently held meetings with headmen of 
Moros and pagans in the Koronadal Valley, assuring them that the Administration 
would respect their legitimate claims to their land at alt times. All Bilaans who have 
lived for sometime on a piece of land, built their homes and tilled even a small 
patch of ground are respected in their holdings and allowed to stay. If they have 
no title to the land, the Administration offer to help them perfect their title to it.”
[Santos 1940: 45-6].
However, at issue was a fundamental contradiction between shifting cultivation and sedentary 
agriculture. This tension was heightened by the fact that the Visayan settlers were fleeing 
overcrowded lands, where many had been impoverished tenants. For them, the promise of 
landownership was the greatest motivator for the move to Mindanao. Furthenmore, the state 
had important strategic purposes for its sponsorship of settlement in Mindanao. These were 
the economic development of untapped natural resources, and the consolidation of national 
territory - the aspirational opening of a national frontier akin to the ‘American West’. In 
addition to these points, it was also intended that settlers would pre-empt any independence 
bid from within Mindanao [Pelzer 1948 /  Wemstedt and Simkins 1965].
The inevitable result was that very little thought was given to the needs of indigenous 
inhabitants. Karl Pelzer, an American scholar who was present in the Koronadal valley in 
1940, noted that although B’laans were concerned, surveyors 'gave only verbal assurances 
that their rights would be respected, telling them to declare their land for tax purposes and 
obtain tax receipts as evidence of ownership”. Such advice “was not very helpful, especially 
to the Bilaans." Furthermore, “It would have been better if the area could have been 
surveyed and sufficient land set aside for Bilaans and Moros" [Pelzer 1948:142]. Moreover, 
while referring to the recent imprisonment of B'laan debtors, Avancena-Arcenas states that 
“This is reminiscent of the first settlers who used to tie-up, beat, and display the Bilaans 
suspected of theft in the town square.” [Avancena-Arcenas 1993:18]
According to Fernando Lawihan, the B’laan Headmaster of Carpenter Hill Elementary 
School in the municipality of Koronadal, B’laans were not included on the list of those
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who could own land within surveyed areas. There were also problems establishing the 
legality of settler claims to land which had not been surveyed. Settlers gave cans of 
sardines, clothes and processed commodities in exchange for land. Some were honest, 
but others were not, paying to use land but titling it to themselves.
Indeed, the Visayan grip on southern Mindanao was institutionalised via land title, 
extending a historical pattern of consolidation that had unfolded throughout the Philippines 
over the previous 300 years. The Spanish crown had assumed possessionary rights 
following the 'discovery' of the archipelago, and commanded its subjects to register their 
lands [Lynch 1988], which were handed on to the United States in 1898 [Rodil 1994: 28]. 
Passed by the US Congress in 1902, eight Sections of the Philippine Bill related to state 
ownership of land and the manner of land disposition, with Section 12 stipulating “all the 
property and rights which may have been acquired under the treaty of peace with Spain" 
[Rodil 1992: 236]. Public Act No. 718, passed by the Philippine Commission the same 
year, entitled “An Act making void land grants from Moro sultans or dattos or from chiefs of 
non-Christian tribes when made without governmental authority or consent”, denied Moros 
and tribal peoples any right to dispose of their lands [Rodil 1994:29 /  Gaspar 2000:115]. 
The Land Registration Act, also passed by the Philippine Commission in 1902, provided 
subsequent guidelines for registration of private land. This was according to the Torrens 
system, adopted from Australia, under which, proof of ownership is only ensured by 
certification of title [Aranal-Serenos and Librarios: 1983]
Rules governing settlement in Mindanao by migrants, also impacted upon tribal lands.
The Public Land Act of 1903, allowed individuals to acquire homesteads not exceeding 
sixteen hectares each, and corporations 1024 hectares each, of “unoccupied, 
unreserved and unappropriated agricultural public lands”. No caveat was made for 
traditional communities. Amendments in 1919 increased the sixteen hectare allowance 
to twenty-four. Non-Christians were permitted no more than ten, to which strict 
conditions were attached. A five year permit had to be applied for at a cost of five 
pesos, after which the applicant could apply for a homestead. Each applicant had to 
cultivate their land. If this had not begun within 6 months, the permit was revoked. 
Commonwealth Act No. 41, as amended in 1936, withdrew the privilege earlier granted 
to settlers, of owning more than one twenty-four hectare homestead, and reverted to 
one, not exceeding sixteen hectares. However, the ten hectare maximum permitted to 
non-Christians was correspondingly reduced to four [Rodil 1992:238].
80
The Torrens system, and the notion of private property, dash with traditional concepts of land 
use. Unlike communities which have a custodial relationship with the land on which they live, 
title holders have the right to use and dispose of land, guaranteed to them by the state. 
Moreover, such laws discriminate against indigenous groups, as the majority are illiterate.
Because of this historical pattern, economic disenfranchisement and sodal exdusion 
followed ethnic lines. Gregorio Ogoy notes that;
After being dispossessed of their ancestral lands, the B'laans succumbed to other 
economic and sodal pressures from Christian settlers. In the process of yielding to 
these pressures, they were pushed to the bottom of the social pyramid of Cotabato. '
[Ogoy 1985: Quoted from the preface.]
Indeed, while Moros appear to occupy a similar sodo-economic position, they have 
always had an advantage over B’laans in the sense that they have for four centuries 
maintained political institutions through the sultanates of Cotabato and Sulu, which 
formed a comparatively solid basis for identity and organisation. As Rodil noted, and 
Cooper-Cole before him, B’laans had no such unifying structures [Rodil 1994:49-51 / 
Cooper-Cole 1913:131], which denied them a means to articulate their needs.
3.3. The Tampakan Copper Project and the positionality of mining in Mindanao.
The third section of this chapter concerns the context within which the Tampakan Copper 
Project operated. This is necessary for two reasons. First of ail, interpretations of mining 
have implications for understanding of mining among the host communities. That is to say 
that they do not receive all of their information relating to mining from the company itself. 
Project experience from Papua New Guinea and Indonesia related in Chapter 2, suggests that 
a number of state and non-governmental agencies, both local, national, and foreign-based, 
contribute to local knowledge. These organisations are introduced, and their relations with 
respect to communities hosting mining projects are considered. Secondly, perceptions of the 
Tampakan Copper Project across the region were also of consequence to the research.
Herod [1993], Cochrane [1998], and McDowell [1998] stress that the positions of diverse 
sections of society and institutions must be evaluated in light of the possibility that they will 
affect the meaning of data collected. This served as a controlling framework for analysis.
Western Mining Corporation arrived in the Philippines in 1987, shortly after the Marcos 
era [1969-86] had ended. During the following ten years they evaluated over 200 
exploration sites, examining twelve in detail [Western Mining Corporation 1997: 5],
According to Western Mining, the Tampakan prospect was introduced to them in 1990, 
by Gerry Palermo, a Visayan businessman who headed a group of mining claims held
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by prominent members of the Visayan community in the municipality of Tampakan.
After preliminary investigation, Western Mining entered an Option Agreement with the 
Tampakan Group of Companies, of which Mr. Palermo was President. Exploration 
began in May 1991 over an area of four square kilometres. Mapping, sampling, 
geochemical and geophysical surveys were completed in 1992. Results identified a 
target for exploratory drilling, that was completed in September 1993. This confirmed 
the sub-surface continuity of viable deposits [WMC 1997].
With the ratification of the Mining Act in March 1995, Western Mining Corporation 
immediately obtained a Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement, covering 89 669 
hectares straddling the provincial tri-boundary between South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat 
and Davao Del Sur. The Tampakan Copper Project was established in June of the same 
year and focused on detailed sub-surface exploration. Within the first two years contractors 
had drilled eighty-five holes. Old logging roads were rehabilitated and accommodation for 
thirty-five men, a drilling workshop, laboratory, and office buildings were constructed early 
in 1996. The area was subsequently reduced in accordance with FTAA regulations, and 
was 73 548 hectares at the second contract year. However it should be noted that the size 
of any mine will be much smaller, as of the end of 1997 the drilling grid was approximately 
two kilometres square, or 400 hectares in size. The total area envisaged as necessary - the 
Mineral Development Area, was 2450 hectares [WMC 1997].
As has been acknowledged in section 1.3., Filipinos debated the prospects of mineral-driven 
development in a broad manner. Radio and television stations such as Radyo Bombo and 
RMN [Radio Mindanao Network], and ABS-CBN [Associated Broadcasting Services /  Central 
Broadcasting Network] and GMA [formerly Greater Manila Area], popularised issues. So too 
did journalists such as Frank Cimatu and Maurice Malanes at the Philippine Daily Inquirer 
[Cimatu 1999 /  Malanes 1999]. Others, like Art Borjal at the Philippine Star [Boijal 1993],
Leo Gonzaga at the Manila Bulletin [Gonzaga 1993], and Luis Beltran at the Manila 
Standard [Beltran 1993], supported proposals for the revival of the mining industry.
Functioning as a rallying point, the passing of the Philippine Mining Act attracted an 
organised and vocal opposition. Critics included Filipino and international non-govemment 
organisations, and church-based groups. The fact that Western Mining were the first 
foreign company to obtain a Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement, made them a 
target Reports referring to the Tampakan Copper Project were published by a number of 
oppositional organisations. These included the Philippine Center for Investigative 
Journalism [Florentina-Hofilena 1996:97-120], the Alternative Forum for Research in
82
Mindanao [Montiflor and Alano 1998:11-24], and the IBON Foundation [Tujan and Guzman 
1998:111 /  IBON 1999:13-4]. They were followed by the Bishops-Businessmen’s 
Conference in conjunction with the Environmental Science for Social Change institution 
[Dalisay ed. 1999:40] and the Philippine International Forum [Smith 1999: 55-68].
Arguments against the Mining Act revolved around several themes, nationalism, 
constitutional challenges, environmental and social issues, state ownership of minerals, 
and small scale mining. They help explain the political circumstances in which Western 
Mining Corporation, and research relating to mining was located.
Panagtagbo, a Mindanao forum of people's and non-governmental organisations, 
declaimed the Mining Act as a *sell-out for thirty pieces of gold” [Lozano 1996:12]. This 
argument was rooted in the history of mining in the Philippines. As Salvador Lopez 
demonstrates, American companies dominated the Philippine mining sector during the 
immediate post-war period through ‘parity rights’ which persisted until 1974 [Lopez 1992: 
236-49]. During the 1980s the mining sector shrank along with much of Philippine industry 
and commerce, due to mismanagement structural inadequacies, and the negative impact of 
world prices. Hence the Philippine Chamber of Mines and the Mines and Geosciences 
Bureau viewed the Mining Act intended to provide incentive to new capital, as “long 
overdue” [Chamber of Mines of the Philippines 1995:1]. Panagtagbo on the other hand, 
saw the Act as a return to colonial-style exploitation and contrary to national interests. They 
claimed it encouraged foreign domination of the minerals industry, removed Filipino control 
over natural resources, and allowed profits from those resources to flow out of the country 
[Lozano 1996].
The Mining Act was also subject to a pending constitutional challenge by the Legal Rights 
and Natural Resources Center [LRC], who filed a petition in the Supreme Court. This is 
based upon provisions of Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 constitution, which reads;
“The exploration, development and utilizatbn of natural resources shall be under 
the full control and supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake 
such activities, or it may enter into co-productbn, joint venture, or production 
sharing agreements with Filipino Citizens, or corporatbns or associations at least 
sixty percent of whose capital is owned by such citizens.
The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations 
involving either technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploratbn, 
development and utilizatbn of minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils according 
to the general terms and conditions provided by law, based on real contributions to 
the economic growth and general welfare of the country."
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The LRC claim that the Mining Act violates the quoted portion of the constitution because it 
allows foreigners to operate mineral projects while the constitution permits foreign 
participation only through technical or financial assistance [Leonen and Begonia 1995: 53]. 
Furthermore, that by granting FTAAs, the Mining Act revives the service contract concept 
that was intended to be removed by the 1987 constitution [Ruiz 1996].
In addition to those expressed by the petition, there were a number of other arguments 
questioning the constitutionality of the A ct Some critics pointed out that by giving 
mineral projects priority over private ownership, the Mining Act in effect permits the 
taking of private property without due process. It was also argued that contrary to the 
spirit which guided the drafting and approval of the 1987 constitution, priority rights are 
given to miners over ‘tillers of the soil’. Furthermore, that the Vested' rights of 
Indigenous cultural communities which have not documented their private claims, are 
violated. Moreover, that whereas the constitution requires the equitable sharing of 
wealth, the Mining Act permits inequitable sharing of wealth. This is because it allows 
mere payment of regular taxes to be an adequate share by the state in an FTAA. This it 
was argued, is on top of other incentives which render FTAAs lopsidedly in favour of 
foreign investors.
There was also opposition to the Philippine Mining Act on the basis of environmental 
and social issues. A frequent theme was that while the Philippines may achieve ‘Newly 
Industrialised Country’ status in the near future, this would take place at the expense of 
the environment and the Filipino people, see for example articles in Section 2 The Price 
of Growth, in The Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism’s Saving the Earth: The 
Philippine Experience [1997].
Regarding the environment, Article II, Section 16 of the 1987 constitution guarantees 
the Filipino people the right to;
'a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of 
nature
However, Article XII, Section 2, also reserves to the state all rights to resources;
“Alt lands of the public domain, waters minerals, coal, petroleum, and other 
mineral oils, all sources of potential energy; fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, 
flora and fauna and other natural resources are owned by the State. ”
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Opponents of the Mining Act interpreted these clauses as a contradiction. They regard 
them as giving the state mineral rights, but that they could be a basis for challenge if 
exploitation of such mineral rights caused environmental damage. Some also argued 
that the constitutional right to a ‘healthful’ environment is inconsistent with a minerals 
industry dominated by foreign companies. That is to say that foreign companies were 
not regarded as sufficiently mindful of the Philippine environment.
Sodal concerns related to the impact of the Mining Act and FTAAs on local people, 
particularly traditional communities and their land rights. As the Philippine Legal Rights 
and Natural Resources Center put if
“Full implementation of this new mining law would likely setback the painstaking
incremental gains made by people’s movements in the area of ancestral domain,
community based tenure and local people’s empowerment. ”
[From the ‘Introduction’ to Leonen and Begonia 1995}
Considering that land rights legislation for traditional peoples had yet to be passed, 
enshrinement in law of partidpation by non-Filipino companies in the minerals industry 
was perceived to have taken place with undue haste. This concern was compounded 
by negative experiences of traditional communities with mining companies in the 
Philippines as well as other parts of the world - of which organisations such as the 
Legal Rights and Natural Resources Center, who were affiliated to the US group, 
Friends of the Earth, were well informed. They insisted that the interests of indigenous 
cultural communities would be overridden by the profit imperative of foreign firms 
[Leonen and Begonia 1995 p. 21].
Finally, while the constitution vests the state with mineral rights, there is a view within 
many traditional sodeties that their ancestral domains indude minerals. As has been 
explained earlier, this is not unique to the Philippines. Almost all mining projects in 
Papua New Guinea have been contested by local people who do not accept the right of 
the state to minerals within their land [Filer 1995 /  Jackson 1995]. Therefore, although 
companies may have had government approval to explore for, or develop mineral 
resources under the terms of the Mining Act, they did not necessarily have the support 
of local communities. Subsequent resentment was often focused upon the company 
and ail those perceived to be assodated with it.
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These narratives of opposition to mineral-driven development manifested themselves In 
southern Mindanao and the vicinity of the Tampakan Copper Project through the 
activities of a number of prominent figures and organisations. Bishop Dinualdo 
Gutierrez in the Diocese of Marbel was an outspoken critic of the Mining Act and 
Western Mining. He accused it of serving the interests of the most wealthy and 
influential section of Filipino society to the detriment of the least well off. In June 1996, 
Roman Catholic clergy issued a statement asking President Ramos to rescind the FTAA 
granted to Western Mining, which was presented by Bishop Gutierrez in December of 
that year. The Diocese of Marbel was supported in its opposition to mining by the 
Uniting Church of Australia [UCAJ. UCA representatives made a number of visits to the 
area, most notably an International Fact Finding Mission in December 1996. This 
comprised experts whose findings were released in Australia and the Philippines, and 
who criticised the social and environmental efforts of Western Mining in Tampakan 
[UCA 1996:18].
While Governors Hilario de Pero of South Cotabato and Pax Mangadatu in Sultan 
Kudarat provinces agreed, Governor Rogelio Llanos of Davao Del Sur and Mayor 
Jaime Caminero of the Municipality of Kiblawan were also opposed to the Tampakan 
Copper Project, expressing dissatisfaction with environmental safeguards. At the time 
of research they refused to sign agreements with Western Mining. Caminero stated 
that he did so on the grounds that any environmental accident such as a leakage of 
tailings might have disastrous consequences for his municipality. Although they could 
not specify the precise risk to the environment, these men maintained distrust of 
promises of safe practice. This extended to political figures within provinces and 
municipalities that had signed agreements with Western Mining. Jun Cagape for 
example, the third councillor of the Tampakan municipal council, frequently berated 
Western Mining through local radio and print media.
Considering the recent history of Mindanao, particularly the abuses of Ferdinand 
Marcos’ martial law regime [1972 - 86], the recalcitrance of some local leaders may 
have been a tacit reflection of left-wing opposition to the state strategy of top-down 
development by means of multi-national corporate investments in exchange for rights to 
land, minerals, etc. Environmental uncertainty on the part of politicians who had not 
previously shown any concern for their ‘pristine’ environment might therefore have 
been a smokescreen for deeper political machinations.
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Nevertheless, it was apparent that the technical complexity of mining operations was 
preventing people from evaluating risks. A mining company may assure communities 
that new technological developments such as non-toxicity of tailings, are real.
However, in remote parts of the Philippines the technologies involved are beyond the 
comprehension of everybody bar the scientists employed by those mining companies. 
Thus approval for mining depends entirely upon trust. This parallels the scenario 
presented by Ulrich Beck who has made the point in terms of nuclear power in a 
developed society [Beck 1992 /  Beck, Giddens, and Lash 1994]. Like nuclear power, 
mining poses unknown risk far beyond the confines of the site. The 1996 Marcopper 
disaster served to enforce the point. In that incident a containment dam broke, 
releasing toxic tailings into the Boac river. This event was marked by the destruction of 
fish stocks and a wide expanse of agricultural land, and by the departure of the foreign 
partner, the Canadian company Placer Dome [Severino 1997 /  Loney and Sheldon
1998].
First World societies are accustomed to multiple and simultaneous sources of risk, 
accruing from nuclear, transport and agricultural industries. In remote regions of 
developing countries however, it might be supposed that such massive and invisible 
risks are new phenomena. Mining presents the Risk scenario, which inevitably 
accompanies the process of globalisation, to the municipalities of Tampakan, Kiblawan 
and Columbio for the first time. Taking the whole of Mindanao and even the Philippines 
into account, there has as yet been negligible opportunity for people to articulate 
themselves in terms of Risk, and debate of mining issues represents a struggle to do 
so. This struggle was complicated by the fact that although Western Mining had been 
active in the region since 1990, no actual mining was likely to take place before 2002. 
Thus communities had limited experience upon which to base decisions, and instead 
relied upon conjecture.
As has been shown earlier, the impact of mining at the local and national level were 
different. Moreover, no rational judgement of a mine can be made without qualified 
analysis of individual project circumstances. Nevertheless, the politicisation of mineral 
development, as well as the circumstances of risk, have had the effect of polarising the 
mining debate into ‘Fori and ‘Against camps. Regard for local mineral-driven 
development was consequently ideological in nature, and researchers thereof were 
inevitably categorised accordingly by all those with whom they raised the subject.
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Finally, with respect to the prospective relationship between Western Mining 
Corporation and host communities, Western Mining Corporation appeared genuinely 
friendly and willing to invest a great deal of their resources in successful local 
partnerships. During the first visit to Mindanao in 1996, a new house, built according to 
traditional eight-sided design, for Malayon Malid, the Bong Fulong resident in Salna’ong 
territory, was observed. Also a new school building, where B’laan children were able to 
attend elementary classes in the B’laan dialect from a B’laan school teacher. These 
services were being paid for by the company and the experience appeared positive.
Notwithstanding this goodwill, by 1999 some questions concerning the approach being 
taken by the company towards its host communities, local perceptions of mining, and 
how to fdo business’ in Tampakan, had emerged. For example, the company 
consistently held that; aBla-an power structures appear to have centered around a 
single 'strongman':m [Western Mining 1997:36], Initial discussions with B’laans had 
however indicated, that while B’laan society was no formal democracy, neither was it 
one in which strong men wielded personal - and presumably coercive - power. 
Observation of ‘Kasfaia’ sessions by B’laan leaders demonstrated that B’laan society 
was capable of organising itself in a consensual and pre-established manner.
Moreover, Western Mining Group Geographer Stephen Davis stated that the Heads of 
Agreement and successive Principal Agreements were drawn up in accordance with the 
traditional Kasfaia negotiation and more binding Diandi blood compact [Davis 1997: 
239], Even on the evidence of the first visit to Mindanao in 1996, this statement 
presented a clumsy parallel. Principal Agreements had long been standard practice in 
the mining industry, and Davis' comments contributed to a growing body of information 
which indicated that the company might be seeking B’laan customs to fit with mining 
practices rather than the other way around.
Stephen Davis also stated that “attitudes within communities are changing to more 
democratic processes and the leadership is adjusting to accommodate those changes■“ 
which implied that communities were doing exactly what the company intended [Ibid:
36]. This raised questions as to how this had been achieved in Tampakan, when 
partnerships with host communities had proved so difficult elsewhere.
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Chapter Four.
The Methodology.
Chapter Four addresses the task of collecting and understanding data. Geographers 
[Ward and Jones 1999], and increasingly economists [Herod 1999 /  Mullings 1999] are 
re-examining ways in which research is conducted, how the research process unfolds, 
and the various subjectivities that are commonly inscribed in societies. In accordance 
with this increased awareness of, and emphasis on transparency, the methodology is 
outlined.
The methodology comprised two parts in responses to the aspects of the subject, that is 
‘national’ and 'local* influences upon the Tampakan Copper Project, as introduced in 
section 1 .4 . First were those organisations, institutions and individuals that shaped the 
mining arena in the Philippines. They had to be examined in order to assess 
circumstances in accordance with hypothetical factors that functioned across the region 
and which were not necessarily associated with the mining company.
The second aspect focuses on the local environment, and developmental relations 
between Western Mining and each of the five host communities. This was based upon 
measurement of Tribal Council performances. Presentation of this comparative part of 
the methodology begins with a discussion of requirements imposed by local conditions 
in consideration of which an appropriate framework was adopted. This was made up of 
a series of indicators devised in London. On arrival in the field, these were piloted 
informally, in order to assess the rigor of each indicator. This exercise revealed that 
data necessary for several of the planned indicators was unobtainable. As a 
consequence, certain indicators had to be altered and in several cases, new indicators 
were constructed. Finally, the comparative methodology, as it emerged from changes 
made in the field, and explanation of how it was conducted, is presented.
4.1. Specific methodological techniques used.
The methodological techniques deployed by this research were adopted for two sets of 
reasons. First was the constraints imposed by the environment in which the research was 
conducted. Second were the techniques available for gathering data appropriate for 
expressing the impact of the five hypothetical obstacles upon local mineral-driven 
development in Tampakan. The research began with documentary analysis in order to 
articulate the hypothetical obstacles to local development presented in Chapter Two. It
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continued to draw upon documentary analysis in order to address the context in which the 
research was located, and indeed to present the life-ways of B’laans, and other aspects of 
the mineral-driven development dilemma, such as the legislative context pertaining to the 
rights of indigenous peoples in the Philippines and the Philippine Mining Act of 1995.
This presented a number of challenges of the nature described by Eileen Kane, who 
expresses concern over the reliability of written sources in documentary based research 
[Kane 1987:98]. First of all, there was little material relating to B’laans, and that tends to 
have been produced by missionaries or explorers, who had limited capacity for rigorous 
data collection. Government data emerged after World W ar Two, but its collection was 
driven by plans to open the region for settlement in order to relieve overcrowding in Luzon 
and the Visayas region, and there was little motivation to uphold the presence of B’laans, 
who presented a potential obstacle to settlers. Indeed, as Kane makes dear, 
substantiation of written sources is essential, and was therefore an important responsibility 
for this research. Developing a reliable impression of B’laan tradition and lifeways 
depended upon triangulation between diverse accounts, and with literature relating to the 
neighbouring Bagobos and TBoli tribes, among whom some recent research has been 
conducted. Another significant challenge to documentary analysis was the fact that the 
rights of indigenous peoples and mining companies were subjects of contention, and 
realities were constantly evolving as various cases passed through the Philippines’ 
Supreme Court, and protest movements emerged. Much of the documentary material first 
appeared in newspapers, or articles published by campaign groups, and while being of 
interest are difficult to clarify or indeed, verify. Published information is therefore less 
reliable than had been anticipated, and required regular verification, with figures such as 
Terence Gardner, President of Western Mining or Datu Vic, an Indigenous Peoples 
Commissioner, and other figures with ‘expert1 knowledge. By confirming new ‘facts’ with as 
many such well placed sources, it is gradually possible to establish what was real.
This research also relied heavily upon in-depth interviews with B'laans as well as Filipino 
and western figures.' Conducting interviews in a developing country setting is a 
challenging task, particularly where interviews are conducted with B’laans, who do not 
speak English, nor most often, Filipino, the national language. Interviews with B'laans 
were conducted in an unstructured manner. This was important because, particularly at 
the outset, very little was known about the B’laan communities, compared with say 
government agencies or Western Mining Corporation. This kind of interviewing is 
frequently used by anthropologists who, like this researcher, conduct their studies in the
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context of other cultures. Generally speaking, there are two ways to study this kind of 
group. According to Kenneth Pike, the ‘emic’ approach involves finding out how the group 
sees itself and categorises its world. The ‘etic’ approach involves imposing categories 
developed outside the group using a set of questions based upon standardised categories 
which can be used to study not only one group, but others as well [Pike 1967]. As so little 
was known about the B’laan perspective, it was necessary to begin with an ’emic1 
approach, and the broadest possible questions were initially asked of community 
members. See for example section 7 .3 ., in which answers to questions such as What is 
mining?', 'What is the Principal Agreement?’, and 'How long will mining take?’ are 
presented. Following from these 'grand tour questions’, as Spradley and McCurdy refer to 
them, new questions can be posed, based upon the answers given [Spradley and 
McCurdy 1972]. So for example, if B’laans state that mining is a hole in the ground, then 
the next question might be, Where will that hole be?’, or 'How big will that hole be?’. A list 
of sample questions are presented in Appendix 6.
Two classes of interviewee were approached. One was individuals or groups of Tribal 
Councillors; the other was communities as a whole. Interviews with communities fulfilled a 
multiple purpose; first they were intended to access specific information, such as the data 
presented in section 7 .1 ., relating to how many people from each community had travelled 
to which places. Interviews with communities served as an ice-breaker and as get-to- 
know-you sessions, where community members could familiarise themselves with the 
identity of the researcher and assistants in order to feel comfortable about their presence. 
It was also a time when the research project could be explained in detail. Moreover, these 
community interviews were generally light-hearted and an opportunity to explore 
qualitative areas such as the workings of the Kasfaia, and the life of Datu Baro Imba, 
presented in section 3 .1 ., which while not being quantitative in nature, or directly linked to 
the hypothetical obstacles, nevertheless have bearing upon B’laan iifeways, and 
implications for local development. Such details could not have been arrived at by means 
of standardised schedule type interview technique, and required time to be articulated and 
understood.
Interviews with Tribal Councillors tended to follow meetings with communities and the 
‘emic’ approach to them, and were ‘etic’ in nature. This was because it was to Tribal 
Councils that questions on specific aspects of the research, such as the workings of the 
Tribal Council -  Foundation system and data necessary to fulfil indicators of Council 
performance, were directed. While this thesis set out to explore the five hypothetical
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obstacles, the ‘emic’ approach raises issues such as the importance of roads and tenurial 
insecurities which need to be explored specifically in order to address the hypothetical 
obstacle of political power on the part of host communities. For this reason, a 
standardised interview technique, according to Kane, was deployed, albeit one that did not 
adhere to a schedule [Kane 1987:63]. This kind of interview is based upon the 
assumption that it will take different kinds of questions, perhaps put in a different order, to 
obtain the same information from different people. Essentially, the interviewer proceeds 
with any approach that is useful to convey to the interviewee the sense and meaning of 
what they want In this type of interview the answers received are likely to cover more 
material, and allow for group variations. This technique was also used when interviewing 
Visayan participants, such as Barangay officials, who often wanted to stress points of their 
own, which were not necessarily relevant to the thesis aims, and when impromptu or 
unexpected meetings took place.
4.2. The data collection strategy.
As noted at the beginning of this chapter, the methodology that supports this thesis was 
shaped by two forces. One comprised the five factors hypothesised to explain the failings 
of local mineral-driven development at mine-sites, they being antecedent social structures, 
violence, inadequate political power, lack of understanding, and procedural equity. These 
are in turn regarded as having two sections, violence and politics having regional or 
national sources, while antecedence, understanding, and procedural equity were local and 
dependent upon the proposed mining area itself. The other force that determined the 
methodology, was the availability of data and obstacles in the field, and it was therefore 
difficult to enter the field with a pre-planned strategy for collecting data. There were 
considerable difficulties in terms of access to remote communities, which took time and 
effort to overcome. There were language barriers which required translation, and 
differences in terms of culture and subsequent understanding of apparent facts. Because 
this researcher was white and an outsider, there was a near constant association of the 
research with the mining company, that could not be displaced by a letter from the London 
School of Economics, nor it was felt, by any amount of patient explaining. Techniques for 
data collection that were used had to be adopted and justified away from the classroom 
and tutorial support that would normally be available.
The initial three month period in the Philippines comprised a process of preparation, and 
on arrival in Mindanao, a number of preliminary tasks were necessary. The research 
project was introduced to the provincial governors and mayors concerned, and research
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assistants were interviewed and. recruited and vehicles secured, which points are detailed 
in section 4 .4 . Meetings were held with each of the five barangay councils, within whose 
territories, the proposed mine and B’laan communities were located. These took 
place in barangay halls at the convenience of Barangay Captains and Councillors. 
Communications were established with B’laan communities and Tribal Councils in 
preparation for each journey into the region affected by the proposed mine, in order that 
intended meetings could be planned. This generally had to be done by word of mouth. 
When B’laans visited the market place in Tampakan for example, introductions were made 
and messages proposing meetings passed on. Initial meetings were held with Tribal 
Councils, within their communities and at their convenience in order to introduce the 
research project to them, and to ascertain their willingness to participate.
The methodology itself comprised two parts, the first was qualitative assessment of 
information relating to the five factors hypothesised to obstruct local mineral-driven 
development. This involved in-depth interviews with specific people who were familiar with 
various aspects of the proposed mining project, and who are introduced in section 4 .4 . A 
list of interviews conducted in the course of this research project is presented in Appendix 
5. These people were contacted prior to interview, and the research presented to them. 
Some of these figures, such as those within Western Mining, local government, and the 
church were planned prior to arrival in Mindanao, while others, such as Romulo de la Rosa 
and Datu Migketay Saway were not. In addition to this, group interviews were conducted 
with members of each affected community, and Tribal Councils. Documentary analysis of 
for example, Principal Agreements between each community and Western Mining, 
constitutional laws, and the monthly bulletin published by Western Mining was also 
important, as was literature available in Filipino libraries, particularly relating to the history 
of the affected region.
The following paragraphs outline the methodology conducted in order to research each of 
the five hypothetical factors upon which this thesis is based. Study of antecedent social 
structures among the communities affected by the proposed mine began with literary 
sources. For example, Stuart Schlegel [1972,1975,1979,1999] and James Eder [1993] 
have each conducted extensive studies of the iifeways of tribal groups in the Philippines. 
Local museums in General Santos and Marbel also contributed through their collections of 
indigenous artefacts, which provided points of reference at meetings with B’laans. 
Community based ‘emic’ interviews were carried out with B’laan groups at seventeen 
different locations in the Koronadal Valley, who all gave various perspectives of traditional
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B'laan lifeways. This involved indentifying senior and generally elderly B'laans by word of 
mouth from other B’laans and from the indigenous People's Office at the Diocese of 
Marbel. They were asked whether they were willing to meet with a foreign researcher to 
talk about B’laan lifeways, and a time and place agreed upon. While open-ended and 
conducted in the manner of a conversation with the support of a local translator -  usually a 
family member who would translate from B’laan into Visayan, these interviews arrived at 
focal points such as Datu Baro, who was familiar to almost all B’laans, a brief biography of 
whom is presented in section 3 .1 . Interviews were also conducted with local scholars 
such as Cesar Lutero [1986] and Gregorio Ogoy [1985], who have completed specific 
studies of B’laan culture and economy respectively, at local universities, and who are 
introduced in section 4 .4 .
In terms of violence, a number of quantitative sources were available and these were 
exploited -  that is to say police statistics and incidents recorded by Western Mining’s own 
security services. These sources were compared with each other and triangulated with 
data collected by the Peace and Justice Office in the Diocese or Marbel. However, a 
certain amount of crime was obviously not being reported, and in any case, this research 
was concerned with the motives for criminal activity. Interviews were conducted with local 
police leaders about crime, and who are introduced in section 4. 4., however, as all of the 
policemen and women encountered were Visayan, and this research was concerned with 
B’laan areas, there was considered to be a potential bias within data collected from the 
police. Interviews were also conducted with the Local Amnesty Board at their office in 
Marbel. The Amnesty Board process applications for amnesty from rebels, and were 
valuable to this research, not only because they were able to provide data, but because in 
the course of meeting applicants, Board members had contact with figures involved in 
criminal activity in remote areas, and were familiar with the historical roots of much of the 
violence in Mindanao. Moreover, several of them were former rebels and were able to 
provide alternative perspectives of the role of the state in the region. Further information 
was gathered during meetings with Visayan buy-and-sell traders, B’laans themselves, and 
the Indigenous Peoples Office in the Diocese of Marbel, and upon the basis of these 
sources, generic causes of violence in the region, that are presented in section 5 .1 . could 
be consolidated.
In order to research the level of political power held by the communities hosting the 
proposed mining project, means by which such power could be assessed had to be 
identified. Two potential indicators were the construction of roads to B’laan communities
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and the degree of tenurial security held by B'laan communities over their ancestral 
domain. It was important to consider more than one because no single indicator would 
provide for a broad demonstration of political power, there being attendant physical, 
geographical, cultural, etc, considerations to take into account.
During meetings with affected communities and Tribal Councils, issues regarding their 
livelihoods and access to markets were discussed. Preliminary information was obtained 
from research assistants who were familiar with the region, and meetings with small 
groups of B'laans and Tribal Council members, particularly those using market places, 
pursued. They were asked about their agricultural produce, transportation, and market 
access. These meetings were followed up by meetings with Barangay Captains, at which 
issues of market access were also followed up. The assumption was that if B’laans in 
remote areas were experiencing difficulties, then so would those Visayans living there, 
whose responses would corroborate those of B'laan farmers. Discussions were also held 
with buy-and-sell storeowners, both within and without the area affected by the proposed 
mine, who explained farm to market arrangements, and the costs this imposes on B’laans. 
It was from these meetings that the economic potential of specific roads was identified and 
subsequently, an interview was sought with Richard Corpuz, a civil engineer at Western 
Mining, who confirmed the technical feasibilities of a new road. The potential of new roads 
was then discussed with municipal Councillors and Mayors, and the apparent advantages 
and disadvantages of road construction, assessed.
The second means by which the degree of political power held by B’laans was to be 
assessed, was tenurial security. Several meetings took place with staff at the Indigenous 
People's Office in the Diocese of Marbel, and an interview on the subject of the Indigenous 
People’s Rights Act was obtained with Commissioner Migketay Saway of the National 
Commission of Indigenous Peoples, at his office in Malaybalay, and similarly with Romulo 
de la Rosa at the Alternative Forum for Research in Mindanao, Inc. Although these served 
to set the scene with regard to the relationship between B'laans and their ancestral land, 
the majority of information pertaining to the legal rights of B’laans to their land came from 
documentary sources. These include the Filipino Constitution and Acts of the Philippine 
Congress, and newspaper articles. A brief case study of the B’laan community at Lamkwa, 
outside of the area affected by the proposed mine, but illustrative of the challenges facing 
B'laan communities in Tampakan was completed following reading of a PhD thesis by 
Oriinda Sevilla at the University of Notre Dame in Cotabato City, Sevilla [1999], and visits 
to that area in the company of staff from the Indigenous People’s Office in Marbel.
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Specific examples of local abuses of tenurial rights were unearthed through informal 
contact with B’laans. Generally these meetings were informal, and questions asked as 
and when it was appropriate and B'laan participants agreed to talk. For example, when 
waiting together with B'laans for transport to arrive, was often a good time to chat. Where 
B’laans talked about problems with land, these could be followed up with the Justice and 
Peace Desk in the Diocese of Marbel who conducted investigations on behalf of B'laans, 
and triangulated with Tribal Liaison Officers at Western Mining who monitored tenurial 
issues for compensation purposes.
The fourth phenomenon hypothesised to inhibit local mineral-driven development was lack 
of understanding of the implications of mining. Two important aspects of understanding, 
necessary for B’laans to participate in a partnership with Western Mining, were 
understanding of the terms of the contract that they had signed with the company, and 
understanding of what mining is. Very few B’laans encountered were able to read or write, 
yet four of the five Tribal Councils had signed the Principal Agreement with the company, 
and only a handful of B’laans had ever seen a mine. In order to ascertain the level of 
understanding of mining within each Tribal Council, meetings were organised with each of 
them. Meetings took place within Bong Banwus, or tribal territories, not only to ensure that 
the greatest number of Councillors from each community would be present, but to enable 
them to speak as confidently as possible. The purpose of the meeting was presented to 
each Tribal Council by means of a research assistant acting as interpreter. It was 
important to communicate the purpose of the research clearly, and language skills were 
explored and recorded informally so as to avoid giving the impression that B’laans were in 
any way inferior. The physical realities of mining encompassed notions of time, scale, and 
space, and questions were open-ended. The issue of mining was addressed by asking 
what B’laans thought mining was, and they were encouraged to sketch, or act out their 
ideas. In order to obtain an accurate assessment of B’laan perceptions, at no point were 
B'laans led into making any statement, nor any leading information given to them. The 
responses were lengthy and the Councillors generally had a lot to say on their own terms 
about mining. Statements made were translated by the research assistant and recorded 
for subsequent analysis.
Research of the degree of Procedural Equity B’laans held within the Tribal Council -  
Foundation structure began with the literature of the mining company itself, see for 
example Western Mining [1997], which detailed in positive terms how the company’s 
Community Development Program operated. This was presented in greater detail during
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interviews with Terence Gardner, President of Western Mining Corporation [Philippines 
Inc.]. This researcher also attended Tribal Council meetings and spoke at length with 
Councillors regarding the Foundation meetings they attended. On the basis of this 
knowledge, this researcher interviewed Geoff Allen, an accountant at Western Mining, who 
provided details of Foundation bank accounts and elaborated on the financial problems 
that the Tribal Councils had in participating in the Council -  Foundation system. These 
shortcomings partly explained why some communities were frustrated, but clearly there 
were structural problems to the Council -  Foundation system.
The second part of the methodology was quantitative, based upon indicators of 
performance that compared each of the Tribal Councils. This was in order to identify any 
patterns between them, which might correlate with the three local hypothetical factors, that 
is antecedence, understanding, and procedural equity, or other factors as were apparent, 
and indeed directions for further research. The performance indicators and the basis for 
the comparative index were developed in London, prior to departure for the Philippines, 
and are presented in Appendix 4. Once in the Philippines, a pilot methodology was 
conducted as presented in section 4 .7 ., and a number of drawbacks identified. This 
demanded changes to the quantitative methodology for two groups of reasons, first, some 
of the data that had been hoped for was not available while some other data was, and 
second, because the Tribal Council -  Foundation system was not at the point where it had 
been expected by this research and hence some of the indicators did not apply. The 
comparative indicators were subsequently revised in accordance with the data available, a 
process, which is detailed in section 4. 8.
The quantitative data presented in the seven indicators of Tribal Council performance was 
collected over a period of six months spent working among the five communities affected 
by the proposed mine. Data for the Regularity, Location, Attendance, and Recording of 
meetings was collected during Tribal Council meetings themselves by this researcher or 
research assistants, or through subsequent meetings with Council members who 
generously shared details of the procedures of meetings. For Representation, a list of 
members of each Tribal Council was available from various sources, principally the 
Councils themselves and Western Mining. The number of members of any particular 
family represented, was provided by Council members themselves, and corroborated by 
sources such as the Indigenous People's Office in the Diocese of Marbel, and Tribal 
Liaison Officers. Data for Female Participation was collected in a similar way.
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Expediency is based on the amount of time it took for each Tribal Council to progress from 
it’s creation to the signing of their Principal Agreement. These dates were obtained from 
the office of the National Commission of Indigenous Peoples in General Santos, and 
Western Mining respectively. Training data came from a variety of sources. First of all, 
B’laan communities were asked about training. B’laans were considered to be a reliable 
source of information because of the prestige associated with participation in training, 
hence they were more likely to overestimate than forget training, there being an incentive 
to disclosure. Training data was then corroborated by providers, among who were 
Western Mining, the Diocese of Marbel and local government units. As detailed in section 
6.1., there were difficulties in obtaining comparative data for the Comprehensiveness of 
initiatives undertaken by each Tribal Council. Two more comparable sources were the 
balance sheets for Foundation accounting, provided by Geoff Allen, an accountant at 
Western Mining, and the monthly bulletin, Project Update. Data contained in these were 
triangulated with Tribal Council members, Tribal Liaison Officers, and staff from the 
Indigenous Peoples Office in the Diocese of Marbel, who monitored the progress of each 
community. Data pertaining to the Spending Capacity of each Tribal Council, was collated 
following an interview with Geoff Allen on the subject of Tribal Council -  Foundation 
financing. Tribal Councils and Foundations were able to draw upon three accounts, the 
money in each of which provided the basis for Spending Capacity as an indicator of 
performance.
Finally, the data relating to proximity to urban centres presented in section 7.1. as a 
precursor to those hypothetical factors that were local in origin, was collected during 
meetings with each B’laan community in their Bong Banwus. In order to obtain this 
information, lists were drawn up of all the municipal poblacions within each of the 
provinces in which the affected communities were located. In addition to this, regional 
cities such as General Santos and Davao were included, as well as the capital, Manila and 
the final category ‘abroad’. The purpose of finding out how many people had been to 
which places, and how far people in each community had travelled was explained to the 
assembled community members. This exercise was addressed to whole communities, and 
as many people as possible were invited to attend. Those who were present were asked 
to fetch any family members who were nearby, and if otherwise engaged to join briefly. 
Provided that a large enough sample, i.e. more than just Tribal Council members, and at 
least fifty people in number were present, the exercise could go ahead. The list of 
locations was read out and the community encouraged to put their hand up if they had 
visited that place. These hands were counted and subsequently assessed as a
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percentage of the total number of people present. Although this was obviously an 
imprecise indication, the results were more or less closely corroborated by those of other 
communities, and correlated with remoteness from the nearest poblacion, in Tampakan.
4.3. Positionality and Research Ethics.
The positionality of the researcher had a constant bearing upon the conduct of research in 
Mindanao. Like almost all anthropologists, this researcher was an outsider in terms of 
race and culture. However, because the subject was closely related to mining, and the 
host communities had almost no previous contact with white people, and were at that time 
confronted by a multi-national mining company managed by white males, there was an 
inevitable association of this researcher with the mining company on the part of B'laan 
respondents. Moreover, like employees of the mining company, this researcher had more 
'money' as well as other material and intellectual resources to draw upon than the majority 
of B’laans, which would have been obvious to B'laan participants. As Flannery has 
observed in Papua New Guinea, such a position can give rise to considerable 
expectations on the part of communities with whom the research is engaged [Flannery
1999]. This may take the form of payment, or for the 'ear* of the company, government or 
other agency. Local respondents may tell the researcher whatever they think they want to 
hear in order to elicit money, or publicity they may associate with the media. Alternatively, 
host communities may perceive foreign researchers as a threat, and refuse to participate, 
or even provide disinformation. During the course of this research, several ‘business 
propositions’ were made, and on one occasion the researcher was quizzed as to whether 
his real purpose was seeking treasure, by which the interviewee meant gold supposedly 
hidden by the Japanese army at the end of World W ar Two. This indicates not only the 
impression held by some B’laans of the purpose of the research, but also of the mining 
project itself -  coming to get something for nothing and or something that is not rightfully 
theirs.
Considering the material and intellectual distance between the researcher and the B’laan 
respondents, acknowledgement of ethical implications is necessary. The greatest ethical 
concern is for those being studied, that is to say, the B’laan people who comprise the five 
communities hosting the Tampakan Copper Project. This was for a number of reasons, 
the first of which was that B'laans are different from the researcher in almost every 
respect. Hence it was not anticipated to be easy to appreciate their standards, or 
viewpoints. Conversely, there was a likelihood that this research would misunderstand 
B’laans and in doing so, misrepresent them, which is a constant concern. In order to
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address this challenge, this researcher spent the first three months in the field engaged in 
a process of getting to know the region, meeting many B’laans, and developing as high a 
level of understanding as possible before embarking upon data collection. Secondly, the 
research project was concerned with explaining the meaning and purpose of the research 
to B’laan participants. In order to do this, research assistants were engaged, who were 
qualified to introduce the research to the affected communities, and it was only after 
numerous visits to the region, and when acquaintance with the communities had been 
secured that research began. Thirdly, the aims and needs of the communities affected by 
the proposed mine had to be taken into account There was no doubt that some B’laans 
were more in favour of closer ties with outsiders and the investments that the mine would 
bring, than others. As a white man and a foreigner, there was always a possibility that this 
research would be perceived as associated with mining and hence it might have attracted 
the patronage of those B’laans who were pro-mining, and the rejection of those who were 
not For this reason, questions directed at B’laans were posed in such a way as not to be 
leading, and to avoid reference to the mine as much as possible. Indeed, the focus of the 
research being upon five factors associated with development rather than mining, helped 
to avoid direct reference to Western Mining Corporation, gold, and the military, for 
examples, which were potentially inflammatory issues. Fourth, this research has an 
obligation to share its findings with those concerned. Indeed, this researcher has 
maintained contact, albeit indirectly, with the five B’laan communities via the Indigenous 
People’s desk within the Roman Catholic Diocese of Marbel, who relay information to the 
communities. Fifth, the research project has an obligation to compensate research 
assistants for their work, and B’laan participants for the time they contribute. Following 
consultation with Professor Richard Jackson of James Cook University in Australia, who 
conducted his own research in the region, assistants were paid in accordance with a 
primary school teacher's salary, that is 200 pisos per day. B’laans who participated in 
meetings were provided with food, coffee, sugar, and cigarettes. It was considered 
inappropriate to compensate them with money, lest they elaborate their contribution for the 
purpose of financial gain.
4.4. Relevant organisations and their contributions to the research.
Research of factors obstructing local mineral-driven development depended upon 
interviews conducted with representatives of a cross-section of interest groups and 
stakeholders familiar with the Tampakan Copper Project. They were conducted in 
accordance with the five themes of this research project - that is the impact of 
antecedent traditions upon the Tribal Councils as an institution, the extent and
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consequences of violence, the degree of power held by the host communities, the level 
of understanding of mining among host communities, and the balance of procedural 
equity between the company and communities within the Tribal Council /  Foundation 
framework - and their respective relationships with development. These themes were 
not addressed in any specific order. Rather, they were explored in a commensurate 
manner, the timetable of research being determined by variable access to interviewees, 
practical considerations such as travel, and the capacity and availability of local 
research assistants. Those organisations and individuals among whom information was 
sought, are broadly introduced in this section.
Land tenure as an indicator of the degree of power the five B’laan communities held in 
relation to other groups and institutions in the region, was discussed with 
representatives of the Legal Rights and Natural Resources Center [LRC], a national 
organisation comprising lawyers specialising in the field of indigenous rights. The LRC 
provided legal assistance to B'laans throughout the region, most notably those at 
Lamkwah in Polomolok, fifteen kilometres from Tampakan, who after a lengthy court 
case, had wrested a part of their ancestral land from the Dole Pineapple plantation in 
1998, [Sevilla 1999:77-9]. The LRC were opposed to the Tampakan Copper Project on 
the grounds that the rights of B'laans to their land and self-determination were being 
abused. They advised the affected communities in their negotiations with Western 
Mining and the Office of Southern Cultural Communities /  National Commission for 
Indigenous Peoples.
Research of tenurial rights also engaged with officers of the National Commission for 
Indigenous Peoples in General Santos City. The NCIP was the government agency 
officially responsible for overseeing the welfare of B'laan communities. Their officers 
explained the role of state agencies in safeguarding the interests of traditional 
communities, and the powers afforded to those B’laans within the proposed mining area 
and under the terms of Certificates of Ancestral Domain Claim. Accordingly, traditional 
communities could register their claim to land on which they lived and depended, 
leading it was envisaged, to the subsequent granting of a Certificate of Ancestral 
Domain Title, by which means traditional inhabitants could own land on a communal 
basis. A visit was also made to the office of Datu Migketay 'Vic' Saway, the NCIP 
commissioner for northern Mindanao. He related the history of the NCIP and the 
problems it had experienced. He provided additional assessment of CADC legislation, 
and the gap between the conceptual powers contained therein, and what was possible
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'on the ground’ in remote regions in Mindanao. This was essential for interpreting the 
practicalities of the CADC system and its real meaning for the communities hosting the 
Tampakan Copper Project.
Also valuable to assessing the extent of rights and power among indigenous 
communities generally, and the five B’laan communities hosting the Tampakan Copper 
Project specifically, was Romulo de la Rosa at the Alternative Forum for Research in 
Mindanao Inc. [AFRIM] in Davao and Rose Romano at the Social Action Center [SACj 
within the Diocese of Marbel. AFRIM was a social research, advocacy, and 
communications institution concerned with promoting the development of Mindanao. 
They assisted with understanding of the constitutional position of the five B’laan 
communities, the process which gave rise to the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act, and 
the implications of legal challenges to it The SAC aimed to protect the rights of 
indigenous people within the Diocese of which the affected communities were a part, 
and regarded the activities of Western Mining as exploitative. They encouraged 
affected communities to reject the Principal Agreements and the plans of the company, 
stating that they would damage the environment and disenfranchise the local 
population. Both of these organisations were opposed to the Mining Act, FTAAs, and 
Western Mining. Nevertheless, they offered a critical perspective of mining impacts and 
a basis for framing questions put to the company and state agencies.
The idea of judging the power of B’laan communities through their ability to effect the 
construction of roads necessary for improving their welfare, came from visits to remote 
B'laan communities throughout the region. Meetings with Tribal Councils concerning 
the type of projects that would benefit their communities confirmed roads as a means of 
improving access to and from B’laan communities. The potential benefits included 
trade of agricultural produce at municipal marketplaces, access to schools, and 
enhanced security in the area. Comparison of cost-benefit analyses - of impacts upon 
B’laan and Visayan communities, revealed a distinct disadvantage for B’laans. Indeed, 
barring outside assistance from sources such as the United States Agency for 
International Development [USAID], or Oxfam, the only significant benefits appeared to 
occur as a matter of coincidence.
In order to corroborate this, individuals and organisations which were familiar with the 
implementation of development projects and challenges thereof, were sought Among 
these was Brother Robert McGovern at the Business Resource Center [BRC] in
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General Santos City. This was a non-govemmental organisation conducting research 
on behalf of bi-lateral development agencies such as the United States Agency for 
International Development [USAID] and the Japan International Co-operation Agency 
[JICA], BRC stafF members were familiar with the Tampakan Copper Project and the 
five host communities, as well as political and business figures within the region. The 
BRC had to deal with political structures in supporting marginal communities such as 
indigenous Badjao villages along the coast of the Sarangani Bay, and in remote areas 
of Gian and Malungon to the southeast of General Santos City. The BRC provided 
assistance in assessing the position of the five B'laan communities hosting the 
Tampakan Copper Project, with respect to those institutions - primarily municipalities, 
which administered the process of road construction.
Supplementary analysis of the physical implications of road construction within the area 
occupied by the five host communities was provided by Engineer Richard Corpuz at 
Western Mining. He explained various types of road and confirmed the cost 
implications of each, as well as the Western Mining perspective. This was essential in 
that it supplied a basis for discussions with community leaders.
The smallest political unit in the Philippines was the Barangay, authority over which lay 
with the Barangay Captain and approximately twelve Councillors and executive officials. 
Meetings with Captains Jonathan Consad at Danlag, Amirh Musali in Datal Blao, Jusies 
Dianga at Kimlawis, Lolerio Suat at Pula Bato, and Claudel Magbanua at Tablu, 
provided appraisals of conditions within their areas of jurisdiction, including potential 
benefits that might accrue from various configurations of new roads. They stated that 
roads were important for Visayan communities living close to the potential minesite, and 
that they would also benefit from access to school and increased trade.
On account of their authority over the construction of roads, the municipalities within 
which the five host communities lay were also approached. Interviews with Mayors 
Claudius Barrosso in Tampakan, Zaharra Paglas in Columbio, and Jaime Caminero in 
Kiblawan, were crucial in assessing obstacles to the construction of a road that would 
result in the connection of the three municipalities. Moreover, under the terms of the 
Local Government Code, municipalities were obliged to formulate a Comprehensive 
Development Plan. These documents, along with the municipal officers who compiled 
them, provided important demographic and economic information for evaluating the
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needs of host communities, and triangulating the predictions given by members of other 
agencies.
Local traders and operators of ‘buy and sell’ businesses, like Rodolfo Gagnao in 
barangay Miasong, part of the municipality of Tupi, and which shares a border with 
Tampakan, also contributed to research of obstacles to, and potential benefits of new 
roads. They purchased agricultural products such as rice and com from farmers in 
remote regions, for shipment to municipal marketplaces. Their information was vital to 
understanding of different perspectives, that is between B’laan communities and remote 
barangays on one hand, and municipalities on the other.
Research of criminal activity, in accordance with violence as a destroyer of 
developmental potential, began with Colonel Dacoco at Philippine National Police 
provincial headquarters in Marbel. He provided statistics relating to crime in Tampakan 
municipality. However, just saying how much crime there had been did not explain what 
kind of crime there was, or in what way it impacted upon development Inspector 
Virgilio Carreon and officers at the Tampakan police station assisted analysis of 
criminal activity taking place within the area of mineral exploration. So did George 
Dida, Security Co-ordinator at Western Mining. He supplied data relating to criminal 
activity in the vicinity of the proposed minesite, that had been collated by the Telstar 
Security Agency - contracted by Western Mining to protect their facilities. Control 
Risks, an international risk consultancy were also deployed by Western Mining and 
Bernard Isherwood at their Manila Office provided additional counsel.
Concepcion Salmorin at the Local Amnesty Board in Marbel was another source of 
information concerning criminal activity. A series of Presidential Proclamations enacted 
by President Fidel Ramos [1992 -1998] provided for the granting of amnesty to 
members of rebel groups in Mindanao. These are the Communist Party of the 
Philippines, the New Peoples Army, the National Democratic Front, The Muslim 
Independent Liberation Front and the Moro National Liberation Front, as well as 
renegade members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Local Amnesty Boards 
throughout the Philippines were responsible for administering the amnesty program by 
advertising opportunities for amnesty and processing applications. The area of 
proposed mineral operations coincided with that of rebel organisations whose 
operations were alleged to involve B’laans.
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In order to analyse the Tribal Council - Foundation structure in accordance with the 
notion of procedural equity within such a developmental apparatus, it was essential to 
engage with Western Mining directly. To this end interviews with Terrence Gardner, the 
President of Western Mining [Philippines] Inc., and Geoff Allen, the company 
accountant on the Foundation Boards, at their offices in General Santos City, were 
obtained. These two men provided information relating to Tribal Council - Foundation 
structure and performance respectively. This was important in ascertaining the 
capabilities of each of the Tribal Councils, and to assembling comparative indicators of 
performance.
Former members of the Association for Community Concern, Ecology and Social 
Services, or ACCESS Inc., a developmental consultancy whose survey laid the 
foundation for Western Mining’s Community Development Program in 1996, were also 
interviewed. They were familiar with prominent Tribal Council members and challenges 
faced by Councils and explained the everyday workings of the Tribal Council - 
Foundation structure. This was important in light of potential discrepancies between 
the ‘official’ framework and its practical application. Indeed, a rigorous methodology 
could not have relied upon the evidence of the company alone, which might have had 
an obvious interest in quiescent Councils.
Perhaps the most complex area of data collection was that relating to traditional 
structures. Texts such as those by Casino [2000], Rodil [1993 /1994], and Schlegel 
[1993], have been cited in section 3.1.  However, the bulk of the data relating to B’laan 
society was gathered in the course of interviews with B’laan elders and leaders across 
the region. Drawing on their combined experience, prominent strands provided a basis 
for comparison of B’laan leadership and organisational structures, with the Tribal 
Council system promoted by the Office for Southern Cultural Communities and the 
National Commission for Indigenous Peoples, throughout the Philippines.
Data concerning the grasp of each community of the impacts of mining, depended upon 
interviews conducted within each community. Each of these typically lasted a whole 
day, and like interviews with B’laans elsewhere in the region, they were conducted 
through B’laan interpreters, being translated into Tagalog and then English. However, 
accessing communities and meeting with all members of Tribal Councils and large 
groups of community members was difficult. Practical considerations such as swollen 
rivers, and poor communication meant that journeys were frequently wasted. Co­
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ordination was consequently the primary challenge to the collection of data from B’laan 
respondents.
Western Mining’s Tribal Liaison Officers, that is B’laans and other local people hired by 
the company to assist communication between the company and B’laan communities, 
also consented to interviews concerning Tribal Council - Foundation affairs. They 
provided access to documentation held by each B'laan community, that had been 
prepared as requirement of applications for Certificates of Ancestral Domain Claim.
This was valuable to developing understanding of the role of community members 
within the Tribal Council structure.
The medical relief agency CARE International [formerly known as Co-operation for 
Assistance and Relief Everywhere! were contracted by Western Mining in 1998 to 
provide health care services for the communities hosting the Tampakan Copper Project 
[CARE International 2000]. This came in response to the results of research into infant 
and child mortality in the vicinity of the Tampakan Copper Project [Lasen and Jackson 
1998]. CARE subsequently established a three year project entitled Sustainable 
Maternal & Child Health Initiatives through Local Government and Education, known 
locally as Project Smile. CARE’s baseline surveys and operations in conjunction with 
community members offered a means of assessing the capacity of Tribal Councils to 
manage projects, and of corroborating findings.
Amateur scholars of B’laan society offered important counsel for findings. Principal 
among these was Cesar Lutero in General Santos City. In the course of his Masterai 
research he had transcribed over 250 B’laan myths, riddles, proverbs, and songs 
[Lutero 1986]. Gregorio Ogoy, a municipal administrator in Koronadal, had completed a 
Masterai thesis which focused on the adaptation of traditional B’laan agriculture to 
techniques introduced by Visayan farmers [Ogoy 1985]. Ester Sevilla in Cotabato City 
had based her Ph.D. research on changes to B’laan society brought about by the loss 
of traditional land and the struggle to get it back [Sevilla 1999]. Others included the 
Redemptionist Brother, Karl Gaspar, whose work relates to indigenous rights and 
development in Mindanao [Gaspar 2000].
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4.5. Practical aspects of fieldwork among the five B'laan communities hosting 
the Tampakan Copper Project
This section introduces the practical means by which research was carried out That is 
to say what considerations were made for Filipino protocol in the research process, how 
research assistants were sought, and how information was gathered.
In accordance with Sheshkin's techniques for securing interviews with figures one is not 
already familiar with [Sheshkin 1985], the first act was to write to Governor Hilario De 
Pedro III of the Province of South Cotabato, introducing the purpose of the research. 
Governor de Pedro provided provincial consent and a letter of authority that was earned 
to Mayor Claudius Barosso of Tampakan, under whose jurisdiction three of the B’laan 
communities lie, and who also provided a letter expressing support Having obtained 
these documents, the project was presented to Mayor Zaharra Paglas in the 
municipality of Columbio, and Mayor Jaime Caminero in Kiblawan, which municipalities 
lie outside the province of South Cotabato. Zaharra Paglas gave a favourable 
response, while Caminero was the most difficult to persuade. He regarded the research 
as being in the interest of mining and having refused to sign the Principal Agreement 
with Western Mining, was reluctant to approve. However, he did give permission to 
interview Jusies Dianga, the Barangay Captain of Kimlawis in which the Bong Mai 
B'laan community were resident. Unlike Mayor Caminero, Jusies Dianga was 
supportive of mining and consented to meetings with the Bong Mai community.
Having obtained authority independent of Western Mining and organisations that 
claimed to speak for B’laans, it was possible to approach the communities at Bong Mai, 
Danlag, Folu Bato, Salna’ong and S’banken and their respective Tribal Councils 
through an independently formulated strategy. In order to accomplish this, research 
assistants were required. These had to be from outside the affected B’laan 
communities and beyond the influence of Visayans who owned land in the area. That is 
because both groups perceived potential threats and benefits accruing from research 
relating thereto. For example, some B’laans regarded it as a means of publicising their 
plight, while many Visayans feared that it might lead to the diversion of resources from 
Visayan dominated Barangay Councils and toward the newly formed Tribal Councils. 
Nevertheless, research assistants had to be intimate with that area and its inhabitants. 
They were preferably literate and versed in B'laan as well as Visayan dialects.
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Typically perhaps, of communities hosting a mining project in such a remote region, all 
such people appeared to have been either employed by various state agencies and 
indeed by Western Mining to conduct their Community Development Program, or were 
participants of the various non-govemmental organisations opposed to ‘exploitation’ by 
a foreign company. This situation was somewhat akin to that described by Colin Filer,
•the history of all mining projects in PNG suggests that any government 
official who possesses the skill, energy and experience required to act as 
an effective mediator between a mining company and a landowning 
community will sooner or later be absorbed by the former, rejected by the 
latter, or promoted to a higher level of government. “
[Filer 1995: 74]
The only apparent opportunity was with former insurgents who had opposed the regime 
of Ferdinand Marcos [1965-86]. They had generally spent many years living in the 
mountainous regions of South Cotabato and were familiar with the communities in the 
proposed mining area. Following the relaxation of Martial Law by the administration of 
Cory Aquino [1986-92], they had found employment, settled, and established families in 
the region. Introductions to these men and women were arranged by the staff at the 
Local Amnesty Board in Marbel. They were interviewed individually for their 
communication skills, and impartiality towards mineral development and the Tribal 
Councils, and six of them were engaged. A methodological workshop was 
subsequently conducted, during the course of which the purpose of the research, the 
methodological framework, the implications of data collection, and other research 
contingencies, were presented and discussed.
A driver was also hired and a vehicle capable of reaching the furthest points of access 
to motorised traffic was rented. This afforded an independent means of transportation 
which was essential considering that vehicular traffic accessing the mining area was 
almost exclusively that of Western Mining or agencies connected with the Tampakan 
Copper Project
4.6. A methodology for the comparative measurement of Tribal Council 
performance.
Analysis of Tribal Council performance involved the collection of specific information 
relating to various aspects of Council functioning. The fact that the Office of Southern 
Cultural Communities I National Commission of Indigenous Peoples had established 
five Tribal Councils offered an opportunity for comparative measurement of
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performance. If reliable results could be obtained, correlation between any pattern of 
performance and factors regarded as influential of mineral-driven development would 
render their role worthy of investigation. Prior to embarkation for the Philippines, a 
detailed methodology was drawn up for this purpose.
Western Mining had stipulated a number of Tribal Council responsibilities. These 
included undergoing management training, liaison between the company and 
community, and the employment of appropriate community members for development 
projects. Also the payment of surface right fees [monies payable for the use of land 
where mining takes place] to correct claimants, provision of access to drill sites, 
attendance of regular meetings, and proficiency in handling funds [Western Mining 
Corporation 1997: 36]. Fulfilment of these tasks might have provided ready measures 
of performance.
However, the contribution of Western Mining was a significant part of the subject in 
question. To appropriate their terms for success would imply measurement of the 
performance of Tribal Councils in contributing to successful mining, rather than to 
successful development of host communities. As a corporate entity with stock market 
listings, the parameters of Western Mining for the success of Tribal Councils were 
unlikely to exceed those necessary to ensure profitable investment - in accordance with 
Gerritsen’s model of Capital Logic [Gerritsen and Macintyre 1991] outlined in section
2.1. Moreover, as the work of Putzel [1997], and Harriss and de Renzio [1997] suggest, 
relations between Tribal Councils and organisations beyond the boundaries of the 
mining project were potentially crucial to their success. Thus independent and 
geographically far-reaching means of evaluation had to be devised.
Gary Libecap has measured the performance of various institutional initiatives in 
circumstances of mineral resource endowment [Libecap 1989]. These were attempting 
to manage mineral booms efficiently and in order that all stakeholders would benefit. 
Thus there were parallels with the position of communities hosting mining projects in 
Southeast Asia. However, in the case of Libecap’s communities, the participants were 
small-scale miners, constituting a Common Pool Resource scenario. Libecap was 
measuring their success in overcoming dilemmas of the type presented by Elinor 
Ostrom [1990]. That is to distribute rights in a profitable yet sustainable manner in 
situations where the source of wealth [and destruction] is accessible to all. Large scale 
mining projects on the other hand, are of limited access on account of the huge capital
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and technological resources required. Organisations tasked with instigating 
development at such minesites typically have a fixed budget sourcing from state or 
company. They are therefore closer to local government units in character than the 
contractual structures described by Libecap.
Indeed, Tribal Council members were from the outset directly elected by each 
community under the supervision of the Office of Southern Cultural Communities and 
the National Commission for Indigenous Peoples. Elections took place on a nominally 
annual basis and those elected were responsible for development according to the 
aspirations of each community. They had to identify, plan and implement projects, 
strategising according to perceived needs. For this they received a fixed monthly salary 
and communities had the power to elect new leaders in case of failure. Thus the Tribal 
Councils were representative and how well they ‘governed’ was fundamental to their 
performance.
Any measurement of the capacity of representative institutions needed to be 
comprehensive. That is because the Tribal Councils did many things - they spent 
money, delivered services and managed internal operations. They also had 
responsibility for many different areas, such as health, agriculture, public works, 
education, social services and economic development Measurement of institutional 
capacity should also be consistent Because the Tribal Councils did many things, they 
had no single ‘bottom line’ that could be equated with a corporate entity. They might 
therefore simply have been good at different things - one leading in health care 
initiatives, while another was better at implementing agricultural projects or had greater 
accounting skills. Reliability is another important aspect. To be worth explaining, 
institutional performance must be reasonably durable. Only if the same units governed 
consistently well, could it be said that performance turned on something more than 
coincidence. Furthermore, in order to be meaningful, measurement of institutional 
performance should correspond to the objectives of users.
Robert Putnam’s evaluation of twenty Italian regional governments comprises a 
pragmatic methodology for measurement of institutional performance, the framework of 
which is presented in the following table. The subsequent pattern of regional 
government performance provided a basis for his explanation and articulation of the 
concept of social capital. It must however be noted that this methodology should not be 
confused with his better-known indicators of civic engagement, which he deploys as
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evidence of trends in the strength and depth of social capital [Putnam 1995a / 1995b /
2000].
Putnam’s Methodology.
Putnam’s method comprised three sections, [1] Policy Processes [2] Policy 
Pronouncements [3] Policy Implementation
First, because an institution’s effectiveness depends upon how well it manages its essential 
internal affairs, Policy Processes focused on the stability of the decision-making apparatus. 
This family of measures asked whether the institution in question was conducting its 
crucial internal operations smoothly and with despatch.
Second, because studying the performance of governments means studying policies and 
programs as well, Policy Pronouncements sought to evaluate the extent to which the 
regional governments were successful in identifying social needs and proposing innovative 
solutions. In other words, whether legislation enacted reflected capacity to react 
comprehensively, coherently and creatively to issues at hand
Third, appraisal moved beyond words to deeds and included evaluation of the success of 
regional governments in their roles as problem solvers and service providers. Putnam 
demonstrated the success of governments in using available resources to address the needs 
of rapidly changing societies, implementing policy objectives, and how efficient 
governments were in responding to the demands of individual citizens.
Upon this basis, Putnam devised twelve indicators which reflected the diversity of things 
that the Regional Governments did to and for their citizens. By combining their scores 
into a single Index of Institutional Performance, he reduced the idiosyncratic impact of any 
single measure. While some regions were high-ranked by virtually every yardstick, others 
were unsuccessful in almost every measure. Thus his composite measure was both 
comprehensive and internally consistent
[Putnam 1993: 3-82].
The framework of Putnam’s methodology thus provided a basis for rigorous appraisal of 
local government performance. Furthermore, a means for demonstrating that some 
governments actually are systematically more effective than others, so that it makes 
sense to speak generically of success.
The comparative methodology subsequently drawn up in London, prior to departure for 
the Philippines, therefore sought to evaluate three aspects of Tribal Council 
performance - Processes, Pronouncements and Implementation. A Council's 
effectiveness depended, first of all, on how well it managed its essential internal affairs. 
Thus the stability of the Councils' decision-making apparatus had to be measured. 
Essentially this family of measures was to ask: Whatever else this institution did, was it 
conducting its internal operations smoothly and with dispatch? Second was 
Pronouncements.* Studying the performance of Councils would mean studying policies 
and programs as well. Were they prompt in identifying social needs and proposing
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innovative solutions? Did their actions reflect a capacity to react comprehensively, 
coherently and creatively to issues at hand? Third was Implementation. Appraisal had 
to move beyond words to deeds. The success of Tribal Councils in their roles as 
problem-solvers and service providers had to be evaluated. Were the Tribal Councils 
successful in using available resources to address the needs of a rapidly changing 
society?
The proposed assessment of Tribal Council performance was founded upon twelve 
diverse indicators, four of Processes, four of Pronouncements, and four of 
Implementation. These are presented in the following table.
Proposed Indicators of Tribal Council Performance.
Processes.
1. Stability.
This relates to Putnam’s first indicator which was based upon the assumption that an 
institution’s effectiveness depends on how well it manages its internal affairs. A broad 
selection of factors, including regularity, attendance, and recording of meetings were to be 
accounted for each Council A scale of 0-10 was to be devised for each category to provide 
a composite indication for each Council.
2. Promptness
This indicator was based upon the monthly Administration and Operation payment made to 
each Council by WMC and administered with the company as joint signatory. A comparison 
of how long it took to ‘budget’ for each month would have demonstrated promptness. The 
number of days that it took to obtain each signature from WMC was to be noted and 
averages also calculated for six month periods. Numbers for each Council were to be 
divided by 10 or 100 to give a score of 0-10.
3. Information Services.
Assuming that better informed institutions respond more effectively, this referred to the 
capacity of Councils in managing data on their communities. Much of the socio-economic 
data for the mining leasehold area was provided by Councils. Examination of the 
methodology of the socio-economic baseline study by Mindanao State University and WMC 
social surveys, was to permit Council contributions to be identified. The input of each 
Council, measured in quantity, means, time, etc. was to be graded on a scale of 0-10, from 
which averages could finally be calculated.
4. Information outsourcing.
This indicator also assumed that information correlates positively with performance. The 
number of outside organisations with which each Council networked offered a potential 
indicator. Organisations with which each Council met were to be counted, as well as the 
number of meetings, and arty degree of regularity noted. Each of these was to be given a 
grading 0-10 from which an average could be calculated representing the relationship with 
that organisation. It was acknowledged that some Councils might have more relationships 
[more organisations] and some have stronger relationships [higher averages]. Which is 
better would be impossible to tell because of multiple implications. This indicator relied 
upon the sum of the average scores for each Council which were in turn to be divided by 10 
to provide final scores.
Pronouncements.
5. Comprehensiveness.
This referred to the breadth of issues addressed by each Council Because certain issues 
were exclusive to particular communities and irrelevant to others, a broad list of issues
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relevant to every community was to be prepared. Each Council was to be graded according 
to the number they addressed compared to the totaL The scale ran from 0, representing no 
issues, to 10, to which the total number was to be converted.
6. Coherence.
Coherence referred to the co-ordination of Council activity. For each Council, the number 
of linkages between the total number of initiatives was to be counted. Each was to be 
graded according to the number of linkages, from 0, representing no linkages, to 10, 
equivalent to the maximum possible, whereby every initiative would be linked to every other 
initiative.
7. Creativeness.
This indicator was to capture Council performance in the identification of needs, 
experimentation with services, and creation of incentives for private initiative. Achievements 
were to be listed for each Council and performances rated 0-10 on a comparative basis. This 
would have depended upon assessment of Council activities backed up by comparison with 
evaluations from community members, community development program officers and others 
whose experience related to the Councils.
8. Innovation.
This indicator assumed, as Putnam had observed in the US, that successful ideas diffuse 
through local government bodies. The goal was to identify business, environment, 
education, and agricultural innovations. Despite differing priorities, certain Councils were 
assumed to be consistent leaders or laggards. The metric to be taken was, of those actions 
appropriate to all communities, on average, how soon after the first appearance of a model 
action, was it adopted by each other Council A Council was to be given 10 points for each 
action it pioneered, those that adopted it points between 0 and 10 according to the thnelag, 
and those that did not adopt it, 0.
Implementation.
9 Financial Proficiency.
As with Putnam’s Day Care Centers, an activity was to be found for which there was no 
‘opportunity cost* to Councils. This was to be achieved by selecting an aspect of Council 
functioning directly funded by WMC regardless of demand, or one which offered benefits 
without cost to the Councils. Potential examples included management of compensation. 
Proficiency in handling funds might have been measured by the number of transactions 
undertaken by each Council following the establishment of their banking facilities.
10. Training.
This focused on the number of people to have completed training for management of 
community affairs and initiatives. The number of people trained was to be compared with 
the number of positions available [or households or adult population] to each community. 
The Councils ware to be ranked 0-10 accordingly
11. Development Instruments.
In accordance with their developmental priority, Tribal Councils could adopt business, 
education, agricultural, etc. strategies. By noting which tools each deployed and how 
quickly they became operational, another indicator of performance could be obtained.
Scores from 0-10 were to be awarded for each project and made proportional to the date at 
which they were instigated.
12. Spending Capacity.
This indicator was to be based upon what fraction of any fixed allocation of funds - such as 
the Operation and Administration payment, was actually disbursed Because transactions 
were assessed by community development officers and countersigned by accountants at 
WMC, the majority of spending decisions were assumed to be sound. Spending Capacity 
was to be calculated from the amount of money in each account at the end of each month.
By adding all of them for each Council and dividing each total by the number of payments 
and deducting that from 30 000, the average amount not disbursed each month could have 
been calculated The bigger that sum, the less money was on average disbursed That
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amount must always be below 30 000 and the lower the better hence each Council could 
have been given a value between 10, representing 0 pesos and 0, representing 30 000 pesos. 
Putnam [1993]
Data pertaining to these indicators was to be drawn from the period 1995 - 2000, that is 
after the passing of the Mining Act and creation of Financial and Technical Assistance 
Agreements. Although the relevance of indicators to institutional performance was 
clear-cut, their quantification was less exact. Indeed, it is acknowledged that the 
indicators, particularly Nos. 1., 4., and 7. were subjective. Each was therefore to be 
discussed with those familiar with the B’laan communities and evaluated from a cultural 
perspective, as there may have been cultural explanations for events observed. While 
no single metric taken in isolation would suffice to rate the Tribal Councils fairly, their 
collective fulfilment would undergird a broad-based assessment of institutional success 
and failure. This was to be expressed in an Index of Comparative Council Performance 
formulated from the scores accruing to each Council.
It should be noted that while evaluation of Tribal Council performance measured 
actions, not only words, it was important not to give Councils credit [or blame] for 
matters beyond their control. In the language of policy analysis, "outputs” were to be 
measured rather than “outcomes" - health care rather than mortality rates; economic 
development programs rather than business profits; agricultural initiatives rather than 
yields. Mortality rates, profits and yields are important but social outcomes are 
influenced by many things other than local government units. Health for example was 
dependent upon factors such as diet and lifestyle, that were beyond the control of 
Councils. Agricultural yields were obviously even more so. Profits represent worker 
skill, entrepreneurial talent, world markets - and luck.
While this methodology fulfilled the first three requirements of measurement of 
institutional performance, that is comprehensiveness, consistency and reliability, 
correspondence with the evaluations of users remained a problem. That is because 
none of the five B’laan communities had ever had a Tribal Council prior to the arrival of 
Western Mining. Moreover, their social and cultural norms were difficult to assess. 
Expressing success in B’laan terms would require an intimate understanding of every 
obstacle.
The methodology aimed to address performance in terms of the objectives of B'laan 
communities by three means. The first was in pragmatic terms. In order to be 
persuasive, measures of policy performance are not affected by differences in
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substantive priorities. While it is not easy for example, to compare the innovativeness, 
effectiveness and social importance of say, a scholarship program and an irrigation 
project, the framework reduced such difficulties to manageable proportions. The same 
themes were to be expressed in interviews with members of all Tribal Councils.
Although the urgency of certain problems varied, all grappled with similar issues - such 
as health, education and business issues. Admittedly, they did not address these 
equally promptly or comprehensively, and the results did not equally satisfy members or 
constituents. Nevertheless, while Tribal Councils could not be expected to pursue 
targets they did not desire, it could be expected that they would be effective in pursuit of 
priorities which were strong preferences.
The second means of addressing the objectives of the host communities was by 
comparison itself. Instead of either resting upon the ideals of Western Mining, or 
attempting to capture those of B'laans, which would have involved an anthropological 
undertaking, the Tribal Councils were to be compared with each other to identify 
strengths and weaknesses. What is more, no point of absolute success or failure was 
to be adopted. All the data collected and the quantitative representations they provided 
were to provide for comparison of the performance of one Council with another, rather 
than with any external scale.
Third, corroboratory evidence relating to correspondence with the objectives and 
evaluations of constituents and protagonists was to be obtained from those 
organisations familiar with the Tribal Councils. Although these were limited in number, 
it was possible to obtain assessments of Council performance independent both of this 
research and Western Mining. That is because these organisations included church 
groups, local businesses, and B’laans themselves, and data could subsequently be 
triangulated in order to identify consistencies in the findings.
4.7. The pilot methodology and its findings.
Before comparative research was attempted in earnest, the proposed indicators 
were piloted in a twofold manner. First, they were presented to Western Mining’s 
Tribal Liaison Officers, former members of ACCESS Inc. - the Association for 
Community Concern, Ecology and Social Services which had been contracted by 
Western Mining to conduct a socio-economic baseline survey of affected 
communities in 1995, as well as Professor Elipidio Octura at the Mindanao State 
University’s College of Agriculture in General Santos City, and Emeritus Professor
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Richard Jackson, who had processed the results of that survey and who were all 
therefore familiar with Tribal Council capacity. Secondly, questions to be asked of 
Tribal Council members were translated into llonggo, which was the most familiar 
Visayan dialect among B’laan communities in the vicinity of the proposed minesite. 
Measurement of Tribal Council performance was conducted in full at Folu Bato, 
the B'laan community closest to the poblaaon of Tampakan.
Professors Octura and Jackson suggested that some of the questions that needed 
to be asked in order to fulfil planned indicators were not practical, because data 
was either not available or too ambiguous. For example, No. 4., Information 
Outsourcing, for which the number of organisations with which a Tribal Council 
consulted for developmental information and advice were to be counted. With the 
onset of mineral exploration, it was apparent that oppositional organisations had 
thrust themselves toward, rather than having been consulted by, Tribal Councils. 
Distinguishing between 'consulting' and ‘thrusting’, as well as accounting for 
varying means of participants and the depth of contacts was difficult.
Moreover, the information provided by Tribal Liaison Officers et. al. and evidence 
observed in Folu Bato, indicated that the Tribal Councils were not performing 
many of the functions for which, under the terms of their agreement with Western 
Mining, they were responsible. Not all Councils appeared to be undergoing all of 
the management training intended - all were doing some but the extent varied and 
there was an obvious shortfall. Neither were they all providing liaison between 
Western Mining and community members. Again the extent varied, in the case of 
Salna'ong relations seemed to have broken down completely. Performance in 
terms of assisting administrative functions such as the employment of appropriate 
community members for development projects, payment of surface right fees to 
correct claimants, providing access to drill sites and payment of appropriate 
compensation for drill sites to the correct landholder was also weak. Moreover, 
there appeared to be confusion as to what these tasks entailed.
116
Indeed, several Tribal Councils were not sending representatives to meetings with 
Western Mining personnel. As Western Mining had themselves conceded in October 
1997;
“It is early days, and the process has not been without its difficulties.
Problems have been experienced with budgeting and transparent 
accounting procedures. The Tribal Councils are working to improve 
their performance, and support is being provided by external training, 
non-govemment organisations and WMC community development 
workers."
[Western Mining Corporation 1997: 37]
On arrival in Mindanao, a considerable gap was apparent between the ostensible 
responsibilities of Tribal Councils and what they were actually doing. The pilot study 
indicated that they did not have the skills or the capacity for their role. Thus the 
definition of Council success adopted had ‘missed the target1, providing an inadequate 
fit with prevailing circumstances. Expectations that had oriented methodological design 
were found to be ambitious, supposing too much of the Councils. Conversely, the 
Councils might be said to have failed to meet expectations, the poor fit reflecting under­
achievement.
4.8. Subsequent adaptations to the comparative methodology.
The findings of the pilot methodology necessitated a number of changes to the 
comparative methodology. These were in order to refocus measurement of Tribal 
Council performances upon the progress that they had made and the tasks that they 
were so far able to engage in.
First, the three aspects of Council functioning according to which indicators had been 
categorised, that is Processes, Pronouncements and Implementation, were not 
appropriate. While the Councils had been successfully established and were 
participating in regular meetings, elections and so forth, the extent to which they 
identified needs, proposed solutions and provided services was less than had been 
anticipated. Indeed the creation of the Councils and the fact that they were in existence 
seemed to have been the most significant achievement. Processes was therefore 
enlarged. Pronouncements and Implementation on the other hand, were subsumed into 
a new section entitled Operations.
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In the changes made to the Processes section, indicators of Promptness, Information 
Services, Information Outsourcing and Frequency of Elections were dropped. 
Promptness had to be excluded because the monthly Administration and Operations 
payments were made without any'budget being prepared by the Tribal Councils.
Rather, the only budgets were those calculated by Western Mining accountants and 
applied to payments made for projects agreed upon by the Foundation Boards. 
Information Services was impractical because socio-economic data was gathered at the 
behest of Western Mining and usually by their Community Liaison Officers, which made 
it difficult to establish the level of participation by Council members. Information 
Outsourcing was impossible to calculate on a comparative basis because awareness on 
the part of Councils, of which organisations to consult and for what purpose, was 
limited. Moreover, opportunities to initiate contact were also minimal due to the 
isolation of the area. Contact with outside organisations was almost always at the 
instigation of the external party and usually managed by either Western Mining or 
groups opposed to mining. Frequency of Elections was dropped because the 
communities were oblivious to the principle of regular elections, which were not 
promoted by the National Commission for Indigenous Peoples.
Despite these changes to the first section, aspects of Council Stability remained valid 
and provided inspiration for three new indicators. These were Meetings, according to 
which, regularity, location, attendance, and recording, were all addressed. 
Representation provided scope for assessment of the extent to which representative 
leadership had taken hold in an otherwise dan-based sodety. Concomitant with 
representative leadership, Female Partidpation examined the contribution of women to 
the Tribal Coundls and ranked them accordingly.
Indicators of Comprehensiveness, Coherence, Creativeness, and Innovation, which 
made up the Pronouncements section, and Finandai Profidency, Training,
Development Instruments, and Spending Capadty, which comprised Implementation, 
were also extensively altered. The new Operations sedion induded Expediency, 
Training, Comprehensiveness, and Spending Capadty. These adhere to the concepts 
that oriented Pronouncements and Implementation, but were more dosely attuned to 
the drcumstances experienced by the Tribal Coundls.
Comprehensiveness proved viable and remained largely unchanged in the new 
methodology. Coherence on the other hand was dropped because Tribal Coundl
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initiatives had not, at least until 1999, arrived at a level of sophistication that reflected 
integration. Initiatives were being deployed in response to overwhelming primary needs 
for increased productivity, health, and education. Creativeness was also hampered by 
the novelty of the Tribal Councils, and the necessity of basic services. Innovation was 
likewise severely constrained by the limited activities of Councils. There were some 
examples such as the rattan business with which the Folu Bato and Danlag 
communities had become involved, but they were too few to provide a demonstrative 
sample.
Of the indicators that had constituted the Implementation category, Financial 
Profidency was dropped because no activity was available for which there was no 
opportunity cost to the Tribal Coundls. Bank deposits and withdrawals might have 
sufficed, but these were performed by the Foundations. Because of the limited number 
of initiatives adopted by each Coundl and proximity to Comprehensiveness, 
Development Instruments was incorporated into Comprehensiveness. Spending 
Capadty was preserved, albeit in a different format Rather than being calculated on a 
monthly basis, this was done bi-annually according to the balance or defidt in the 
account of each Foundation just prior to each of the six-monthly payments by Western 
Mining. Using the Foundation accounts was considered safe in this instance because 
Western Mining employed professional accountants who had an obvious interest in 
finandai stability. Mismanagement in the form of excessive unspent funds or defidt 
was therefore presumed to be the result of inexperience or otherwise on the part of 
B'laan members.
Training was maintained. Through the Tampakan Copper Project bulletin, ‘Project 
Update’ it was possible to follow the training in which Tribal Coundl members and 
communities partidpated. These activities were verified through interviews with the 
affected communities and provided an impression of new skills. Another new indicator 
introduced following the pilot study was Expediency, which reflects the time it took each
Coundl to progress from its creation to the formation of a Foundation. This presumes
0
that having signed the Prindpal Agreement, a Coundl intends to partidpate in a 
Foundation - the timelag should therefore correlate directly with its effidency.
It is also necessary to note that in indicators dependent upon data deriving from 
Foundation partidpation, that is Expediency, Comprehensiveness, and Spending 
Capadty, one of the communities - Salna’ong - was problematic. As preliminary
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observation had established, it had not signed the Principal Agreement and 
subsequently had no Foundation. Thus, Salna’ong was barred from comparison in 
terms of indicators dependent upon participation in the Foundation structure. However, 
it was not intended to exclude Salna’ong from a complete analysis. Corollary 
explanations of performance were to be evaluated and ranking points awarded 
respectfully.
Thus, procedural difficulties encountered in the course of the pilot study and preliminary 
investigations were accommodated. However, it should be noted that the changes do 
not suggest the methodology devised in London was conceptually defective. Rather, 
indicators such as Coherence and Creativeness may well become appropriate after a 
period of further maturation by the Tribal Councils.
Finally, the observation was made that it was simply too soon to begin measuring 
Council performance and that they should have been given more time to function 
properly. As Richard Jackson pointed out in his review of the proposed methodology;
“Indeed, If you were planning on doing your PhD over a twenty year 
period, this would be an excellent topic. . .  only if one takes this study 
over the life of the mine would I conceive it to be a whole study”
The constraints of a three year Ph.D. to measurement of institutional performance in 
such a traditional environment are acknowledged. James Ederfor example, collected 
data among the Batak people on Palawan over a period of fifteen years [Eder 1993: vii] 
which enabled him to say a great deal more about the overall process of change to 
traditional institutions. Likewise, Stuart Schlegel spent eight years among the Teduray 
in western Cotabato [Schlegel 1999:1-20], In measuring the performance of Italian 
regional governments, Robert Putnam himself repeated his methodology six times 
between 1977 and 1988 [Putnam 1993: 78].
Nevertheless, the advent of a mining project and inputs accruing therefrom, may create 
an institutional hothouse, in which pressures and responses evolve more quickly than 
would otherwise be the case. Moreover, apparent disparity between Tribal Coundl 
performances suggested that there was a lot to be learned. While the pilot study 
identified Danlag, Folu Bato, and S’banken as having partidpated in various projects, 
relations between Salna’ong and Western Mining had broken down almost completely.
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What is more, the affected population was of a suitable size for a single researcher, and 
its isolation enabled comparisons to be drawn with other B’laan communities not 
affected by mining. Division of the affected population into five separate communities, 
each under the jurisdiction of its own Tribal Council, meant that trends could be 
distinguished from an early stage. For these reasons such a study was considered 
viable.
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Chapter Five.
Southern Mindanao and regional obstacles to mineral-driven development.
The first part of the methodology focused on the ‘national' arena, to ascertain the 
impact of political and legal factors upon host communities in the context of mining 
projects. The second was concerned with the performance of Tribal Coundls 
themselves in order to assess local' factors affecting developmental initiatives.
This structure provides the basis of the following three chapters. Chapter Five 
concerns the environment into which Western Mining entered, and problems 
sourdng therefrom. Chapter Six presents the findings of the indicators of Tribal 
Coundl performance, and the pattern of Coundl performance. Chapter Seven 
examines aspeds of the local area that correlated with this pattern, and that might 
explain the progress of mineral-driven development.
Those ‘national' issues induded violence, the dedsion-making process which 
governed the construction of roads, and the tenurial security of B’laan 
communities. They had implications for procedural equity on the part of host 
communities within the Tribal Coundl - Foundation framework, and the power to 
build upon developmental opportunities within the prevailing political context
5.1. The Impact of violence upon communities hosting the Tampakan 
Copper Project
As even a cursory visit to the proposed mineral development area would have 
confirmed, violence was commonplace. There were estimated to be 500 000 
unregistered firearms in the Philippines [Rasul 1993:64-5]. According to the Local 
Amnesty Board in Marbel, there was at least one for every household in Bong Mai 
and Salna’ong. Those observed induded revolvers and automatic hand guns, 
pump-action shotguns, ‘long arms’ such as the M16, as well as home-made “surit- 
surif and “paltik” rifles. Members of ACCESS Inc. had recommended a policy of 
disarming B'laan communities to Western Mining in 1996. This was discounted as 
impractical considering the tense nature of relationships in the region.
Western Mining had contracted the Telstar Security agency to ensure physical 
security at their facilities. They had also engaged Control Risks to assess strategic 
threats to the Tampakan Copper Project. Control Risk operatives provided 
ongoing assessments of political, military and para-military activities in the region.
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Moreover, on the occasion of the opening of CARE International’s Tampakan office 
in April 1999, Country Director David Stanton explained the strategy to be 
implemented by Project Smile. Because of frequent violence, the Project was only 
to be introduced in the three communities closest to the Tampakan municipal 
poblacion. That is to say Folu Bato, Danlag and S’banken. Participants from Bong 
Mai and Salna'ong were travelling to those places to avail of the CARE services.
Indeed, during the first five years [1995-2000], a number of prominent members of 
the B’laan community had been killed. Whether Council processes could continue 
smoothly, let alone be expanded upon was therefore questionable. Violence was 
clearly impacting upon community life in the manner witnessed by Moser and 
Holland in Jamaica [1997:23-5]. This supported the hypothetical importance of 
violence as a limiter of local mineral-driven development.
However, in order to qualify this, it was necessary to address a number of 
important aspects of the violence encountered. First of all, whether the proposed 
mining project played any part in the pattern of violence was not known. In light of 
disputes engendered at minesites elsewhere in Southeast Asia, it was important to 
establish this. Secondly, whether the level of violence would force all 
developmental initiatives to proceed in a truncated form - as was the case for 
David Stanton’s Project Smile, was unclear. Third, how deeply rooted the causes 
of violence were within the social structures of southern Mindanao, and whether 
they might be influenced in a positive manner, by developmental initiatives, was 
uncertain.
Analysing violence was a complex task. The multitude of apparent causes of crime 
meant that categorisation was necessary in order to make any rigorous 
assessment In accordance with Putzel and Harriss* insistence on the importance 
of political structures, an initial distinction was made between that violence which 
was ostensibly political, and that which was not
5.1.1. Political violence.
Evidence of politically motivated violence, stemming from clashes between each of 
the two main alternative ideological perspectives - Marxism and Islam, and the 
Philippine state in Mindanao, was frequently encountered in the course of 
research. The New People’s Army [NPA] - the military wing of the Mao inspired
123
National Democratic Front, and the secessionist Moro Islamic Liberation Front 
[MILF], were active in the mountainous regions of South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat 
and Davao Dei Sur provinces. In April 1999, the NPA raided a military camp in the 
municipality of Columbio. Arms and ammunition were ‘confiscated’ from the 25th 
Special Forces Company based in Tupi. In February 2000 the MILF intensified 
their campaign over a period of several months, including bombings of department 
stores General Santos City and Marbel.
Units of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and Civilian Home Defence 
Geographical Units [local militia] were consequently deployed throughout 
Mindanao, including Tampakan and Columbio. Many leaders of Visayan militia, 
such as Barangay Captain Claudel Magbanua in Tablu, maintained a tight military, 
political and economic grip on remote areas. Skirmishes between these militia and 
rebel forces, and their potential to erupt into something worse, served to heighten 
tensions within the area - particularly between Visayans in the lower regions of the 
municipality and B’laans further up.
Moreover, because NPA and MILF bases lay in remote regions, and as such places 
were the scene of much of the combat between them and the military, B’laans had 
inevitably been embroiled. The Local Amnesty Board provided evidence of 
participation by B'laans in rebel organisations. Presidential Proclamations 347 and 
348 granted amnesty to any surrenderees whose application was filed between April 
30th 1994, and June 1st 1995 for political crimes on or before April 30th 1994, and 
which were subsequently approved. They were followed by Proclamations 723 and 
724 granting amnesty to surrenderees whose applications were filed between 
December 20th 1996, and March 20th 1997, for political crimes that occurred on or 
before June 1st 1995, and which were likewise approved. Proclamation 21 
followed, offering amnesty for applications filed between March 24rth 1999, and 
March 23rd 2000, covering all political crimes on or before December 31st 1996. 
Tables 1. and 2. present the outcomes of surrender applications. On analysis of 
this data with Amnesty Board members, it was estimated that twenty-five percent of 
applications under proclamations 347 and 348, and thirty percent of those under 
proclamations 723 and 724, had been made by B'laans.'
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Table 1. Summary of amnesty proceedings conducted by the Marbel 
Local Amnesty Board under Presidential Proclamations 347 and 348, 
as of January 7th, 2000._____________________________________
Rebel
Affiliation
Granted
Amnesty
Denied
Amnesty
Cases
Pending
Total
C PP/N PA /N D F 67 20 3 90
MILF 33 1 2 36
MNLF 0 0 0 0
‘ Military 1 2 0 3
Total 101 23 5 129
‘ Military, Paramilitary and CHDF, now GAFGUs, or Civilian Armed Forces' Geographical Units 
represent those rebels originating from the military.
Table 2. Summary of amnesty proceedings conducted by the Marbel 
Local Amnesty Board under Presidential Proclamations 723 and 724, 
as of January 7th 2000.______________________________________
Rebel
Affiliation
Granted
Amnesty
Denied
Amnesty
Cases
Pending
Total
C P P /N P A /N D F 98 15 55 168
MILF 32 12 61 105
MNLF 4 18 29 51
‘ Military 1 0 1 2
Other 0 1 0 I 1
Total 135 46 146 327
‘ Military, Paramilitary and CHDF, now GAFGUs, or Civilian Armed Forces’ Geographical Units 
represent those rebels originating from the military.
However, it must be noted that the Amnesty Board had difficulty in determining 
genuine surrenderees. That is distinguishing perpetrators of political crimes from 
those motivated by other factors - namely personal gain. Indeed, sometimes ho 
division existed. There had been many instances in South Cotabato of both 
Visayans and B’laans, when wanted by the police in connection with various crimes, 
filing applications with the Local Amnesty Board. Whether or not they had 
committed any political crime was often not even the issue, rather the lengthy 
application procedure provided a means of ‘buying time’. The Curriculum Vitae of 
Gog Cafion - see the following table, illustrates the complexity of the relationship 
between B’laans and the NPA /  MILF, and the broader scope of criminal activity.
The relationship between B’laans and the NPA / MILF.
During the 1970s Gog Cafion, a Fulong from Bong Mai, fought at sporadic 
intervals against loggers and the loss of land to Visayan settlement of the 
Quezon mountains. During the 1980s he participated with the NPA of which 
his membership, surrender and application for amnesty were accepted by the 
Marbel Amnesty Board under Proclamation 724. In 1996 and 1997 he was 
employed by Western Mining as a Tribal Liaison Officer, within their
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Community Development Program. As a Fulong, he was also a traditional 
leader and on occasion a fighter, and possessed firearms. On the morning of 
September 17th, 1998 Gog Cafion was killed in an ambush while riding a 
horse en-route to Maklak, a sitio in Bong Mai. According to the report filed by 
Telstar security, the killing was perpetrated by rival B’laans and allegedly took 
place as revenge for the theft of a horse.
Thus, while it seemed clear that a considerable number of B’laans had 
participated in the activities of the NPA and MILF, the degree to which they 
had really been members was ambiguous. The majority had certainly not 
studied Marxist / Maoist doctrine nor the teachings of the Koran, as the titles of 
those organisations suggest would be requisite to membership. Rather, the 
relationship between them and B’laans was for the most part motivated by a 
shared experience of marginalisation. The NPA in particular had a recognised 
political strategy, which B’laans had never managed to achieve. To say that 
they were simply ‘hitching a ride’ wherever they could, would be a more 
accurate expression of their participation in political rebellion. The acceptance 
of applications such as Gog’s, as well as those of fourteen other B’laans in the 
first six months of 1999, enabled them to avoid jail, but in reality the 
relationship was very weak.__________________________________________
It is acknowledged that there was a hypothetical’ potential for the NPA to encourage 
B’laans to reject a foreign owned mining project, or attempt to extort some form of 
‘revolutionary tax' from the company, which might have embroiled the Tampakan Copper 
Project in political violence. That was because such methods were a familiar tactic of the 
NPA Two of the buses that plied the route from Marbel to General Santos were 
destroyed in Tupi in October 1999, when the Yellow Bus Line refused to make such a 
payment Likewise, the MILF might conceivably oppose the entry of Western Mining into 
an area of traditional Muslim patrimony, Western Mining’s FTAA marking the southern tip 
of a region of strong Muslim influence.
However, despite these uncertainties and potential sources of conflict, no direct 
connection was found between political violence in southern Mindanao, and the 
Tampakan Copper Project. Neither were B’laans considered to have posed a sufficient 
threat to the Visayan community to engender any deep structural basis for aggression.
Nevertheless, it should not be assumed that B’laan development was completely isolated 
from the effects of ideological conflict Indeed, there was an indirect connection between 
B'laans and politically motivated violence. In the minds of the Visayan community and 
the context of State-Insurgent and Christian-Moslem violence, B’laans were guilty of
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association. Moreover, units of the Armed Forces of the Philippines periodically raided 
B'laan settlements within the Tampakan Copper Project area, including Salna’ong, Datal 
Biao, and Bong Mai. These visits took place without warning, and while no one was 
killed, B’laans were turned out of their houses and saw their property confiscated. Such 
incidents were recorded in November 1997, September 1998, June 1999, August 2000, 
and in February 2001. On the latter occasion, Juanito Malid, came to the Cathedral 
compound in Kororiadal to tell staff at the Social Action Center that soldiers had forcibly 
entered the house of his brother Gorrilmin, before dawn. The family had been roused, 
from their sleep and their home ransacked. Rice and tools had been ‘confiscated’ which 
the family witnessed at gunpoint. Following this, Gorrelmin was hiding in the mountains, 
while Juanito reported the incident to the Diocese, who would then protest to the military 
authorities, in the light of which publicity it might be safe for Gorrelmin to return home. 
These actions reflected popular distrust on the part of the dominant Visayan community. 
They also fuelled resentment among B’laans, many of whom regarded the military as 
being on the side of the mining company, and operating to remove potential objectors. 
These sentiments placed an incremental cost upon B’laan development. Indeed, while 
these findings were being written up in 2002, this researcher was informed by Rose 
Romano, the Indigenous Peoples Officer at the Social Action Center, that Gorrelmin 
Malid had been murdered, alledgedly by local Visayan militia.
5.1. 2. Non-political violence.
Aside from political and ideologically directed violence, records supplied by George 
Dida, Security Co-ordinator at Western Mining, of crimes committed within the vicinity of 
their exploration activities, as well as those of the Telstar agency, indicated numerous 
instances of, and reasons for, non-political crimes.
In respect of the authority of the Philippine National Police, research began with the 
Tampakan police. They were asked to order the barangays of Tampakan according to 
the approximate level of violence in each. Their answers are listed in the first column of 
the following table. These are then compared with rankings according to distance from 
the pobladon and those barangays in which majority B’laan communities were present, 
which are represented in the higher case.
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Violence in the municipality of Tampakan - June 1999.
Criminality
Ranking
Distance
Ranking
Population*
DANLAG [Danlag] 1 3 2 159
TABLU [S’banken] 2 1 1 841
PALO 3 2 1 182
PULA BATO [Folu Bato] 4 4 1358
LAMPITAK 5 9 1912
BUTO 6 6 1 502
ALBAGAN 7 5 960
Kipalbig 8 8 3 707
Poblacion 9 13 5 851
Maltana 10 12 2 548
Lambayong 11 7 1768
Liberty 12 10 1 859
San Isidro 13 11 1 609
*Source: Tampakan Municipal Planning Office.
The table expresses correlation between violence, distance, and B’laan communities. 
The six most ‘violent1 barangays all embraced B’laan communities. Five of them were 
the most distant from the pobladon, although Lampitak was an interesting exception, 
which might suggest that the fact that the population were B’laan rather than remote 
was the reason for violence - or at least police activity there. That is to say that 
Lampitak was comparatively dose to the pobladon, yet the level of violence there was 
higher than in other barangays close to the pobladon. Although Datal Blao [Salna’ong] 
and Kimlawis [Bong Mai] were beyond their jurisdiction, the Tampakan police regarded 
these barangays as more violent than those in Tampakan, and an external threat to the 
munidpality. Moreover, much of the Bong Mai community remained at Bong S’bang in 
S’banken at least partly because of the high inddence of “banditry" assodated with the 
Bong Mai area. In summary, it was the opinion of the Tampakan police, that the five 
barangays in which the communities affected by mineral development were located, 
were the most violent areas. A list following the order of such activity would have 
begun with Kimlawis in Kiblawan, followed by Datal Blao in Columbio, Danlag, Tablu, 
and Pula Bato respectively.
It should however be noted that the Tampakan police were seriously under-resourced. 
Ronny Labrador, one of the police officers at Tampakan police station explained that 
during 1999 they had no vehide and relied upon being able to borrow a dumptruck from
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the Office of the Mayor, for operations outside the pobladon. This he said depended 
upon the goodwill of the Mayor who might or might not immediately co-operate. This 
gave rise to an impression of polidng in Tampakan as something which took place at 
the discretion of munidpal authority, which police officers did not discourage when it 
was put to them. Moreover, according to provindal police statistics, the munidpality of 
Tampakan had registered ninety-seven cases of homidde or attempted homidde 
between January 1st 1995, and May 31st 1999, which indicated a relatively high crime 
rate. It was therefore understandable that the Tampakan police force, who numbered 
twenty-seven personnel with seventeen rifles, judged themselves under-equipped to 
respond adequately to crime in the munidpality. On several occasions, commanding 
officer Virgilio Carreon expressed reluctance to intercede in reported misdemeanours in 
remote barangays for fear of being overextended. Another point is that the Tampakan 
police force were entirely composed of Visayans and might therefore have been 
susceptible to perception of traditional B’laan land as a source of criminal activity. 
These factors must all be taken into account when evaluating the data and that only a 
portion of the actual violence taking place had been processed and could not therefore, 
as with criminal data anywhere else, be regarded as complete. Nevertheless, the 
correlation does demonstrate that whatever the cause, B’laan lands were the scene of a 
comparatively large proportion of the violence in Tampakan.
During the course of speaking to both B’laans and Visayans in the area affected by the 
proposed mine, a large amount of anecdotal evidence relating to violence was 
gathered. Through discussions with community members, three generic sources of 
violence were identified. These were land disputes, marijuana, and feuding, which 
correlated with accounts of crime gathered from the Social Action Center at the Diocese 
of Marbel, and Western Mining’s community development personnel. The following 
case studies outline these three sources.
Land disputes.
With the vast influx of Visayan settlers into the region - outlined in section 3. 2., 
loss of traditional land was everywhere a challenge to B’laan communities. 
‘Landgrabbing’ was an ongoing reality in the remoter regions of South Cotabato 
[Rodil 1994: 37-40 / Ogoy 1985: 1-14]. By its very nature, mineral exploration 
enhances the perceived value o f land. In the event o f mineral development, the 
target of landgrabbers is to obtain some form of veto power through rights to land 
in which mining will take place. This provides a potential ‘gatekeeper’ role, 
ensuring a share of royalties. Attempts to secure title to land within the FTAA 
leasehold, were commonplace. Western Mining had also attracted migrants hoping 
to find work within the Project. Indeed, the Tampakan Copper Project was 
popularly perceived in association with the cult of ‘treasure hunting’, symbolised by
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tales of the ‘Yamashite Gold’ allegedly hidden by the Japanese during World War 
Two [Lopez 1992: 7], which induced further speculation.
To draw a comparison with the ‘goldrash’ phenomenon at minesites in Brazil, die 
scramble for rights to land is typically lawless as a result of the absence of any 
mechanism to regulate demands created by new situations - see for example, Alcida 
Ramos [Ramos 1993: 271 -313]. In the case of traditional BTaan land, at the time 
of the arrival of Western Mining, this was under the jurisdiction of the Department 
o f Environment and Natural Resources, and was subsequently awarded Certificates 
of Ancestral Domain Claim. However, illegal acquisition of CADC land suggested 
that this particular mechanism was not appropriate for the task. It is within the 
context of these circumstances that land disputes, as well as Visayan encroachment 
in general, should be understood._________________________________________
Marijuana.
According to the Tampakan Police, marijuana was being cultivated within CADC 
lands in S’banken, Bong Mai and at Datal Biao in Salna’ong. Indeed, one of the 
prison cells at the Tampakan police station was being used to store a quantity of 
‘evidence’ collected in Salna’ong and several prominent B’laans, including 
members of the Salna’ong Tribal Council, were alleged to be growers.
Marijuana was a controversial subject but had undoubtedly been a substantial cash 
crop for many B’laans during recent decades. The typical mechanism by which this 
economy operated was explained by B’laan elders in Benigno Aquino, a part o f 
barangay Miasong. Marijuana had been cultivated in the area since die late 1970s, 
beginning at Lamalis, in S’banken. It was introduced to the B’laans at Bong Mai in 
approximately 1980 by one Mr. Chua, a Chinese-Filipino timber concessionaire 
from Davao City. Having logged the area in question, he then explained the 
necessary cultivation techniques to the BTaan residents and instructed than to sell 
to him. Although Chua had departed, this basis for cultivation and supply was still 
in place.
Marijuana production functioned as a result of remoteness - die area being 
effectively beyond the law. All of the police information regarding these activities 
was supplied and pinpointed by occasional informants, few B’laans having 
sufficient empathy with the police to volunteer information. Police expeditions into 
these areas were hampered by their lack of transportation and the frequent 
opportunity for ambush offered by the terrain. Military helicopters were 
occasionally deployed for the purpose and were observed in Kiblawan, but were not 
sufficiendy effective. Poverty was also a persistent motivation, few alternative 
means of generating such income being available.
The majority of the marijuana was sold outside o f the area and there was no 
apparent evidence to suggest B’laans as consumers. While many of its offenders 
were indeed BTaan, die source of instigation was not indigenous. Indeed, it was 
doubtful that B’laans would be so engaged without the encouragement of certain 
Visayans. The Tampakan police explained their proposed link between drug 
trafficking and mineral exploration in terms of the renovation of logging roads and 
increased vehicular traffic in and out of the area.
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Feuds.
A certain amount of crime specific to B’laan communities was also evident 
Almost all B’laan respondents testified to and related experience of feuds.
Typically a woman being taken or simply eloping from the house of one man to that 
of another from a different clan, and a revenge party being mobilised to exact 
retribution, resulted in a series of tit-for-tat skirmishes. Inter-clan cattle rustling or 
the occupation of the land of another clan without consent provoked similar results.
Feuds provided a basis of power within B’laan society as has been documented 
since Fay Cooper-Cole visited the area in 1910 [Cooper-Cole 1913]. However, 
during the intervening years they had been made more lethal by the introduction of 
firearms. They had also been rendered more difficult to resolve internally due to 
the vacuum created by the demise of the indigenous system of justice known as 
Kasfala. They remained difficult to resolve externally because of its incomplete 
replacement by the Filipino justice system, for which there were two reasons. First 
was the remote nature of B’laan land and the lack of resources available to the 
Philippine National Police. Second was the cultural divide between Visayan and 
BTaan sections of society.
The latter point was evident from the way that the causes of BTaan feuds were 
referred to as “wife stealing” or “wifenapping” and regarded as indicative of 
promiscuity, by Visayans. Such references were based upon the assumption that the 
Roman Catholic concept of marriage extended to relationships between BTaan men 
and women. Marriage rites were observed among B’laans and several detailed 
accounts of them exist within the anthropological literature on Mindanao - see for 
example the Encyclopedia of Philippine Art [CCP 1994]. However, BTaan 
marriage was a more flexible institution than that of Visayans. Polygamy was 
practised by many Fulongs, and as Espinosa explains, a form of ‘divorce’ was also 
common [Espinosa 1974: 49-55], Indeed, Malayon, Juanito and Piring Malid each 
had several wives.
The hegemony of Visayan and broader Filipino value systems had led to 
perceptions of B’laan institutions as primitive and backward. Aside from a few 
communities such as at Lamkwa in Polomolok, Rang-ay in Banga, and El-Gawel in 
Koronadal, who had sought legal representation, formal judicial proceedings 
frequently failed to take customary law into account and subsequently lacked 
appropriate sensitivity. This served to alienate B’laans, and seemed to obstruct the 
development of their respect for the law and modem institutions.________________
Quantification of the cost imposed by violence upon mineral-driven development 
initiatives defied conclusive explanation. While it might have been possible to state 
explicitly what facilities the communities of Bong Mai and Salna'ong had lost on account 
of the disinclination of CARE Philippines or other specific services to visit those areas, 
violence impacted indirectly too. For example, through the reduction in travel by 
community members and those upon whom they depended for business and 
administration. Sporadic instances of violence restricted movements within the area, 
with messages having to be ‘sent ahead’ to announce any visitor and secure safe
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passage. The possibility of violence meant that transportation to more remote 
communities would frequently be terminated and some communities became “no go” 
areas. Thus violence had a greater impact upon remote communities and less among 
the communities at Folu Bato and Danlag, which were comparatively dose to the 
Tampakan pobladon and the floor of the Koronadal valley. Indeed Salna’ong, Bong 
Mai and large parts of S'banken lay beyond the reach of the Tampakan police. It was 
harder still to judge the impact of the voluntary curfew observed by the majority of 
B’laans and Visayans, but there can be no doubt that crime impacted directly upon local 
mineral-driven development.
Crime affected local mineral-driven development processes through a depressive effect 
upon sodal capital. That is to say that opportunities for assodational life and the 
development of trust between individuals and sections of the population, upon which 
initiatives depended, were limited. Claudel Magbanua and Amirh Musali wore sideamns 
wherever they went, and ail mayors were accompanied by bodyguards. Such groups 
travelled in four wheel drive vehicles with reflective windows - as did Western Mining 
personnel. This prevented local people from knowing who was approaching them or 
who had entered their area, which was an intimidating matter for B’laans. Moreover, the 
military presence in the area was visible on a daily basis. Soldiers dad in battle dress 
and armed with rifles would commonly congregate in dining rooms and other public 
places. While this may or may not have reduced the actual level of violence, it palpably 
heightened the sense of danger and subsequent tension.
Perceptions among the Visayan population, of crime in remote regions, negatively 
influenced attitudes and the ’idea’ of, if not real violence, served to marginalise B'laans 
through images of insecurity and potential threat. Young people, in urban areas of 
General Santos City, with whom this researcher socialised in the course of his stay in 
Mindanao, regardecj visits to the Quezon mountains with shock. Ricardo Dalisay, the 
thirty-two year manager at Gensan Duratrak, a chain of tyre shops in Mindanao, stated 
that anybody visiting B'laan communities “would need a bodyguard1, because “visitors 
to those regions will be targettecT and “likely to be robbecT and that B’laans would “not 
tear being caught because nobody would find yo if. Sincerely held attitudes like these 
restricted activities and interrelationships between the Tribal Councils and businesses 
and services in the region, and thereby retarded their capability - particularly those in 
remote areas - to access markets. This occurred in a general but significant sense.
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Barring specific incidences, the effect of criminality was a slowing down of Council and 
community capacity building.
5.2. Roads as an indicator of power relations between B’laan and Visayan 
communities.
As explained in section 2.6., the methodology also set out to evaluate the level of 
power held by those communities hosting the Tampakan Copper Project This was 
hypothesised to be essential for successful mineral-driven development
Means of transportation of goods and people to and from remote regions of southern 
Mindanao, were controlled by Visayans in municipal pobladons. Rodolfo Gagnao, the 
Visayan owner of the ‘buy-and-sell’ store in Barangay Miasong, a part of the 
munidpality of Tupi which bordered Tampakan, explained how B’laan farmers brought 
their produce to the nearest roadhead or buy and sell store, from where he said, it 
would be picked up by Visayan traders such as himself, who were middlemen between 
the mountain and the market “B’laans can receive cash for their produce, but most 
often it is exchanged for rice, sugar, coffee, tinned fish, tobacco, and other goods that 
B’iaans cannot produce in the mountain." Indeed, Visayans such as Gagnao would 
extend goods to B’laans in advance, and many were in a position of “utangf, whereby 
they owed their production to one Visayan or another. Gagnao introduced several such 
people while this researcher was in Miasong. The most significant product was maize, 
which Gagnao would transport to General Santos City where he sold it on to ethnic 
Chinese traders for cash.
Furthermore, following road construction in remote regions, the ‘in traffic' was commonly 
greater than the ‘out traffic?, with Visayan settlement penetrating traditional B’laan land. 
Combined with the wholesale loss of forests, roads oriented towards pobladon 
marketplaces had eroded barter economies and kinship modes of production, and 
B’laans' livelihood base had shifted toward cash crops and Visayan marketplaces.
Many B'laan communities had altered their settlement patterns in order to avail of road 
use, upon which they had come to depend. B’laan households were often strung out 
beside roads, where families squatted in lieu of Visayan ownership. Visayan 
penetration had also served to isolate B’laan communities from each other. Therefore, 
if B'laans happened to have benefited from road use, it was generally incidental, as the 
majority of roads were not built for them or with their needs in mind.
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The orientation according to which roads were built and the lack of attention paid to „ 
their impact upon communities raised questions as to whose interests roads served.
The most obvious point was that where a road cut into an area of traditional B’laan 
occupancy, particularly where no title or legally recognised security of tenure was held, 
then the effect was disruptive. No such consideration was made prior to the creation of 
logging roads and very little was in evidence at the time of research. This situation 
exemplified B'laan vulnerability to Visayan hegemony in regional economic 
development Thus roads provided an opportunity to test the ability of B’laans within 
the proposed mining area to articulate themselves in the context of mineral-driven 
development gains and Visayan institutions.
A number of prominent B'laans and Visayan leaders within the area affected by the 
Tampakan Copper Project had called for the construction of a road linking sitios in Bong 
Mai with Salna'ong, and the existing road to Tampakan pobladon, in order to provide 
opportunities to their communities. These men induded Dot Cafion, the Chairman of 
the Bong Mai Tribal Coundi, and Jusies Dianga. the mestizo-B’laan Barangay Captain 
of Kimlawis, in Kiblawan, of which Bong Mai was a part. The project was also 
supported by Amirh Musali and Jonathan Consad, Barangay Captains of Datal Blao and 
Danlag respectively, whose barangays were relatively remote, as well as being home to 
majority B’laan populations.
The road proposed by the leaders of those communities hosting the Tampakan Copper 
Project would have connected communities in three munidpalities, Salna’ong straddling 
the border between barangays Danlag in Tampakan and Datal Blao in Columbio, while 
Bong Mai was part of barangay Kimlawis in Kiblawan. Vehicular transportation between 
the agriculturally dependent communities would have thereby improved their ability to 
market products and empowered B’laans within the local economy. Moreover, 
according to Engineer Richard Corpuz, there was a possibility of Western Mining 
entering into a co-construction project with the Department of Environment and Natural 
Resources, under whose jurisdiction Non-Alienable Landfalls. Thus Western Mining 
might have shouldered part of the financial burden.
Despite these apparently favourable conditions, the proposal was dependent upon 
municipal authority. Seen from this perspective, the market in the pobladon of 
Tampakan was only fifteen kilometres from the area in which the road would be built, 
compared with thirty kilometres to those in Columbio and Kiblawan. Thus the road
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would, in all probability, have attracted trade toward Tampakan at the expense of 
Columbio and Kiblawan. This would have been magnified by the fact that the 
Tampakan marketplace had over thirty stores as well as closer proximity to Marbel and 
General Santos City. Columbio on the other hand had fewer than ten stores and 
because of the barrier of the Quezon mountains which lie between the pobladon and 
the sea, there were no fresh fish available there, other than a single freshwater variety 
brought from Lake Buluan. Kiblawan pobladon also had a very small market with less 
than ten stores, as the majority of its people travelled to the pobladons of Padada and 
Digos to engage in trade. The new road would have encouraged an already apparent 
trend for people in the southern and western districts of Columbio and Kiblawan 
respectively, to gravitate toward Tampakan. As a consequence, the Office of the Mayor 
of Columbio had rejected the plan.
What is more, proposals for such a road were apparently being ignored by Claudius 
Barrosso, the Mayor of Tampakan, who rejected the suggestion when interviewed. Any 
economic analysis was subservient to the ongoing ‘conquest1 of the area. Mayor 
Barrosso talked in terms of Tampakan as the ‘frontier' of Filipino sodety, and saw his 
role as a protector of his people [read Visayans] and propagator of Filipino nationhood. 
This was reminscent of the language of Teodulo Ramirez, chronicler of the expedition 
to, and settlement of, the region by Major-General Paulino Santos in the 1930s. 
Strategies for economic development that were not owned or controlled from the 
municipality, and the possible benefits of income distribution to the region as a whole, 
were not taken seriously. Indeed, while municipal resources were clearly stretched, 
such a road would have clashed with Claudius Barrosso’s personal interests, as they 
did for many mayors in similar municipalities. The Barrosso family controlled the ‘buy 
and sell’ business that purchased rice and com from B'laans in the area affected by the 
proposed mine. Thus they were able to fix prices and even exchange goods against 
future harvests. Barring the truck purchased by the S’banken community, the Barrosos 
also owned the only transportation into the area, that is the the Santa Filomena truck, 
which went as far as sitio Palo 19 in Danlag. This was the only form of public transport 
to enter the area aside from Skylab motorcycles. If a new road was built, new traders 
would likely enter the market, forcing the Barrossos to compete and depressing their 
profit margins. Any fiscal gains from increased trade on the other hand, would flow into 
national rather than municipal coffers.
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No discernible consideration had been given to the possibility that the medium to long­
term economic growth offered by the Bong Mai - Salna’ong road might outweigh any 
shift of trade from one market to another. No tri-municipal negotiation of the subject 
had been broached. Indeed, until June of 1999, the actual provincial boundary 
between Sultan Kudarat and South Cotabato, which bisects the Salna’ong area, had not 
been officially demarcated, and the respective municipal planning offices were 
apparently uninterested in the issue. Priorities were dependent upon Visayan 
perceptions of development and focused by political expediency.
Without the Bong Mai - Salna’ong road, vital to economic participation by B’laans, Bong 
Mai remained in economic isolation and Salna'ong a cul-de-sac S’banken, Danlag and 
Foiu Bato were respectively better off due to their proximity to the Tampakan pobladon 
and established roads at lower elevations, where Visayan farms were more numerous. 
Nevertheless, this situation rendered all five communities considerably more marginal 
than they would otherwise have been.
Moreover, this situation demonstrated that B’laans had little effective power in terms of 
the munidpal structures within which they were located. Indeed, the remote barangays 
whose Visayan inhabitants shared their isolation, were similarly unable to influence the 
munidpal authorities. On the basis of Roads and the material presented here, it 
seemed dear that drcumstances at the site of the Tampakan Copper Project failed to 
fulfil the hypothetical recommendation for power vis-a-vis the prevailing political 
economy within which the proposed mine was located. The following section, relating 
to tenuria! rights, expands upon the issue of power.
5.3. Tenuria I security among B’laan communities within the proposed mining 
area.
Another means of assessing the power of the host communities with respect to 
exogenous institutions, was the degree of tenuria! security B’laans held over the land 
on which they lived. On examining maps of the area affected by the proposed mine, 
there was only a ten percent correlation between the pattern of occupation within the 
traditional territories of the five B’laan communities recorded by Western Mining, and 
the munidpal land use survey prepared by the Office of the Mayor of Tampakan. That 
is to say that the munidpality identified much more land as being occupied by Visayans, 
and if Visayans did not actually own land in the area affected by the proposed mine, 
they dearly regarded themselves as having the right to much of it This suggested that
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B'laans were poorly-prepared to cope with the pressures that would likely accompany 
mining.
Prior to the arrival of Western Mining, traditional custodianship of land at the site of the 
proposed mine was not recognised by the Philippine state. B’laans occupied Public or 
Forest Land, which was non-alienable and under the jurisdiction of the Department of 
Environment and Natural Resources [DENR]. In 1993 Department Administrative Order 
No 2, established procedures for issuing Certificates of Ancestral Domain Claim 
[CADCs]. These provided for DENR recognition of an indigenous groups' claim to 
traditional association with a particular area, and recognition of their right of occupation 
and land-use management through an Ancestral Domain Management Plan. Ancestral 
domain claims were supervised by the Office of Southern Cultural Communities until 
November 1997, when the Indigenous People's Rights Act was ratified by the Senate 
and the National Commission for Indigenous Peoples was created.
Western Mining collected necessary data, and sponsored the five B’laan communities 
in their applications to the DENR for CADCs. These were approved and duly awarded. 
Western Mining thereby consolidated the position of stakeholders on the land they 
occupied, ostensibly supporting bonafide signatories to subsequent agreements. 
Certificates of Ancestral Domain Claim represented the extent of tenuria! security on the 
part of communities affected by the Tampakan Copper Project They provided the basis 
upon which the terms of B'laan tenure and corresponding power with respect to the 
appropriation of their land, could be tested.
As the term 'Claim' indicates, CADCs are not a guarantee of tenurial security that can 
be equated with title. Datu Migketay V ic’ Saway explained that the role of the Office of 
Southern Cultural Communities had been simply to represent indigenous peoples. With 
the formation of the NCIP, a more pro-active role was possible - the titling of ancestral 
domains. The IPRA contained provisions for the conversion of CADCs into Certificates 
of Ancestral Land Title, ostensibly conveying communal title equivalent to that held by 
individuals [IPRA 1997]. However, administration of CADCs and CALTs, and B'laan 
tenure with them, was under threat from a series of external events.
First of all, the structure of the NCIP had been problematic from the outset. Established 
by President Fidel Ramos [1992 -1998] in 1997, the NCIP comprised seven 
commissioners, all of whom were presidential appointees. This was itself a source of
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weakness, as it produced commissioners whose allegiance was directed up the political 
hierarchy but not necessarily down. This provided a questionable service to the 
concerns of traditional communities.
As of July 1999, the NCIP comprised offices and staff in each province, inherited largely 
from the defunct Office of Southern Cultural Communities. However, two 
commissioners, including the representative for Central Mindanao, had gone 
unappointed. Moreover, on taking office in May 1998, President Joseph Estrada had 
attempted to replace National Commission for Indigenous Peoples’ Chairman David 
Daoas with commissioner Cesar Sulong. This was rejected by the other 
commissioners, and there ensued a year long period of ‘dual chairmanship', before 
Daoas was reconfirmed as chairman.
There were also accusations of corruption within the NCIP, and related charges had 
been filed against six of the commissioners, which had hamstrung the Commission. 
Ostensibly acting to break the deadlock, President Estrada froze the NCIP budget on 
September 21st 1998. From this moment the Department of Budget and Management 
released only the salaries of NCIP staff and not the Monthly Operating Allowance, 
which served to further paralyse the Commission. Considering that the Implementing 
Rules and Regulations, or ‘operating manual’ of the NCIP was only issued on June 13th 
1998 [IPRA IR R 1998], the NCIP were fully functional for a mere 100 days. Without the 
Monthly Operating Allowance, the NCIP in South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat and Davao 
Del Sur relied upon indigenous representatives to travel to their offices and fund those 
services necessitated by their cases.
Regarding the communities hosting the Tampakan Copper Project, NCIP members of 
the Foundation Boards established following the signing of the Principal Agreement by 
each Tribal Council, were rarely present at Board meetings. When they were in 
attendance, their effort was provided for by Western Mining. For example, the travel 
and accommodation of Chairman Daoas on June 21st 1999, to present the Certificate of 
Ancestral Domain Claim to Danlag Tribal Council, was paid for by the company.
Without such contributions, the NCIP would have been unable to provide any services 
at all. As it was, their offices were entirely bare of tools such as telephones, fax 
machines, and typewriters, necessary for official function.
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Other obstructions included a shortage of qualified NCIP staff. At the South Cotabato 
office there were ten staff members, of whom only three claimed to speak any of the 
B'laan language, and certainly none were fluent Accepting the conservative B'laan 
census of 100 000, and that half are located within the province South Cotabato, in 
conjunction with the fact that it is the elder generation who lead B'iaan communities, few 
of whom spoke any other language than their own, this was apparently inadequate.
In March 1999, President Estrada attempted to fast-track ancestral domain claims with 
Memorandum No. 25, creating the Presidential Taskforce on Ancestral Domain. He 
appointed Donna Gasgonia, from the Anti-poverty Commission, as Chairwoman in order 
to circumvent NCIP commissioners. The Taskforce had a six month remit, which on 
expiration in September, was duly renewed. However, whether the Taskforce was 
legally empowered to award CADCs was uncertain and indeed, none had been 
awarded. The NCIP did retain this power because the Supreme Court had not issued 
any restraining order. Nevertheless, its practical capacity was severely reduced.
Aside from these executive issues, ex-Supreme Court judge Isagani Cruz and one 
Cesar Europa, brought a suit challenging certain provisions of the Indigenous Peoples 
Rights Act They accused it of violating the Constitution in giving indigenous people 
control of ancestral domains [Cruz 1999]. The point being they argued, that this 
includes any natural resources that may exist in these areas. They claimed that this 
contradicts the Regalian Doctrine embodied by the Constitution, which provides that;
“With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not 
be alienated. The exploration, development and utilization of the natural 
resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State."
[Philippine Constitution of 1987, Article XII., Section 2.]
By contrast, the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act describes the ancestral domains as;
*belonging to the Indigenous Cultural Communities /Indigenous People* 
including, “lands, inland waters, coastal areas and natural resources therein," 
as well as ‘ancestral lands, forests, pasture, residential, agricultural and other 
lands. . .  hunting grounds, burial grounds, worship areas, bodies of water, 
mineral and other natural resources. *
[IPRA 1997: Chapter 2., Section 2a. ]
Cruz and Europa argued that certified ancestral domains cover over 2.5 million 
hectares scattered throughout the Philippines, which are therefore reserved for
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indigenous people to the unconstitutional exclusion of the rest of the population, who 
are co-owners of the national patrimony [Cruz 1999].
In defence of the IPRA, the .NCIP, members of 112 indigenous peoples groups, 
including B'laans from Salna’ong, S’banken, Pula Bato, the Philippine Commission of 
Human Rights, the Ikalahan Indigenous People, and the Haribon Foundation for the 
conservation of Natural Resources, Inc., argued that the ancestral domains of 
indigenous groups were not covered by the Regalian Doctrine, because these lands 
had been held by native tribes in the concept of owner, since time immemorial. They 
could not therefore be claimed by the colonisers when they imposed their rule in the 
Philippines.
On December 6th 2000, the Supreme Court reached its decision. Voting was divided 
equally, seven votes were cast for, and seven against the petition of Cruz and Europa. 
Without a majority the case was dismissed [Proceedings of the Supreme Court 2000]. 
However, the decision was too close for comfort. Had the petition succeeded, the IPRA 
would have been repealed and the National Commission for Indigenous People 
disbanded. Doubts over the credibility of the NCIP engendered during the intervening 
two year period and the subsequent vote, served to undermine its capacity.
Indeed, there was evidence that Certificates of Ancestral Domain Claim did not have 
sufficient strength to displace speculation. Engineer Richard Corpuz at Western 
Mining, acknowledged that increased in-migration to traditional B’laan land by Visayan 
settlers, as a result of anticipated employment opportunities and speculation over land, 
was exacerbating challenges facing the host communities.
Although traditional land which had not yet been titled was non-alienable, usufruct 
’rights’ were being purchased. Employees of Western Mining were reluctant to discuss 
such sales as they reflected a failure on the part of the CADC system. The police were 
similarly cautious because they generally had few details of affairs relating to the 
Tampakan Copper Project Indeed, police recalcitrance reflected in part, a gap in 
understanding between themselves and the Office of the Mayor, and thereby with other 
parties too. For example, in one incident in June 1999, Virgilio Carreon, the 
commanding officer at the Tampakan police station related one incident that frustrated 
him. Western Mining had hosted an Australian diplomat at the basecamp without 
informing the Tampakan police. Carreon expressed resentment of the fact that had any
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ambush or other untoward incident happened to the diplomatic party en-route, they 
would undoubtedly have received a large share of the blame. Carreon stated that his 
hands were 'tied behind his bac/c” by the company’s “irresponsibility.
Nevertheless, physical evidence of illicit landsaies was visible in terms of deforestation 
of ostensibly protected areas, and B’laans provided clues as to how this came about 
The process was exemplified by the purchase by ‘Undo’ Teofilo, a brother-in-law of 
Mayor Claudius Barosso in Tampakan, of 150 hectares in Datal Biao, from Firing Malid 
early in 1999. Piring had received an undisclosed sum of cash in exchange for the 
land, but the sale caused dismay and confusion among B'laans in the Salna'ong 
community. One B'laan man described it in the following manner; “We know that this is 
bad and that by doing so we are losing something we need more than food or water, but 
it is hard to see what else to do. Piring is wrong but he cannot be blamed for what he 
did.” B’laans were thus aware of at least some of the negative effects of losing their 
land, but were at a loss as to how else to support themselves. Although this sale 
occurred without legal sanction, its reversal, let alone repurchase by the B'laan 
community, appeared neither likely nor possible. As far as CADCs represented rights 
on the part of B’laan communities, they were therefore very weak.
The family of former Mayor Emilio Escobillo provided further insights to problems 
experienced by B’laans in obtaining rights to traditional land. They were the biggest 
landowners in the municipality, having acquired title to large tracts of land in barangay 
Tablu, of which S’banken was part. They also owned the road via Tablu, connecting 
the pobladon with the Western Mining basecamp. If the proposed mine were 
successful, they would profit considerably. Chieftain Liwahim Magurnway of the 
S’banken Tribal Coundl was incarcerated at the provindal jail at Marbel, then having 
then been imprisoned for one year and two months without charge. He had been 
implicated in the murder of a Visayan farmer and his two children on February 28th, 
1996. According to staff at the Sodal Action Centre, this was despite the identification 
of the killers as guards employed by the Escobillos.
In terms of power as a hypothetical precondition for mineral-driven development, the 
tenurial situation indicated that the host communities were in a vulnerable position. 
B'laans were dearly weaker in practice than in the terms expressed by the Indigenous 
Peoples Rights Ad. The history of the region was symbolised by Visayan 
encroachment onto B’laan land and the CADC legislation was simply not strong enough
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to halt this precedent. Moreover, there were signs that the prospect of mining was 
contributing to encroachment Although this had not taken place on a large scale, 
circumstances suggested that should mining take place, and with it opportunities for 
employment, etc., grow, there would be little to prevent a sharp rise in the appropriation 
of B’laan land.
In the whole of southern Mindanao, there was only one example of B’laans obtaining 
rights to ancestral land lost to Visayan settlement That was at Lamkwa in the 
municipality of Polomolok, approximately fifteen kilometres from Tampakan. Datu Suya, 
a B’laan chieftain in Polomolok, explained how the Lamkwa B'laans had lived in a 
similar manner to those in Tampakan, until the 1960s, at which time they were pushed 
up into the forests of Mt Matutum and the Quezon mountains by sectarian violence.
That was between militia groups such as the Blackshirts from Muslim communities and 
llagas from among Christian settlers, who were arriving in increasing numbers from the 
Visayas. The Lamkwa area was subsequently appropriated by the Dole Corporation, as 
part of its burgeoning pineapple plantation, and whose security guards forcibly excluded 
B’laans. The Lamkwa B'laans did not however entirely disappear, and first petitioned 
for their legal right to return to their land in 1985. This protest gathered momentum, 
culminating in a picket of the provincial capitol building in Marbel, and the occupation 
and uprooting of pineapple fields. Ester Sevilla has documented the legal battle 
sustained by the Lamkwa B’laans, which eventually saw them win the right to return to a 
portion of the land they claimed, in 1998 [Sevilla 1999: 77]. Although the victory of the 
Lamkwa community was not achieved in terms of CADC certification, the protracted 
process involved does indicate some important points for those communities hosting 
the Tampakan Copper Project
The apparent success of the Lamkwa community might have suggested that the role of 
Visayan dominated state institutions was evolving in a manner sympathetic to the 
B’laan point of view. However, although the Office of Southern Cultural Communities 
did pursue the legal case brought by the Lamkwa community in the latter stages - albeit 
in pursuit of a cash settlement rather than title - they did not have a dominant or 
decisive role. Indeed, it was the media attention devoted to the protest actions, in 
combination with a legal undertaking on the part of a tribal group, that denoted change. 
Thus, while state agencies had provided unprecedented support for a B’laan 
community, it had not been unequivocal or internally motivated. Rather, OSCC and 
Department of Agrarian Reform support was prompted by the visibility and high profile
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nature of the Lamkwa case. That is to say a small community versus a multi-national 
company.
What is more, the Lamkwa community achieved their victory in terms of a variety of 
individual and minor dan or extended family based daims, as opposed to a communal 
daim that is the basis of the CADC system. This was due in part to the processes 
proposed by the DAR, and the fragmentation of the B'laan daim by individual payments 
offered by the Dotefil Agrarian Reform Benefidaries Co-operative Incorporated, an arm 
of the Dole corporation. However, the variety of daims also reflected divisions within 
the B'laan community. This was in part due to the fact that they had spent more than 
three decades in scattered ‘exile’, during which time they had partially disintegrated. 
Indeed, the concept of communal land appeared to have been diluted and even 
rejected by some B'laans as a result of the commodification of land and uncertainty 
experienced as a consequence of Visayan settlement Many B’laans insisted upon 
individual claims to ownership - to the exclusion of other B'laans, which phenomenon 
functioned to complicate their case.
Despite the award of CADCs at the site of the Tampakan Copper Project, a similar 
pattern of fragmentation of claims was also apparent The fact that some individuals, 
particularly members of Tribal Councils had made independent claims to land, 
suggested that the CADC system was being similarly superseded. Unsay Wales, Tribal 
Councillor, and Treasurer in S’banken. had registered a claim with the municipal land 
use survey, to land at the site of the Western Mining basecamp. Willy Golaya, the 
former Tribal Chieftain in Folu Bato, had objected to the plans of Western Mining on the 
grounds that he was not compensated for the use of land he claimed rights to. in the 
mining area. This suggested that the presence of the Tampakan Copper Project was at 
best not counteracting the trend toward disintegration of traditional values, and possibly 
exacerbating it  That is to say that because of the speculative climate engendered by 
proposed minerals development, B’laans were abandoning their traditional manner of 
communal landuse, at the expense of less experienced and less well positioned 
members of their communities, more quickly than they might otherwise have done.
Moreover, the award of communal title to indigenous people clashes with the 
aspirations of other groups who are invariably present within their ancestral lands. In 
the case of the five B’laan communities, their land was everywhere shared with Visayan 
settlers who bitterly opposed the award of Certificates of Ancestral Domain Claim, and
143
the possibility of Certificates of Ancestral Land Title. Thus blanket-style communal 
claims to ancestral land conflicted with the interests of Visayans, who having in some 
areas acquired title, had a legitimate legal daim. In December 1996, Visayan residents 
of Tampakan barricaded roads leading to the proposed minesite in opposition to B'laan 
CADCs, fordng negotiation of agreements with Visayans. Bearing in mind that there is 
virtually no part of the Philippines where indigenous groups are the sole occupants of 
their ancestral domains, the award of communal title is in policy terms unrealistic. 
Indeed, none of the CADCs awarded to indigenous communities had anywhere been 
granted a Certificate of Ancestral Land Title and none of the NCIP offitials encountered 
were in foreseeable antidpation of doing so. CADC /  CALT legislation is therefore 
conduded to have come too late.
Thus the CADC system implemented and ostensibly managed by the Office of Southern 
Cultural Communities and the National Commission for Indigenous Peoples 
respectively, was inappropriate. Not only did it fail to provide tenurial security, and with 
it power, but it fondioned in opposition to the evolution of B'laan aspirations.
Moreover, while Western Mining had conducted the research which provided the basis 
for CADC awards, the extent to which they were or were not aware of these problems 
was unlikely to have been relevant That is because the CADC system was a national 
project, implemented by the state in a uniform manner among indigenous communities 
across the country.
Finally, in reference to the rights of communities outlined by Bob Muntz and related in 
section 2 .6 ., there was a question among reviewers of this research, as to whom the 
right to development belongs in a situation where a project that may benefit the nation 
as a whole, has a negative impact upon a local community. The rights of host 
communities are proteded by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
[ICCPR 1966] and the International Covenant on Economic, Sodal and Cultural Rights 
[ICESCR 1966], both of which are binding in the Philippines, as well as in the Draft 
Dedaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples [DUNDRIP1994], the International 
Labour Organisation’s Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention [ILO 1989], and the 
Charter of the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples of the Tropical Forests [CITPTF 1992]. 
The Philippine Constitution on the other hand, is less dear, extolling the development 
of a *self-reliant and independent national economy” while i t 'recognizes and promotes 
the rights of [traditional communities] within the framework o f national unity and
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development.” [Hughes 2000: Section 3]. Whether national or local rights prevail is 
unclear. This uncertainty on the part of the state has implications for mining projects.
In the absence of a clear distinction between the national and the local, the Philippines 
is obliged to allow national and local rights to be exercised side by side. The 1995 
Mining Act and the 1997 Indigenous Peoples Rights Act [IPRA] exemplify contradictions 
that this situation raises. By charging the government with the right to grant Financial 
and Technical Assistance Agreements to companies, the terms of the Mining Act -  
under which Western Mining Corporation established the Tampakan Copper Project - 
indicate that the rights of the nation takes precedence of those of local communities.
On the other hand, the IPRA suggests that communities have the right to reject mining 
projects. From the perspective of local communities, no certificate of land title had been 
awarded under the IPRA. Indeed, the Supreme Court very nearly repealed the IPRA in 
its vote on the petition of Cruz and Europa in December 2000. Needless to say, without 
the implementation of IPRA, the right to reject an FTAA has never been established in 
court.
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Chapter Six.
The comparative performance of Tribal Councils.
As has been explained in section 1. 3., the Tribal Councils were not indigenous 
structures. Rather, they were established by the Office of Southern Cultural 
Communities and ostensibly supervised by the National Commission for 
Indigenous People as a means of organising traditional communities with the aim 
of incorporating them into the structure of the state. Thus Tribal Councils provided 
an elementary local government among the host communities. They were 
sponsored by Western Mining as the means by which mineral-driven development 
would be effected and recommendations such as those of the World Bank fulfilled.
While limitations imposed by state structures and the ‘national1 context, on 
recommendations for mineral-driven development, have been related in the 
previous chapter, it was also hypothesised that local factors would influence the 
development process. That is to say that traditional aspects of host societies and 
their understanding of the implications of mining had to be accommodated. This 
constituted the basis for the second part of the methodology - assessment of local 
factors.
Because the B'laans living within the vicinity of the proposed mine had been 
divided into five communities, there was an opportunity for comparison of Tribal 
Council performance. That is to say that if a pattern could be identified, and this 
correlated with any pattern of traditional social structures, or understanding of the 
implications of mining, then the case for their contribution to the development 
process would be strengthened. Moreover, the nature of their role could be more 
closely analysed.
Chapter Six presents the findings of the comparative measurement of Tribal 
Council performance. These are subsequently assembled to provide a 
Comparative Index of Tribal Council Performance. The final section contains an 
array of evidence corroborating this index
It is acknowledged that measurement of Tribal Council performance is a qualitative 
exercise, and that findings may be influenced by assumptions contained within the 
indicators used. Indeed, the performance issue was a matter of controversy.
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Organisations opposed to Western Mining, such as the Social Action Center at the 
Diocese of Marbel, regarded the Tribal Councils as a means of manipulating 
B'laan communities. In their view, Western Mining's funding of Council activities 
constituted bribery. However, to accede to such a viewpoint would be to digress 
from assessment of the recommendations of the World Bank which is the central 
aim of this thesis. The Tribal Councils were the supposed manifestation of those 
recommendations. The purpose of this chapter is to provide a comparative picture 
of how much they achieved.
6.1. Indicators of Tribal Council performance.
Processes.
Before proceeding to evaluation in terms of outputs, the extent to which each 
Council was operational in the terms determined by their structure had to be 
assessed. That is to say that before a Council could provide for fulfilment of 
recommendations for public involvement, social equity in revenue distribution, 
compensation and other social investments, and partnerships in support of 
sustainable development, it had to be asked whether the Tribal Councils were 
representative of their communities. Indeed, World Bank recommendation No. 9 
was for the development of mechanisms for the long term representation of 
stakeholders [Aidan and Davy 1998: 32-4]. The first three indicators, Meetings, 
Representation and Female Participation, provide for comparative measurement of 
representation.
1. Meetings.
The first indicator relates to the organisational qualities of Tribal Council meetings. 
This was a complex aspect of performance because circumstances in which 
Councils met, and their composition, varied - no two Councils for example, had the 
same number of members. In order to accommodate these obstacles, Meetings 
was broken into four aspects, that is Regularity, Location, Attendance, and 
Recording of Council Proceedings. This made it possible to identify distinctions 
for which “Yes" or “No” answers could be obtained. These are in turn collated to 
provide for a composite indicator of performance.
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a] Regularity.
It was difficult to judge the optimum frequency for Tribal Council meetings. 
However, Foundation Board meetings took place every month, being instigated by 
Western Mining who provided the venue, transportation, and food for participants. 
It was therefore supposed that meeting at least once a month would be important 
in order to digest events at, and to prepare for forthcoming Foundation meetings.
b] Location.
Location is based upon to the extent to which meetings took place independent of 
the influence of any particular figure. All communities had access to some 
independent venue, which was assumed to be preferable to the home of the Chief- 
Chairman, or any specific Tribal Council member.
c] Attendance.
Attendance comprises two parts. First is attendance itself. Second is the capacity 
of each Tribal Council to impose penalties for non-attendance. Attendance refers 
to whether or not all members of Tribal Councils actually attended Council 
meetings. It is based upon the assumption that attendance is closely connected to 
Council performance and is therefore regarded as a positive factor. The 
imposition of penalties is based upon whether or not each Council enforced any 
penalty for non-attendance by their members. Such penalties are presumed to be 
indicative of Council strength in terms of discipline and recognition of the 
importance of participation, and are accorded a positive value.
d] Recording of Council proceedings.
This aspect of meetings is likewise split between two parts. The first is based 
upon whether minutes were taken at Tribal Council meetings. The second on 
whether these were backed up by tape-recordings. Maintenance of such records 
are regarded as important to the efficiency of Councils. Foundation Board 
meetings were held in accordance with corporate board meetings elsewhere, with 
both minutes and recordings being taken. Council members were therefore 
familiar with the practice and the majority expressed approval, regarding some 
form of recording as important in order to preserve accountability. When a carrot 
growing project was discussed at a meeting of the Folu Bato Council, no recording 
was made. When the project eventually failed, the funds allocated by the Folu 
Bato Foundation could not be accounted for. A disagreement between Folu Bato
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and Western Mining ensued, that wasted co-operative effort, indeed, the 
recording of Council meetings had come to be recognised as important for winning 
the approval of Western Mining Foundation Board members, to whom the Councils 
had to apply for project funding.
Data gathered in relation to these four aspects of Tribal Council meetings, are 
presented in a Yes-or-No format and compiled into the following composite 
indicator of performance:
Summary indications of Council meeting procedures.
Bong Mai Danlag Folu Bato Salna’ong S’banken
Regularity
Monthly meetings held? No Yes Yes No Yes
Location
Independent meeting place? Yes Yes No Yes No
Attendance
By all Council members? No Yes Yes No No
Penalty for non-attendance? No Yes Yes No No
Recording
Minutes taken? Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Tape-recordings made? No Yes No No No
Total Yeses 2 6 4 1 2
Ranking 3 1 2 5 4
In terms of meeting procedures, the totals suggest that Danlag was most 
successful, while Folu Bato was dose behind. S’banken and Bong Mai were some 
way back, and Salna’ong fared least well, with only one Yes.
2. Representation.
Aside from the conditions under which meetings took place, there were 
opportunities for gauging the performance of Tribal Coundls in terms of their 
constitution. The Councils were elected and therefore representative bodies. 
Indeed, World Bank recommendation No. 5., Recognize public involvement as 
integral to project sustainability, stressed that “special care be taken to ensure the 
representation of indigenous people" and that “democratic consultative 
decisionmaking processes may help to develop an awareness of issues". An 
important indicator of Coundl performance could therefore be obtained from the 
breadth of representation of community members.
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Dominance by specific groups or factions was manifested by ‘autocracies’ and 
‘oligarchies’. Autocracies occurred wherever there was a prevalence of Council 
members related to, or in dose allegiance with the chairperson. Although kinship 
networks were difficult to ascertain, family ties were relatively simple and were 
therefore relied upon. Alternatively, representation might be reduced by 
oligarchies. In such a case, members of a dique of families would dominate a 
Coundl to the exdusion of lesser families and the majority of the population of 
each community. Therefore the Tribal Coundls were examined for evidence of 
either phenomenon and compared according to their relative strength.
Part 1: Autocratic tendencies.
The presence of members of the chairperson’s family would indicate a potential for 
exploitation of the wider community represented thereby. Conversely, relative 
absence of members of the chairperson’s family from each Tribal Coundl would 
indicate comparative progress in adopting representative prindpals. Because the 
number of members varied between Coundls, those not related to the chairperson 
were calculated as a proportion of each, following which the Coundls are ranked 
accordingly.
Number of Tribal Council members related to the chairman.
Bong Mai Danlag Folu Bato Salna’ong S’banken
No. of Council members 
[excluding the Chairperson] 10 13 10 11 10
No. related to the Chairperson 3 0 1 8 2
Proportion as a %
related to the Chairperson 30 0 10 73 20
Rankings: 4 1 2 5 3
From this table it is dear that the Danlag Tribal Coundl exhibited absolutely no 
autocratic tendendes. Bong Mai, Folu Bato and S’banken all reveal the influence of 
the chairperson’s family, albeit to a slight degree. Salna’ong however, shows a 
strong degree of vulnerability to autocratic influence.
Part 2: Oligarchic tendencies.
However, just because the family of the chairperson did not dominate a particular 
Tribal Coundl, does not mean that another family or other families did not. For 
example, while chairwoman Dalina Samiing was the only member of her family 
present upon the Danlag Coundl, three members of the Tokaydo family were. 
Indeed, just as the dominance of the family of the chairperson would indicate
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neglect of the representative principal, so too would an oligarchy, through the 
dominance of a group of families. Therefore it was important to test the extent to 
which an oligarchy persisted within each of the four remaining Councils. First of all, 
the number of families represented as a proportion of total membership had to be 
considered, which data is presented below.
Number of families present within each Tribal Council.
Bong Mai Danlag Folu Bato S’banken
Total membership. 11 14 11 11
No. of families represented. 7 10 8 8
Proportion as a % of total 64 71 73 73
Rankings: 4 3 1.5 1.5
Furthermore, those families represented by a single member as a proportion of the 
total number of families was also indicative of oligarchic tendencies. This is an 
important point because those Tribal Council members who did not come from 
separate families, may or may not all come from one family. For example, while five 
out of eleven Council members may come from five families, the other six may come 
from one family or three families, that is to say two from each, as was the case for 
Folu Bato. This aspect must be accounted for if the presence of oligarchies is to be 
addressed.
Number of families represented by only one Council member.
Bong Mai Danlag Folu Bato S’banken
No. of families. 7 10 11 8
No. represented by 1 member. 5 7 5 6
Proportion as a % of total 71 70 45 75
Rankings: 2 3 4 1
The three sets of data all express different aspects of adherence by the Tribal 
Councils to the principle of representation. By adding the rankings for each and 
dividing the totals by three, a combined indication of performance was obtained.
Overall rankings according to representation.
Bong Mai Danlag Folu Bato ‘Salna’ong S’banken
Total Rankings: 8 7 7.5 / 5.5
Overall Rankings: 4 2 3 5 1
* Because Salna'ong demonstrated a distinctly autocratic character, 
with one family rather than a clique of families clearly dominating, the 
scope for an oligarchy was inevitably limited and useful ranking points 
could not be gathered.
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It should be noted that when the Total Rankings were compiled, the highest 
possible score was three and the lowest, fifteen. According to these terms, barring 
Salna’ong, the results were quite close, particularly for Bong Mai, Danlag and Folu 
Bato. Nevertheless, the results from each aspect of the indicator do express 
consistency, and the overall rankings are consistent with those of other indicators.
3. Female participation.
Neither the Berlin Guidelines, nor the World Bank Discussion Paper make 
considered reference to gender issues. However, the recommendations of the 
National Councils for Sustainable Development in Asia [see Appendix 2] for 
implementation of Agenda 21, state that indigenous women should be integrated in 
all social uplift efforts. They stipulate that Their myriad roles in promoting the 
interests of their families, communities and groups should be promoted and 
strengthened" [NCSDA1995]. This point coincides with the concepts of 
stakeholdership and social equity encompassed by World Bank recommendations 
Nos. 5. and 7. respectively. Female participation was therefore considered to be a 
valid indication of Council performance.
Inexplicable absence of female participation was regarded as potentially negative, 
and the number of females to have held Tribal Council posts accorded a positive 
value. However, whether there was any female participant of a given Tribal Council 
at the time of research could not be taken as the sole basis for indication. That is 
because of the possibility that women had been voted from, as well as to Councils.
It was therefore necessary to record female participation in a retrospective manner.
Female Representation.
Bong Mai Danlag Folu Bato Salna’ong S’ban ken
Total Council participants. 11 14 11 12 11
No. of female participants. 0 5 0 3 1
Ranking according 
to proportion of total 4.5 1 4.5 2 3
It must be noted that for Bong Mai and Folu Bato there had never at any time been 
any female member of the Tribal Council. Therefore the data could not be 
elaborated in any way which would distinguish between the two. Hence the fourth 
and fifth places have been split to accommodate them.
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Section Two. Operations.
Having provided comparative indicators of Tribal Council performance in terms of 
their constitutional structures, analysis turned to their output.
4. Expediency.
Expediency refers to the amount of time it took each Tribal Council to progress 
from its creation to the signing of Principal Agreements with Western Mining. This 
is based on the assumption that these Agreements were essential to accessing 
local development funding, provided by the company in accordance with the 
recommendations of the World Bank. A shorter time is therefore regarded as 
reflecting a positive performance, and Councils are ranked according to time 
taken.
Expediency.
Bong M ai____________________________________   '
June 25th, 1995 - First meeting of the Bong Mai Tribal Council.________________
Oct 20th 1998 - Bong Mai signs Principal Agreement_______________________
Time taken; 3 years 4 months.
Danlag____________________________________________________________
January 18th, 1995 - First meeting of Danlag Tribal Council___________________
Nov. 14th, 1997 - Danlag signs Principal Agreement.
Time taken: 2 years 10 months________________________________________
Fohi Bato
August 2nd, 1995 - First meeting of Folu Bato Tribal Council__________________
Feb. 23rd, 1998 - Folu Bato signs Principal Agreement._______________________
Time taken: 2 years 6 months_________________________________________
Salna’ong
January 12th, 1995 - First meeting of Salna’ong Tribal Council._________________
Time taken: 5 years so far 
S’ban ken
July 5th, 1995 - First meeting of S’bank en Tribal Council_____________________
Nov. 16th, 1997 - S’banken signs Principal Agreement_______________________
Time taken: 2 years S months_________________________________________
The data shows that the S’banken, Folu Bato and Danlag were very close, all 
being within five months of each other. Bong Mai was in fourth place, while 
Salna'ong was the exception, not having signed the Principal Agreement. The 
subsequent ranking positions were as follows;
Rankings according to Expediency.
Bong Mai Danlag Folu Bato Salna’ong S’banken
Rankings: 4 3 2 5 1
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5. Training.
Another measure of Tribal Council performance in terms of provision of services, 
was the number of people to have completed training for management of 
community affairs. Accepting that some community members may have 
participated in more than one training program, the number of incidences of 
training undertaken is regarded as correlating positively with Council performance.
Although Council members might naturally be biased contributors to any 
assessment of their own performance, they were considered a reliable source of 
information. This was on account of a degree of prestige clearly associated with 
participation in such programs. Hence they were more likely to overestimate than 
forget instances of participation, and bias therefore flowed in the right direction, 
providing an incentive rather than disincentive to disclosure.
This information was then triangulated with other sources to obtain verification. 
Oates and other details of training courses were compared with those provided by 
other communities. They were also compared with newspaper articles relating to 
events among communities affected by the proposed mine. The Office of the 
Mayor in Tampakan municipality and the staff of agencies such as the Social 
Action Center at the Diocese of Marbel also provided information relating to 
training courses.
Another point that should be noted was the critical observation that the use of 
training courses as an indicator of performance may be vulnerable to influence by 
non-B’laan organisations. It was pointed out that the budget and facilities of 
organisations involved in training, frequently determined the number of places 
available on programs. For example, a trip to Nusa Tenggara in Indonesia was 
sponsored and organised by Western Mining. If all members of any given Tribal 
Council had wished to see the Newmont mine in operation, it would not have been 
possible due to the limited capacity of the company. Hence it has been argued 
that the participation of Council members was constrained by conditions beyond 
their control.
In defence of training as an indicator, it must be pointed out that there was no 
evidence to suggest that Tribal Council members were in any way forced to 
participate, and there were instances of Council members failing to do so. Nor
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was there anything to suggest that the number of places available for any given 
training was related to whether or not they were all taken. Participation in training 
was therefore regarded as subject to free will, and thus indicative of desire to 
acquire new skills in an environment where organisational and technical skills of 
all kinds were in short supply. Moreover, training courses related to agricultural 
developments were demanded by Coundls and fadlitated without any inspiration 
from outside organisations. That is to say that certain Coundls made proposals 
which were unequivocally agreed upon and subsequently made available by their 
Foundation Boards. What is more, a considerable number of training 
opportunities had been available - sufficient for trends to have become apparent.
Descriptions of courses, their duration, the number of partidpants, and dates, were 
tabulated. Each Tribal Coundl was subsequently ranked according to the number 
of courses, their duration and the level of partidpation. This is based upon the 
presumption that all three are important aspects of training and provide each other 
with a degree of corroboration. These are then added for each Coundl and 
divided by three to produce a combined ranking of performance.
Rankings of performances according to Training.
Bong Mai Danlag Folu Bato Salna’ong S’banken
Number of courses. 4 2 3 5 1
Number of days. 4 I 2 5 2
Number of participants. 4 3 2 5 1
Totals: 12 6 7 15 4
Combined Rankings: 4 3 2 5 1
The results show that the S'banken Tribal Coundl had up to the period of 
research, partidpated most keenly in training opportunities, being second only in 
terms of the number of days. Danlag and Folu Bato were dose behind, while 
Bong Mai was some way back, and Salna’ong were last in all categories.
Once more, a pattern in which Danlag, Folu Bato and S’banken were dear 
leaders, and along with Bong Mai, were on a progressive performance curve, was 
evident. Again too, Salna'ong were non-starters. This demonstrated that Danlag, 
Folu Bato and S’banken were respectively more successful in terms of acquiring 
skills necessary for Foundation functioning and agricultural and business 
initiatives. Bong Mai were conversely less successful. Not only were Salna’ong 
least successful but their partidpation was almost negligible. This suggested that
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something more serious had taken place and that rather than not being able to 
participate as successfully as the others, that they were actively not participating.
6. Comprehensiveness.
Comprehensiveness refers to the scope of each Tribal Council’s activities. It is 
based upon the assumption that the wider the range of challenges tackled by any 
Council, the greater its capacity for action, and hence performance.
It is acknowledged that particular issues may be exclusive to certain communities 
and irrelevant to others. That might occur because the needs arising from the 
different social and environmental factors experienced by each community were 
inevitably diverse. Therefore, rather than ask whether Coundls all implemented 
particular projects, issues were categorised into Business I Agriculture, Education, 
Transport and Health, which are important for every Coundl. This provided 
leeway in terms of spedfic projects implemented. While some Coundls expressed 
a leaning toward particular categories acoording to particular need, i.e. 
transportation projects for more remote communities, measurement in terms of 
categories provided a broad indication of comprehensive performance.
However, categorising diverse initiatives was a difficult task in the sense that some 
appeared to fit more than one category. Thus categorisation was a somewhat 
general basis for comprehensiveness. Moreover, as the tables below show, the 
resulting rankings were bunched, which hindered distinction between Tribal 
Coundls’ performance. Where Coundls had acted in the same number of 
categories, their ranking places therefore had to be split between them, out of 
respect for the comparative measurement. For example, if two Coundls shared 
third place in the rankings, third and fourth place would be split and each would be 
accorded 3.5, as was the case for Bong Mai and Folu Bato in the first table. 
Therefore, comparison of the categorical basis alone was insuffident. In order to 
improve the distinctive quality of the indicator, the number of initiatives within each 
category was fadored in, and Coundls are also ranked according to the number of 
partidpants.
Moreover, the verbal accounts of Tribal Coundl members could not be relied 
upon. - Not only were their accounts naturally impredse where exad numbers over 
periods of time were concerned, but there was apparent motivation for 
overestimation in terms of the temptation to exaggerate their efforts. Double­
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checking with Western Mining's community development personnel, who were the 
only other figures with comprehensive knowledge of this matter, would not 
necessarily have provided for more concrete data. That is because it would 
realistically have been in their interest to elevate the contribution of Councils, with 
whose success their careers were linked. Nevertheless, over the course of 
research, two alternative sources of data were obtained from Western Mining.
The first was the balance sheets from the Foundation accounts for the fiscal year 
December 1998 to November 1999. With the establishment of Foundation 
Boards, a great deal more of the affairs of Tribal Councils came to be recorded. 
Although Foundation data comprised non-B’laan inputs, the detailed accounting 
structure employed by Western Mining permitted the isolation of Council actions.
A list of all the projects implemented by each Foundation was drawn up from the 
left-hand columns of the balance sheets. Following discussion with Geoff Allen, 
the respective accountant at Western Mining, those actions which Council 
members and communities had proposed and participated in, were taken aside for 
use as an indicator.
Projects which had been rejected by the Foundation Boards were not included. 
This was because the reasons for rejection were overwhelmingly related to 
impracticalities therein. That is to say that they did not withstand technical 
appraisal. Indeed, many could be regarded as millennial, considering the extent to 
which they lacked economic viability - some Tribal Council members apparently 
assumed that a business venture of any form was bound to be profitable. This 
must be read in conjunction with the fact that rather than there being a flood of 
proposals, the number was in fact limited. This threatened Western Mining with 
the awkward position of not having sufficient scope to spend the development 
budget allocated to each community. Thus, whether or not a proposal was 
implemented was directly related to its ‘seriousness’, there being no other 
discernible motive for the Foundation Boards to reject them, the impetus running in 
the opposite direction - toward implementation.
The second source was Western Mining’s monthly bulletin, ‘Project Update', which 
was published from April 1997 until July 1999, and carried details of initiatives 
made by and on behalf of the Tribal Councils. Indeed, Project Update was 
informally touted as a Public Relations exercise by which Western Mining
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heralded the developmental successes of the Project. Once again, bias flowed in 
the right direction, tending to exaggerate rather than overtook. This made a 
considerable amount of detail accessible, which could be triangulated with 
Foundation balance sheets and with outside agencies involved. It was thus 
possible to assemble a list of initiatives for each Council.
These two sets of data are presented in the tables below. They are maintained as 
separate for several reasons. First of all, they provide a further opportunity for 
distinction between the performance of the Tribal Councils when the rankings are 
finally incorporated into a single indicator of comprehensiveness. Secondly, 
because they provide each other with a degree of corroboration. In an 
environment where there was a significant lack of concrete sources, and many of 
those concerned had motives for bias, corroboration was a valuable commodity. 
However, it should also be noted that initiatives implemented between December 
1998 and May 1999, might be registered twice. Indeed there was an unavoidable 
degree of overlap between the two sources. This point having been stressed, 
there was nothing to suggest that such overtap worked for or against any Council, 
and did not therefore affect the comparative qualities of this indicator.
Projects initiated and projected by the Foundation Boards in fiscal
year December 1998 - November 1999.
Bong Mai Danlag Folu Bato "Salna’ong S’banken
Agriculture 5 3 2 / 3
Education 2 4 4 / 5
Transport 0 1 0 / 2
Health 1 1 1 / 2
Total categories: 3 4 3 / 4
Total initiatives: 9 11 8 / 14
Projects reported in ‘Project Update’, April 1997 - June 1999.
Bong Mai Danlag Folu Bato Salna’ong S’banken
Business / Agriculture 4 6 2 0 3
Education 2 1 0 2 1
Transport 0 2 1 1 1
Health 0 1 1 1 1
Total categories: 2 4 3 3 4
Total initiatives: 6 10 4 4 6
Following the collation of data extracted from the Foundation accounts and Project 
Update, the total categories and initiatives were ranked for each Tribal Council.
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These were then added up, divided by four, and ranked accordingly. This 
calculation provides a combined ranking of Council performance in terms of the 
comprehensiveness of issues addressed by each.
Rankings according to Comprehensiveness.
Bong Mai Danlag Folu Bato *Salna*ong S’banken
Foundation data.
Ranking according to 
categories: 3.5 1.5 3.5 / 1.5
Ranking according to 
initiatives: 3 2 4 / 1
Project Update.
Ranking according to 
categories: 5 1.5 3.5 3.5 1.5
Ranking according to 
initiatives: 2.5 1 4.5 4.5 2.5
Combined Ranking: 3 1 4 5 2
‘ Because the Salna’ong Tribal Council had not yet signed the Principal 
Agreement, no data could be obtained for them from the Foundation 
accounts. In the Project Update data however, they emerged joint fourth 
and fifth both in terms of categories and initiatives. Therefore, in 
conjunction with the fact that not having signed the Principal Agreement 
is a negative factor in terms of the Tribal Coundl /  Foundation model, 
Salna'ong are accorded fifth place.
Although the data remain bunched, The Foundation accounts and Project Update 
were nevertheless mutually consistent In the combined rankings, Danlag were 
first, followed by S’banken, Bong Mai, and Folu Bato, while Salna’ong were last.
7. Spending capacity.
Financial management represents an important aspect of Tribal Council 
functioning. Indeed, should mining proceed, the management of funds accruing 
therefrom will be essential to the development process. Moreover, competency in 
executing financial responsibilities would reflect capaaty for independence and 
sovereignty on the part of host communities.
To summarise the Tribal Coundl - Foundation accounting structure, there were 
three accounts - the Development Account, the WMC Direct Account, and the 
Foundation Bank Account The Development Account and WMC Direct Account 
each received a 250 000 peso payment from Western Mining twice a year. The 
Foundation Bank Account for operations and administration, received 42 000 
pesos per month. The finandal year began in November, and May marked the
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midpoint. These half yearly watersheds represent the points of calculation for 
measurement of spending capacity. Balances for December 1998 express the 
starting point, and are compared with those for May 1999 in order to obtain a 
ranking.
The following charts present the sum of receipts and expenditures for each 
account;
Development Account
Dec. 1998 May 1999 Ranking November 1999 
[projected]
Ranking
Bong Mai 494000* 164707 4 196042 4
Danlag 175 644 -22 587 1 42 995 2
Folu Bato 138 010 -107 261 2 -7425 1
S’banken 184 053 46 487 3 -15 114 3
*As of February 1999.
Foundation Bank Account
Dec. 1998 May 1999 Ranking Nov. 1999 
[projected]
Ranking
Bong Mai 556486* 239 633 4 290116 4
Danlag 202 904 31 097 2 14 573 1
Folu Bato 183 325 -7 713 1 84 620 2
S’banken 243 385 164 659 3 124 897 3
*As of February 1999.
WMC Direct Account*
December 1998 November 1999 [projected] Ranking
Bong Mai 750 000 271 127 4
Danlag 997 867 -5 841 1
Folu Bato 955 000 -76 862 3
S’banken 861 654 -28 553 2
* Data available for the WMC Direct Account was less detailed than 
that for the others and only the end of year balance was available > 
hence the data was not broken down into two parts.
Payments made by Western Mining represented a fixed allocation of funds to each 
Tribal Council. This indicator was based upon Putnam’s ninth indicator - 
Agricultural Spending Capacity, which assessed performance according to the 
percentage of a fixed fund actually disbursed [Putnam 1993:65-72],
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If too much money was spent, accounts fell into negative equity, necessitating 
repayment, restricting scope for future investment, and incurring banking charges 
and interest payments. It is acknowledged that negative equity may reflect the 
implementation of a project that provides benefit. Indeed, negativity depends on 
the balance between losses in terms of debt service etc., versus future gains from 
the services provided. However, of those Foundations which had overspent, none 
were marked by the success of any particular project sufficient to outweigh the 
impact of the corresponding debt Moreover, it should be noted that there was 
evidence of the mismanagement of funds by community members - such as the 
failure of carrot production in Folu Bato. This had resulted in a tightening of the 
processing of proposals by the Foundation Boards and greater supervision 
following approval. Therefore, in the prevailing context, negative equity was 
regarded as indicative of negative performance.
However, this does not mean that positive equity could be taken to mean positive 
performance. It was difficult to assess the impact of unspent funds because the 
benefits that might have been gained defied calculation. Moreover, the bigger the 
sum that remained in accounts at the end of each financial period, the less money 
that had been disbursed. That is to say proposals had generally been too weak to 
merit investment. At a time when Councils were in their infancy, and the 
successful utilisation of resources was most vital, surplus funds were also 
regarded as negative. Positive performance was therefore identified in terms of 
proximity to a zero figure on the bottom line of Foundation statements, regardless 
of whether it was above or below zero.
Before each Tribal Council is ranked, one exception should be explained. First, 
because Salna'ong had not signed the Principal Agreement, it did not have the 
funds that came with it. Therefore no data was available. In terms of the model 
for local mineral-driven development which is the subject of this research, it is 
regarded as faring least well and is accordingly ranked fifth.
In order to arrive at a conclusive comparative indicator of performance in terms of 
spending capacity, the rankings observed for each Tribal Council were added up 
and divided by their number. This figure was converted into a simple ranking as 
follows:
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Combined rankings of performance in terms of spending capacity.
Boog Mal Danlag Folu Bato Salna'ong S’banken
Total Ranking Points 20 7 9 / 14
Combined Ranking: 4 1 2 5 3
In these terms. Danlag had best managed its spending responsibility. Folu Bato 
and S’banken appeared to have tracked the performance of Danlag. Of the four 
Councils which had a Foundation, Bong Mai had performed least well, having a 
noticeable surplus of funds at the end of each accounting period. It must be noted 
that the Bong Mal Foundation was not formed until December 1998, only 
becoming operational in January 1999. Hence data was only available from 
February 1999 onwards, compared with November 1998 for the others, which had 
more time in which to spend. Moreover, because of its very recent formation,
Bong Mal members were least well acclimatised to the proposal-making process, 
and a considerable portion of project finance was pending rather than unspent
Critics have pointed out that the data used derived from the decisions of 
Foundation Boards and not Tribal Councils. It has therefore been argued that the 
bottom lines of Foundation accounts were not an expression of host performances. 
The first point is undeniable, but the numbers used are nevertheless indicative of 
local ability. This is because, while the Foundation accounting procedures were 
conducted by Western Mining, the subject of the accountancy depended upon the 
Coundls. That is to say, the Coundls were responsible for proposing 
developmental initiatives and carrying them out
Moreover, Western Mining were assumed to make better economic judgements 
than Tribal Coundl members. This is for two reasons. First by merit of the 
greater finandal experience of professional accountants. Second because the 
experience of the affected communities was very local, while that of Western 
Mining encompassed the region. Their development expertise sourced from 
Community Development Officers hired from various parts of southern Mindanao, 
who had a greater appredation for the viability of various proposals within regional 
markets. Therefore, while accounting performance might have been much worse 
without the input of the company, it is assumed that defidendes therein did reflect 
the varying progress of Coundls.
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Furthermore, data was representative of each Tribal Council rather than 
Foundation performance because there was only one Western Mining and the 
same staff members participated on each of the Foundation Boards. Tribal 
members on the other hand, were obviously different individuals. Hence there was 
a greater degree of consistency in the contribution of Western Mining, which 
reinforces the argument that variation can be attributed to the role of B'laan 
members.
6.2. A Comparative Index of Tribal Council Performance.
Having collated and ranked the data gathered for each of the ten indicators, the 
following Comparative Index of Tribal Council Performance was drawn up. This is 
an important stage in the methodology if a definitive comparison of Coundl 
performances is to be achieved. By constructing such an index, the effect of 
idiosyncrasies within particular indicators can be reduced through the identification 
of cumulative trends. While the gap between outside researcher and subject 
Coundls may never be overcome, it can be brought within meaningful bounds. 
Indeed, the fact the comparative methodology comprised two sections meant that 
performances in each can support or refute performances in the other.
All of the indicators, despite differences in complexity or the quantity of data 
gathered, are given an equal status. Each is ranked on a scale of one to five, one 
being the highest, five the lowest. Considering that there are seven indicators, 
potential performances therefore range between seven and thirty-five.
Comparative Index of Tribal Council performance.
Bong Mal Danlag Folu Bato Salna’ong S’banken
1. Meetings. 3 1 2 4 3
2. Representation. 4 2 3 5 1
3. Female Participation. 4.5 1 4.5 2 3
4. Expediency. 4 3 2 5 1
5. Training. 4 2 3 5 1
6. Comprehensiveness. 3 1 4 5 2
7. Spending. 4 1 2 5 3
Total: 26.5 11 20.5 31 14
Combined Rankings: 4 1 3 5 2
The index provides a summary of comparative performance. It shows that in terms 
of the strategy pursued by Western Mining, and in accordance with the 
recommendations of the World Bank, Danlag was the 'winner', having led both
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Processes and Operations. S’banken and Folu Bato were close to each other. 
Bong Mal was some way behind them. Salna’ong had the lowest rankings.
Indeed it appears that Danlag, S'banken, Folu Bato and Bong Mal were all on a 
similar trajectory, with Danlag in the lead and Bong Mal catching up. Salna’ong 
was the obvious exception to the pattern, where relations with mineral-driven 
development had broken down.
6.3. Corroboratory evidence for the Comparative Index.
The Comparative Index reflects important, coherent differences in Tribal Council 
performance. In order to test it for anomalies, sources of corroboration were 
sought. That is to say individuals and organisations who dealt with Council 
members and were familiar with the workings of the Tribal Councils. These 
included CARE International and Community Aid Abroad.
According to CARE’s Community Based Doctor, Arlene Cardos, as of March 2000, 
Danlag was the first community in which Project Smile had been adopted, in April 
1999. Folu Bato followed soon after, also in April 1999. Next was S’banken in the 
following month. Bong Mal started in January 2000, but for Salna’ong there was 
no plan in place to provide services. Presuming that speedy participation in 
Project Smile is indicative of positive Tribal Council performance, the five B'laan 
communities may therefore be ranked as follows;
Bong Mai Danlag Folu Bato Salna’ong S’banken
Ranking: 4 1 2 5 3
This table correlates with the Comparative Index of Tribal Council Performance. 
Only Folu Bato and S’banken differ, with rankings two and three reversed in 
comparison with the Index. It might however be noted, that in the summary of 
rankings, these two Councils were the closest, differing by only half of a single 
ranking point This data is thus interpreted as positive corroboration for the index 
of performance.
Doctor Cardos also supplied data relating to actual attendances by community 
members in Project Smile activities in 1999, which are displayed in the chart 
below. As the Bong Mal and Salna'ong communities had not as of 1999 
participated in the Project, they could not be included. The first of each dual set of
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columns shows the number of people that participated, while the second 
expresses this as a percentage of the total population.
Danlag Folu Bato S'banken
No. % No. % No. %
1st quarter 0 0 0 0 0 0
2nd quarter 48 8.23 23 6.13 47 6.39
3rd quarter 64 11.03 14 3.73 64 8.71
4th quarter 104 17.93 44 11.73 355 48.23
Judging by the percentage figures, Danlag appears not to have participated as 
thoroughly as S’banken. Folu Bato is in third place. Because Bong Mal had 
agreed to initiate Project Smile and was at the time of research preparing to 
participate, while there are no figures, it may therefore be ranked fourth. 
Salna’ong’s failure to reach any agreement with Project Smile’s co-ordinating 
officers, suggests that it may be ranked fifth. Therefore, if the Tribal Councils were 
ranked according to performance in terms of the percentage of the communities 
that each of them represents, in the activities of Project Smile, their positions 
would be as follows;
Bong Mal Danlag Folu Bato Salna'ong S'banken
Rankings: 4 2 3 5 1
Once more, the data relates closely with the Comparative Index of Tribal Council 
Performance. Again, the positions of only two Tribal Councils differ from those of 
the Index These are Danlag and S’banken, which occupy second and first places 
respectively, as opposed to first and second in the Index
The second opportunity to obtain corroboration for the Comparative Index of 
Council Performance came from Community Aid Abroad, an Australian affiliate of 
the Oxford Committee for Famine Relief network, or Oxfam, who had been active 
in the area for seven years [Community Aid Abroad 2000]. They were opposed to 
the plans of Western Mining on the basis that they represented exploitation of 
indigenous communities by Australian corporations. During the latter half of 1999, 
CAA carried out feasibility studies among the five B’laan communities in order to 
assess their requirements in terms of support programs independent of mineral 
development.
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Bob Muntz, Community Aid Abroad’s Southeast Asia Program Co-ordinator, 
regarded Danlag as the most successful Tribal Council. He considered Danlag 
Council members to be most aware of the plans of Western Mining, and that it was 
only in Danlag and S’banken that any members understood the fact that signing 
the Principal Agreement committed them to mining. He found that other Tribal 
Councils had only a hazy idea of what mining involved, or in the case of Bong Mal, 
none at all. Bob Muntz also noted that chairwoman Dalina Samling in Danlag had 
a relatively dear idea of what she wanted to do with potential royalties. She had a 
plan to establish a B’laan highschool. None of the other Councils with whom he 
spoke had any such long term plans. Moreover, Danlag also had the best defined 
and successfully implemented community development program, using the money 
from Western Mining.
Bob Muntz also regarded the Danlag Tribal Council as the strongest of the five 
because they had led opposition to Western Mining’s plan to pay for Project Smile 
from the Development Fund allocated to each community. Indeed, it must be 
noted that because Community Aid Abroad were opposed to mining, they were 
also judging the capacity of communities in terms of their ability to articulate 
themselves independently of the interests of the company.
To summarise the corroboratory evidence provided by Bob Muntz and Community 
Aid Abroad, Danlag were clearly the strongest of the five Coundls. S’banken were 
tentatively second place. Folu Bato, Bong Mal and Salna'ong were all very weak. 
These findings correlate with the Index of Coundl Performance.
Thus a pattern of performance was established for the five Tribal Coundls. This 
provided a basis for those limiting factors located within the confines of the 
Tampakan Copper Projed. Correlation with for example, any pattern of traditional 
lifeways, would support the idea that traditional structures had a role to play within 
strategies for mineral-driven development Moreover, it was hoped that the nature 
of such correlation, be it positive or negative, would provide for further 
understanding of limiting factors raised by the literatures reviewed. Evaluation of 
local hypothetical factors forms the basis of Chapter Seven.
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Chapter Seven.
The Tampakan Copper Project and local obstacles to mineral-driven 
development
As explained in section 1 .4 ., aside from violence, and power, three of the five 
hypothetical preconditions for successful mineral-driven development were located 
within the confines of the Tampakan Copper Project. These were an understanding of 
the implications of mining on the part of host communities, incorporation of traditional 
structures into the development strategy, and equity for local parties within those 
development structures. Chapter Seven tests the Tampakan Copper Project for each of 
these.
First however, despite the apparent similarity between the five communities hosting the 
Tampakan Copper Project, that is to say in terms of their uniform population size, 
cultural background, agricultural production systems, etc., there was a significant 
difference. That is in terms of local geography. Some communities were close to the 
Tampakan municipal centre, while others were very remote. This had an obvious 
physical impact upon the delivery of development initiatives, which should not be 
ignored, and is an important part of the context in which this thesis is situated.
7.1. Proximity to urban centres.
The institutional literature presented in Chapter Two stresses the influence of path 
dependence over institutional change. Moreover, that the strength of tradition may 
directly affect institutional outcomes. In terms of the hypothetical point that the 
incorporation of traditional structures is important for the success of developmental 
institutions at minesites, this raised the possibility that distinctions might evolve in Tribal 
Coundl performances according to familiarity with modem institutions. The apparent 
spectrum of tradition, and conversely, of modem forms, between the five communities, 
offered an opportunity to study not only the influence of tradition upon modem 
structures, but also of the relationship between modernity and tradition in the institution 
building process. This further underlined the importance of comparative analysis.
The five communities affected by the proposed mine comprised a total population of 
approximately 6000, more or less evenly spread. One distinct difference between them 
was their proximity to Visayan settlements, the nearest being the Tampakan pobladon, to 
which Folu Bato was closest, followed by Danlag, and S’banken respectively, with Bong 
Mal and Salna'ong furthest away - see Map 4. Although this difference did not appear
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Map 4.
Urban centres in the proposed mineral development proximity.
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significant on a map, all being within twenty kilometres of Tampakan, it was extended 
by steep terrain, poor roads and limited transportation.
in order to establish the degree to which each community was acquainted with 
various urban centres in the region, a census of people who had travelled outside the 
confines of the territories administered by their respective Tribal Councils, was 
conducted. This exercise was intended to obtain an indication of familiarity with 
formal institutions, and hence modernity, within each community. The following table 
shows the percentage of the population of each community to have travelled to 
various places.
The percentage of people in each community to have travelled to urban
centres across the region.
Destinations
Bong Mal
%
Danlag
%
Folu Bato 
•/•
Salna’ong S’banken 
% %
Tampakan poblacion 55 100 100 60 95
Columbio poblacion 25 12 3 35 20
Kiblawan poblacion 20 30 20 25 50
Tupi municipality 10 90 100 4 95
Polomolok municipality 2 70 80 3 10
Marbel poblacion 45 90 100 50 80
General Santos City 15 85 95 3 50
Davao City 5 20 20 5 10
Totals 177 497 518 185 410
Rankings 4 2 1 5 3
As might be expected, the rankings matched comparative distance from the 
Tampakan poblacion. The Folu Bato community were most familiar with urban 
centres, Danlag second and so on. Indeed, as noted in section 5 .2 . in relation to 
the potential impact of road construction, Tampakan poblacion was the urban center 
with which all communities were most familiar, regardless of whether they were in 
the municipality of Tampakan.
However, because the five B’laan communities straddle the tri-boundary of three 
provinces and municipalities, provincial and municipal allegiances might have 
skewed travel data. Because of this possibility, the five communities were also 
compared according to travel within their home provinces. The numbers gathered 
are displayed below.
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Travel within home province: South Cotabato*.
Municipal poblacions
Folu Bato
%
Danlag
%
S’banken
%
Bong M al
%
Salna ’ong
%
Surallah 5 5 2 I 1
Tampakan 100 100 95 55 60
T’Boli 5 5 3 I 0
Tupi 75 50 80 30 3
Lake Sebu 10 10 4 1 1
Norala 10 10 5 0 0
Tantangan 2 2 1 5 0
Santo Nino 6 5 1 0 0
Banga 20 10 4 10 0
Totals: 233 197 195 103 65
*As has been stated, it is important to note that all of the South Cotabato 
municipalities are closer to all of the five communities than any of the 
municipalities in any of the other two provinces in which Bong Mai and 
Salna’ong are located.
Travel within home province: Sultan Kudarat.
Municipal poblacions
Salna’ong Bong M al Danlag Folu Bato S ’banken
% % % % %
Columbio 35 25 12 3 20
Lutayan 1 5 10 15 3
President Quirino 0 0 5 5 0
Tacurong 1 3 10 10 5
Lambayong 1 1 5 5 1
Bagumbayan 3 2 3 4 2
Isulan 15 10 25 30 10
Esperanza 5 3 10 10 5
Ninoy Aquino 3 0 10 10 5
Palimbang 1 0 5 5 5
Lebak 1 0 3 5 1
Kalamansig 1 0 5 5 1
Totals: 66 49 103 107 48
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Travel within home province: Davao Del Sur.
Bong Mal Danlag Folu Bato Satna ’ong S ’banken
D, D. S. Municipal poblacions % % % % %
Kiblawan 45 30 20 25 50
Jose Abad Santos 0 0 0 0 0
Don Marcelino 0 0 1 0 0
Malita 5 0 0 0 0
Santa Maria 10 2 0 0 0
Matalag 15 2 0 0 I
Sulop 20 0 0 0 0
Padada 20 0 0 0 0
Matanao 20 5 0 7 5
Hagonoy 10 0 0 0 0
Magsaysay 0 0 0 5 0
Bansalan 2 0 0 5 0
Santa Cruz 10 0 0 0 0
Sarangani 0 0 0 0 0
Totals: 157 3 9 21 37 56
Data for travel within home provinces reinforced the observation that the Folu Bato 
community were best travelled. They had more exposure within both South Cotabato 
and Sultan Kudarat than any other community. Danlag were in second place both in 
South Cotabato and Sultan Kudarat, which corroborates the Folu Bato result.
Salna’ong were in fifth place for travel within South Cotabato, fourth within their home 
province of Sultan Kudarat and an albeit indeterminate fourth in Davao Del Sur, for 
which four communities came within twenty-five percentage points of each other.
Thus, while all five communities faced similar conditions regarding mineral development 
and the implementation of a uniform Tribal Council model, their resources in terms of 
institutions located in urban centres were different Access to markets and services varied, 
with Bong Mal and Salna’ong being markedly more remote than Folu Bato and Danlag.
With regard to the importance of understanding of implications of mining, it was therefore 
anticipated that Folu Bato and Danlag would have more experience of the modem 
business and infrastructural institutions that would accompany mining. Traditional 
institutions among communities close to Tampakan poblacion might also have been 
eroded by dependence upon Visayans, and offer less of an obstacle to formal initiatives.
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7.2. Tradition and the Tribal Council model.
This section addresses the hypothetical necessity of incorporating antecedent structures 
into developmental apparatus. As the literature review explained, institutional theory 
predicts that traditional value systems and existing organisational structures will influence 
the success of new institutional models and processes of modernisation. That is to say that 
the strength of traditional institutions and the influence of path dependence over 
institutional change, may directly affect outcomes.
Assuming that traditional systems were weak in urban centres and stronger in remote 
regions, correlation between distance from Tampakan and Tribal Council performances 
suggests that tradition had a bearing on the ‘formal’ Council model. As demonstrated in 
section 7 .1 ., Salna’ong and Bong Mal were furthest from Tampakan and their 
constituents were least familiar with urban centres and modem institutions therein. Folu 
Bato, Danlag and S’banken were on the other hand closer, and people from those 
places were much better travelled, and hence familiar with urban or modem institutions.
In order to engage with tradition as a means of explaining Tribal Coundl success, ways 
in which traditional aspects of B’laan life influenced Coundl processes had to be 
identified. Those aspects which lay at the interface of traditional and Coundl practices 
induded leadership styles. That is the capacity of otherwise traditional B’laans to 
manage the modem, representative and executive leadership responsibilities entailed by 
the Coundl model. Second was the perceived legitimacy of the Coundl model among 
traditional B’laan communities. Each had multiple outcomes. Section 7 .2 . is divided 
into two parts which address each of these explanative factors.
7.2.1 . Leadership.
Acquaintance with the Tribal Coundls indicated that the ‘personalities’ of chairpersons /  
chieftains and Coundl members, and the type of leadership they provided, had a strong 
relationship with Coundl performance. However, subjecting such idiosyncrasies to 
rigorous evaluation is a complex task. At least as important and better suited to such 
analysis are qualifications for leadership. This explanator comprises two parts.
The first focuses upon Tribai Council leadership in the context of modernity. This begins 
with a comparison between Dalina Samling, the chairwoman of Danlag Tribal Coundl, 
whose leadership has already been referred to in section 6. 3., and three members of the 
Salna'ong Tribal Coundl, Chieftain Malayon Malid and two of his sons, Juanito and Piling.
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According to the Index of Tribal Council Performance, Danlag was most successful. What is 
more, all observers conceded that the leadership of Dalina Samling was important Dalina 
understood the Foundation system, to which Bob Muntz of Community Aid Abroad and Geoff 
Allen, the accountant at Western Mining, each testified. Her opposition to the plan of 
Western Mining to fund the work of CARE International from their Foundation account 
indicated grasp of financial process, and a view as to how else it should be disbursed.
Malayon Malid provided a dramatic contrast. As the most experienced leader among the 
Salna’ong community, he had duly been elected chairman of the new Tribal Council. 
However, he was elderly. He could neither speak nor read Visayan or Pilipino, and did not 
have anyone close to him who did. These factors meant that all of his authority had to be 
channelled through others, namely his sons, several of whom were traditional Fulongs and 
also members of the Tribal Council. This had the effect of freezing the Coundl from the 
early stages. The reason was that the most dynamic of his sons, Piling and Juanito, were 
diametrically opposed in their perceptions of how to progress. Broadly speaking, Piling was 
in favour of Western Mining’s Community Development Program and had been employed as 
a Tribal Liaison Officer. Juanito was more critical, rejecting the company and seeking an 
independent path toward community development.
As well as their rivalry, and skirmishing between the respective camps, neither Piring nor 
Juanito were able to read or write in any Visayan dialect. They were only intermediate in 
their ability to speak Visayan, let alone English or Pilipino. Subsequently, both had various 
Visayan ‘advisors’. However, the commitment of these figures to the welfare of the B’laan 
community at Salna'ong was uncertain. In particular, the Visayan ‘secretary’ of Piring was 
one Berting Pito, a resident of the munidpality of Banga, twenty kilometres from Salna’ong.
In one inddent early in 1999, Berting bought a motorcyde from Piring, which had belonged 
to the Tribal Coundl. He had also withdrawn funds allocated to the Coundl by the 
Department of Environment and Natural Resources for fulfilment of their Ancestral Domain 
Management Plan. In April 2000, Piring was attempting to file a complaint against Pito at the 
Regional Trial Court in Marbel.
This comparison has presented two contrasting leadership styles. The informed leadership 
of Dalina Samling in Danlag, and the apparent leadership vacuum in Salna'ong. It was dear 
that the new Tribal Coundl structure demanded new skills of leaders of the B’laan community 
and that these were crudal to performance. They induded communication, which was 
different in that it involved new languages. Also a grasp of formal legal process in terms of 
Filipino law and constitution. Moreover, finandal aptitude, that is to say, understanding of
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market principals in order to develop business initiatives, and the ability to manage bank 
accounts, credit and deficit. These represent important aspects of institutional capacity, 
which the Salna’ong leadership did not have.
However, the absence of such skills cannot explain the entire pattern. Why was it that 
although Bong Mai and Salna’ong occupied fourth and fifth rankings respectively in the 
Comparative Index, Bong Mai exhibited some success while Salna’ong had consistently 
failed to participate? For this reason, the second part of the leadership section factors-in the 
contribution of traditional leadership and considers whether it was related in any way to 
Council performance.
As Castro explains, the Kasfala system that comprised the legal basis for B’laan society, had 
been undermined by the creation of barangays [Castro 1997:17]. No Kasfala had been 
conducted among the Folu Bato and Oanlag communities for some years. It had apparently 
died out in S’banken also, where Liwahim Magumway had performed such duties. He was in 
prison and did not expect to resume. However, Kasfala persisted in serving to settle feuds in 
Bong Mai and among the Bong Mai community resident at Bong S’bang. Also at Oatal Biao 
in Salna’ong, under the auspices of Malayon Malid and Danuan Gula-e.
Thus, traditional leadership exerted significant influence in Bong Mai and Salna’ong. However, 
these two communities provided a distinct contrast. Respect for the leadership of Danuan Gola- 
e continued in Bong Mai, but in Salna'ong, cohesion had been damaged by discord in the Tribal 
Council. The argument over whether to enter agreement with, and accept the company’s 
money, or whether to reject it, went on, with Juanito, Gorelmin, and Deling in favour of rejection, 
and Piring and Ramonal wanting to take the money and decide later about whether to support 
mining. These viewpoints were presented at Kasfala by representatives of each party, but 
Kasfala meetings did not address the mining issue successfully. There did not appear to be 
sufficient trust in the company, and there certainly was not sufficient trust between community 
members. Outside of the Kasfala, Gorelmin and Piring had each threatened the other with 
violence, if they did not get their way, and much of the community was a no-go area to members 
of each side.
Because of Malayon Malid’s reliance on his sons for dissemination of authority, their ensuing 
dispute had divided the community into two factions. That is the ’Piring’ faction, centred on 
the settlement at Datal Biao, and the ’Juanito’ faction in Salna’ong. The contrasting 
experiences of Bong Mai and Salna’ong suggests that in the absence of modem leadership 
qualities, traditional leadership was better for the Tribal Council structure than no leadership.
174
The following statements can subsequently be made of the relationship between modem and 
traditional leadership. Under Daiina Samling, the Danlag Tribal Council appeared to have 
made the leap from traditional to modem, and indeed traditional leadership qualities were 
second to those modem in terms of their contribution to local organisation.
Although the Bong Mai Tribal Council demonstrated only minimal command of modem 
structures, because of the strong traditional leadership of Danuan Gola-e, the Bong Mai 
Council were on a positive course to do so. Moreover, as of the period of research, it 
was intent upon the task. Danuan Gola-e and Tagum Bayan, another of the Bong Mai 
councillors, in particular, were sincere and generous in the co-operation with this 
research. Visits to Bong Mai took a long time to organise and involved a days travel, by 
Skylab motorcycle and horseback. This burden was lessened by Gola-e and Freay who 
travelled to Lampitak Crossing at the foot of the Quezon mountains, to speak at greater 
length and to answer the inevitable questions that cropped up after interviews had been 
conducted. However, as has been noted, whether Bong Mai's commitment to the Tribal 
Council - Foundation system will prove consistent has yet to be demonstrated. The 
Bong Mai Foundation had only recently been established and pressures of decision­
making had not come to bear to the extent that they had elsewhere.
In Folu Bato the dispute between former chairman Willy Gulaya and Western Mining 
had disrupted the traditional pattern of leadership. The community were divided into 
two camps, those behind Celso Dok who were for mining, and those with Willy Gulaya, 
who were against. Celso Dok had been elected chairman but did not embody strong 
credentials for traditional leadership. Indeed, Gulaya and Dok were both in their 
twenties and of very modest stature in terms of B’laan tradition. Furthermore, the 
'misplacement' of funds allocated to specific projects indicated that formal leadership 
qualities were also lacking.
In S’banken, traditional leadership was relatively strong. It provided a source of 
institutional gravity which bound the Tribal Council together in spite of their dubious 
command of modem leadership skills and the Council /  Foundation structure. Although, 
as related in section 5. 3., chairman Liwahim Magumway had been in prison for a 
period of almost two years, he remained a highly respected leader. In his absence, the 
Tribal Council was led by acting chairman, Tinga Freay and treasurer Linsay Wales, 
whose Visayan husband Tommy Sarvilla provided important counsel. The fact that their 
elderly chairman was absent during this crucial stage in their development might be
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regarded as paving the way for younger Council members to move ahead with 
business, education and agricultural initiatives. That is to say, in the absence of the 
'obstacle' of traditional ways of doing things. Thus, while traditional leadership was 
intact, progress was being made on the basis of engagement with, and a growing grasp 
of, Foundation processes and accumulation of modem leadership skills.
Due to the weakness of Malayon Malid, traditional leadership within the Salna’ong 
Council had on the other hand collapsed, before any modem system could take hold. 
Indeed, a vacuum ensued in both traditional and modem terms. Moreover, not only did 
the modem fail, but in doing so, it severely damaged traditional leadership, which 
resulted in a degree of anarchy.
This examination indicates that the Salna’ong collapse was partly due to failure in 
apprehending modem leadership qualities. However, this would only have served to 
delay participation. The problem was compounded by the associated collapse in 
traditional leadership under pressures of modernity, the speed of which outstripped the 
capacity of the Salna’ong leadership to develop accordingly. A similar problem was 
faced by the leadership of the Folu Bato community. However, because of Folu Bato’s 
close proximity to the Tampakan poblacion and at least partial ability to engage with 
modem institutions, they were better able to cope with, and develop according to, 
modem requirements.
To summarise the extent of modem and traditional leadership in each Tribal Council;
Bong Mai Danlag Folu Bato Salna’ong S’ban ken
Modern leadership. None Yes Some None Some
Traditional leadership. Yes Yes Some None Yes
Both traditional and modem leadership can be said to have important consequences for 
the Tribal Councils. Analysis of interactions within the Tribal Councils suggest that 
success clearly depended upon modem leadership qualities. That is an easy statement 
to make. However, the timelag between instigating such a model and the emergence of 
appropriate skills created contradictory pressures within the leadership of communities. 
The failure of both the Kasfala and Tribal Council in Salna'ong suggests that traditional 
leadership may not be able to contain these pressures. The elderly Malayon Malid was 
the rightful traditional leader but could not resist the conflicting influences exerted by his
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sons in the context of the modem structure. Thus the demands of modernity worked to 
undermine his leadership.
This suggests that two processes were underway. Both relate to the ‘speed’ at which 
changes took place and relate to endogenous and exogenous aspects of change. The 
first is the speed at which new demands were being placed upon leadership. The 
second is the speed at which leadership could accommodate these changes. If the 
speed of the first outstrips the second, the findings suggest there will likely be tensions. 
Albeit to a different extent, this was the case for all the Tribal Councils. Indeed it is 
attested to by their limited success in terms of the performance indicators.
Regarding the hypothetical contribution of tradition to mineral-driven development, the 
obvious assumption of leadership as an explanation for performance, was that modem 
leadership would translate as successful Tribal Councils. Much less obvious was the 
significance of traditional values. These were an important part of the initial leadership 
material which formed the basis of each Council, and had to be built upon in order to 
acquire modem competency. Council leadership was vulnerable to exogenous 
economic, political, and cultural forces wherever those forces moved at a speed that 
exceeded the ability of leadership to cope. Exogenous pressures such as the 
encroachment of Visayan settlers, the loss of forest, and the growth of cash as the 
basis of exchange, were far from new when mining arrived, but because the 
establishment of Tribal Councils and Foundations was an exogenous process and the 
ability to cope with transition had not been quantified, there was always a danger that it 
would be too fast Moreover, it is dear that the speed at which Coundls could absorb 
such changes varied from one to another which further complicated the issue.
This implies that for some communities, particularly those doser to the Tampakan 
pobladon, and with leaders who were more aware of formal process and modern 
institutions, such as Danlag, the Tribal Coundl -  Foundation framework was viable. In 
others, which dearly induded Salna’ong, it was not. In practical terms therefore, the 
system established by the Office of Southern Cultural Communities and sponsored by 
Western Mining, was something of a misfit.
Features of B’laan organisation such as Kasfala meetings and Diandi pacts suggest 
that traditional precendents could have been incorporated into the Tribal Coundl 
structure to a far greater extent. However, much of the anthropology conducted by
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figures such as Joseph Lalo [1997], and other anthropologists hired by Western Mining, 
or which already existed -  see for example Ogoy [1985] and Lutero [1986] - was 
apparently ignored by Western Mining’s Community Development Program.
Moreover, traditional leadership was also very vulnerable and once lost, there was no 
evidence from any B’laan community that it could be revived. Indeed, Salna’ong fell 
through the net, unsupported by either traditional or modem structures. This suggests 
that the gap between traditional and formal value systems was simply too big for the 
model in question to address. The Tribal Council -  Foundation system was 
inappropriate for the context presented by the host communities -  particularly those 
which were more remote, affording no opportunity for smooth institutional transition.
The project stumbled, and in Salna’ong, it fell. This also implies that some sections of 
the B’laan community were simply not ready for mining - a conclusion which has been 
drawn in relation to communities hosting mining projects in similar circumstances 
elsewhere [Filer 1990].
The final point is that elections were to take place every year, so that leadership could 
evolve in a representative manner.
Tribal Council Elections
Elections among B’laan communities, and other mdigenous communities in southern 
Mindanao, were supervised by the Office of Southern Cultural Communities and the 
subsequent National Commision for Indigenous People. Those that this researcher witnessed 
were conducted by using ears of maize rather than ballot papers. Community members would 
assemble at the time of the election, when aides of each candidate would haggle with each 
other over what each candidate had to offer, or planned to do. There would be considerable 
shouting back and forth between community members, these aides, and sometimes candidates 
themselves. Once a consensus had been reached about who would or would not do what, or 
more likely, an impasse had been arrived at, the impatient and mdeed mocking government 
officials would order the community to line up outside whatever public building was nearby. 
In this building would be placed glass jars, marked according to the candidates identities. 
These jars had been stoppered so that you could pop a ear of maize in but not get it out. 
Community members would then enter one by one to cast their vote, foBowing which 
procedure, the ears of maize would be counted and the ‘winner’ announced.
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In fact, among the five communities hosting the proposed mining project, only a few 
elections had been held. Prolonged incumbencies might have indicated approval of the 
Tribal Coundl I  Foundation system, and been interpreted as positive. However, it was 
apparent that elections were only deployed in response to spedfic problems as 
perceived by outside agendes. At the time of research only two Coundls had seen a 
change of chairman. In Folu Bato, Willy Gulaya, who was opposed to the plans of 
Western Mining, was removed from his position as chairman in July 1998. This was by 
resolution of the Coundl rather than election. He was replaced with then vice- 
chairman, Celso Dok. In December 1999 there was also a change in S’banken, where 
in the continued absence of Liwahim Magumway, Usman Tagum, a B’laan living in the 
Tampakan pobladon, had been elected. Never having appeared on the Coundl 
membership list, nor a signatory to the Prindpal Agreement with Western Mining, 
Tagum was an unfamiliar name. In fact he was from Barangay Assumption, in the 
munidpality of Koronadal, eighteen kilometres distant He was assodated with Claudel 
Magbanua, the Visayan Barangay Captain of Tablu, who had impressed upon the 
B’laan community to elect him.
Thus there did not appear to have been any dedsive ‘pick up’ of representative 
prindples embodied by the Tribal Coundls, among the B'laan communities. This 
suggested that B’laans were ambivalent towards the Tribal Coundl system, and the 
prindples it ostensibly represented. Moreover, that because of this situation, the Tribal 
Coundls were vulnerable to manipulation. Indeed, it appeared that Barangay Tablu 
was in the process of ‘capturing’ the S’banken Tribal Coundl.
7.2. 2. Legitimacy.
This section builds upon the fact that traditional B’laan sodal structures persisted most 
distinctly in remote regions. The contribution of legitimacy to the hypothetical 
importance of tradition for performance of developmental institutions is based upon the 
assumption that Tribal Coundl members partidpated more successfully within 
structures that they perceived as legitimate. Conversely, such institutions are assumed 
to be least successful where their legitimacy is weakest.
The Tribal Coundls represented potential newfodi for institutional capacity. That is to 
say, indigenous capadty as opposed to external support for B’laans through for 
example, the finandng of particular livelihood projects or cultural aspects of B'laan life. 
By the encouragement of institutional capacity, dependency upon the company might
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be evaded, and local ‘sovereignty’ retained, enhancing confidence and identity, and in 
due course providing the necessary conditions for B’laan self-resurgence. So goes the 
theoretical case for greater institutional capacity and fulfilment of World Bank 
recommendations.
The vulnerability of this ‘seeding’ of new institutional capacity can be explained by 
analogy with a transplant operation in which a 'donor' organ is introduced to the human 
body. Once in place, the new kidney or liver may be accepted or rejected, depending 
upon a match of blood types and other physiological features. So it is when a new 
institution is introduced to a society, be it a new trade agreement or law, or in the case 
of B’laans, a Tribal Council, the nature and indeed delivery of the institution is critical to 
whether or not it will be successful.
Without entering into an anthropological project, the basic precepts of traditional B’laan 
leadership, that is by Fulongs and through Kaspala, expressed a dear distinction from 
those of the Philippine constitution, based upon the U.S. model, and ‘democracy’. 
Among the most obvious features of comparison between the ‘host’ society and ‘donor* 
institution, was the fact that such processes as formal elections and representative 
authority were a significant break from traditional leadership.
Each Tribal Council was made up of approximately twelve elected members including a 
chieftain I chairman and vice-chairman, as well as appointed treasurers and 
secretaries. This system replicated the Barangay Council - the smallest socio-political 
unit in the Philippines, which has an elected Barangay Captain, Vice-Captain, 
Treasurer, Secretary and approximately ten council members. Indeed, considering the 
comparatively large geographical size of the Tampakan barangays within which the 
Tribal Coundls were located - an average of 5023 hectares, compared with 1373 for the 
remaining ten barangays, the growing population, and frequent creation of new 
barangays in the region, there was scope for Tribal Coundls to evolve according to the 
barangay model. Jose Villamor, an anthropologist at the Western Mining office in 
General Santos City, explained that this had been the intention of the Office of 
Southern Cultural Communities. Such a path cannot easily be prejudged, as barangay 
status and incorporation into the formal political sphere may convey future benefits to 
B'laan communities. Nevertheless, it does betray a lack of appredation for indigenous 
leadership structures, which may displace legitimacy.
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What is more, Tribal Councils were organised on a basis of one per barangay, as was 
the policy of the Office of Southern Cultural Communities / National Commission for 
Indigenous Peoples, throughout the country. They had been established between 1994 
and 1995, incentive coming from the Local Government Code which stipulates the 
formation of Tribal Councils in barangays where traditional communities are located 
[IBON 1999:22]. Indeed it appeared that different sitios and minor B’laan settlements 
had been collected within new representative boundaries as they would not otherwise 
have been. This had the effect of furthering the imposition of ‘modem’ boundaries upon 
otherwise traditionally defined communities, which itself had consequences for the 
legitimacy of Tribal Councils among B’laans. The fact that the OSCC implemented a 
model for the B’laan communities identical to those across the country, supports the 
impression that they had little sensitivity to B'laan traditions, or diversity in general.
Once again, this served to undermine the principle of smoothness identified in Chapter 
Two as being crucial to the process of institutional change. It also exemplified the 
conflicting themes of local and national identity noted by Rundstrom [1991], Woods 
[1992], and Winichakul [1994].
Research contracted by Western Mining in support of Ancestral Domain Claims by 
B’laans, did address the question of boundaries, and the limits of traditional territories, 
or ‘Banwus’ overlapped political boundaries in several places. Salna’ong was shown to 
straddle the border between Danlag in Tampakan and Datal Biao in Columbio, while 
S’banken came to indude Lamalis which is part of the munidpality of Tupi. However, 
as noted in sedion 5. 3., these were only daims, and nowhere in the Philippines had a 
Certificate of Ancestral Domain Claim been converted into title. Moreover, in delimiting 
the area of traditional habitation and land use management, B’laans and Western 
Mining alike, were handicapped by opposition from the munidpality of Tampakan, 
whose own land use survey dashed in almost its entire extent, being very much in 
favour of Visayan settlers.
The research presented in the Certificates of Ancestral Domain Claim expressed 
significant drawbacks. Reading indicated that it had focused upon three tasks, 
identification of stakeholders, delimitation of their occupancy, and estimation of the time 
they and their ancestors had been resident there. These purposes were in accordance 
with the commitments of the company to host communities under the terms of the 1995 
Mining Act That is to say, legitimate daimants had to be found, and negotiating parties 
secured. However, as was observed of the Office for Southern Cultural Communities /
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National Commission for Indigenous Peoples, Western Mining had devoted little 
attention to developing practical understanding of B’laan socio-political structures. 
Although ostensibly cultural documents intended to support B’laan traditions, 
meaningful analysis was largely absent from the CADC research, or that contracted in 
support of the Principal Agreements. The company adopted and built directly upon the 
Tribal Council structure provided by the OSCC. They paid monthly salaries to Council 
members and negotiated formal contracts with them. Following the signing of Principal 
Agreements, Foundation Boards were based entirely upon the workings of modem 
management and commercial institutions.
These breaks with B’laan tradition demonstrate that rather than institutional capacity 
building, the OSCC, NCIP and Western Mining had embarked upon a course of 
institution creation, in defiance of the laws of institutional gravity presented by Robert 
Bates [1981]. This suggests that a fundamental distinction can be made between 
strategies aiming to strengthen institutional capacity. Providing that legitimacy is 
indeed important to success, whether existing institutions are built upon and improved, 
or new institutions are grafted onto societies, is significant. By building upon existing 
structures, legitimacy is more likely to be preserved. New institutions on the other 
hand, pose a break in institutional evolution. Although the relative size of the break and 
strength of existing legitimacy, as well as other factors may influence outcomes, 
institutional theory therefore predicts that the challenge facing such a Tribal Council 
model will consequently be strong.
Events in Salna’ong already related, were also significant for legitimacy. The persistent 
focus of Tribal Council affairs upon a struggle between the sons of the ageing chieftain, 
and the division of the community into respective camps, highlighted the fact that 
despite optimistic rhetoric, representative democracy had made little headway into the 
psyche of traditional B’laans. Indeed, a ‘victory’ of one brother over the other would 
likely reinforce this. This scenario signals important flaws in the structure of the Tribal 
Councils as vehicles for B’laan development.
This situation heralded the complexity of requirements for representative leadership 
among B’laan communities. Education was essential in order that constituents could 
make informed decisions about the new world, and for leaders to ably represent them.
A degree of wealth, or at least the absence of poverty, was also necessary. Without it 
individuals could not afford choices. Security, both physical and in terms of tenure, was
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important too. In its absence, B’laan constituents voted for immediate gains, rather than 
the long-term strategies that would be of greatest benefit
Without a sense of legitimacy to anchor representative principles and formal process 
within B’laan life, the imposition of the Tribal Council model upon a traditional 
environment had resulted in its inevitable ’capture’ by traditional means of social 
organisation. Rather than each member of the Tribal Council being democratically 
elected, each was in fact the strongest man within each of the largest of the settlements 
in the new constituencies. This was particularly the case in Salna’ong and Bong Mai, 
and to a lesser extent in S’banken, Folu Bato and Danlag respectively. That is to say 
they were either the most wealthy or heavily armed, a Fulong under the traditional 
system, or all of these.
Thus there was a perpetuation of tradition rather than an embrace of the formal.
Indeed, constituents were no more aware of themselves as within, or even heading in 
the direction of democracy, than they did before the representative structure was 
initiated. Besides which, the shortage of people within Salna’ong and its environs, who 
possessed the necessary skills and grasp of formal processes, made this conclusion 
inevitable. It was not that B’laans did not want Tribal Councils to succeed, or had in 
any way sabotaged them. Rather, they did not know what the project was, nor how to 
make it work.
This problem was compounded by the dearth of positive role models that might have 
instilled a sense of legitimacy among B’laans. Research among B'laan communities in 
the municipality of Kiblawan noted that;
“Officially there are Barangay Councils, made up of the Barangay Captain 
and Kagawads, for every barangay. In practice, these Councils do not 
operate as collective structures. The Barangay Captain exercises individual 
authority over the community. "
[Castro 1997:17-8]
Observations made during the course of this research correlate with Castro’s findings.
In barangay Datal Biao for example, Amirh Musali was just such a Barangay Captain. 
Furthermore, he owned a six-wheeler truck which was the only motorised vehicle in the 
barangay and upon which the whole community depended for the transportation of 
agricultural produce to the market in Columbio. Musali was the only member of the 
community with a tertiary education, having undertaken a course of agricultural study at
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the University of Marawi. Considering that the local economy was entirely dependent 
on agriculture, this decidedly added to his importance. Musali also occupied the only 
concrete house, in which all Barangay Council meetings were conducted. Moreover, 
Musali's grandfather had been the first Muslim Datu in the area. Thus it was difficult to 
envisage anyone other than Musali ever holding the position of Barangay Captain, 
barring on the completion of his three terms, the election of a candidate approved by 
him.
Claudel Magbanua, the Barangay Captain of Tablu was a similar example. When 
interviewed at his home in Tablu, he began by listing his credentials. He had led the 
civilian militia which drove the New People’s Army from Tablu during the early 1980s. 
He was officially the largest landowner in Tablu. His family owned a construction 
business which had completed several contracts with Western Mining. He was also 
closely allied to the Escobillo family, who were one of the two prominent dynasties in 
the municipality of Tampakan. Indeed, the May 1998 election of Mayor Claudius 
Barosso was at the time of research under challenge from his electoral opponent 
Emerico Escobillo, son of former Mayor Emilio Escobillo, a recount being awaited. 
Since the creation of the munidpality of Tampakan in June 1969, the name of the 
Mayor had only ever been Barosso or Escobillo, and these two families controlled the 
majority of business and public affairs within the munidpality.
This is not to allege that Musali, Magbanua, Barosso, or any elected leader in the area 
had exploitative intentions. Musali’s efforts and ambitions for his community appeared 
progressive and development-minded. Nevertheless, opportunities for abuse of 
leadership in a democracy subject to such drcumstances were plentiful and obvious, 
should any leader be disposed to take them. Indeed, a number of studies explain how 
this can take place - see for example Anderson [1988] and McCoy [1993].
Thus the role model for political partidpation in the region, and toward which state 
agendes were steering B’laan communities, was one in which strongmen played a 
dominant role. Rather than engender democracy, the Tribal Coundl model and the 
funding accruing from mineral development might thus function to corrupt what remains 
of traditional B’laan authority.
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7.3. Grasp of the implications of mining among Tribal Council members.
The hypothetical importance of understanding is based upon the presumption that 
grasp of the implications of mining is fundamental to the relationship between mining 
projects and host communities. Western Mining had sponsored a variety of initiatives to 
raise awareness of mining and to educate their prospective hosts, the most obvious 
being the Information Center in Tampakan pobladon, a building which housed photos 
and exhibits explaining various aspects of the mining industry. These efforts however, 
had clearly met with mixed success. The apparent focus of the Information Center was 
upon the wonders of technology rather than their effect upon the area and the people 
living there. Moreover, visitors were found to be dominantly outsiders, typically school 
parties and municipal delegations from around the region, rather than local people. 
B’laans on the other hand, were apparently discouraged by the official appearance of 
the new building, its location in the town centre, expensive vehicles parked outside its 
door, the businesslike manner of Visayan staff and so on. Thus the Center served 
international standards and outward appearance rather than local needs.
Western Mining also commissioned an elaborate topographical model of the proposed 
mine, which was useful. The model was periodically transported into communities to 
whom it offered a means of overcoming the gap in literacy, formality, eta However, 
there was only one such model and a substantial proportion of the B’laan community 
had not seen it. Moreover, while the model portrayed the physical features of the mine, 
they were weakly linked with temporal processes, the nature of which, in the absence of 
relevant studies of B’laan society, could not be known. That is to say the model could 
be dissembled according to the progress of the mine, stage one five years, stage two 
ten years, and so on, but the ability of B'laans to appreciate consequences ten years 
and more hence, was a matter of apparent doubt.
Perhaps the most valuable means of developing understanding of the implications of 
mining are visits to operating mines. Western Mining did organise a visit to the 
Newmont mine on the island of Sulawesi in Indonesia. However, this was a one-off 
event and not part of a co-ordinated educational-awareness program. As interviews 
conducted in Salna’ong in particular revealed, a single visit for a limited number of 
community members was not sufficient to convey the potential impacts of such a 
project. Some community members had not wanted to participate because they were 
afraid that they would not be able to come home. Those that had taken part said that 
they had been exhausted by the journey, and that there had been no time to rest. They
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said that they had seen each other sleeping when employees of the mining company 
spoke to them. All agreed that they had not had any chance to visit the communities of 
local people in Indonesia, and that that they had only been entertained by the company.
This section comprises two parts. The first assesses competency in language. The 
fact that many of the B’laan signatories to Principal Agreements had done so with a 
thumbprint indicated a high degree of illiteracy among Tribal Council members. Indeed, 
only the Danlag Tribal Council knew where their Principal Agreement was - their copy 
was in the house of Luz Aligata, the Council Secretary. After a period of three months, 
none of the other Councils could produce their Agreements, and were not therefore 
able to make any specific reference to it. This situation raised questions as to how 
much of the one-hundred-plus page documents had actually been read. Capacity of 
Council members in terms of language, is therefore assumed to correlate positively with 
understanding of commitments to local mineral-driven development The second part 
aims to assess understanding of the physical realities of mining, contractual obligations, 
and the timescale and subsequent future needs of communities, within each Tribal 
Council. Accounts are gathered and an Index of Understanding assembled for each 
section.
7 .3 .1 . Competency in key languages as an indicator of Understanding.
Considering the social, cultural, and financial divide between the Tampakan B’laans 
and Western Mining, effective communication was essential to their relationship. In the 
course of meeting with Tribal Councils and discussing the prospects presented by 
mining, the issue of language and its importance for gathering information and 
articulating problems, was constantly apparent.
Language as an indicator of understanding is based upon the fact that although 
Western Mining did employ Tribal Liaison Officers from within each of the B’laan 
communities, none of their contractual agreements were conducted in the B’laan 
language. Like relations with the Department of Environment and Natural 
Resources, and all other outside organisations, they were conducted in Visayan 
dialects, Filipino which is the national language, and even English. The National 
Commission for Indigenous Peoples did employ staff conversant in B’laan dialects. 
However, as noted in section 5 .3 ., at the office in General Santos City, that was 
responsible for relations with the three B’laan communities in South Cotabato, that 
is Folu Bato, Tablu and S’banken, there were only four Visayan-B’laan mestizoes
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able to speak B’laan, none of whom were assigned to the communities hosting 
Western Mining. At the Sultan Kudarat office in Isulan, ostensibly responsible for 
the Salna’ong community, there were no staff members able to speak B’laan.
Moreover, translation pertaining to assistance in contractual negotiations 
depended upon relations with outsiders. Visayans such as Luz Aligata, the 
Visayan secretary of the Danlag Tribal Council, and Tommy Sarvilla, the husband 
of Linsay Wales in S’banken, were part of the affected communities and fully 
accepted therein. They lived within those communities, and were barely 
distinguishable from them. However, they were the exception rather than the 
norm. Barring Pedro Baloio, who had a home in Danlag as well as Koronadal City, 
Tribal Liaison Officers employed by Western Mining lived outside of the affected 
communities, and were regarded as biased in favour of the company and generally 
distrusted. ‘Advisors’ such as Berting Pito, from whom Piring Malid sought advice, 
were apparently in pursuit of personal gain. Affected communities therefore had 
few such resources to draw upon for interpretation of contracts.
The ability of members to speak and write in Visayan, Pilipino, and English was 
recorded at meetings with Tribal Council members. It must however be noted that 
which of these languages was most important to the functioning of Tribal Councils 
was difficult to quantify. For example Visayan was necessary for interaction with 
local agencies and businessmen, Pilipino for relations with national organisations 
and visitors from elsewhere in the country, and English for communication with 
foreign representatives of international agencies and expatriate company 
employees. That is to say that gains from each differed, and so the languages 
cannot be regarded as equal in importance. Comparison of the contribution of 
specific language skills was therefore impossible. However, by including all three 
languages in both written and spoken form, a degree of self-corroboration was 
incorporated. Indeed, a dear trend was obvious and there were no cases of any 
Tribal Coundl being successful in terms of one language but not another. The 
numbers of Coundl members competent in each language category were added 
up for each and expressed as a percentage of the possible total. That is the 
number if all Coundl members were competent in all categories which would be 
the ideal situation. The results are presented in the table below.
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Literacy across Tribal Councils.
Bong Mai Danlag Folu Bato Salna’ong S’banken
No. of Council members. 14 17 15 13 10
Can speak Visayan. 10 16 15 9 8
Can read / write Visayan. 3 10 8 0 2
Can speak Pilipino. 0 1 1 0 1
Can read / write Pilipino. 0 0 1 0 0
Can speak English. 1 1 1 0 1
Can read / write English. 0 1 1 0 0
Maximum possible. 84 102 90 78 60
Totals. 14 29 27 9 12
% of Maximum. 16.66 28.43 30 11.53 20
The data shows that Darrfag and Folu Bato had the highest degree of language 
proficiency among the Tribal Councils, while Salna’ong had least. The totals 
reflect a division and a line could easily be drawn, separating Danlag and Folu 
Bato from Bong Mai, S’banken and Saina’ong. However, what is most obvious is 
that no Coundl came anywhere dose to the maximum [that would express ‘parity’ 
with outside agendes] and that the latter three were at 20% or less. Language 
therefore indicates that the scope for communication between partners was 
unlikely to be suffident to fulfil the hypothetical precondition of understanding for 
mineral-driven development. The following section pursues this point in a manner 
spedficto mining.
7.3 .2 . Mining, contracts, and planning.
Group interviews were conducted in order to develop meaningful statements 
regarding the grasp held by Tribal Coundl members of mineral development 
realities. Discussions took place in accordance with the following three themes;
1. Physical aspects of open-cut mining.
Important issues were whether the Tribal Coundls were aware of what open-cut 
mining is, and what infrastructural changes it would involve. Moreover, how it 
would affect the environment and what sodal changes it might incur.
2. The terms of the Principal Agreement.
Discussion was directed at whether Tribal Coundls were aware that the Prindpal 
Agreement would commit them to mining. Secondly, whether they understood the 
purpose of the Foundations established under the terms of the Prindpal 
Agreements. Finally, whether they understood that Western Mining had veto 
power over proposals made by the Tribal Coundls.
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3. The timescale of mineral-driven development
Points for determination of understanding were whether Tribal Councils knew when 
mining might happen, and what respective medium to long term plans they had. Also, if 
they had a co-ordinated plan for utilising future funds in the event of mining.
Responses to these themes were gathered and collated for each community. They 
were then condensed, and are presented in the following sections.
Danlag.
Danlag Tribal Council members understood that mining would mean removal of forest 
and soil by machinery. They did not know exactly where, only that it would take place 
somewhere above them on the upper part of the Quezon mountains. They knew that 
this would mean construction, much of which would gain access to the minesite through 
their area.
Chairwoman Dalina Samling had a clear idea of the commitment to mining contained in 
the Prindpal Agreement What is more, members of the Danlag Tribal Coundl 
appeared to have a good grasp of the purpose of the Danlag Foundation. It was they 
said, the place where they could obtain expertise and funding for their initiatives. 
However, this is not to say that the Danlag Foundation was without upsets. At 
Foundation meetings in October and November of 1999, Dalina Samling and other 
members of the Danlag community dashed with Western Mining over the CARE health 
program.
During 1999 the entire cost of the work of CARE was borne by Western Mining, being 
paid from the WMC Direct account However, it was the intention of Western Mining 
that from January 2000 this would change. From that time, half of the cost would be 
met by each of the five barangays in the area affected by mineral development, with the 
remainder coming from the Development Fund account of each B’laan Foundation. 
Danlag Tribal Coundl resented the use of the Development Fund for this purpose. That 
money they conceived of as their own and objected to its disbursement without Tribal 
Coundl consent Dalina Samling daimed that the Tribal Coundl had not been 
consulted by Western Mining over the budget allocation for the work of CARE 
International and Project Smile. This suggested that rather than a lack of 
understanding, the matter had not been discussed at suffident length. Moreover, the
189
incident also served to remind the Danlag Tribal Council of the veto power vested in the 
Foundation members from Western Mining.
Regarding the timescale of the project, Danlag Tribal Council members understood that 
it would be “years" before mining began, but had no idea of how many. Although they 
had no grasp of geological or engineering practices, they did appreciate that certain 
technical requirements had to be met, and that Western Mining were addressing them 
through “exploration".
In terms of their development, the Danlag Tribal Council had an array of projects 
underway, including a truck which was being used to haul agricultural goods to market, 
the operation of which expressed a relative degree of co-ordination and foresight.
Dalina Samling also had several plans for what should be done with the royalties that 
would flow if and when mining proceeded. These included the establishment of a 
B'laan highschool to provide a continuation of B’laan based education following 
graduation from the new elementary schools.
Thus it might be said that while the hypothetical understanding of the implications of the 
Tampakan Copper Project were by no means complete, the Danlag community were in 
a state of considerable preparedness. The dispute over the budget for Project Smile 
indicated that they were taking a proactive role, and their plans for the future suggested 
constructive, if not integrated, aspirations.
Folu Bato.
Despite being supportive of Western Mining, Folu Bato Tribal Council had only a limited 
idea of what mining involved. They knew that it would involve “digging1 but did not 
appreciate that it would be a copper mine and some members suggested that gold and 
diamonds were the real object of Western Mining’s efforts. They knew that mining 
would not take place in Folu Bato - that is to say the mine itself, but appreciated the 
importance of the road traversing their area.
The Folu Bato Tribal Council did not know that signing the Principal Agreement 
committed them to mining. Tribal Chieftain Celso Dok explained that the Principal 
Agreement; “is a contract between the Western [Mining] and Folu Bato leaders.
Western have already done a lot of things and travel through our area every day. When 
they want to build a mine, then we will talk about agreement to mine" Nevertheless,
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the Folu Bato Tribal Council clearly approved of the proposed mine for the attention and 
money that it would bring. This they said, they needed in order to survive.
However, apparent consensus toward mining at the time of research had resulted from 
a power struggle within the community. Former chairman Willy Gulaya had opposed 
Western Mining because of a dispute over a parcel of land which he claimed to own 
within the area of the proposed minesite. He was voted out of the Council chair in a 
snap election held by the Office of Southern Cultural Communities. This event seemed 
to reflect a degree of outside interference in Council proceedings and therefore 
consensus was not interpreted as deriving from understanding. The new chairman, 
Celso Dok, and other members, were anxious to avail themselves of funds and were 
supportive of mining.
Folu Bato Tribal Coundl members attended Foundation Board meetings, but regarded 
them solely in terms of a source of funds. Their partidpation in the Foundation process 
was by their own admission, oriented by whatever strategy they thought was most likely 
to obtain money. Indeed, the Folu Bato Tribal Coundl described the Foundation as a 
kind of test. If they could propose projects that would pass the scrutiny of Western 
Mining's Board members, they would obtain money. Whether projects proved 
economically viable was a secondary consideration, if a consideration at all. Of the 
proposals they had made to their Foundation Board, several agricultural projects had 
been approved and paid for, but failed because harvests had not been timed in 
accordance with the market, or crops had simply not been planted in the first place.
The apparently persistent sense of dependency that prevailed in Folu Bato could not 
however be attributed simply to dishonesty. Factionalism within the community had 
given rise to mistrust, and obstructed consensus in the decision-making process. 
Moreover, focus on internal ‘political’ objectives rather than relations with outside 
agencies and developmental initiatives had thwarted the process of engagement with 
market institutions, such as banks, Visayan businesses, and the poblacion marketplace. 
Indeed, problems of acquaintance with the workings of the market economy in which the 
Foundation structure demanded the community participate, were hindered by the 
obvious illiteracy and inexperience of Celso Dok, who sat passively through meetings.
The lack of understanding, not only of the realities of mining, but more importantly, of 
the workings of formal institutions, among the Folu Bato Council members, was a direct
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obstacle to developmental initiatives. Moreover, it also worked to drag them backward. 
Once again, experience confirmed the hypothetical importance of understanding of the 
implications of mineral-driven development
Because of the budget and implementation problems, Western Mining Foundation 
Board members had denied further funding to the Folu Bato Tribal Council. Council 
members were therefore aware of the veto power of Western Mining, which was a 
cause of disillusionment. Moreover, the short and medium term plans of the Folu Bato 
Council were dominated by the insistence of Western Mining Board members, that they 
extricate themselves from deficit According to Doming Collado, Tribal Council member 
and colleague of chieftain Celso Dok; “Western [Mining] were helpful to us but now 
they have stopped.. .  How can we have development if we cannot do farming or do any 
business. We need to pay for seed, for urea [fertilizer] and for food and salary. What 
can we say that they [Western Mining] will give helpT As of the time of research, the 
Council were still at the stage of grasping and incorporating economic principals of 
profit and accumulation into their process of proposal design, which limited their future 
plans to the short term. Those tentative proposals that they had, did not express any 
degree of co-ordination. Moreover, Folu Bato Council members did not know when 
mining would happen, and assumed that Western Mining might begin at any time. 
Neither did they have any long term plans in the event of mineral development.
S’banken.
S’banken Tribal Council members were aware that open pit mining would involve some 
environmental change in terms of the loss of forest and soil and that there was a danger 
of water sources being polluted. However, they did not know how this would come 
about
S’banken Tribal Coundl members and leaders showed some understanding of the fact 
that signing the Prindpal Agreement committed them to mining, although only one 
member, Unsay Wales, had a definite understanding of this. Chairman Liwahim 
Magumway expressed no idea of the consequences of signing the Prindpal Agreement.
Moreover, while the S’banken Tribal Coundl had a relatively good grasp of Foundation 
processes, having engaged themselves in various projects, induding the purchase of a 
truck that afforded them a degree of vertical expansion in the local market, they were 
having difficulty developing viable business proposals. As the data for the indicator of
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Spending Capacity in section 6 .2 . shows, the S’banken accounts were running at a 
deficit There remained a sense among the community that the Foundation Boards 
were a source of money and attention was focused on rights rather than 
responsibilities. On the occasion of each Board meeting at the Western Mining office in 
General Santos City, fifty or more community members would cram the S’banken truck 
for the journey. Once in General Santos they would await the outcome of the meeting 
and the monthly Operation and Administration payments, at the house of Tommy 
Sarvilla, the Visayan husband of Linsay Wales. These occasions were distinctly 
millenial in character.
With respect to the hypothetical importance of understanding, this signalled a failure in 
S’banken, to grasp formal processes. However, there was no apparent link between 
such ’millenial’ actions and traditional values. Rather, in light of experience at other 
mines, see for example that related by Filer of Bougainville [Filer 1990 /1992], this 
suggested that something else was taking place. Formal initiatives did not seem to be 
worldng, but rather than relying upon traditional means, the community were looking 
directly to the company for their subsistence. Failure to ’understand' combined with the 
superior means of the company were contributing to dependency.
The obvious conclusion would be that failure to grasp formal processes was because 
those opportunities presented by the Tribal Council - Foundation structure, and the 
supporting resources provided by Western Mining, were too sophisticated for the 
community to manage. However, this would be a shallow reading of the situation and 
perhaps an insult to the community. It seems more likely that cultural differences 
underlay the gap between tradition and modernity. That is to say the culture that 
oriented dominant organisational and economic norms, both of Visayan society and the 
foreign company, were different from those of B’laan society. Thus understanding may 
be connected with the hypothetical importance of traditional structures to such 
developmental delivery systems as Tribal Councils.
The purchase of the truck represented an investment which encouraged the S’banken 
Tribal Council to contemplate the future and make efforts to co-ordinate agricultural 
initiatives not only within the community but with other communities such as those at 
neighbouring Lampitak and Albagan, who availed of its service. Moreover the truck was 
a source of pride and keeping it on the road was an obvious achievement, and an 
indicator of developments which had taken place. In this respect the S’banken Tribal
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Council were developing plans for the short to medium term. However, they did not 
have any idea when mining might begin, saying that it could be next year or in ten 
years, depending upon when Western Mining were ready. Nor did they have any long 
term plans in the event of mineral development.
Bong Mai.
Through meetings with the Bong Mai Tribal Council, it became dear that Council 
members had no idea about what open-cut mining is or involves, that is to say the size 
of the mine or by what means mining might be carried out. Nor were they aware of any 
infrastructural considerations such as facilities for processing ore and accommodation 
for employees, that would accompany a mine. However, during the late 1980s and 
early 1990s, the Bong Mai area had been the scene of fighting between the Armed 
Forces of the Philippines and elements of the New People’s Army and Moro Islamic 
Liberation Front There had also been violence stemming from banditry. These events 
appeared to influence their relationship of the Bong Mai community with mining. 
Although their community was one of the most remote. Bong Mai Council members 
regarded the presence of Western Mining and the developments they hoped it would 
engender, as a source of future stability. According to tribal chieftain, Danuan Gola-e; 
“The most important thing is for a road, and for a school, and a hall for meetings. 
Western Mining will help us to do these things. . .  and these things will help us to stay on 
our land. They will show outsiders that this is our place, and that to interfere will have 
bigger consequences than before.. .  Western have been friendly to us and we agree to 
them.”
No members of the Tribal Council were aware that the Principal Agreement committed 
them to mining. Their decision to sign the Agreement had been based upon the fact 
that a Foundation Board would be a source of increased funds. Participating in a 
Foundation was also regarded as a source of status that would afford the community 
greater recognition from outside agencies and local government The Council felt this 
was important because they regarded their community as marginalised and remote, and 
as having already missed many opportunities. Indeed, they expressed a desire to 
“catch upT.
However, they had very little understanding of how the Tribal Council - Foundation 
system was intended to operate. Foundation Board meetings were regarded as a 
primarily prestigious event at which the relationship between themselves and Western
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Mining would be periodically ‘celebrated’. Proposals by the Bong Mai Tribal Council 
were dominated by essential services and improvements and none involved the 
deployment of new skills on the part of community members. This situation was 
however, undoubtedly symptomatic of the relative youth of the Bong Mai Foundation. 
Indeed, none of the Bong Mai Coundl members knew that Western Mining partidpants 
could reject any initiative that they might propose.
In terms of the future, the Bong Mai Tribal Council were not aware of the timescale 
implied by large scale open-cut mining. They did however, have three medium term 
demands. First, for the construction of a school. Second, for the extension of the road 
to Bong S’bang in order to link settlements such as Datal Alyong and Tokay Mai with 
Tampakan munidpality. Third, for the construction of a meeting hall.
Salna’ong.
Salna’ong Tribal Coundl members expressed divergent opinions as to what mining 
would involve. Several had partidpated in the trip to Indonesia, where they had 
witnessed the Newmont mine. It might have been supposed that they would therefore 
have a dear idea of what would happen within their own lands. However, this was not 
the case. Physical aspects of the Newmont site could not be dearly recounted by 
partidpants. This seemed to have been brought about by various factors. The time 
lapse between the trip and the period of research had apparently eroded perceptions. 
The extreme locality of Coundl members, as evidenced by the small number of 
community members to have travelled outside the area - see section 7 .1 ., may have 
restricted their ability to relate processes observed elsewhere to their own land. The 
novelty of the trip to Indonesia, which was described as an ‘evenf, the flight, 
accommodation, and food being most readily recollected, and the fact that the trip had 
all taken place within the span of one week, might have blurred the purpose of the 
journey.
Indeed discussions of the physical processes of mining had a distinctly ‘mythical’ 
character. It was undear whether the Salna’ong community actually believed that the 
nearby Bolul Mot - or Mossy Mountain - could be excavated by human effort. Large 
scale open-cut mining was therefore a myth in reverse - something that might or might 
not happen in the distant future, rather than the past, depending on whether or not you 
believed the ‘tales’ you heard. On one occasion in 1996, this researcher rested for a 
week in Datal Biao, a part of Salna’ong which lies at the foot of Bulol Mot. When he
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pointed to the mountain and suggested that mining would remove it entirely, B’laans 
laughed. They regarded it as a joke, and as impossible. This was not an uncommon 
response. When faced with the same point, other B’laans later reacted as though they 
had heard a ghost story. Some believed it, some did not. It was an upsetting prospect 
and no-one could explain it.
Moreover, discussion of the trip to Indonesia raised another point which had 
repercussions for the hypothetical precondition of understanding. In accordance with 
the process of incorporation into the ‘geobody’ of the nation identified by Winichakul, 
whether ail B’laans in Salna’ong were even aware of themselves as Filipinos, was 
unclear. While they recognised symbols such as the ubiquitous national flag, 
prominently displayed at all public buildings, there was nothing to indicate that they 
regarded it as theirs. Moreover, the fact that Indonesia was outside of the Philippines, 
while Luzon and Manila were part of it  seemed to be of no relevance to them. Such 
observations suggested that lack of understanding of formal structures ran very deep.
The Salna’ong Tribal Coundl did not recognise the fact that the Prindpal Agreement 
would commit them to mining. This point was underlined by the fact that not one 
member of the Salna’ong Tribal Coundl could read. Indeed, the fact that they had not 
signed the Prindpal Agreement did not reflect strength or independent analysis of the 
facts. Rather, it had its origins in differences within the Tribal Coundl, which was split 
into two constituent groups, each led by a prominent son of the elderly chairman, 
Malayon Malid. Without internal means of understanding and consensus building, each 
relied upon organisations outside the community. The Piring Malid faction was 
ostensibly pro-mining, but in pursuit of as much money as might be extracted therefrom 
in order to enhance personal power. The Juanito Malid faction was opposed to mining 
on the grounds that it would exploit B’laans. They drew support from the Diocese of 
Marbel and the Legal Rights and Resources Center, who were opposed to Western 
Mining. Thus neither side was willing to consent. Their rivalry reflected a lack of 
robustness and distinct vulnerability. The Salna’ong Coundl was too weak to develop 
understanding through an independent process of dedsion-making and the reverse was 
underway. That is to say that in the absence of understanding and analysis, pressures 
for and against mining fuelled by finanda! aspirations, misinformation and mutual 
suspidon, had contributed to an anarchic collapse of consensus.
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Salna’ong Council members had no idea as to when mining might proceed and 
supposed that it would occur when Western Mining had control over the area. Indeed, 
they held this view as to the source of money from Western Mining, assuming that the 
company would give them money when they had control. One B’laan Tribal Councillor 
in Salna’ong stated that; “We do not know exactly what Western Mining wants from us . . 
. .W e  do not know what to ask in return. Therefore, we do not know whether it is right 
for us to say yes or to say no to them." As the conversation went on, the B’laan 
perspective became more pessimistic. "In the end they wilt do what they want."
Moreover, when pressed as to what ‘control’ meant, this term was found to have 
connotations of security. Because of their remoteness, the suspected presence of 
rebels, animosity between Visayans and B’laans, and perhaps other reasons too, there 
had been a comparatively high level of militarisation in the area.. The Philipine Armed 
Forces, and indeed civilian militia, were seen by some B’laans in Salna’ong, as a 
means by which outsiders exerted control over B’laans. Consequently, a section of the 
Salna’ong community felt that they would be harrassed by the military until they signed 
agreements.
Community members in Salna’ong expressed a persistent perception of themselves as 
incidental to the plans of Western Mining. That is to say, rather than as an integral and 
contributive part of the mineral-driven development framework represented by the Tribal 
Councils.
The Salna'ong Tribal Coundl had no plans for the future. At the time of research, 
Western Mining were resigned to their ongoing dispute, and had exduded them from 
the community development process, apparently preferring to work around them rather 
than with them. As Salna’ong comprised much of the actual mining area, how this 
relationship will develop in future is a matter of concern.
These events provided for some comparative analysis of understanding as a 
hypothetical requisite for mineral-driven development. They suggested that Salna’ong 
on one hand, and Bong Mai, Danlag, Folu Bato, and S’banken on the other, were on 
opposite sides of a threshold of understanding. While the latter communities had 
difficulties in terms of the formal economic and organisational principals necessary to 
partake in mineral-driven development, they had enough to participate. Salna’ong on 
the other hand had insufficient grasp of such institutions. In their case, the gap
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between the traditional structures of B’laan society and the formal requirements of the 
Tribal Council - Foundation structure, was apparently too great
However, it must also be noted that timing may have contributed to this outcome. 
Malayon Malid, chieftain of the Salna’ong Tribal Council was an elderly man, and the 
community was split between adherents of his sons. Moreover, the experience of Bong 
Mai and Fulo Bato suggested that they were living on borrowed time. Bong Mai were 
enjoying a ‘honeymoon’ period of goodwill with the company, but had not demonstrated 
grasp of developmental principals in terms of practical initiatives. Folu Bato had 
‘stalled’ and a lack of understanding seemed to have been holding them back.
Having collected a large number of statements, it was important to convert them into a 
uniform format in order to demonstrate the extent of understanding. By breaking the 
received information down into three categories and identifying particular points, it was 
possible to obtain ‘Yes’, ‘No’ and ‘Maybe’ type answers from responses. These were 
then attributed scores of two points for a Yes, one point for a Some, and none for a No. 
Such an approach enabled the basic clarification of an otherwise qualitative and 
subjective area of Tribal Council capacity.
Understanding of circumstances facing host communities.
Bong Mai Danlag Folu Bato Salna’ong S’banken
Physical aspects of mining.
What is Open-cut Mining? No Yes Some Some Some
Terms of Agreement.
Commitment to mining. No Yes No No Yes
Foundation Processes. Some Some Some No Some
Western Mining veto power. No Yes Yes No Yes
Timescale of development.
When will mining take place? No Some No No No
Short-term plans. Yes Yes Some No Yes
Long-term plans. No Some No No No
Totals 3 11 5 1 8
The data shows that all Tribal Councils, barring Salna’ong, had developed some 
understanding of Foundation procedures. However, responses to such issues as the 
physical consequences of mining, what is meant by the Principal Agreements, and what 
future plans Tribal Councils had in the event of mining, were broadly negative. That is 
to say that no Tribal Council could answer these questions with a comprehensive and 
unequivocal Yes. Even where the answers seem convincingly positive, they did not
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extend to all members of the Council concerned, There were dear indications that 
traditional and local values pervaded procedures to negative effect, that Countil 
members were ill-prepared for economic endeavours, and that some members had 
become disillusioned by the local development project presented to them by Western 
Mining.
The hypothetical requirement for understanding of the implications of mining cannot 
therefore be said to have been satisfied. Indeed, the lack of understanding observed 
seemed likely to have repercussions for the process of mineral-driven development in 
the manner noted at minesites elsewhere [Clark 1992, Filer 1990 /1992, Thompson 
1990]. That is for misunderstanding to fuel disputes within communities, and with 
companies.
What is more, this has a bearing upon equity between the company and community. 
That is to say that without a sound understanding of mining and the workings of formal 
institutions, communities are less likely to be able to proceed as equal partners with the 
developmental apparatus - both in contractual negotiations, and Foundation meetings.
7.4. The relationship between Foundation Boards and the Tribal Council model, 
and procedural equity.
This section examines the Tribal Council -  Foundation relationship in order to assess 
the level of equity held by the host community within the developmental framework.
This is in accordance with the hypothetical point that procedural equity, or at least a 
sense thereof, is a requisite of successful local mineral-driven development
In terms of the regional-local division of findings expressed by Chapters Five and 
Seven respectively, procedural equity is something of a ‘black sheep1. Like regional 
factors, it applies to all Tribal Councils in an even manner. However, being an aspect 
of the Tampakan Copper Project itself, it must be treated as a local factor.
On arrival among the host communities in 1999, it was dear that changes had taken 
place since the signing of Printipal Agreements. The Foundations had effectively 
replaced the Tribal Coundls, leaving them largely redundant in the dedsion-making 
process. Foundations dedded upon the proposals made by Tribal Coundls. They also 
fadlitated the concerns of the company and state institutions, providing the resources 
with which their dedsions could be Implemented.
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The authority invested in the Foundation Boards indicated that they offered an 
appropriate point from which to evaluate the Tampakan Copper Project in terms of 
procedural equity. The position of B’laans within that structure, by comparison with that 
of the company and government agencies, offers an indication of procedural equity as it 
is hypothesised to be essential to the long term success of local mineral-driven 
development.
Three aspects of the Foundation Boards were of concern. First, Board members 
representing communities were outnumbered by company and government members 
two to one, there being three from Western Mining, two from the National Commission 
for Indigenous Peoples and one from the Mines and Geosciences Bureau, compared 
with three B’laans. Thus the company and government had a stronger hand in the ‘one 
man one vote' system for deciding what was important and what was not.
Second, the majority of Foundation meetings were held either at the Family Country 
Homes and Hotel, or the offices of Western Mining themselves, both in General Santos 
City. Thus many important decisions were made outside of the traditional territory of 
each community and under conditions determined by the company. Tribal Council 
members from Bong Mai and S’banken explained that this put them under pressure, 
placed a sense of obligation upon them, and weakened their ‘bargaining' position. Fani 
Ginga from Bong Mai stated that; “ When you are at Western [office] you can see how 
clever the Western people are. They are so serious to see and so we think that they 
must be right. It is difficult to have a disagreement with them." Filo Gaping at S’banken 
said; “When you see a problem in the mountain and when you see the same problem in 
the city, they seem to be very different. .  You forget what it was you came to say to the 
company.’  Both men lamented their own 'foolishness', and those other B’laans who 
were present laughed at them sympathetically. Embarassment in the presence of 
outsiders seemed to be a familiar sentiment among B’laans.
Third, Western Mining Foundation Board members held veto power over all spending 
decisions. Although the number of Western Mining members would be reduced to one, 
and the veto dropped at such time as B’laans demonstrated that they could successfully 
manage the Foundations themselves, no mechanism or circumstances, nor target date 
for this were ever stipulated. Western Mining Board members acknowledged their 
dominance of the Foundation Boards during interviews, which they justified by arguing
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that communities were unprepared for technical responsibilities. Geoff Allen, an 
accountant at the Western Mining office in General Santos City stated that to give 
B'laans any authority over spending decisions would be problematic, because money 
would be disbursed without heed to the consequences. Furthermore, that these 
consequences could potentially include the purchase, through direct or indirect means, 
of firearms, which would be unnaceptable to the company. Moreover, that profligacy 
would likely fuel a syndrome of dependency among B'laans, which would draw 
increased criticism of the company both locally and in Australia. Nevertheless, no 
parameters that would provide for the establishment of a more equitable framework 
were set forth in the Principal Agreement, being entirely at the discretion of the 
company and government
This contradicted earlier statements. For example;
'The thrust of both the Principal Agreements and Foundathns is ‘ownership
and control1 by the people."
[Western Mining Corporation 1997:40]
The dominance of Foundations by Western Mining, and their veto power meant that 
they would provide an effective cap for any B'laan aspirations that did not conform with 
those of the company. That is to say that B’laans had limited means to oppose the 
strategy chosen by the company, within the terms of the development structure. To do 
so would mean breaking the rules and straying outside of agreements, which would 
threaten continued compensation, royalties and other benefits, as well as invite 
reprisals from the state, should the company-state revenue stream be threatened. 
Indeed rule-breaking behaviour would absolve the company of legal responsibility for 
future dilemmas.
Examination of the Foundation structure revealed no guarantee of procedural equity 
and considerable scope for dominance by the company. While it would not have been 
pragmatic [or indeed equitable to Western Mining], to give full authority over spending 
decisions to the Tribal Councils, and Councils had admittedly already made errors in 
their decision-making, B’laan Foundation members could only be effective where they 
could obtain the consent of company members. This arrangement might be regarded 
as constructive in a paternalistic sense. However, there was a distinct aspect of 
‘capture’ by the company, of each community, from the moment at which they signed
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the Principal Agreement, that bound them to mining and participation in Foundation 
Boards.
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Chapter Eight.
Conclusion.
The findings of this thesis, presented in Chapters Five, Six, and Seven, provide scope 
for a number of debates relating to the hypothetical points made at the outset of this 
thesis. The first theme to be presented here is one of interactions between companies 
and communities in their pursuit of development. The company was found to be 
blinkered in its approach to the host communities, by Westem-centrism. This position 
was rooted in a corporate-industrial culture that was not displaced by rigorous analysis 
of local ways of doing things. It is also the case that the degree to which the company 
was willing to adopt local strategies was partly dependent upon politico-historical 
processes and the subsequent unwillingness of the state to countenance political 
diversity. This latter issue is addressed in section 8. 3.
The first issue to be addressed is problems with the index for measurement of Tribal 
Council performance. While it was valid to test the use of this approach in this thesis, 
the results nonetheless point to problems with the use of this index, notably, that its lack 
of connection to any normative referent renders it a tool of limited utility. An effort is 
also made to link community differences as revealed in Chapter Six to the discussion of 
empirical findings in Chapter Seven -  such as differences in community understanding 
of the process and implications of mining development in the vicinity.
The second section presents a debate which focuses upon the relationship between 
peace and development, and the consequences for mineral-driven developers. The 
popular question of whether development leads to peace or peace leads to 
development posits two obvious strategies for dealing with violence. Examination of the 
various causes of violence in Tampakan found differing degrees of political causation 
associated with ail of them. It is therefore concluded that companies must at least 
assess the potential for violence as part of their planning process.
Another debate is over the apparent gap between the interests of states and 
companies, and consequences this has for host communities. Coverage of local-level 
mineral disputes in media gives a general impression that host communities are 
aggrieved by mining interests, while companies and governments work hand in hand in 
the implementation of mining projects. This thesis found that while the ultimate 
objectives of companies and states may be similar, their resources and respective
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political constraints are very different, and hence their ways of doing things are also 
different. These differences are unaccounted for by the World Bank and are concluded 
to pose significant obstacles to mineral-driven development.
A second theme comprises anthropology and its potential contribution to local 
development Understanding is an obvious prerequisite for agreement yet examination 
of mining projects indicated that understanding among host communities of mining 
contracts, is generally weak. Many tribal people cannot for example, read or write, and 
many contracts, including the Principal Agreement in Tampakan are signed with a 
thumbprint Lack of understanding was therefore considered to be an obstacle to 
mineral-driven development. In order to address this, anthropological studies of host 
cultures, and how modem institutions such as mining companies might best engage 
traditional communities, have been sought However, the experience of Tampakan 
indicates that such analyses are inappropriate to the task in hand.
A third debate stemmed from the contrast between group and individual actions. The 
research undertaken among host communities indicated that due to wider soda! 
influences, the five host communities were undergoing immense changes. Many of 
these changes were manifested by the emergence of the individual as the primary 
economic unit and the disintegration of traditional community based modes of sodal 
organisation. This trend had implications for development strategy. Whether 
developmental institutions such as companies and government units should adopt 
individuals or communities as the basis for developmental initiatives, is a question that 
needs to be addressed. For example, if the law makes only limited provision for 
communal rights, or communal title to land cannot be obtained, or banks insist on 
lending only to named individuals, community-based development strategies may need 
to be abandoned. This point strikes at the heart of policy-making for many funding 
agencies, as development and modernity imply divergence from traditional cultures.
This conclusion is structured around each of these themes and debates. In successive 
sections, issues are drawn from this specific study of processes in Tampakan, and 
examined for the ways in which they inform generic study of mineral-driven 
development. Recommendations for better practices are made, and areas for further 
study identified.
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8.1. Problems of the Putnam Index.
As explained in section 1. 3., the community affected by the proposed mine was split 
between five banwus, ostensibly traditional territories, the inhabitants of which 
comprised distinct communities, which were represented to the state and mining 
company by five Tribal Councils. This offered an opportunity to deepen study of local 
factors hypothesised to influence mineral-driven development, they being 
Understanding of Mining, Traditional Structures, and Procedural Equity. That is 
because any pattern of performance between each of the five Tribal Councils presented 
a potential correlation with the local factors. If any such correlation could be identified, 
then greater light might be shed on the process of local mineral-driven development. It 
was for this reason that this research set out to conduct a comparative measurement of 
Tribal Council performance.
However, the results presented in Chapter Six point to problems with the use of the 
Index of Tribal Council Performance, particularly associated with the lack of any 
normative referent To begin with, the methodology for measurement of performance 
could not be based upon any standards or goals set by the company-resourced 
Community Development Program. That is because as noted in section 4 .2 ., adopting 
such standards would mean measuring performance of Tribal Coundls in contributing to 
successful mining, rather than the successful development of host communities. These 
two goals could not be assumed to mean the same thing, on account of the history of 
negative development experiences at mine-sites across Southeast Asia. Moreover, 
Western Mining Corporation had not set any spedfic development targets, nor made 
any quantifiable promises with respect to the progress of the host communities, that 
might have been adopted had this research intended to do so.
Furthermore, it was difficult to connect the progress of B’laan communities with 
internationally recognised or indeed external parameters for development, because so 
little of B’laan lifeways is known. Indeed, the methodology used assumes that 
democratic values are a positive phenomona, and judges the Tribal Coundls according 
to how many democratic attributes they display -  see for example, indicators 1 and 2 in 
section 6.1. Reflecting on the research conducted in Mindanao, not only does the 
comparative methodology lack a normative referent, but it has gone as far as to create 
its own, which is likely to not only be misleading, but to feed stereotypical impressions 
of what is development.
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This last point is enforced by the fact that remoter communities fared less well in the 
Index of Performance. Because remoter communities were by default more traditional, 
the Index therefore gives the impression that traditional attributes were negative or even 
detrimental to development. This was not necessarily the case, because as was shown 
of Bong Mai in section 7 .2 .1 . ,  traditional values were able to support inexperienced 
Tribal Coundls in the absence of modem leadership skills. This indicates that the 
‘Putnam’ Indicators of Performance missed important traditional qualities of Tribal 
Coundls and B’laan life. This is not the intention of this research. It also points to the 
fact that the comparison is not thorough, and highlights the lack of an appropriate 
referent.
In defence of the Index of Tribal Coundl Performance, it can be said that a number of 
the intended indicators were not feasible, either because the data required was not 
available as was the case for Information Outsourcing,, or because antidpated activities 
were not taking place and thus the data was not there to collect - see for example 
Frequency of Sections, both of which problems are detailed in section 4 .5 .  The 
number of indicators was therefore reduced which inevitably affected the depth and 
scope of the comparison. This could not be foreseen prior to arrival in the field. While 
a common-pool resource approach had to be abandoned due to the failure to identify a 
common-pool aspect to the copper resource and subsequent institutional initiatives in 
Tampakan, other approaches might have been found. Nevertheless, had more data 
been available, or had the Tribal Coundls completed more of the planned activities 
prior to research, then the comparative index might have been stronger and more 
informative.
In light of these drawbacks, the Index of Tribal Coundl Performance might best be 
regarded as a descriptive tool, and a means of organising complex reality. While it 
leads the reader towards assumptions about what is good for Tribal Coundl 
performance, such as democracy, female partidpation, familiarity with modem 
institutions and conversely by implication, that traditional virtues are a negative 
influence on performance, the comparative exercise helps to darify the Tribal Coundl 
system and explain what each Coundl is doing. However, the Index of Performance is 
only selectively useful when it comes to explaining findings pertaining to local obstades 
to mineral development, which are presented in Chapter Seven.
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8.1 .1 . Community differences and empirical findings.
The community differences revealed in Chapter Six are summarised by the Comparative 
Index of Tribal Council Performance presented in section 6 .2 . Data for the proximity of 
each community to urban centres, primarily the pobladon in Tampakan, show that 
Tribal Council performances correlate closely with familiarity on the part of community 
members, with urban environments. This finding suggests that where communities are 
familiar with modem institutions, they are more likely to succeed in operating the Tribal 
Council -  Foundation system.
Indeed, section 7.2., which presents findings relating to the relationship between 
tradition or antecedent forms of social organisation and the Tribal Council model, 
indicates that where traditional norms hold sway, then Tribal Council performances are 
weaker. This would appear to indicate that not only is familiarity with modernity ‘good’ 
for Tribal Councils, but that tradition is bad for Tribal Councils. However, detailed 
examination of social organisation within the two most remote communities, that is Bong 
Mai and Salna’ong, presented in section 7 .2 .1 .,  reveals that this is not necessarily the 
case, and that traditional leadership can support an exogenous institution such as a 
Tribal Coundl, even if coundllors are unable to make significant progress in formal 
terms. Hence a successful Tribal Coundl in a remote region depends upon traditional 
strengths as well as a grasp of modernity.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, grasp of the implications of mining in each of the five 
communities presented in section 7.3., correlates dosely with the Comparative Index of 
Performance. Communities that are least competent in terms of languages and have 
the weakest grasp of the implications of mining performed most poorly in terms of Tribal 
Coundls. This is somewhat understandable, considering that in representing 
themselves to the company and to local government and other agenaes, they 
depended to a considerable extent upon their ability to speak languages other than their 
own, as no non-B’laan encountered in the course of this research is able to speak the 
B'laan language. Furthermore, if communities had a poor grasp of the implications of a 
large scale mining project, then it would seem likely that their ability to negotiate Tribal 
Coundl -  Foundation affairs with their partners from the company and government 
agendes is also likely to be limited.
Regarding Procedural Equity, each of the five communities hosting the proposed mine 
was bound by the same terms of engagement with the company in terms of the
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procedures of the Tribal Council -  Foundation system. It is therefore difficult to 
select specific differences-between one community and another that might be 
analysed in terms of their position within the Comparative Index of Performance. 
One point of note was that as of the time of research, Salna'ong had not signed a 
Principal Agreement and was not therefore participating in a Foundation Board. 
Examination of the reasons for this, presented in section 7 .2 .1 .,  indicates that 
this was due to negative reasons, primarily a dispute between members of the 
predominant Malid 'dan', and Salna’ong was subsequently accorded fifth place 
in terms of the Expediency indicator. Overall however, as presented in section 7. 
4., there were some serious concerns relating to the Foundation system in 
particular, where it seemed that the company held considerable veto power over 
the actions of the Tribal Coundls, and it was not possible to distinguish further.
In light of the consistendes between the Comparative Index of Tribal Coundl 
Performance and the three local obstades hypothesised to obstruct mineral- 
driven development presented in Chapter Seven, the Comparative Index can be 
said to have generally confirmed the relevance of those obstades. However, it 
must be acknowledged that the Index of Performance is not connected to any 
normative referent and is therefore a tool of limited utility. This was apparent in 
terms of the positive aspects of traditional leadership noted above and detailed 
in section 7 .2 .1 . ,  which escaped the Indicators of Performance. That is to say 
that the value of traditional leadership for the success of the Tribal Coundl 
model only came to light as a result of ‘phonemic’ interviewing techniques, which 
identified ways in which the communities in question viewed themselves. Hence 
it can be said that an exogenous set of indicators such as are represented by the 
Index of Comparative Performance are only as good as the questions they ask, 
and are likely to miss endogenous perspectives of how local institutions work, or 
indeed, the reasons why they fail. This may in turn be to repeat mistakes made 
by the Office for Southern Cultural Communities and successive National 
Commission for Indigenous Peoples, and indeed Western Mining Corporation in 
implementing the Tribal Coundl -  Foundation system in the first place. On 
reflection, such a set of indicators, based as they were upon measurement of 
local government performance in Italy, would not be used if this research were to 
be repeated-
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8.2. The contribution of host communities to the mineral-driven development 
process.
In Chapter Two It was hypothesised that host communities have an important role to 
play in local mineral-driven development. This role is in terms of traditional social 
systems and the part these systems might play within development structures. This 
section considers the evidence relating to the role of traditional systems and argues 
that if they were to be acted upon to a greater extent, the potential of communities to 
contribute to their development and the overall success of mining projects would be 
enhanced. Furthermore, it was also the case that World Bank recommendation No. 2. 
states; "acknowledging the legitimacy of all stakeholder perspectives is very important” 
[Aidan and Davy 1998: XI]. In light of the institutional literature reviewed in Chapter 
Two, it seemed fair to question whether'acknowledgement of stakeholder perspectives 
would have been sufficient to make a difference to problems experienced by 
communities at minesites. That is because ‘acknowledgement* does not insist that local 
institutions should be constructed according to local values.
In assessing the context in which the Tampakan Copper Project was situated, Western 
Mining's grasp of B’laan lifeways was found to be weak. The reflections of Stephen 
Davis, on the parallels between mining protocol and traditionally accepted social 
structures, noted in the closing paragraph of section 3. 3., was clumsy. Principal 
Agreements have long been standard practice in the mining industry, and Davis’ article 
contributed to a body of information indicating that companies sought local customs to 
suit their preferred strategy, rather than a strategy to support local customs.
Moreover, the findings relating to the interaction between traditional and modem 
concepts within the host communities presented in section 7.2., indicate Stephen 
Davis’ claim that attitudes within communities were changing to more democratic 
processes, told only one side of the story. While democratic processes had indeed 
been imposed, they had been interpreted by host communities according to traditional 
perceptions. The company’s definition of democracy - that is formal or western style 
representation, based upon principles such as an independent electorate and private 
ballot, were being berrt by local people to fit local customs. Thus a two way process 
was underway, with changes being promulgated by both the traditional community as 
well as the modem company. Just as the company were changing local ‘attitudes’, so 
local people were changing the model for democratic decision-making that the company 
sought to implement.
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Subsequent comparison between Tribal Council performances and the strength of 
traditional characteristics in each community, presented in Chapter 7, indicated a 
relationship. In remoter regions, where familiarity with modem institutions was weaker 
and traditional systems continued, Councils were clearly less successful. That was 
because the host communities responded to the Council model in two inter-related 
ways. First was in terms of modernity - participation in Councils demanded that 
members exercise formal skills. Second was in terms of tradition - that is dependent 
upon the strength of traditional forms of organisation, leadership and social control 
among B'laans. Modernity and tradition varied from one Council to another, tending to 
have an inverse relationship with each other. Although complex, modernity, tradition 
and the relationship between them had distinct implications for local mineral-driven 
development because of the influence they exerted over development delivery systems 
such as Tribal Councils.
Despite the criticisms of the mining project outlined in section 3. 3., the company did 
make some accommodation for differences between each community in terms of their 
capacity to meet development targets. For instance, as illustrated by the Expediency 
Indicator in section 6.1., there were no fixed deadlines for communities to complete 
agreements. Nevertheless, the failure of Salna’ong to participate in, and their rejection 
from the community development project, detailed in section 7 .2 .1 .,  indicates that such 
concessions were not enough and that in some areas at least, the Tribal Council model 
was at fault This raises the first of two lessons for scholars of local mineral-driven 
development regarding the role of antecedent traditions in the performance of new 
institutions. That is modem institutions, may undermine traditional structures. This was 
crucial in Salna’ong and showed signs of affecting Folu Bato also. Modem institutions 
should therefore be regarded as a double-edged sword because they present obstacles 
while simultaneously reducing capacity to overcome them. This research found that in 
Salna’ong the Tribal Council model had displaced traditional leadership before modem 
skills had been acquired, by which time Council members could have effected a new 
system. The transaction costs were therefore too high and a collapse ensued. Thus 
there is indicated to be a positive relationship between incorporation of antecedent 
factors and the success of developmental institutions.
The second way in which the host communities responded to the Tribal Council model 
was as follows. Taken in conjunction with the comparative performances of Tribal
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Councils, examination of the Councils’ progress, presented in section 7.2 .2 ., suggests 
that while the imposition of an illegitimate model can discourage participation and 
contribute to a dependency culture, legitimacy may conversely sustain a materially 
unproductive model, preserving it until such time as 'modem' skills may be achieved. 
Thus it is also concluded that traditional structures have potential value in the 
development of modem structures. They may guide communities through the initial 
vacuum of modernity , when communities do not know how to participate in formal 
institutions, compensating for the lack of familiarity with the formal.
Closely related to this, in terms of procedural equity, it is noteworthy that there was little 
evidence to displace the point made in section 2.6., that the 'feeling’ of procedural 
equity may be as effective in supporting developmental relationships as equity itself. 
That is to say that the Tribal Council - Foundation system gave minimal impression of 
procedural equity. Host communities are unlikely to have rights of ownership of the 
mineral reserves beneath them, so equity in the fundamental sense is impossible. 
Therefore frameworks that both assure communities of a real role despite their 
weakness in formal terms, and which adhere to the economic discipline necessary for 
development - particularly business initiatives, are important.
The company did attempt such a strategy in the sense that they paid salaries to Tribal 
Council members. The individuals concerned were free to spend these monies at their 
own discretion and over time it was intended to give local people greater confidence in 
handling funds, as well as an incentive to better management through saving and 
investment Eventually, new sources of income from agricultural, commercial, transport, 
or other initiatives, would replace the salaries as the host communities acquired 
economic sustainability and independence. However, the Tribal Council salaries 
represented a large portion of the community development budget and the research 
found that tribal leaders presented with cash payments were often profligate and 
frivolous spenders. Those receiving salaries would seek to impress rivals with shows of 
consumption such as expensive sport shoes and wristwatches, rather than less exciting 
investments in the agricultural economy. Thus the salaries and other cash payments 
that were incorporated into the Community Development Program might be regarded as 
a waste. Nevertheless, if at some stage the salaries were displaced by new sources of 
income and community leaders weaned off their honorary pay-checks, the strategy 
could still be justified. However, there were potentially very serious risks involved. 
Anecdotal evidence from 1996 indicated that initial payments during the early days of
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the Tampakan Copper Project had led to the purchase of firearms and drinking binges 
by B’laan men. This highlights the perils of financial reward as a means of initiating 
local development Indeed, no evidence was found in the course of this research to 
indicate that cash is an appropriate tool for local mineral-driven development.
While the company and state were aware of the need to support the host communities 
in terms of training and preparation, they did not give sufficient credence to the 
importance of traditional structures for the success of ‘modem’ systems. The Tribal 
Council model operated at one level while in fact two existed. That is to say that the 
Council / Foundation system was modern in character, and only engaged with the 
traditional to the extent that traditional society could participate. Where traditional 
systems were not compatible, they were redundant and rendered marginal.
Opportunities to incorporate traditional norms into structures such as Tribal Councils 
were clearly missed. There were two sets of reasons for this, the first being associated 
with the role of the company. On assessing the gap that existed between company and 
community, it would be reasonable for the company to introduce anthropologists to 
examine local norms in order to base local development thereupon: To be fair, the 
company did engage a number of anthropologists who produced a lengthy report that 
was replicated in each of the Tribal Council Principal Agreements. However, 
examination of this work revealed that it was largely descriptive, listing prominent 
landmarks, describing the use of traditional tools, and translating the names of 
important plants, animals, and so on. This anthropological research said little about 
social organisation and nothing relating to how B’laan social structures did or might best 
interact with modem institutions. The anthropologists hired by the company operated 
as consultants to the community development program but did not participate in its 
management, which was dominated by men who had risen through the ranks of 
Western Mining and other mining companies. Moreover, findings of existing studies 
such as Lalo [1997], Lutero [1986], and Ogoy [1985], which presented considerable 
methodological rigour, were apparently ignored. The overall effect was of anthropology 
as a public relations exercise, focused externally, where it impressed government 
agencies, international observers, global media, and other potential critics.
While there was clearly a need for anthropological input, it is concluded that this 
requires better management and must be of a distinct character. To begin with, while it 
may be important to inform outside observers about the lifeways of local people,
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anthropological studies among communities hosting mines must also be focused locally 
in response to local needs, rather than just externally. Secondly, it is dear that 
anthropology undertaken in relation to mining projects should be used as a tool and 
have a defined purpose if it is to serve development needs. Anthropology must also be 
more analytical if it is to fulfil its potential in local mineral-driven development Greater 
analysis would provide greater scope for evaluation of the possible effects, problems, 
and benefits of various developmental strategies that may be available. This would 
broaden the options open to development for the design of local institutions responsible 
for initiating economic development. More anthropological analysis might also provide 
opportunities to create new strategies and institutions where alternatives do not exist.
Moreover, regarding contacts between host communities and the company, expatriate 
and indeed Filipino managers as well as the anthropologists engaged by the company, 
spent minimal time in the presence of B’laans. Filipino managers lived in the suburbs of 
General Santos and other cities. Expatriates lived in the Sydney Hotel in downtown 
General Santos City, and when it opened in 1998, the even more exclusive East Asia 
Hotel complex. Those more permanently based in the area lived within the gated 
community at Kalsangi in the municipality of Polomolok. If such places were physically 
distant from the affected area, they were vastly more so in social terms. This did not 
place company managers in an advantageous position when it came to appreciating 
antecedent structures. It is therefore considered essential that there be stronger 
connections between mining project managers and host communities. Goodwill alone 
does not appear to be sufficient to ensure that local development inputs from company 
to community will succeed.
The second set of reasons for why opportunities for local mineral-driven developers 
failed to incorporate traditional structures into the development strategy was associated 
with the state. That is to say national and historical events beyond the reach of either 
communities or companies also influenced the choices taken by local development 
planners. Because they were located outside of the area affected by the proposed 
mining project and closer to the remit of the state, they will not be addressed here, but 
further on in section 8. 3.
This conclusion also draws on findings pertinent to procedural equity and power on the 
part of host communities. Deconstruction of the Tribal Council - Foundation system 
presented in section 7.4., demonstrated that the host communities played a marginal
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role in decision-making processes. However, it was difficult to evaluate the potential 
impact of this position over the medium to long term, because local development was 
still in its infancy and actual mining had not begun. If for example, developmental 
initiatives were to prove sustainable in the hands of community members, attention 
might well be deflected from issues of procedural equity. Nevertheless, some elements 
within Tribal Councils had already clashed with the company over the allocation of 
development funds, and the signs were not promising. This analysis of institutional 
arrangements for community development is therefore insufficient and further research 
appears to be necessary.
In light of the lack of familiarity with modem institutions, and the shortage of formal 
skills, there was also the possibility that having five Tribal Councils spread local talent, 
particularly in remoter areas, too thinly. This could have a number of outcomes in terms 
of inter-relationships between traditional and formal capacities. Perhaps most 
obviously, it could undermine remoter Councils such as Salna’ong and Bong Mai, and 
offer greater opportunity for traditional perspectives to dominate. Indeed, comparison of 
Tribal Council performances in Chapter Six demonstrated that these Councils were 
weaker. From the company-community viewpoint, three or four Councils might ■ 
therefore have been more practical. Success would depend however, upon the ability 
of community development planners, on the optimum size of catchment area, and the 
human resources available therein. That is assuming that the resources necessary to 
make such a system work, are established. Moreover, this would likely mean ignoring 
the boundaries of traditional territories - after all, basing a modem structure upon 
traditional boundaries would seem to be a contradictory measure. Ironically, Western 
Mining’s inventorical [rather than analytical] anthropology lent itself well to this purpose 
and probably played some part in the failings of the Councils - Foundation system.
Local participation in mining projects presents a conundrum to project managers and 
increasing involvement of community leaders is a matter that many mining bosses are 
loath to accept. In the course of this research absolute control over internal aspects of 
projects by companies became a familiar taboo among local mineral-driven developers. 
While mining companies are likely to be the only organisation with appropriate 
expertise to make decisions relating to the mining process, they maintain this grip over 
social and environmental aspects of projects. Whether managers accept it or not, the 
established importance of antecedence and procedural equity helps to focus 
contemplation of the future role of host communities in mineral-driven development.
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Indeed, it should be noted that in 1999, Tom Beanal, a long time local leader of 
Amungme protesters against the Freeport-McMoRan mine in Indonesia, was admitted 
to that company’s Board of Directors. Whether Beanal had involvement in the 
management of the mine is doubtful but irrelevant. Rather, the recognition of the local 
and its acceptance on the same plane as national, and indeed multinational aspects of 
a mining project was important and sets a constructive standard.
In light of the importance of local ways of doing things, further research is needed in 
order to better integrate antecedent values and traditions with mineral-driven 
development. There are several aspects of local institutions charged with delivering 
development to remote communities, toward which such research can usefully be 
directed. First, more new institutional structures, that incorporate traditional and 
legitimate aspects of local systems, must be devised. This will be difficult to promote on 
a generic basis because of the qualitative nature of the subject, both in terms of 
'internal' aspects of communities themselves, and 'external' environments created by 
states and societies. Nevertheless, the expertise required to analyse local systems, 
that is anthropology and other social sciences, are generic, and need to be utilised by 
mining companies and governments.
Another aspect of local institutions that requires further research, is how to better 
assure communities of a real role in their development, where local people have little 
experience of formal systems. The Tribal Council - Foundation system showed that 
while communities had a long way to go before engaging with mining, a comprehensive 
local development project, which employs local people and establishes business and 
agricultural opportunities, has potential. Nevertheless, providing a role for hosts 
requires better methods of communication with communities where definite 
opportunities are available. Also the creation of opportunities for communities to 
manage responsibilities which on one hand do not endanger local development but do 
impact upon their lives in a manner which instructs them, and from which they can 
learn. It may even mean creating the appearance of institutional participation, that will 
sustain communities until education or other local resources can be nurtured.
One more challenge for future research is the coupling of institutional arrangements 
with available human resources. That will involve assessment of the size of populations 
and skills within mining leaseholds, in conjunction with feasible institutional structures. 
This will be important in order to maximise the opportunity for sustainable development,
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and conversely limit the risk of collapse, within any given area. The Tampakan 
experience, particularly the comparative success and failure of the five communities, 
suggests that prototypical formulae for developmental institutions are possible. In Bong 
Mai for example, there clearly were not the skills necessary to manage a Tribal Council, 
while in Danlag there was. Skills need to be identified and then institutions established 
accordingly.
8.3. Which comes first; development or peace?
One apparent oversight of the World Bank recommendations was they did not address 
violence at minesites other than that directly associated with the mine. Consideration of 
the process of development in regions afflicted by violence in section 2. 3., raised 
immediate questions about the relationship between violence and development 
Indeed, wherever the development literature contemplated violence, it seemed to be 
divided as to whether peace would provide scope for development or vice-versa.
a
As presented in Chapter Three, B’laan involvement with the Mao-inspired New Peoples 
Army had been a result of their marginal position in society, and the lack of any wider 
leadership among B’laans, rather than self-determined political choices. Indeed, the 
Muslim-Christian struggle was similarly distant. Thus it was that neither of the familiar 
political or religious divisions in southern Mindanao had a direct impact upon choices 
made by B'laans.
The isolation of indigenous communities from Marxian and sectarian ideologies dispels 
a large portion of the Filipino literature purporting to explain the perspective of such 
communities. That is to say that much of the literature relating to indigenous peoples in 
Mindanao, examined in the course of this research attempts to implicate tribal peoples 
in ideological struggles. For example, as suggested by its  title, Karl Caspar’s The 
LumacTs Struggle in the Face of Globalizatbn', portrays tribal groups as direct 
participants in a fight against exploitative foreign forces. While there is no doubt that 
many traditional communities face a struggle, research presented in section 5 .1 .  found 
that the majority perceive it not so much globally as locally, taking place from one day to 
the next and not across the span of centuries. While Non-Govemmental Organisations 
such as the Legal Rights and Natural Resources Center campaigned against mining 
legislation that bears the imprint of a colonial past [from the Introduction to Leonen and 
Begonia 1995], B’laan communities typically regarded the company little further than in 
terms of what they might obtain from the next monthly meeting.
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These findings are supported by studies of other traditional communities upon which 
this thesis has drawn. Partidpant-observers such as Albert Alejo [2000], and Stuart 
Schlegel [1999], who have focused on the problems of spedfic communities, note that 
their perceptions are distinctly local in nature. On the subject of understanding local 
conflicts as they affect local communities, such scholars have produced work on the 
basis of many years spent living among spedfic communities. Indeed, since the 
Vietnam War era, when a great deal of United States' sodal sdence research funding 
was given to the subject of understanding the perspectives of grassroots communities 
within the context of conflict, the character of sodal research in Southeast Asia has 
been transformed. The wealth of peasant studies that has been completed since that 
time offers a rich vein of research to local mineral-driven development planners today. 
There was limited evidence within the mining literature that this field has been tapped in 
the project planning process.
While violence and criminality in Tampakan were not rooted in Mindanao’s Maoist- 
Mandan or sectarian divisions, local animosity between B’laans and Visayans was 
found to have historical and ethnic roots. Visayan prejudice stemmed from their 
settlement of this frontier' region since the 1930s, and Visayans generally viewed 
B'laans as primitive and pagan. For their part B'laans regarded Visayans with fear and 
awe. Divisions between B’laans and Visayans presented a barrier to developmental 
initiatives that must inevitably cross such ethnic lines to be successful.
These findings gave rise to a number of conclusions. First of all, crimes such as cattle 
rustling and theft were not simply symptoms of poverty. It appeared that at the local 
level there was an ethnic or perhaps class division at work, and that this had the 
potential to obstruct a mining project. This indicates that economic measures available 
to companies may be less effective than the apparently petty character of crime might 
indicate. Moreover, this in turn suggests that situations in which violence is rooted 
wholly in poverty, without any ideological, sectarian, or ethnic factors playing a role, are 
less commonplace than had been anticipated. That is to say opportunities to address 
violence successfully with developmental measures alone will be scarce, and some sort 
‘peacemaking’ initiatives will probably be necessary. Furthermore, where several 
causes of conflict exist simultaneously, i.e. ethnic division and poverty, development 
may be needed to address one cause of violence, while peace initiatives may 
simultaneously be required for another. Thus the which-comes-first-development-or-
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peace question is an over-simplification of reality in developing regions. What is more, 
peace may mean not just stopping shooting, but the encouragement of understanding, 
the promotion of difference, and other applications aimed at promoting social capital at 
the interface between two communities. Such strategies demand detailed analysis of 
local circumstances.
By applying a social capital analysis to the contradictory relationship between violence 
and local development, this thesis contributes to the development literature by 
differentiating between causes of local violence and identifying outcomes associated 
with them. That is to say that there were convincing examples of development leading 
to peace and vice versa, for which this political approach provides an explanation in 
terms of the depth and history of conflicts within communities. The fact that the causes 
of violence differed so greatly between the region and the mining locality, indicates that 
such an approach to violence is useful for evaluating regions for their potential as hosts 
for successful mining projects. The results of such an analysis can in turn provide a 
basis for addressing the negative impact of violence upon development, as well as for 
identifying situations in which conditions are not appropriate for mining to proceed in 
the first place.
As a glance at the international section of newspapers can confirm, violence in remote 
regions of developing countries is both common, and diverse in origin. As was 
reviewed in Chapter Two, scholars such as Jeremy Holland and Caroline Moser have 
used Social Capital as a basis for assessing the impact of violence upon development. 
They found that violence damages Social Capital, and by measuring Social Capital, that 
it is possible to obtain an indication of whether development will be sustainable. 
However, their work does not differentiate between causes of violence, or provide any 
prediction of violence. Moreover, as this research has identified, there are some salient 
features of societies, such as the preponderance of firearms, that are particularly 
indicative of violence. This suggests that more direct response to violence may be 
possible.
As has been pointed out, the depth of causes of violence within social structures is 
crucial to local development While these causes can fairly easily be located in 
religious, ethnic, political, and criminal type categories, these remain blurred, and it is 
not clear to what extent they might be generic to remote regions or specific to 
Tampakan. Future research is needed at the interface between violence and minerai-
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driven development in order to establish indicators of the nature and depth of violence 
in order to better assess the viability of mineral projects. By identifying the cause-depth 
of violence, and evaluating the likelihood and nature of violent incidents, mining 
projects can select appropriate development strategies.
For example, in Tampakan there was no ideological cleavage but there was an ethnic 
division in the form of Visayan and B’laans. While they were ethnically different, they 
were of a generally uniform economic profile - that is tenant farmers, and they spoke the 
same language in public places. Indeed there was a high degree of intermarriage and 
hence ethnic convergence. Poverty, and a large number of unlicensed firearms in the 
region raised the stakes, but this profile suggests that economic initiatives might be 
successful, with only a limited amount of social or diplomatic intervention being 
necessary. Upon the basis of such factors it is concluded that generic indicators of 
violence are feasible.
Companies such as Control-Risk, which were contracted by Western Mining 
Corporation to assess the threat of violence in Tampakan, already gather relevant data. 
However, their focus is on direct threats to physical aspects of mines, and the 
sustainability of development initiatives is lacking. By assembling generic indicators of 
violence, scholars and organisations such as the World Bank and multi-national mining 
companies could more readily assess violence, and effectively address it’s impact upon 
local mineral-driven development.
8.4. State and Company: partners or adversaries in local mineral- 
driven development?
The relationship between mining companies and states is popularly portrayed as a 
dose one. Companies are assumed to prize their contract with a government as the 
locus of highest authority, while governments covet multi-nationals as a convenient 
source of revenue. However, the findings of this thesis demonstrate that at the local 
level, the company-state relationship is not dose, espedally when it comes to the 
development of local communities.
Having obtained a Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement from the foreign 
investment-friendly administration of President Fidel Ramos [1992 -1998], Western 
Mining encountered problems with state institutions at every level. As described in 
section 3.1., Barangay Coundls objected to the allocation of resources for the non-
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statutory Tribal Councils. At the municipal level, discrepancies between Company and 
Municipal land use surveys demonstrated reluctance on the part of the municipality to 
negotiate the excessive claims to land made by Visayans. At the provincial level,
Davao Del Sur refused to sign the provincial principal agreement. Furthermore, the 
Philippines showed how regime changes that accompany presidential, charismatic, or 
other forms of personal rather than bureaucracy-led governance can obstruct mining 
projects. With the passing of power from the structural adjustment-minded 
administration of Fidel Ramos, to that of the national-populist Joseph Estrada in 1998, 
foreign mining firms lost state patronage. Opponents of Foreign Direct Investment were 
also found to guard the rights enshrined in their comparatively new constitution 
jealously, and foreign-owned enterprises were a target for nationalist rhetoric,
A fundamental division between the strategies of state and company was apparent from 
first contact with the Tampakan Copper Project in 1996. At that time the Office of 
Southern Cultural Communities were implementing the Tribal Council model while 
anthropological research was still underway. Indeed, the developmental framework was 
never found to have been influenced by local traditions or values. This indicates that 
although the company and state shared a macro-economic agenda, they were working 
to different local purposes. As the institutional theory presented in section 2. 2. 
explains, it would have been in the interest of the company to implement a model 
sensitive to traditional values - in order to avoid local conflicts and project a positive 
image. Constitutional prerogatives on the other hand, insisted upon something more 
formal. The OSCC [and indeed the Office for Northern Cultural Communities 
elsewhere] implemented the Tribal Council model - based upon the Barangay - across 
the country in accordance with unifying national strategies. Promotion of development 
within a B’laan context and thus a B’laan modernity, would therefore have been a 
contradictory position.
So it was that the nation took sovereignty over local development That is to say, over 
any local model that might have contradicted national strategies for development This 
situation circumscribed, the scope that there was for a company to participate in the 
design of organisations for local development in accordance with local precedents. 
Considering the prescription of institutional theory presented in section 2.2., that an 
institution based upon accepted [as opposed to unknown] precedents, is more likely to 
be successful in its purpose, state sovereignty is concluded to be potentially 
obstructive. Moreover, in light of the Tampakan experience, it seems logical that
220
problems stemming from the [illegitimacy of new models for social organisation, are 
more likely to occur where differences exist between social groups at the core and 
periphery. That is to say the capital region for instance, where legislative and other 
major decisions governing national development are decided upon, and outlying 
districts where these strategies have to be implemented. Furthermore, that institutional 
challenges to local development can be expected to be even more severe where 
political or sectarian conflict divide these places.
Faced with such a situation, companies and communities might rely on legislation that 
protects the rights of communities. That is because where communities have legally 
recognised rights to their land, livelihoods, etc., they are more likely to provide reliable 
partners to companies, even in opposition to national governments. Certificates of 
Ancestral Domain Claim, detailed in section 4 .5., were intended to provide recognition 
and rights to tribal communities. Western Mining and the host communities pursued 
tenurial rights to the full extent of legal provisions for indigenous tenure, achieving as 
much as any tribal community in the Philippines had been able. No community had 
progressed further along the chain enacted by the Indigenous People’s Rights Act -  no 
Certificate of Ancestral Land Title having been awarded as of November 2002, and only 
one Certificate of Ancestral Domain Claim - that coming in July 2002. It is therefore 
concluded that provisions for the tenurial rights of indigenous communities were not of 
sufficient strength to provide communities with effective power.
Moreover, if the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act were to be implemented in its entirety, 
the host community would have complete rights to the mineral reserves within their land 
and the opportunity to eject miners. If on the other hand, the pending case against the 
constitutionality of the IPRA were to be upheld, then the company would be in a 
potentially stronger position. Indeed, the Mining Act appeared to give the state the right 
to allocate ‘public’ land to mining ventures - in contradiction with the IPRA. The Mining 
Act itself was subject to an [albeit weaker] legal challenge from the Legal Rights and 
Natural Resources Center and other opponents of foreign mining firms. The result was 
considerable uncertainty over the rights of both companies and communities. Not only 
did the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 fail to accommodate new demands 
raised by the proliferation of mining companies following the 1995 Mining Act but it 
exacerbated problems associated with that Act. Neither of these new laws were dear, 
nor based upon realistic precepts, and there were lengthy delays in darifying them, 
which hurt both companies and communities.
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Aside from the weak legislative environment, and at the local level, Visayan hegemony 
over political and business institutions upon which B’laans depended, obstructed the 
efforts of the company to support host communities. Research presented in sections 5. 
2. and 5. 3., relating to roads and tenurial security, demonstrated that the Tribal 
Coundls had little political influence, and that munidpal authorities and state agencies 
tended to ignore them. The fad  that a road servidng the more remote communities had 
not been built showed how Tribal Coundls and B’laan communities remained subjed to 
Visayan politicking. Indeed, the state had not apparently considered the implications of 
local power. It is therefore conduded that power is not only crudal to the welfare of 
host communities, but is also determined by conditions that can only be provided by the 
state. Indeed, considering the relations between Visayans and B’laans and their 
distance from the state, that the state will have a tough job providing new host 
community institutions with the power required to sustain their development within a 
mining context
There has been debate among critics of the Tampakan Copper Projed as to whether 
Western Mining were forced' or ‘chose’ to uphold the Tribal Council model as it was 
presented to them by the Office of Southern Cultural Communities /  National 
Commission for Indigenous Peoples [NCIP]. In light of the fadors noted, the company 
had to a d  pragmatically in balandng the interests of Visayan local government the 
strategies of state agendes, and corporate demands for expediency, with B’laan values. 
In any case they would also have shared the risk and expense incurred by experiments 
with an untried model. Had they endeavoured to design local institutions according to 
B'laan values and customs, they would have invited condemnation from the state as 
well those organisations opposed to mining, as well as the media, should that model fail 
to deliver. Indeed, such a model might easily have been vetoed by the NCIP. All of this 
worked to mitigate any objections Western Mining had to the Tribal Council model, as 
had been implemented in a one-size-fits-all manner across the country.
The measures provided by the state to protect communities were insufficient and 
reflected a struggle between national identity and protection for indigenous lifeways or 
national ‘heritage’. Clearly, protection of indigenous peoples had for a long time been 
the losing side, and the central or core of the state paid limited attention to the to the 
welfare of indigenous peoples at the periphery of the nation. This was no doubt 
exacerbated by cultural differences between the core and periphery. The state thereby
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failed to shoulder the social responsibility accruing from its restructuring of the minerals 
sector and the influx of mining investment to remote regions.
Furthermore, assuming that the goal of the state is to integrate ‘tribal' communities into 
a modem nation state and the possibility that the company might seek to preserve a 
cohesive tribal identity for the purpose of partnership in local development, two broad 
developmental policy options - ‘modernisation’ or ‘preservation’ are apparent. In certain 
situations technical modernisation and cultural preservation may be compatible, and 
they are not the only strategies that states and companies can adopt. For example, 
companies may seek to relocate communities or operate in isolation from them. 
However, modernisation and preservation imply greatly different outcomes. Although a 
legitimate-preservationist model may work best initially, in the long term, breaking down 
of ‘tribal’ conventions in favour of formal systems that are compatible with structures of 
the modem state, may be more beneficial and indeed realistic.
Indeed, in the Tampakan case, replacement of Tribal Councils with new barangays at 
some point in the future, would afford them a greater degree of formal recognition and 
power. Whether this restructuring would be possible - particularly over the short to 
medium term is uncertain in light of the complexity involved and the limited 
administrative resources available. The five communities straddled three provinces, 
three municipalities and five existing barangays. Opposition from Visayan dominated 
barangays whose perimeters would have to be substantially redrawn, would be 
considerable and the costs to the region substantial.
However, it must be noted that the preservation vs. modernisation question, which 
exercises much of the pro and anti-mining lobbies, distracts from the issue of power. As 
section 2 .4 . explained, that the relationship between power and sustainability is direct, 
with communities needing rights in order to sustain development. Therefore the most 
important issue is not likely to be whether a traditional or preservationist path to 
development is adopted, but which, under the prevailing legislative and political climate, 
offers the most power to communities concerned. This will depend upon myriad 
national and local factors, such the strength and applicability of specific laws, and local 
power relations, not to mention the aspirations of communities themselves.
It was dear from the research that states and companies have distinct roles within local 
mineral-driven development While companies are better able to provide resources,
that is financial, material, technological, and so forth, responsibility for an appropriate 
political and legalistic climate belongs to the state. These requirements must 
nevertheless be commensurate if sustainable development is to be effected. However, 
the Tampakan experience suggests that the state is weak in remote regions and lacks 
the clout to provide an appropriate lego-political climate for communities hosting mining 
projects. Furthermore, the contradiction between nation building, which demands a 
unifying agenda, and local systems, indicates that the implications of mining for 
developing states are more serious than straightforward economic development that the 
World Bank had anticipated. Indeed, the identity of the state may be brought into 
question. Is the state for example, a plural polity or something defined at its core?
Local mineral-driven development is therefore a potential political threat to the state 
and should not be underestimated as such, as Colin Filer has observed in Papua New 
Guinea [Filer 1995]. Moreover, if government agencies are not materially able to 
support local communities and manage the responsibilities of the state to its citizens, 
then local opportunities presented by mining projects are likely to be missed and 
political unrest may ensue for economic reasons.
In terms of further research, the state-company relationship was found to be a matter of 
obstruction rather than opportunity for local mineral-driven development Relations 
were dependent upon factors such as laws, political platforms, and histories, that are 
specific to places and states. Few of the findings therefore, were available for generic 
application, and hence scope for further research seems limited. The fact that the state 
and company are not likely to be dose at any level, bar the very top perhaps, and that 
avenues for companies to act are dictated by the [in]capadty of the state, is an obstacle 
to local mineral-driven development Nevertheless, as has been noted, if governments 
are going to lease large tracts of remote regions to mining operations, appropriate legal 
and political conditions must be ensured if local development initiatives are to be 
sustained. These conditions should ideally be identified at the outset, and understood 
and agreed upon by all parties. They might be incorporated into future Finandai and 
Technical Assistance Agreements. The Indigenous Peoples Rights Act had support 
within urban areas and the importance of iandownership in terms of its contribution to 
wealth was gradually decreasing. How to exploit this space provided by growing 
awareness of indigenous issues among middle class societies, and use available 
legislation to strengthen the status of host communities, is a question that might usefully 
be addressed by the World Bank and other international bodies, as well as the mining 
industry, and further scholarship.
224
8.5. The importance of Anthropology.
The findings presented in section 7 .3 ., indicated that understanding of mining among 
the host communities was minimal. This had various real and potential consequences 
for local mineral-driven development The most immediate consequence was for 
contracts between each community and the company. The Principal Agreements with 
Tribal Councils had been drawn up by lawyers who had a thorough knowledge of the 
physical circumstances of mining and the requirements of the Mining Act, as well as 
state agencies and contractual precedents. B’laans on the other hand had a very 
limited concept of mining, its implications, and to what they might be entitled to in return 
for their consent.
Considering this shortfall, and in evaluating support for the host communities, it was 
difficult to distinguish between efforts aimed at promoting understanding of the 
implications of mining, and the comparatively short term task of winning local support 
for the signing of Agreements. Despite the institutional approach and adherence to 
recommendations of the World Bank e t al., inexperienced communities could not 
appreciate mining so objectively while being simultaneously presented with new schools 
and homes as well as salaries for Tribal Council members. Thus it is concluded that 
these two important goals for mining projects - the urgency of formal agreements and 
long term understanding - are incompatible. This was particularly obvious in Salna’ong, 
whose inhabitants had slipped into a dependent relationship with the company, before 
ultimately being rejected when grievances led to conflict -  in an apparent parallel with 
the rebellion on Bougainville, related in section 2 .6 . Understanding was dependent 
upon traditional perceptions while agreement was framed by formal structures. Thus it 
is concluded that until the traditional and the formal can be reconciled in the minds of 
participants in local mineral-driven development, mining projects cannot be assured of a 
rightful or secure environment and sustainable development will remain elusive.
This obstacle to local development was exacerbated by Visayan prejudices, related in 
section 3 .2 . These included an apparent assumption by mining protagonists, that 
understanding and agreement were the same thing. That is to say, as soon as B’laans 
understood mining they would ‘see sense' and agree to it As a result of Visayan 
attitudes, B’laan criticisms of mining tended to be ignored or regarded as recalcitrance 
or even greed, most notably by municipal authorities and state agencies such as the 
Mines and Geosciences Bureau and the National Commission for Indigenous Peoples. 
Representatives of both of these agencies were on the one hand apparently blinded by
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the ‘science’ of the company and lacking in appreciation of host perspectives on the 
other. These matters compounded the problem of understanding. Parties to the local 
development process and other outside organisations - and indeed the state - were 
clearly failing to understand the implications of this lack of understanding and this was 
obstructing their contribution to local development
Agreement between mining companies and host communities was therefore found to be 
a more complex matter than is generally anticipated by companies. Taken in the 
context of a mining company that avowedly pursued the recommendations of the World 
Bank, the findings suggest that awareness of the implications of mining among host 
communities remains a point of generic weakness for mineral-driven development
Findings presented in section 7. 3. confirmed the hypothetical point that traditional 
societies have unique perceptions of time. Moreover, they confirmed that a low level of 
understanding persisted among the host communities after five years acquaintance with 
Western Mining. Indeed the Tribal Councils cannot be said to have been prepared to 
sign the Principal Agreement in 1999, and by all indications it would have been many 
years before they could have acquired sufficient grasp of the implications to make an 
‘informed’ decision. This suggests that of those aspects of understanding assumed to 
be critical to relations between company and community in the mineral-driven 
development paradigm - that is time, scale and space - time is the most significant. In 
light of the inflexibility of formal structures - dependent as they are on the myriad global 
processes bearing upon the mining company - the time it takes to expand traditional 
perceptions appears to be the biggest obstacle to understanding. This poses local 
development a problem of howto convey the timescale over which a mine will be 
developed, which will inevitably be a matter of decades, affecting an increasingly large 
area, not to mention the changing economic character of the region. Traditional, 
cyclical notions of time make it difficult to do this by means of conventional tools such 
as were available at the Tampakan Information Center.
Two further points are as follows. The first concerns the impact of contradictions 
between traditional and formal values. The anthropological literature related in section
2 .5 . indicates that understanding of mineral development involves more than education 
in a new set of formal skills. Indeed, the problems associated with the leap from 
traditional to Tribal Councils demonstrated that these skills have a strong potential to, 
indeed likelihood of, contradicting antecedent social norms among host communities.
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The second point relates to responsibilities for host communities implied by 
participation in formal institutions. Development in the context of a large mine depends 
not only upon understanding of changes taking place, but also of responsibilities 
accruing therefrom. Understanding of a new system is one thing but convincing 
traditional leaders of their new responsibilities such as profit and loss, without them 
actually experiencing bankruptcy, will inevitably be difficult and demand new ideas of 
development expertise. These points mean that modem institutions will take longer to 
put into practice than might be assumed.
In short, for a community to acquire an appropriate level of understanding of mining or 
to consent to its consequences, implies that they understand alt of the formal 
institutions upon which mining is based. If, as this thesis argues, understanding of 
formal institutions is a definition of modernity and the basis for a capital economy, then 
the host communities would not need developmental assistance [and would presumably 
be protected by rights which enable citizens of developed countries to reject the 
majority of mining projects proposed to them]. In an ideal situation, developmental 
assistance and subsequent understanding, modernity, rights etc., would come before 
mining. Reality however, is the other way round and host communities in developing 
regions have to sign agreements without knowing what they are signing or to what they 
are entitled. This suggests a breach of rights that if not already established within 
international law, is waiting to be so in the future. Thus anthropology dictates that 
developmental assistance should be a precursor for, rather than an outcome of, mining. 
This conclusion would appear to place the mining industry in developing countries as a 
whole, in a Catch 22 situation.
Despite this condemnation, mining is an obvious reality throughout the developing 
world, and anthropology does offer a number of instructive points. To begin with, 
traditional societies are not stagnant and many are indeed developing. While 
traditional communities in Tampakan for example, were not counting the years, they 
had consecutive memories of Spanish traders, the eruption of ML Matutum in 1911, of 
Japanese occupation in World W ar Two, of liberation by the US army, of the llaga- 
Blackshirt terror, of militarisation during the Marcos era, and the construction of the new 
airport to the west of General Santos City. Thus there was apparent scope for 
explanation of the implications of mining in temporal if not spatial terms. Indeed, as 
formal institutions encroach upon traditional communities, linear perceptions are 
becoming more commonplace and exist side by side with, if not actually displacing
227
traditional perceptions, as barter trade coexisted with the formal economy for many 
B’laans. However, whether traditional or modem perspectives hold sway, will inevitably 
vary and require local analysis.
Anthropology would also have served to better explain the impact of crime upon B’laan 
lifeways and their ability to participate in developmental initiatives. Accepted 
explanations of violence within B’laan society, presented in existing works on 
indigenous lifeways in Mindanao, were found to be shallow and susceptible to 
prejudice. The findings presented in section 5 .1 ., demonstrated that while on one hand 
antecedent violence must be anticipated by development planners, its nature should not 
be assumed. This is because indigenous perspectives of violence hold an important 
key to sustainable development For example, many of the B’laans and their observers 
encountered in the course of this research, stated that a large proportion of violence 
within their society was related to women. Such violence stems from the local concept 
of marriage and can therefore be better addressed by those who seek to promote 
development, in terms of the combination of modem firearms and traditional disputes, 
than as rampant infidelity and immoral behaviour, the paradigm presented by Roman 
Catholic interpretation and adopted by many observers. Moreover, traditional conflicts 
between individual males and extended families or ‘dans’ in all likelihood once served a 
positive selection purpose, establishing sodal hierarchies etc. Nowadays they are 
palpably destroying B’laan sodety on account of the preponderance of firearms. Thus 
for example, anthropology indicates that an appropriate solution would more likely 
address gun crime than ban wife-napping. Indeed, while it may be impossible to get rid 
of guns, examination of gun crime and knowledge of traditional institutions may provide 
local means of restraint
The question of understanding raises a number of issues which demand that further 
research be undertaken on the subject For example, before the performance of 
companies and the efficacy of World Bank recommendations can be judged, methods 
appropriate for the task of establishing where host communities stand in relation to 
institutions of modernity, need to be established. Comparison of existing studies and 
methods of data collection with the methodology used in this research, indicate that 
local perspectives can be better addressed by studies comprising not only an 
anthropological interpretation, but one that is also undertaken from a grassroots 
perspective, looking up and out from within host communities. That is to say, a 
participant-observational approach, where researchers live among host communities
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and distil everyday experience, rather than only visiting to attend 'events' such as the 
meetings of chiefs. That way it should be possible to apprehend and build a more 
complete picture of local perspectives of mining and other manifestations of modernity. 
In the case of Mindanao, such studies are represented by the work of Albert Alejo 
among Manobo communities in Davao [Alejo 2000], and Stuart Schlegel with the 
Teduray in Cotabato [Schlegel 1999].
Another objective for future research is the development of methods for communicating 
what mining is, and what it means, to communities. As outlined in section 3 .3 ., much 
local information was disseminated through second-hand sources such as Non- 
Governmental Organisations or rumours exemplified by the ‘Yamashite Gold’ treasure 
seeking myth. More rigorous and open-ended awareness building is necessary at 
minesites if only to counteract such sources. This task demands the design of more 
effective programs for communicating strategy, and the establishment of a co-ordinated 
approach at project sites, based upon anthropologically-determined local perspectives.
The fact that no relationship was observed between understanding on the part of host 
communities and the progress of the mine itself, also demands attention from 
researchers and policy-makers alike. That is to say that there were no mechanisms in 
place, either within the company’s investment plan or community development strategy, 
to ensure that mining was connected to development Rather, the physical progress of 
the mine was dependent upon financial and technological matters, and indeed macro 
rather than micro level political willingness. As section 7 .4 . demonstrates, this point 
stretches to procedural equity, the promotion of which lacked specific targets, and 
perhaps more seriously, was not connected with physical or financial plans. This gave 
the impression that mining would take place regardless of understanding, subsequent 
capacity for informed decision-making, and procedural equity on the part of host 
communities had been established. The fact that these goals were absent, and that it 
was impossible to state at what time they might be achieved, was a concern for this 
research. That is because if local development lags behind the progress of mining 
companies, it will likely undermine relations between company and community and 
there would be a danger of mining companies completing their projects and departing 
without sustainable development having been effected. It is therefore concluded that 
future recommendations to the mining industry and companies’ local development plans 
should couple understanding of mining with mining itself, so that they progress in a 
commensurate manner. In light of the link between understanding of the institutions of
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modernity and development, such a policy would improve the prospect sustainable local 
mineral-driven development
Moreover, any such co-ordinated approach to the issue of understanding should 
include an ‘audit of understanding1 in order to evaluate the success of educational and 
awareness-building initiatives. That is to ensure that the company can assess such 
initiatives and know whether partner communities are prepared for the various stages of 
the mining process. Assessment of preparedness for mining is at present vague and 
inconclusive. However, this thesis - in particular the methodologies for measuring 
Tribal Council performance, presented in section 4. 2. and Appendix 4, indicate that 
empirical audits of the progress of communities in grasping the implications of mining, 
are feasible.
Furthermore, the issue of understanding as a pre-requisite for local mineral-driven 
development begs a more complex question of what should be regarded as a sufficient 
level of understanding. Not only sufficient to serve as a basis for agreement between 
local people and a foreign company, but also to underpin development decision­
making, which communities must learn to do in order that development be sustainable. 
This is an area which demands further study, if not by concerned mining companies at 
the individual project level, then at a generic level, by organisations such as the World 
Bank.
8.6. Group versus Individually based strategies for local mineral- 
driven development
Another issue that was raised by this thesis concerns the contrasting implications of 
group and individually based strategies for local mineral-driven development. Much of 
the development literature, state agencies in the Philippines, legislation relating to 
indigenous communities, and all of the non-govemmenta! organisations representing 
local communities, regarded the ‘traditional', ‘tribal’, or ‘indigenous’, community as a 
unit They stated or otherwise implied that this unit forms the basis of negotiations 
relating to all aspects of development. Indeed, World Bank recommendation No. 7 
stresses that the community is the appropriate basis for compensation [Aidan and Davy 
1998: XIV] and Western Mining channelled payments into the five communities 
accordingly. A communal model thereby provided the vehicle for disbursement and 
administration of local development initiatives.
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Conversely, this research found little evidence in the local literature and none on the 
ground to suggest that the communal concept is an appropriate basis for local 
development There were two main reasons for this. One was that as explained in 
section 3 .2 ., like almost all of Mindanao, the area affected by the proposed mine was 
everywhere shared with Visayan settlers. Of the five communities, B’laans were out­
numbered on their traditional land in Folu Bato, Danlag, and S'banken, which indicates 
that the concept of 'tribal territories’ was defunct. Another reason was the changes in 
the pattern of land tenure, related in section 5 .3 ., which reflected changing economic 
perspectives among B’laans. In the context of time, the complexity of the struggle to 
obtain rights to land, the establishment of Visayan settlements on traditional B’laan 
land, and the dominance of Visayan institutions, B’laans were aspiring to individual land 
tenure. The Indigenous Peoples, Rights Act and terms of communal tenure embodied 
by CADCs were being superseded by enterprising community members, and prominent 
B’laans were becoming ‘land grabbers’ themselves. In any case, with the mass 
immigration and sedentarism of the 20th century, even if communities did not own land 
individually, they used it in an individualistic manner and the concept of the community 
as an economic unit was becoming similarly impractical.
In 2002 the administration of Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo decreed that the Indigenous 
Peoples Rights Act, which had stagnated during the latter days of her predecessor, 
would be revitalised, and that 100 Certificates of Ancestral Land Title would be awarded 
within one year. In light of the penetration of traditional lands throughout the 
Philippines by lowtanders and associated conflicts, such promises are impossible to 
fulfil. Considering the erosion of traditional lifeways and the continuing dependence of 
the economy upon land, increasing fragmentation of ownership, and the staking of 
individual claims to land, are everywhere superseding the communal concept Indeed 
the communal concept has been too lightly and too lately embraced by legislation for 
almost all traditional communities in the Philippines.
This may not be a bad thing. As was noted in section 2. 4., traditional law is usually 
unwritten and unpredictable, which may make it harder to raise capital, and thereby 
obstruct economic development on a communal basis. On the other hand, land that is 
held by an individual with a conventional title is more likely to be respected by banks or 
other financial institutions as collateral for loans and business transactions. From the 
developmental [and possibly the preservationist also] viewpoint, individualism may be 
good for business and hence sustainability. The individualism expressed by attempts to
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secure title to land, indicated assertiveness and a break from the apparent apathy held 
by local people for their position in ‘the new global order' - as tenant farmers. 
Alternatively, such initiatives may threaten equality and split host communities into 
‘haves and have nots'. Whether the possible gains of individual enterprise outweigh 
the potential loss of social cohesion will vary with sodai circumstances and demand 
attention at the specific project level.
The communal versus individual debate indicates that the community as a basis for 
compensation and local development is in need of a re-think, and that further research 
is essential. Important factors for consideration include the aspirations of the 
community in question. The evidence from the Lamkwa community presented in section 
5 .3 . indicates that traditional sentiments may be different from perceptions of traditional 
sentiments held elsewhere, or by agencies such as the World Bank, and societies at 
large. The ‘tribal idyll’ of harmony with nature and fellow men is not always so. While 
members of traditional communities may want to be regarded as a whole in terms of 
cultural practices, they may not want to be treated as such when it comes to labour, or 
capital, or in the use of their land. Research in Tampakan revealed that very little was 
known about such perspectives among the host communities. For example, the when, 
where, and how hunter-gathering had given way to sedentarism, which had strong 
implications for the ways people in the mine lease area, as opposed to those in the 
valley, perceived land, was frequently argued about among consultants to the project 
The answers to these questions would have probably provided a good insight as to how 
the host communities would react to various methods of compensation for land use. 
Moreover, while communities may want to be treated as one at the outset this situation 
may evolve as it did in Tampakan, with individual initiatives emerging with the progress 
of the mining project Once again, as has already been concluded, anthropological 
insights will be vital.
Furthermore, as well as looking inside the community in order to address the group- 
individual question, it is also necessary to study the outside. As explained in section 3. 
2., Tampakan there was competition from the Visayan dominated municipal authority, 
with which both the community and the company had to contend - as was evident from 
the discrepancy between the company and municipal land use surveys. Whether a 
community will make greater headway through individual rights or by ‘sticking together1 
will need to be evaluated. The strength of available legislation protecting communities 
is important for this. That is to say, regardless of whether or not a community
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expresses individualistic tendencies, whether there is appropriate legislation to support 
this choice in the face of external pressures, which Tampakan indicates may be severe. 
Such practical considerations need to be considered in order to ascertain the optimal 
strategy for local development.
Finally, if anthropological research established that a given community was not 
prepared for an individualistic approach to development initiatives, or indeed that 
political or other wider societal considerations made a communal approach imperative, 
then greater use might be made of micro-finance initiatives. Many small communities 
and cottage industries, particularly in Luzon and the Cordilleras region of the 
Philippines had benefited from a diversity of micro-finance schemes. Such a scheme 
would offer a means of financing and sustaining local mineral-driven development on a 
communal basis and should therefore be considered.
8.7. Endnotes.
Multitudinous organisations and individuals have deplored negative social and 
environmental impacts incurred by many multinational mining companies. They have 
demanded that mining ‘clean up its act' and contribute to the welfare of host 
communities. In examining the recommendations of the World Bank and the capacity of 
a prominent company to implement them within the context of an open and democratic 
country, this thesis has explored the limits of mining sponsored local development.
Foreign companies in particular, are subject to regional factions and local government 
where they operate in remote regions of developing countries. Indeed, mining projects 
may be consumed by destabilised communities and avaricious local politics, not to 
mention the vagaries of political favour at the national level, where the state 
demonstrated little concern for the sustainability of remote communities. Moreover, as 
has been discussed, the concept of unique local systems contradicted the state's 
unifying political agenda, limiting the scope for incorporation of local values. 
Furthermore, restrictions to development also arose from limitations of the state, of 
which there was little evidence in mountainous areas. Weak legislation and the 
moribund regional economy, with the associated obsession with land as the only secure 
source of capital, all functioned to constrain development It is therefore difficult for a 
conventional mining company to fulfil the role of development provider.
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Nevertheless, it was dear that Filipino sodety is increasingly consdous of local issues 
and indigenous rights, witnessed by Broad and Cavanagh [1992] and the passing of the 
Indigenous People’s Rights Act itself. This trend offers a growing space for traditional 
communities to articulate themselves and pursue their own interests. Where community 
leaders seek to preserve environments and cultures, they need to make trade-offs with 
outsiders in order to obtain the resources with which to support themselves in the 
context of modem sodety. Thus there may be opportunities for mining companies to 
build relationships and establish contracts to mine, and to implement new strategies for 
local development In order to make these trade-offs, companies will have to explore 
that space, distinguishing between one community and another, and working with local 
systems as much as possible.
Indeed, this research indicates that there is no one route to local mineral-driven 
development A common accusation levelled at mining companies in developing 
regions is that they put only a tiny fraction of their profits into local development. 
However, it is conduded that the primary challenge to the mining industry and those 
agendes of government that partidpate in mineral-driven development, is more one of 
flexibility. That is to say they must be responsive to local cultures, and innovative in 
working with host communities, in order to assess what is possible and how it might be 
achieved. This requires mining companies to engage with more diverse sources of 
expertise than they have tended toward in the past not least of which will be 
anthropology, as well as sodal science, and regional spedalists from various fields as 
are applicable.
Reflecting on the World Bank recommendations, three points are dear. First is that 
carrying local mineral-driven development further, and establishing guidelines for when 
and where mining should take place, requires that acceptable sodal conditions for 
mining be determined more specifically. Thus an important threshold in the quest for 
sustainable local mineral-driven development is the definition of terms according to 
which such development can be successful. Secondly, the fact that this research 
established that there were problems with the World Bank recommendations 
themselves, and that unantidpated factors construed to obstruct the mining project, 
demonstrates that the scope of such recommendations needs to be wider and address 
obstades doser to their roots. That is to say they should incorporate other fadors, 
which may not be directly related to the mining project, but are fundamental to the lives 
of host communities. Third, examination of the World Bank recommendations also
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indicates that there may be situations in which it is impossible for mining companies to 
provide for sustainable local development That is to say that where the gap in 
understanding between convention and modernity is too great or where violence is too 
severe or stemming from deep political cleavages, development on the back of a large 
scale mine will be impossible.
Finally, while a number of areas for further research have already been noted in 
previous sections, ex post measurement of the performance of each of the five Tribal 
Councils, would be informative. If the comparative measurement of Tribal Council 
Performance were conducted as part of a longitudinal study, the findings could be 
examined for any patterns over time. Indeed, if the original methodology, with its 
broader scope for measurement of outputs could be repeated, as the Tribal Councils 
presumably progress. Moreover, the Index of Tribal Council Performance offers an 
empirical measure of the success of developmental institutions at other minesites too. 
if such studies were conducted in conjunction with participant-observation style 
anthropological analyses, an explanation of evolving local obstacles and appropriate 
responses might be obtained. Such an exercise would provide more technical lessons 
for local mineral-driven development
235
Appendix 1.
The Berlin Guidelines.
P arti. Addressed to the mineral sector.
Governments, mining companies and the minerals industries should as
a minimum:
1. Recognize environmental management as a high priority, notably 
during the licensing process and through the development and 
implementation of environmental management systems. These 
should include early and comprehensive environmental impact 
assessments, pollution control and other preventive and mitigative 
measures, monitoring and auditing activities and emergency 
response procedures.
2. Establish environmental accountability in industry and government 
at the highest management and policy-making levels.
3. Encourage employees at all levels to recognize their responsibility 
for environmental management and ensure that adequate 
resources, staff and requisite training are available to implement 
environmental plans.
4. Ensure the participation and dialogue with the affected community 
and other directly interested parties on the environmental aspects 
of all phases of mining activities.
5. Adopt best practices to minimize environmental degradation, 
notably in the absence of specific environmental regulations.
6. Adopt environmentally sound technologies in all phases of mining 
activities and increase the emphasis on the transfer of appropriate 
technologies which mitigate environmental impacts, including those 
from small-scale mining operations.
7. Seek to provide additional funds and innovative financial 
arrangements to improve environmental performance of existing 
mining operations.
8. Adopt risk analysis and risk management in the development of 
regulation and in the design, operation and decommissioning of 
mining activities, including the handling and disposal of hazardous 
mining and other wastes.
9. Reinforce the infrastructure, information systems service, training 
and skills in environmental management in relation to mining 
activities.
10. Avoid the use of such environmental regulations that act as 
unnecessary barriers to trade and investment.
11. Recognize the linkages between ecology, socio-cultural conditions 
and human health and safety, both within the workplace and the 
natural environment
12. Evaluate and adopt, wherever appropriate, economic and 
administrative instruments such as tax incentive policies to 
encourage the reduction of pollutant emissions and the 
introduction of innovative technology.
13. Explore the feasibility of reciprocal agreements to reduce 
transboundary pollution.
14. Encourage long-term mining investment by having dear 
environmental standards with stable and predictable environmental 
criteria and procedures.
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Part 2. Addressed to Development Assistance Agencies.
Multilateral and bilateral assistance agencies should:
1. Accord high priority to the mitigation of environmental degradation 
associated with mining in developing countries to achieve high 
environmental performance.
2. Initiate, as an integral part of any exploration and mining project, 
environmental institutional building programmes. Special support 
should be given to countries actively working to improve their 
environmental capabilities.
3. Require that all mining projects supported shall contain a training 
component that will include specific training on environmental 
awareness and its applications to the mining sector.
4. Support increased research regarding the development of new 
processes, with fewer environmental impacts, including recycling.
5. Support the development of activities that would mitigate adverse 
effects on the sodo-cultural fabric and the ecosystem. To achieve 
this objective, international agencies should give priority to 
education and training which increase awareness of these issues 
and allow the affected communities to participate in decision­
making.
6. In supporting mining projects, agencies should also take into 
account the following:
• rehabilitation of displaced population;
• environmental history of the country;
•  large scale impact on socio-cultural patterns;
•  the overall economic balance of the project vis-a-vis its total 
environmental impact;
• the impact on other natural resources and ecologically sensitive 
areas [e.g. protected forest lands, mangroves, wildlife parks, 
and
neighbouring waterbodies],
7. Promote conferences and policy research on environmental 
management practices and technologies, and ensure the 
dissemination of this information.
8. Support and promote regional co-operative programmes to achieve 
sustainable development of mineral resources.
9. Adopt environmentally safe methods of mining and processing for 
existing projects.
10. Increase and co-ordinate their assistance to developing nations in 
the field of environmental policies management.
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Appendix 2.
Potions for indigenous Peoples for a successful Implementation 
of Agenda 21.
1. Measure to institutionalize the participation of NGOs [Non 
Governmental Organisations] and POs [Peoples Organisations] 
involved in indigenous people's issues in regional, national and focal 
development planning should be put in place.
2. Respect indigenous people’s rights to ancestral domain or 
traditional grounds by providing legal guarantees against unwarranted 
infringement. Their organisation and role in the management of their 
ancestral lands should be strengthened.
3. Guarantees to protect the civil, political and economic rights of 
indigenous peoples should be strengthened and enacted. The use of 
all forms of coercion should be stopped, and efforts to indemnify victims 
and their communities should be initiated.
4. Laws which seek to protect the biodiversity through anti-pollution, 
anti-logging and similar measures in areas where indigenous people 
are concentrated should be implemented and strengthened. Where 
these laws are absent they should be enacted.
5. Debt relief measures must be aggressively pursued by Asian 
governments to provide for the protection and rehabilitation of damaged 
indigenous peoples territorie’s, and institutionalize services primarily 
directed to them. Debt swap /  debt conversion measures in exchange 
for environmental protection /  rehabilitation should be promoted.
6. Research and documentation of indigenous people’s practices of 
socio-environmental management should be initiated to provide a new 
knowledge-attitude-practice base for decision-makers and planners.
7. Being a major contributor to nurturing nature and society, 
indigenous women should be integrated in all social uplift efforts. Their 
myriad roles in promoting the interests of their families, communities 
and groups should be promoted and strengthened.
8. A solidarity, networking and information campaign to establish lines 
of coordination across regional, national and local levels can be 
initiated to build public awareness and sympathy for the indigenous 
peoples of Asia.
[National Councils for Sustainable Development in Asia 1995].
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Appendix 3.
Explanation of the World Bank recommendations.
1. Adopt a policy on social issues and develop capacity.
While environmental policies are standard practice for major corporations, those 
addressing social concerns are not so well established. The World Bank 
recommend that the implementation of such policies be a priority and that the 
value of social and human capital, both to companies and communities be 
exploited.
2. Identify stakeholders and acknowledge their leoitimacv.
Provisions for public involvement are either weak or non-existent in many 
developing countries. However, the legitimacy of all stakeholders is regarded as 
important, and the World Bank stress acknowledgement of local perspectives.
3. Identify sodal risks and responsibilities.
Opportunities for companies emerge where social responsibility is viewed as 
conferring business advantages such as access to future exploration concessions 
and reducing costs arising from local conflicts. Accidental spillage or release of 
process chemicals however, can significantly change public perception of 
corporate responsibility. Thus the World Bank recommend the management of 
social risks and prevention of impacts.
4. Assess social and environmental impacts thoroughly: Integrate where 
appropriate.
Social impacts are not always adequately dealt with by the private sector, and 
project approval processes in many developing countries focus on environmental, 
rather than social issues. Where changes in environmental quality may affect 
local communities, or environmental resources are threatened by sodal impacts 
such as in-migration, sodal and environmental assessments should be 
integrated.
5. Recognise public involvement as integral to project sustainability.
The representation of indigenous people, women and minorities, who may be 
disproportionately impacted by projects, should be safeguarded. Moreover, such 
stakeholders have concerns about land tenure, income, and health, which must 
be addressed. Local people can also identify sodal and environmental concerns 
and assist in developing mitigation measures. For consultation to be fully 
effective, the development of a common language was considered crudal. This 
requires a two-way education process. Companies were recommended to 
develop capadty within communities for consultation and negotiation.
6. Delineate responsibilities for sodal provisions.
Mining requires that companies provide for certain sodal infrastructure, which 
commonly exceeds government services to local people. This raises the issue of 
who should benefit The most obvious are employees and their families, but this 
becomes complex when workers arrive from outside the area. The World Bank 
notes that investment in social and community provisions should be an integral 
part of doing business. They recommend that ‘sodal costs’ and business benefits 
be more dearly defined, and that corporations complement government systems, 
rather than replace them.
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7. Aim for social equity in revenue distribution, compensation, and other social 
investments.
Social equity was a primary concern in compensation. Groups such as women, 
the poor, or indigenous peoples often shoulder disproportionate burdens. It was 
recommended that these be factored into compensation arrangements. Any 
assumption that money itself can secure agreement was to be avoided, 
community based compensation being preferred.
8. Partnerships should be developed in support of sustainable development. 
Partnerships were recommended because of the interdependence between 
development issues and the environment, and the complexity of development 
issues. Corporations were to pursue partnership approaches for delivery of 
sodal programs, the advantages being in the pooling of resources, building of 
respect and understanding between potential adversaries, and the transfer of 
knowledge.
9. Develop mechanism for the long-term representation of stakeholders and 
conflict resolution.
Sustainable development initiatives, by which communities may regenerate 
livelihoods or generate new ones, requires long-term commitment With time and 
planning, local business start-ups for example, that may be more important than 
cash compensation.
10 Evaluate the effectiveness of sodal investments.
While the simplest measure of development is the sum of corporate contributions, 
the total amount given is less relevant than the value of outcomes. The World 
Bank argued that if the true sodal development impact is to be captured, new 
indicators are needed to measure the success of community investment activities.
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Appendix 4.
indicators of institutional performance, as devised at the London 
Schooi of Economics, prior to departure for the field.
For each Tribal Council the following aspects of functioning will be evaluated 
and indicators are categorised accordingly.
1. Processes - how well Councils manage internal affairs [indicators 1-4].
2. Pronouncements - how well Councils identify needs and propose solutions 
[indicators 5-8].
3. Implementation - how well Councils provide services and solutions 
[indicators 9-12].
4. Robustness - how well Councils independently manage change 
[indicators 13-16].
Section One: Processes.
1. Stability.
Accepting that stable Tribal Councils pursue more coherent actions, a 
combination of factors, such as below, will be accounted for each Council.
a] Regularity of Council meetings.
b] Attendance, i.e. all members, various members, particular members.
c] Recording of Council proceedings.
d] Location, i.e. communal venue, rotation of venue, a particular private house.
e] Presence of witnesses at Council meetings. 
f\ Public announcement of meetings.
g] Female representatives at Council meetings.
h] Election of members who are not related to chiefs and are not elders.
g] Perhaps average age of members should be considered as an indicator of 
openness.
Each indicator measured will be discussed with Project / NGO members and 
others familiar with the B’laan communities and evaluated from a cultural 
perspective, as there may be cultural explanations for Council functioning. 
Although the focus will remain upon functional stability, cultural influences will 
be incorporated into the value attached to each category. A scale of 0-10 shall 
be devised for each category and each council graded accordingly, from which 
an average can be deduced.
2. Promptness.
Western Mining provides a monthly administration and operation payment to 
each Tribal Council of 30 000 pesos [£400] administered by each Council with 
WMC as a joint signatory. A comparison of how long it took each Council to 
‘budget’ for each month since the summer of 1995, when the community 
development program was initiated, would provide an indicator of promptness.
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The number of days over 28 that it took each Council to obtain each new 
signature from WMC can be noted and averages can also be calculated for six 
month periods to obtain a trend for each council. This data would give a clear 
picture of budgetary promptness across the Councils and a basis for comparison. 
Numbers for each Council could be divided by 10 or 100 to give a score of 0-10.
3. Information services.
Referring to effectiveness of Councils at monitoring and collecting data on their 
communities - assuming that a Council with better information responds more 
effectively. Much of the current social and socio-economic data for the 
leasehold was provided by councils. Examination of the methodology of the 
socio-economic baseline study by Mindanao State University and Western 
Mining’s community development program social development surveys, will 
enable assessment of the contribution of each Council. Initially, the framework 
of each survey will be examined and points at and means by which Councils 
contributed, identified. For such instances, the input of each Council, measured 
in quantity, means, time, etc. may be compared and graded accordingly, on a 
scale of 0-10, from which an average can finally be calculated for each Council.
4. Information outsourcing.
Once again assuming that information correlates positively with performance. 
Tribal Councils obtain information from NGOs and network with other groups 
facing similar struggles etc. The number of sources consulted by each Council 
offers an appropriate indicator. However, with the onset of mineral exploration, 
diverse organisations have thrust themselves upon Tribal Councils in pursuit of 
their own agendas. In order to distinguish ‘consulting’ from ‘thrusting’, as well 
as account for varying means of participants, the depth of contacts will be 
measured. For each organisation a Council liaises with, regardless of who 
initiated contact, the number and regularity of meetings will be taken to indicate 
the degree of meaning of the relationship. Organisations with which each 
Council meets will be counted, as will the number of meetings and any degree of 
regularity noted. Each of these will be given a grading 0-10 from which an 
average can be calculated representing the relationship between the council and 
that organisation. Some Councils may have more relationships [more 
organisations] and some may have stronger relationships [higher averages]. 
Which is better is impossible to tell because of their multiple implications. This 
indicator will rely upon the sum of the average scores for each Council which 
will in turn be divided by 10 to provide final scores.
Section Two: Pronouncements.
5. Comprehensiveness.
This refers to the breadth of issues addressed by each Tribal Council. Particular 
issues may be exclusive to particular communities and irrelevant to others, 
therefore a list of issues will be prepared, each relevant to every community and 
as broad as possible. Each Council will be graded according to the number of
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issues they address compared to the total. The scale will run from 0, 
representing no issues, to 10, to which the total number will be converted.
6. Coherence.
This refers to the degree of co-ordination of Tribal Council activity. For each 
Council the number of linkages between the total number of initiatives will be 
counted. Each Council will be graded according to the number of linkages, from 
0, representing no linkages, to 10, equivalent to the maximum possible, whereby 
every initiative would be linked to every other initiative. So if  there were 10 
initiatives, the number of possible linkages would be 0-90. For clarity, linkages 
between initiatives may be demonstrated by a diagram / s for each Council.
7. Creativeness.
This indicator will attempt to capture council performance in for example, 
identification of needs, experimentation with services and creation of incentives 
for private initiative. Achievements will be listed for each council and 
performance in these areas since 1995 will be rated 0-10 on a comparative basis. 
This is a more impressionistic and less precise measure and will depend upon 
careful assessment of Council activities backed up by comparison with 
evaluations from community members, community development program 
officers and others whose experience relates to the Councils, obtained through 
interviews.
8. Innovation.
As observed elsewhere, successful ideas commonly diffuse through local 
governments. This indicator will identify innovations which may relate to, 
among others;
a] local business promotions.
b] environmental protection initiatives.
c] identification of property and landowners for compensation.
d] promotion of education initiatives.
e] landuser protection initiatives - relating to outside encroachment.
f] involvement in certain agricultural schemes.
g] actions relating to women’s rights.
h] participation in health schemes.
Despite differing needs and priorities, certain councils should appear as 
consistent leaders or laggards. Of those actions appropriate to all communities, 
on average, how soon after the first appearance of a model action, was it adopted 
by each other Council. A Council will be given 10 points for each action it 
pioneered, those that adopted it points between 0 and 10 proportional to the 
timelag, and those that did not adopt it 0.
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Section Three: Implementation.
Comprising three sections designed to cover three important aspects - direct 
service provision [9+10] repertoire of services [11] and ability to use funds [12].
9. Financial proficiency.
An activity must be found, for which there is no “opportunity cost” to the Tribal 
Councils. This may be achieved by selecting an aspect of Council functioning 
that is funded directly by Western Mining regardless of demand or one which 
offers benefits without cost to the Council. For example, stable financial 
management, means of compensation and royalty payment in the event of 
mining, being essential. WMC made efforts to instigate financial management 
by Councils of their own resources. Proficiency in handling funds may be 
measured by the number of transactions undertaken by each Council since the 
establishment of banking facilities for the Councils.
10. Training.
One measure of a Tribal Council’s ability to implement decisions may be the 
number of people to have completed training - for management of community 
affairs, the Council and the Foundation to be established under the longer term 
Principal Agreement. The number of people trained will be compared with the 
number of positions available [or households or adult population] to each 
community and the Councils may be ranked 0-10 accordingly.
11. Development instruments.
The idea that Tribal Councils will foster development is an important motivation 
for institutional capacity building. When funds become available, Councils can 
adopt strategies, for example;
a] Local business promotion plan.
b] Education.
c] Agricultural productivity scheme.
d] Livestock initiatives.
e] Transportation / access plan.
f] Preventive medical care scheme.
g] Water related initiatives.
h] Recruitment initiatives.
i] Women’s rights initiatives.
j] Representations to bodies outside the community.
A crude measure of sophistication may be computed by noting which of an array 
of potential tools each Council actually deployed and how quickly they became 
operational. The timescale will run from the start of the community 
development program to the present. Scores from 0-10 will be awarded for each 
tool adopted and will be proportional to the date the tool was instigated.
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12. Spending capacity.
Where any fixed allocation of funds is made to each Tribal Council - what 
fraction is actually disbursed. Such as the monthly 30 000 peso Western Mining 
administration and operation payment to each Council. This can be calculated 
from the amount of money in the account of each council at the end of each 
month since WMC payments began. By adding all of them for each Council and 
dividing each total by the number of WMC payments and deducting that from 30 
000, the average amount of money not disbursed each month can be calculated - 
the bigger that sum, the less money is on average disbursed. That amount must 
always be less than 30 000 and the lower the better hence each Council can be 
given a value between 10, representing 0 pesos and 0, representing 30 000 pesos.
Section Four: Robustness
As youthful and elementary institutions and dependent upon Western Mining for 
their funding, the Tribal Councils are without any independent source of revenue 
or means of disbursement - this being provided by and carried out in conjunction 
with WMC and NGOs related to the mineral development context. Hence, rather 
than adopt criteria to measure spending efficacy, this study seeks ways to 
evaluate the ‘robustness’ of Councils. Indicator 8 - adoption of Innovations, see 
above - treats new developments as positive and assumes their adoption is 
equitable with progress. Speedy adoption of innovations may indeed reflect 
efficiency but should be correlated with indicators of robustness - the ability to 
reject changes and provide for self determination - otherwise quick adoption of 
innovations may potentially indicate vulnerability to manipulation.
13. Crime.
Crime might be assessed by taking a cross-section of crimes within project 
communities, such as;
a] misdemeanours.
b] robbery.
c] murder.
Although recording of crime is haphazard, data will hopefully be sufficient for a 
current year comparison - and some records available for comparison of past 
incidences to provide a trend for each category. These can be weighted and 
combined to provide an indicator of robustness on a scale of 0-10; Even where 
data may be weak, crime is a vivid indicator and general trends within five 
communities comprising 230 households should be discernible.
14. Landsales.
The encroachment of lowland, Visayan speaking people, onto land traditionally 
inhabited by B’laans has been a gradual process throughout this century, 
threatening B’laan culture, language and identity. Robust Tribal Councils would
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be a means of countering this trend. By comparing acreage of land sold / lost 
through debt / grabbed from B’laan to non-B’laan within the FTAA project 
leasehold [in each year - depending on data] since the Western Mining 
community development program and calculating this as a percentage of the 
total acreage within each community should provide a means to quantify sales. 
This can be converted for a 0-10 scale, ranging from 10, representing no acres 
sold, to 0, representing either a total sale or a fixed percentage of total acreage 
which would capture the total acreage sold in the community with the highest 
percentage. Depending on data, comparison of annual figures would enable a 
rate of landsale to be deduced.
15. Logging.
Sale of timber and Timber Licence Agreements in the 1960s which meant large 
scale logging, have affected the environment and exploited B’laan communities 
within the FTAA project leasehold. Some logging is illegal and logging permits 
are granted by local government, not Tribal Touncils. Nevertheless, increasingly 
assertive Councils may be a deterrent. Thus an indicator of robustness of 
Councils may be offered by measurement of their influence over logging. The 
approximate acreage logged as percentage of the total acreage of each 
community since the onset of the community development program would 
capture this influence. These can be converted to a 0-10 scale, ranging from 10, 
representing no acres cut, to 0, representing either total acreage or a fixed 
percentage of total acreage which would capture the total acreage cut in the 
community with the highest percentage. Depending on data, comparison of 
annual figures would enable a rate of logging to be deduced. Realistically, data 
will be approximate but should offer a reliable degree of comparison.
16. Principal Agreement
According to the terms of their Financial and Technical Assistance Agereement, 
Western Mining must obtain signatures to the Principal Agreement from each 
Tribal Council. Presently three Councils have so far signed. Neither 
recalcitrance nor compliance can be equated with robustness or non-robustness 
because the decision has multiple outcomes and Councils cannot know whether 
mineral development will be a positive experience. However, examination of 
the process by which councils decide to sign the agreement offers a means of 
evaluating robustness. For this, means by which Councils assert their rights and 
signs of community awareness have to be identified. A combination of which 
will potentially include;
a] the number of demands made by each Council met / incorporated into 
agreements.
b] the number of items a Council successfully demanded be removed from 
agreements.
c] the number of external sources of expertise consulted, i.e. NGOs.
d] the number of representations made to each external source of expertise.
e] the average number of monthly meetings between each Council and WMC.
f
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The results of each category of inquiry can be converted to a scale of 0-10 and 
from these, an average calculated for each Council;
17. Satisfaction.
This indicator refers to evaluation of Tribal Councils from the point of view of 
community members. Informal interviewing of community member samples in 
the manner of “Are you satisfiedV’ and gathering comments on respective 
councils. The number of ‘Positive’, ‘Satisfactory’ and ‘Negative’ opinions per 
capita. These can be assembled from views collected from 10 heads of 
household within each community, giving responses from 50 households out of a 
total o f230. Such a method would provide a best and worst case [+10 to -10] 
and a figure in between for each Council.
Index of Institutional Performance.
On the basis of these indicators, a summary Index of Institutional Performance 
may be constructed. The effect of idiosyncratic indicators would be reduced by 
combination of indicators.
Corroboration.
Another perspective on performances of Tribal Councils may come from anyone 
who deals with council members in official capacity - including organisations 
outside the communities represented by the Councils. These include;
a] Managers of banks at which Council accounts are held.
b] Businessmen who buy/ sell agricultural produce and/ or livestock.
c] Salesmen of companies which provide services to Councils.
d] Provincial government officials, i.e. the governor of South Cotabato.
e] Local government officials - i.e. the mayor of Tampakan.
f] Officers of the Office of Southern Cultural Communities.
g] Representatives of NGOs / the Demolan foundation.
h] Church leaders.
They could provide diverse commentary on the evolving institutional capacity of 
the Councils. Comparison of this with the results of methods 1-13 would 
corroborate / refute results.
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Appendix 5.
INTERVIEWS
Allen, Geoff. Accountant, Western Mining Corporation, General Santos City, 
13th May, 16th July, 1999.
Balolo, Pedro. Community Liaison Officer, Western Mining Corporation, 
Tampakan, May 19th, 1999.
Barrosso, Claudius. Mayor of Tampakan, Tampakan, 18th March, 1999.
Bolano, Sr. Susan. Justice and Peace Desk, Social Action Centre, Diocese of 
Marbel, 20th March, 1999.
Bong Mai Tribal Council, Lampitak, 5th July, 1999.
Cagape, Jun. Third Kagawad, Municipal Council, Tampakan, May 27th 1999.
Caminero, Jaime. Mayor of Kiblawan, May 9th, 1999.
Cardos, Dra. Arlene. Director, Project Smile, Tampakan, April 29th, May 23rd, 
1999.
Carreon, Vigilio. Police Commander, Tampakan, 10th June, 17th July, 1999.
Consad, Jonathan. Barangay Captain of Danlag, Danlag, June 7th, 1999.
Corpuz, Richard. Engineer, Western Mining Corporation, General Santos City, 
April 19th, July 
19th, 1999.
Dacoco, Marion. Colonel, Philippine National Police, Marbel, April 12th, 1999. 
Danlag Tribal Council, Danlag, July 26th, 1999.
De Pedro III, Hilario. Governor of South Cotabato, Marbel, 17th March 1999.
Dlanga, Jusies. Barangay Captain, Kimlawis, Kiblawan, July 3rd, 1999.
Dida, George. Security Co-ordinator, Western Mining Corporation, General 
Santos City, May 15th 1999.
Dok, Celso. Chieftain of Folu Bato, Folu Bato, June 1st 1999.
Duon, Mandari. Elderly man from Bong Mai, Tampakan, August 23rd, 1999. 
Duon, Warug. Elderly man from Bong Mai, Tampakan, August 23rd, 1999. 
Escobilio, Emerico. Mayoral Candidate, Tampakan, June 26th, 1999. 
Escobiiio, Emilio. Former Mayor of Tampakan, Tampakan, May 18th, 1999.
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Folu Bato Tribal Council, Folu Bato, July 8th, 1999.
Ford, Warren. Community Development Organiser, Association for Community 
Concern, Ecology and Social Services, Inc. [ACCESS] Basecamp, June 1996.
Gagnao, Rodolfo. Buy-and-Sell store owner, Barangay Miasong, Tupi, August, 
1999.
Gardner, Terry. President Western Mining Corporation [Philippines], General 
Santos City, 10th March, 13th May, 29th July, 1999.
Gaspar, Karl. Mindanao based author, indigenous peoples rights activist, 
political commentator, Davao, 30th April, 1999.
Gola-e, Danuan. Chieftain of Bong Mai, Lampitak, Tampakan, June 21st, 1999.
Green, Nic. Anthropologist, Western Mining Corporation, General Santos City, 
June, 1996.
Gulaya, Willy. Former Chieftain of Folu Bato Tribal Council, May 14th, 1999.
Gutierrez, Dinuatdo. Bishop of Marbel, 12th August, 1999.
Hofilena, Chay. Director, Panagtagbo, Davao, May, 1996.
Isherwood, Bernard. Control Risks Country Director, Manila, 27th August 1999.
Jackson, Professor Richard T. James Cook University Australia and consultant 
to Western Mining Corporation, Manila, 5th March 1999.
Labrador, Ronny. Police Officer, Tampakan, 14th June 1999
Lawlhan, Fernando. Headmaster, Carpenter Hill Elementary School, Marbel, 
July, 1999.
Lindo, Bobby. Management Consultant, Marbel, April 29th, 1999.
Llanos, Rogelio. Governor of Davao del Sur, Davao, April 1st, 1999.
Lutero, Cesar. Historian, General Santos City, August 22nd, 1999.
Magbanua, Claudel. Barangay Captain of Tablu, Tablu, June 21st, 1999.
Magumway, Liwahim. Chieftain of S’banken Tribal Council, Provincial Jail, 
Marbel, May 20th, 1999.
Maiid, Juanito. Bong Fulong, Salna’ong, 13th July, 1999.
Malld, Malayon. Chieftain of Salna’ong Tribal Council, Salna’ong, 13th July, 
1999.
Malid, Firing. Bong Fulong, Salna’ong, 31st July, 1999.
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McGovern, Robert, President of the Business Resource Center, General Santos 
City, 15th March 1999.
Muntz, Bob. Country Director, Community Aid Abroad, Marbel, 17th June, 10th 
August, 1999.
Musali, Amirh. Barangay Captain Datal Blao, Datal Blao, June 25th 1999.
Ogoy, Gregorio. Municipal Administrator in Marbel, Marbel, May 5th, 1999.
Octura, Professor Elipidio. Mindanao State University, Tambler Campus, 
General Santos City, 16th March 1999.
Paglas, Zaharra. Mayor of Columbio, Columbio, March 21st, 1999.
Paldumama, Pedro. National Commission for Indigenous Peoples, General 
Santos City, May 8th, 1999.
Ras, Patricio. Community Development Organiser, Association for Community 
Concern, Ecology and Social Services, Inc. [ACCESS] Datal Biao, Tampakan, 
June 1996.
Ranes, Rodrigo. Farmer in Barangay Otso, formerly a member of New Peoples 
Army, whose surrender was overseen by Local Amnesty Board in Marbel, 
Tampakan, April, 1999.
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Appendix 6.
A sample of questions presented to B’laan communities during interviews with communities and 
Tribal Council members. These served to guide open-ended interviews with B’laan communities, 
Tribal Councils, and individuals. Translations provided are as follows, V = Visayan P = Pflipino.
1. What is the size of your area [Le. Fain Bato, Danlag etc.]
V: Unsa ang kalaparon sa inyuhang katilingban?
P: Ga-ano kalawak ang inyong komunidad?
2. What is the population of your area? Is the population increasing? Or decreasing?
V: Unsa ang gidaghanon sa pumupuyo sa inyuhang teritoryo? Ang pumupuyo nagdungang?
Odiyutay?
P: Ga-ano karami ang naninirahan sa inyong teritoryo? Ang naninirahan dumadami?o kumukunti?
3. Are there any B’laan members of the Barangay Council?
V: Na-a bay B’laan nga kagawad sa Konseho sa Barangay?
P: Meron bang B’laan ng kasapi ng Konseho ng Barangay?
4. How many are B’laan? How many are Bisaya?
V: Pila ang B’laan? Pila ang Bisaya?
P: Ilan ang B’laan? Han ang Bisaya?
5. How many B’laans can speak Visayan? Many? A few? How many? None?
V: Pila ka mga B’laan ang makasulti og sinultian sa Bisaya? Daghan? Gamay ra? Pila? Wala?
P: Ilan sa mga B’laan ang nakakapagsalita ng Bisaya? Marami? Konti? Ilan? Wala?
6. How many B’laan cannot speak Visayan?
V: Pila ka mga B’laan ang dili nakasulti ug Bisaya?
P: Ilan sa mga B’laan ang hindi marunong magsalita ng Bisaya?
7. Do you know any Visayan who can speak B’laan? Many? Afew? How many? None?
V: Na-a ba moy nailhan nga mga Bisaya nga makasulti og B’laan? Daghan? Gamay ra?
Pila? Wala?
P: Meron ka bang kilala na Bisaya na magpagsalita ng salitang B’laan? Marami? Konti?
Han? Wala?
8. Can B’laans living here read? Or write? Visayan? Pilipino? English?
V: Ang mga B’laan ng hunulupyo dinhi makabasa? makasulat? Og Bisaya? Og Pilipino?
Og English?
P: Ang mga B’laan na nakatira dito ay marunong bumasa? sumulat? Ng Bisaya? Pilipino? English?
9. How many people living here have been outside of this area? To Tampakan? Marbel? 
General Santos City?
V: Pila sa mga katauhan dinhi ang makaadto sa ubang dapit? Tampakan? Marbel? General 
Santos?
P: Ilan sa mga mamayan dito ang makapunta sa ibang bayan? Tampakan? Marbel? Heneral 
Santos?
10. Does your area have a Certificate of Ancestral Domain?
V: Ang inyuhang teritory na-a bay Sertipiko sa Yutang Kabilin?
P: Ang teritoryo ba ninyo ang meron ng Sirtipeko ng Lupang Ninuno?
251
11. How often does WMC [Western Mining Corporation] visit?
V: Unsa ka masunson ang WMC mubisita dinhi?
P: Gaano kadalas ang WMC bumibisita dito?
12. How often does NCIP [National Commission for Indigenous People] visit?
V: Unsa ka masunson ang NCIP mubisita dinhi?
P: Gaano kadalas ang NCIP bumibisita dito?
13. What does WMC do with / for you?
V: Unsa ang ginabuhat sa WMC/ ug sa imuha?
P: Ano ang ginagawa ng WMC/ at sa iyo?
14. Can I read your copy of the Principal Agreement?
V: Mahimo bang mabasa nako ang kopya sa Nahaunang Kasabutan?
P: Maari ko bang mabasa ang kopya ng Pangunahing Kasulatan?
15. What outside organisations, apart from WMC and NCIP have visited you?
V: Unsang tagagawas nga organisasyon lain sa WMC ug NCIP ang nibisita sa inyuha?
P. Anong tagalahas na organisasyon maliban sa WMC at NCIP ang bumisita sa inyo?
16. Did you or anybody else in this community seek help or advice?
V: Ikaw ba o na-ay membro sa katilingban nga nangayo og hinabang ug pagpasayud?
P: Ikaw ba o sinuman sa inyong komunidad humingi ng tulong o payo?
17. How long does it take you to get to Tampakan?
V: Unsa kataas ang byahi paadto sa Tampahan?
P  Gaano kahaba ang byahi patungong Tampakan?
18. How do you travel to Tampakan?
V: Unsa ang pamaagi ninyo sa pag-adto sa Tamapahan?
P: Paano kayo naglalakbay patungong Tampakan?
19. Does your community have electricity, a meeting hall, a classroom, a store?
V: Ang inyuhang katilingban na-a bay elekrisidad? hawanan? eskwelahan? Tindahan?
P. Sa inyong komunidad meron ba kayong elektrisidad, pulungan, silid-aralan? Tindahan?
20. Are there any concrete houses in your area?
V: Na-a bay konkreto nga pamalay sa inyohang katilingban?
P  Meron bang konkreto na bahay sa inyong komunidad?
21. Do they belong to B’laans? How many?
V: Gipanagiya ba sa B’laan? Unsa ka daghan?
P: Pag-aari ba ng B’laan? Ilan?
22. Is there piped water in your community?
V: Na-a ba’y tubig sa tubo dinhi sa inyuhang katilingban?
P: Meron bang tubo ng tubig sa inyong komunidad?
23. Are there any televisions in your community?
V: Na-a ba’y telebisyon sa inyuhang katilingban?
P: Meron bang telebisyon sa inyong komunidad?
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24. Are there any other electric appliances? Are any owned by B’laans?
V: Na-a bay uban pang dikuiyenting butang? Gipanag-iya ba sa B’laan?
P: Meron pa bang ibang dikuryenting kagamitan? Pag-aari ba ng B’laan?
25. Are there any motorcydes or tracks? How many? Are any owned by B’laans?
V: Na-a bay motorsiklo o dakong sakyanan? Unsa ka daghan? Gipanag-iya ba sa B’laan?
P: Meron bang motorsiklo o malaking sasakyan? Han? Pag-aari ba ng B’laan?
26. Are there any sicknesses / diseases in your area? What kind?
V: N-a bag sakit-sakit/ balatian sa inyong katilingban? Unsang Klase?
P: Meron nang kapansanan/ sakit sa inyong komunidad? Anong Klase?
27. How many people have any money [to buy things with]?
V: Pila ka katauhan ang na-a’y sapi? [palit ug panginahanglang butang|]
P: Hang tao ang meron salapi [pambik ng pangangailanang bagay/gamit]
28. How do people get money?
V: Unsa ang pamaagi aron makakuha/madawat og sapi?
P: Ano ang pamaraan ng magkaron ng pera/salapi?
29. What kind of crops do farmers grow?
V: Unsang klase sa tanum ang gitidad sa mga mag-uuma?
P. Anong klaseng pananim ang itinatanim ng mga magsasaka?
30. What kind of business do people do? How many people do that?
V: Unsang klase sa negosyo ang ginapadagan sa katauhan? Unsa ka daghan nga katauhan 
ang nibuhat?
P: Anong klase ng kabuhayan ang pinapatakbo ng mga mamayan? Hang tao ang may negosyo?
31. Where do they sell their products?
V: Asa gibaligya ang ilang pugas?
P: Saan nila ipinagbibili ang mga produkto?
32. How long have they been doing that?
V: Unsa kataas na nilang gibuhat ang maong pamagi?
P: Gaano na katagal nilang ginagawa ito?
33. Has any land in this area been sold? When did that happen? How big was the area?
V: Na-a bay yuta dinhing dapit ang gibaligya? Kanus-a nahitabo? Unsa kalaparon sa luna?
P: Meron bang lupa dito na naipagbili? Kailan nangyari? Gaano ka kawak ang lupain?
34. How did these transactions take place? How many transactions took place?
V: Ngano ang trasakyon namugna? Unsa kadaghan ang trasakyon nga namugna?
P: Bakit nagkaron ng pagbibinta? Han ang bintahan na naganap?
35. Why did the people involved buy / sell land?
V: Ngano ang katauhan nagin kabahin sa pagbaligya ug pagpalitay sa yuta?
P. Bakit na mga mamayan ay sangkot sa bintahan at bilihan ng lupa?
36. What is the name of the Mayor? Provincial Governor?
V: Unsa ang ngalan sa Mayor? Goberaador?
P: Ano ang pangalan ng Alkalde ng Bayan? Punong-Lalawigan?
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37. Do people in this community know when die Mayor was elected? Did they vote?
V: Ang mga katauhan ba dinhi nakahibalo kanus-a ang Mayor napili? Nibuto ba sila?
P: Alam ba ng mamayan dito kailan ang Alkakde ng Bayan nahalal? Bumuto ba sila?
38. Did the Mayor ever visit your community? Is he helping you?
V: Ang mayor ba nibisita sa inyuhang katilingban? Nagatabang ba sya sa inyuha?
P: Ang Alkade ng Bayan ba ay bumibisita sa inyong komunidad? Tumululong ba siya sa inyo?
39. What is the relationship with the municipality?
V: Unsa ang inyong relasyon sa munisipyo?
P: Ano ang kaugnayan ninyo sa bayan?
40. Has there been any land-grabbing in this area? How did it happen?
V: Na-a bay nangilog ug yuta sa dinhing dapit? Ngano man nahitabo?
P: Meron bang nagyari na pag-agaw ng lupa sa lugar na ito? Paano nangyari?
41. Is there any crime in this community? What kind of crime?
V: Na-a bay krimen dinhi sa inyong katilingban? Unsang klase sa krimen?
P: Meron bang kasalanang mabigat dito sa kumunidad? Anong klasing kasalanan?
42. Has there been any incidences involving firearms? Can you tell me what happened?
V: Na-a bay panghitabo dinhi panghiapil ang pusil? Mamahimo bang isaysay unsa ang nahitabo?
P: Meron bang pangyayari sangkot sa baril? Maari mo bang isalaysay ano ang nag nagyari?
43. Are trees valuable? Are there any available?
V: Ang puno sa kahoy bilidhon ba? Na-a bay makuha?
P: Ang punongkahoy ba ay mahalaga? Meron bang makukuha?
44. Would people sell them? Has there bees any logging in this area?
V: Ang katauhan ba nibaligya og kahoy? Na-a bay dinagkong pagputol sa kahoy sa dinhing dapit ? 
P. Ang mamayan ba ay nagbibita ng kahoy? Meron bang nagtroroso dito sa inyong lugar?
45. When was the Tribal Council established?
V: Kanus-a ang Lumadnong Konseho gimugna?
P: Kailan itinatag ang Kapulungan ng nga Katutubo?
46. What are. the responsibilities of the Tribal Council?
V: Unsa ang mga katungdanan sa Lumadnong Konseho?
P: Ano ang mga pananagutan ng Kapulungan ng mga Katutubo?
47. H a s  there always been a Tribal Council?
V: Sukad-sukad na-a bay Konseho sa Lumad?
P. Simulat-sapol meron bang Kapulungan. ng mga Katutubo?
48. Did the Tribal Council exist before WMC arrived?
V: Ang lumadnong Konseyo namugna na ba bag-o ang WMC miabot?
P: Ang Kapulungan ng mga Katutubo ba ay naitayo na bago dumating ang WMC?
49. What has the Tribal Council done?
V: Unsa ang nabuhat sa Lumadnong Konseho?
P: Ano ang nagawa ng Kapulungan ng mga Katutubo?
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50. What is the difference between the Tribal Council and Foundation?
V: Unsa ang pagkalahi sa Lumadnong Konseho ug Kahugpungan?
P: Ano ang pagkakaiba ng Kapulungan ng Katutubo at Saligan?
51. Has WMC paid the Tribal Council any money? How did they pay the money?
V: Ang WMC mibayad og sapi sa Lumadnong Konseyo? Pila ang ilahang gibayad nga sapi?
P. Ang WMC ba ay magbayad sa Kapulungan ng mga Katutubong? Magkano ang ibinayad 
nasalapi?
52. What did the Tribal Council do with the money?
V: Unsa ang gibuhat sa Lumadnong Konseho sa sapi?
P: Ano ang ginawa ng Kapulugan ng mga Katutubo sa salapi?
53. Is die money in die bank? Do die Tribal Council members go to the bank?
V: Ang sapi naa ba sa bangko? Ang membro sa Lumadnong Konseho gaadto ba sa bangko?
P: Ang salapi ba ay nasa bangko? Ang membro ng Kapulungan ng Katutubo ay pumupunta 
sa bangko?
54. Does the Tribal CouncO know how much money it has?
V: Ang membro ba sa Lumadnong Konseho makamao ba pila ang ilahang sapi?
P: Ang kasapi ba ng Kapulungan ng mga Katutubo alam kung magkano ang salapi/pundo?
55. Have any people from this place received training?
V: Ang mga katauhan ba dinhi nakadawat og pagbansay?
P. Ang mga tao ba dito nakakuha/natanggap ng mga pag-aaral?
56. How many people received training? What kind of training?
V: Unsa ka daghan ang katauhan dinhi ang nakakuha og pagbansay? Unsang klase sa pagbansay 
P: Hang mamayan ang nakatangap ng mga pag-aaral? Anong klase ng pag-aaral?
57. Training in financial management? Business skills?
V: Pagbansay sa pagpadagan sa sapi? Kahanas sa negosyo?
P. Pag-aaral sa pagpatabo ng salapi? Kaalaman sa Pangangalakal?
58. When does the Tribal Council hold its meetings?
V: Kanus-a ang Lumadnong Konseyo nagahikot ug pagsabot-sabot?
P: Kailan ang Kapulungan ng mga Katutubo nagpapatawag ng pagpupulong?
59. Does every member of the Tribal Council attend the meetings? All members? Some? 
V: Ang membro ba sa Lumadnong Konseho mitambong sa pagsabot-sabot? Tanan? Pipila?
P: Ang bawat kassapi ba ng Kapulungan ng Katutuko ay dumadalo ng pagpupulong?
Lahat? Iilan?
60. Does WMC or NCIP or anybody else attend tribal Council meetings?
V: Ang WMC ug NCIP ug laing pang organisasyon mitambong sa pagsabot-sabot?
P: Ang WMC o NCIP o ibang organisasyon dumadalo ba sa Kapulungan ng Katutubong 
pagpupulong?
61. Do other members of the community attend Tribal Council meetings also?
V: Ang uban bang membro sa katilingban mitambong sa Lumadnong Konseho nga 
pagsabot-sabot?
P: Ang iba kasapi ng komunidad ay dumadalo sa Kapulungan ng Katutubong pagpupulong?
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62. Who decides when there will be a meeting of the Tribal Council?
V: Kinsa ang mohukom nga naa’y pagsabot-sabot ang Lumadnong Konseyo?
P: Sino ang nagpapasya na magkakaroon ng pagpupulong ang kapulungan ng mga katutubo?
63. Where are Tribal Conned meetings held?
V: Asa ang Lumadnong Konseho nagamugna og pasabot-sabot?
P: Saan ang Kapulungan ng mga Katutubo naggaganap ng nagpulong-pulong?
64. Can you show me where Tribal Council meetings happen? Is it always in the 
same place?
V: Mahimo bang ipasundayag asa ang pagsabot-sabot sa Lumadnong Konseho ginapahitabo?
Permamente ba jdinhang dapit?
P: Maaring bang ipakita kung saan ang pagpupulong ng Katutubong Kapulungan ginaganap? 
Palaging sa isang ar?
65. Who are the members of the Tribal Council?
V: Kinsa ang mga membro sa Lumadnong Konsenho?
P: Sino ang mga kasapi ng Kapulungan Katutubo?
66. How many members are there on the Tribal Council?
V; Pila ang membro sa Lumadnong Konseho?
P: Dan ang kasapi ng Katutubong Kapulungan?
67. Are any of them women?
V: Na-a bay baba-i?
P: Meron bang babae?
68. How are the members of the Tribal Council chosen?
V: Unsa ang pamaagi sa pagpili sa membro sa Lumadnong Konseho?
P: Paano ang pamamaraan sa pagpili ng kasapi sa Kapulungan ng mga Katutubo?
69. What are the requirements for membership of die Tribal Council?
V: Unsa ang panginahanglan aron mahimong membro sa Lumadnong Konseho?
P: Ano ang kinakailangan para maging kasapi sa Kapulungan ng mga Katutubo.
70. Is there an election for membership? How often?
V: Na-a bay botasyon sa mamahimong membro? Unsa ka masunson?
P: Meron bang pagpili sa magiging kasapi? Gaano kadalas?
71. Have the members of your Tribal Council ever changed?
V: Ang membro ba sa Lumadnong Konseho mibag-o?
P: Ang kasapi ng Katutubong Kapulungan ba ay napalitan?
72. Are members of the Tribal Council from the family of the chief /  chairman?
V: Ang membro ba sa Lumadnong Konseho gurmkan sa pamilya sa naggulo?
P: Ang kasapi ba ng Katutubong Kapulungan ay nagrrrula sa pamilya ng pangulo?
73. How many are from the family of the chieftain / chairman?
V: Pila ang nanukad sa pamilya sa nangulo?
P: Han ang nagmula sa pamilya ng pangulo?
74. Are die meetings recorded? In writing? On cassette?
V: Ang pagsabot-sabot ba natala? Nasulat? On cassette?
P: Ang pagpupulong ba ay nasa talaan? Nakasulat? Or cassette?
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75. Does your community have a Foundation? Who are your representatives?
V: Ang inyuhang katilingban na-a bay Kahugpungan? Kinsa ang mga representante?
P: Ang komunidad ba ay may kapisanan? Sino-sino ang inyong mga kinakatawan?
76. When was the Foundation established?
V: Kanus-a ang Kahugpungan natukod?
P: Kailan ang Kasapian naitatag?
77. What are the responsibilities of the Foundation?
V: Unsa ang Katungdanan/ papel sa kahugpuungan?
P: Ano ang pananagutan ng Kasapian?
78. What has the Foundation done?
V: Unsa ang nahimo sa Kahugpungan?
P: An gang nagawa ng Kasapian?
79. How many Foundation meetings have there been?
V: Unsa ka daghan na napahitabo nga pagsabot-sabot sa Kahugpungan?
P: Ilang bisis ang naganap ng pagpupulong-pulong ng Kasapian?
80. Where do Foundation meetings take place?
V: Asa ang Kahugpungan nga pagsabot-sabot gipahitabo?
P: Saan ang Kasapian ng pagpupulong-pulong ginaganap?
81. Do Foundation meetings always happen in die same place?
V: Ang Kahugpungan nga pagsabot-sabot permamente gihitabo sa usa ka dapit?
P: Ang Kasapiang pagpupulong-pulong ay palaging ginaganap sa iisang lugar?
82. Who decides when and where the Foundation meeting will be?
V: Kinsa ang mutakna kanus-a ug asa ang Kahugpungan ng pagsabot-sabot ipahitabo? 
P: Sino ang nagpapasya kailan at saan ang pagpupulong ng Kasapian gaganapin?
83. Do you know what are the regulations of the Foundations?
V: Kama-o ba mo unsa ang mga balaod sa Kahugpungan?
P: Alam ba ninyo kung ano ang mga alituntunin ng Kasapian?
84. Do all members attend the Foundation meetings?
V: Ang tanang membro mutambong sa Kahugpungan pagsabot-sabot?
P: Ang lahat bang kasapi ay dumadalo sa pagpupulong ng Kasapian?
85. Are die Foundation meetings recorded?
V: Ang mga pagsabot-sabot sa Kahugpungan natala?
P; Ang mga pagpupulong ba ng Kasapian ay nasa talaan?
86. What is more important, Tribal Council or Foundation? Why is that?
V: Unsa ang mas bilidhon Lumadnong Konseho o Kahugpungan? Ngano man?
P: Ano ang mas mahalaga, Katutubong Kapulungan o Kasapian? At bakit?
87. Which has more money Tribal Council or Foundation?
V: Kinsa ang mas daghan og sapi Lumadnong Konseho o Kahugpungan?
P: Sino ang may mas mala Id na salapi Katutubong Kapulungan o ang Kasapian?
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88. Have the Foundation representatives from your community ever changed?
V: Ang representante sa Kahugpungan mga gumikan sa katilingban nibag-o?
P: Ang kasapiang kinatawan na nagmula sa komunidad ba ay napalitan?
89. How does the Foundation handle money?
V: Unsa ang pagdumala sa Kahugpungan kabahin sa sapi?
P: Papaano ang Kasapian mangasiwa ng salapi?
90. Do B’laan Foundation members use die bank?
V: Ang membro ba sa Kahugpungan sa B’laan nigamit og bangko?
P: Ang kasapi ng Kasapian ng mga B’laan gumagamit ba ng bangko?
91. Do the representatives or Tribal Council know how much money the Foundation has?
V: Ang representate o Lumadnong Konseho nakamao pila ang sapi sa Kahugpungan?
P: Ang kinatawan o Katutubong Kapulungan may nalalaman magkano ang salapi ng Kasapian?
92. "What kinds of decision-making systems existed in the past?
V: Unsa ang matang sa paghukom nga gikinabuhi ngatong miaging panahon?
P: Anong uri ng paghahatol ang meron noong nakaraan panahon?
93. What would happen if somebody committed a crime, say stealing or violence?
V: Unsa ang mahitabo pananglitan naay nakabuhat og krimen, pananglitan pagpangawat o 
panlapas?
P Anong mangyayari sakaling may nagawang mabigat na kasalanan, halimbawa pagnanakaw o 
dahas?
94. Did this community have a Kasfala?
V: Kining katilingban naa ‘bay Kasfala?
P: Itong komunidad merong bang Kasfala?
95. Does this community still have a Kasfala?
V: Hangtud karon kining katilingban naga Kasfala?
P. Hanggang ngayon itong komunidad hag Kasfala?
96. Who takes part in the Kasfala?
V: Kinsa ang mga kabahin sa Kasfala?
P: Sino-sino ang mga bumubuo ng Kasfala?
97. When does the Kasfala take place?
V: Kanus-a ang Kasfala ginapahitabo?
P: Kailan ang Kasfala nagaganap?
98. Who are the most important B’laans?
V: Kinsa ang bilidhon ng mga B’laan?
P: Sino-sino ang mga mahalagang B’laan?
99. Why are they important?
V: Ngano sila bilidhon?
P: Bakit sila mahalaga?
100. Does anybody remember Datu Baro Imba? Who was he?
V: Na-a bay makahinumdum kay Datu Baro Imba? Kinsa sya?
P: Merong bang makakakilala kay Datu Baro Imba? Sino siya?
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